Disruption (Page 35)

When Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky met with President Joe Biden, on September 21, 2023, the topic of weapons supply was on the agenda. That same issue almost certainly came up between Russia’s Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un when the pair met earlier in September.

The fact is, with the conflict in Ukraine having now dragged on for more than a year and a half, both sides are increasingly desperate to keep the flow of arms going. And that has alarmed people like Izumi Nakamitsu, the United Nations’ high representative for disarmament affairs, who on September 12 warned of violations of international resolutions against the illegal transfer of weapons and the risk of proliferation even after the war ends.

As an expert on international security and weapons proliferation, I share these concerns. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, efforts were made to forge a global consensus on the spread of weapons.

But the war in Ukraine is contributing to a reordering of global politics that has eroded cooperation to stop the spread of weapons and dangerous technology, such as advanced missiles, drones, munitions and the components and know-how necessary to build them.

The war itself isn’t the cause of this trend. Growing competition between China and Russia on one side and the United States and its allies on the other prompted the drift away from consensus on weapons nonproliferation.

The post-9/11 consensus

Efforts to encourage global disarmament and nonproliferation date back to before World War I and can be seen in the various conventions to stop the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. But they varied in scope and effectiveness, and it is now recognized that during that time the Soviet Union clandestinely violated treaties, including the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

Global concerns over the threat from terrorism after 9/11 meant that countries looked toward nonproliferation with more urgency. With international support, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1540 in 2004, establishing a legally binding mandate for all member states to confront the illicit proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

It also created an international committee charged with providing support for member states to combat proliferation and develop strategic trade control systems.

Since then, the committee, with broad international support, has assisted states through answering specific requests regarding improving their strategic trade control systems and organizing outreach activities that help individual states address particular issue areas, such as improving their compliance with various nonproliferation regimes.

These events are often supported by numerous states, including China, the United States and Russia. The UN has also instituted multilateral sanctions regimes to address illicit proliferation and its role in conflicts, ranging from sanctions on the North Korean missile and nuclear programs to the now-paused Iran nuclear deal.

This system has seen legitimate transnational cooperation – even among rivals – and success in curbing illicit proliferation

The post-9/11 nonproliferation consensus built upon already existing multilateral export control regimes that sought to limit the spread of dangerous weapons and technology. These regimes differed from Cold War-era trade control regimes, like the pro-Western Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, or COCOM, which sought to limit the spread of weapons and technology to Warsaw Pact countries, that is, those aligned with the Soviet Union and China.

The end of the Cold War brought the creation and expansion of more inclusive nonproliferation regimes – such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, which promotes transparency and greater responsibility in the transfer of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, and the Missile Technology Control Regime, or MTCR, which seeks to limit the proliferation of missile systems and other delivery systems and technology. These followed in the footsteps of the Nuclear Suppliers Group export control regime, which initially included the Soviet Union.

Ukraine and the new nonproliferation world order

But the consensus on weapons nonproliferation has come under serious threat from increased tensions and rivalry between the United States and both China and Russia – and has come to a head over Ukraine.

Western-imposed sanctions over the invasion of Ukraine have angered Russia and China. To Moscow and Beijing, unilateral sanctions undermine international cooperation and reflect a desire by Western powers – particularly the United States – to assert their will over others.

The United States and its allies argue that sanctions are necessary to counter Russian aggression against Ukraine. They are aimed at increasing the cost for Russia to acquire military goods and technology and make their supply chains more vulnerable to disruption.

Arguments of their merit aside, sanctions have forced Russia to become creative in how it goes about acquiring goods and technology. Russia is increasingly reliant on imports from states that are themselves subject to international sanctions, such as Iran and North Korea, and moving sanctioned items, including weapons, through the Caspian Sea.

Iran has been accused of supplying drones to Moscow and developing drone production facilities and technology, while in return receiving sanction-busting goods from Russia.

Meanwhile, Russia’s increasing ties with – and violation of U.N. sanctions against – North Korea have undercut multilateral nonproliferation efforts against the isolationist Asian state.

North Korea has been able to leverage arms shipments to Russia into Moscow’s greater support for its missile and nuclear programs, as evidenced by the North Korean leader’s recent visit to the Vostochny Cosmodrome in Russia’s far east.

Within this changing geopolitical environment, UN mechanisms to prevent North Korea from building up its weapons stockpile are being eroded. Though Russia and China have voted to renew the UN’s panel of experts committee to assist the enforcement of North Korea sanctions, they also voted against strengthening the sanctions for the first time since 2006.

Western arms transfers, though important for Ukraine’s defense, likewise have consequences for nonproliferation. The US decision to send cluster munitions to Ukraine is particularly controversial. The transfer of cluster bombs could undermine efforts – and the US’s own momentum – toward banning their use, something more than 120 countries have signed on to.

The US isn’t alone among Western states in blurring the line on weapons exports. The United Kingdom and France have exported Storm Shadow land-attack cruise missiles to Ukraine – a move that likely violates the Missile Technology Control Regime’s “presumption of denial” affecting missiles with a 300-kilometer range and a 500-kilogram payload. This presumption of denial, though not legally binding, has guided MTCR member states since its creation, though not without some past tension.

The UK has stated that, given the circumstances, the transfer does not violate the MTCR and has received US support for the export. Any decision by the US to send ATACMS missiles, which Ukraine has requested and the Biden administration has seriously considered, would also greatly undercut any possible continued cooperation with Russia through the Missile Technology Control Regime, as well as China – which, although not a member, has pledged to adhere to its terms.

Arms transfers are vital to Ukraine’s defense, but Western leaders need to be prepared to address the proliferation consequences that may follow.

Nonproliferation along ideological lines

The Ukraine war has contributed to a fracturing of the global consensus on nonproliferation in a way that erodes cooperation and has seen the rise of policy driven by competing global blocs, as it was during the Cold War.

This is evident not only in the competition for weapons stemming from the Ukraine war, but also in the way that individual countries are levying controls on areas involved in the development of weapons.

Take, for example, the tit-for-tat, unilaterally applied export controls and sanctions between the US and China.

They target areas such as academia, semiconductors, foreign direct investment and battery supply chains. These previously neglected realms are all receiving increased attention because of their role as sources of knowledge and goods for emerging weapons and technology.

Still some hope of cooperation

Despite these developments, cooperation on weapons nonproliferation is still possible. Even during the height of the Cold War, there was cooperation on arms control and nonproliferation, particularly in the nuclear realm.

Similarly today, the great powers can focus on continued cooperation in areas such as unmanned aircraft, space, nuclear proliferation and deterrence.

The Ukraine war may be a harbinger of a new and more dangerous world regarding nonproliferation, but that doesn’t mean multilateral cooperation to stem the proliferation of dangerous weapons is doomed.

Nolan Fahrenkopf is Research Fellow at Project on International Security, Commerce and Economic Statecraft, University at Albany, State University of New York

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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In Ukraine, Russia now fires about 14 million shell annually. Just 2 million are produced there. On the other hand, the Ukrainians struggle to find their sources while firing about 2.5 million shell annually.

A straightforward solution to Russia’s issue is a deal between North Korea and Russia for artillery shells, which the individual officials have stated they are” constantly advancing.” However, there are risks to the world’s balance associated with this package.

Since its conquest of Ukraine, Russia has been restricted in its ability to purchase military hardware, including artillery shells. It has made calls to China, Iran, and then North Korea. China has been cordial but has officially resisted providing weapons straight to the front lines.

Robots and a few casings have been sold by Iran to Russia. The first country to make the shift to immediately provide a sizable amount of ammunition for Russian artillery is North Korea. When viewed in a broader perspective, this transaction is likely to be remembered in history as an entry point for larger conflicts.

Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin, the presidents of Russia and North Korea, are both averse to traveling abroad. Kim will meet with Putin on September 13 for the first time since the Covid pandemic in 2020.

He rode in a train that was seriously armored. Face-to-face interactions are significant symbolic events for both men because they are uncommon and because their closeness conveys respect.

Russia’s requires

Soviet ground offensives and their well-established protective lines have relied heavily on the use of artillery.

They are under more pressure to purchase from the global market as a result of the Russian army’s inability to maintain its supply of shells. In contrast, North and South Korea maintain the shell reserves on the Korean peninsula, which are still technically under ceasefire rather than over. This is a legacy of the Korea War( 1950 – 1953 ).

As a result, the US is purchasing North Vietnamese shells to ship to Ukraine, and Russia will soon receive North Korean missiles. As a result, both sides can continue to fire at the same rates as long as their local companies adapt to the demands of this conflict.

Russia is no North Korea’s healthy friend. Russia participated in global efforts to halt North Korea’s nuclear technology growth in the 1990s.

A atomic North Korea with the ability to attain the US or Europe may be weakening because, like China, Russia naturally prefers stability in its immediate neighbors. However, the foundation for this rational alliance was laid by the invasion of Ukraine and the requirement for a sizable supply of artillery ammunition.

What is Kim seeking?

In exchange for money, foods support, and cutting-edge military technology, North Korea wants to trade its weapons. The best indicator of how much Russia needs North Korean ammunition will be the amount of Russia payments in these groups.

Regardless of its want, Russia is unlikely to move anything other than upgraded missiles for North Korea’s nuclear system, but not fast weapons or miniature warheads. Russia continues to be strategically concerned about the region’s security, which is one reason why US intelligence sought to make the first rounds of talks public in an effort to discourage Russia from continuing.

The conquest of Ukraine by Russia has boosted global ties. Finland, a former natural country, has joined NATO, and Sweden has requested participation. While Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea have even gotten closer to one another, South Korea and Japan have grown much closer.

The Ukrainians may find it difficult to collaborate on spy satellites, modeling, life intelligence, and even communications hacking. The link between a small, dirty war in Eastern Europe and the historical and present unrest in Asia is extremely risky and serves as an accurate stepping stone to an even larger conflict.

Cyberwar repercussions

Both North Korea and Russia are extremely skilled cyberattacks and computer intelligence countries that have the ability to destroy or destroy important equipment and take sensitive government data. Through careful operation scanning, it has been determined that North Korea‘s Lazarus cluster of thieves is to blame for crypto incidents totaling tens of millions of dollars.

Western societies now face a serious risk from Russia’s efforts in website scams, disinformation, and disruption to critical infrastructure.

Because the adult wallets where the Lazarus Group’s stolen cryptocurrency is kept have been found, some of it is stuck. In order to move the” coins” and make a significant portion of the revenue, Russia may be an invaluable partner.

When combined with Chinese, Russian, and Egyptian skills in influencing activities, hackers, mental battle, their combined power to influence the government and values of the Euroatlantic region is significant. A closer partnership between Russia and North Korea significantly improves the online side of this issue and the ongoing hostilities on the Korean island.

One component of this deal is the provision of artillery shells. The wider risks stem from the fact that it will power the conflict in Ukraine and unite Russia, North Korea, China, and Iran.

In the end, this agreement opens the door for riskier technology exchanges and more instantly links the conflict in Eastern Europe with tensions in Asia.

Professor of Intelligence and National Security at the University of Hull, Robert M. Dover

Disclosure: Robert M. Dover has disclosed no related affiliations outside of their educational session and does not work for, read, private shares in, or obtain funding from any company or organization that may benefit from this article.

Under a Creative Commons license, this article is republished from The Conversation. read the article in its entirety.

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NEW YORK- Corporate and government officials told Asia Times that the US market would be vulnerable to harm in the event of an all-out trade war with China because it lacks the factories or experienced labor to substitute Chinese imports that support defence contractors and basic facilities.

Officials from the Biden administration are therefore unlikely to accept calls from China hawks to entirely cut off US tech to China’s semiconductor industry.

On September 14, a group of ten important House Republicans wrote to the US Commerce Department to demand that the trade restrictions put in place in October 2022 be lifted on US microprocessor technology exports to China.

According to the Republicans’ letter,” Recent & nbsp, reports that Huawei Technologies Co.( Huawei ) has developed a smartphone containing 7 nanometer( nm ) chips, capable of supporting 5G, and produced by the Chinese state-owned Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp ( SMIC ).”

The letter continued,” We are extremely troubled and perplexed about the Bureau of & nbsp, Industry and Security’s ( BIS ) inability to effectively write and enforce export control rules against violators, especially China.

The well-known chip business website Semianalysis.com declared that” US restrictions have failed.” It was referred to as Huawei’s 7 – nm chip, which is essentially incredible,” and” a better designed device than most people in the West realize, with capabilities comparable to Nvidia, Qualcomm, and the best AI processers. It stated that the device was purposefully hampered, had higher produces, and had no access to cutting-edge US intellectual property.

According to the website, China’s progress may be halted by nothing less than a total export ban on all types of silicon products. Half methods won’t work, but a full-scale attack may make it so that internally replicating the silicon supply chain is nearly impossible. It is obvious that the west is also halt China’s fall if decisive action is taken, even though we aren’t specifically supporting any of these,” it wrote.

Unless China completely stops producing semiconductors, the US cannot prevent China from producing high-end chips like the fresh Kirin 9000 computer. With serious monetary repercussions, that may result in a significant disturbance of not only the semiconductor industry but also of dozens of other industries that depend on it.

The likelihood that the US would be able to recruit allies like Japan, South Korea, and the Netherlands is far from certain. In response to Asian needs to keep their current chip factories in China open, the Biden administration complied.

The top chip-making lithography manufacturer in Holland, ASML, won’t sell China its most cutting-edge machinery, but it will keep selling the Deep Ultraviolet ( DUV ) devices that SMIC used to create the new Huawei chip.

The US is not the only nation that you start an economic war with China, even if it could convince other nations to completely ban the country’s chip-making machinery. The destructive effect on the global economy would be unfathomable, and one potential outcome would result in the paralysis of US critical infrastructure.

A potential restrictions on Chinese government officials using Apple smartphones has been the subject of public discussion regarding potential Chinese retaliation against more US export restrictions. However, the thousands of crucial components used in vital system and the US defense industry are evidence of American vulnerability.

For the purpose of producing and dispensing power in 2022, the US imported$ 33 billion in money goods from China. These goods are no longer produced in the United States.

According to professional officials, substituting domestic manufacturing for these goods would result in lengthy lead times and costly costs. A Chinese restrictions on essential parts could lame simple US infrastructure in the event of a full-scale trade war.

Vital infrastructure’s supply chains are acutely and self-inflictedly vulnerable. In fact, almost every component of the technology-based online bright grid is dependent on Chinese-made components, according to Brian Sheahan, a former major US energy regulation official, who wrote in April.” The US and its allies have allowed themselves to become captive to Chinese cartels that control production of electronic components.

Chinese defence companies are also heavily reliant on the US. Raytheon CEO Greg Hayes stated in an interview with the Financial Times on June 19 that his business had” a number of thousand suppliers in China and decoupling is unachievable.” ” Adding that he believed this to be the scenario for everyone” in US manufacturing, we may de-risk but not detach.

Consider the$ 500 billion in trade that comes from China to the US each year, Hayes continued. China is where more than 95 % of rare earth materials or metal are produced or processed. There isn’t any other choice. It would take us a very long time to re-establish that capability, either internally or in other helpful countries, if we had to leave China.

Raytheon manufactures the Javelin anti-tank missiles, Maverick air-to-surface projectiles and Tomahawk cruise rockets as well as other staples of the British army.

However, American efforts to lessen reliance on foreign supply chains for essential products have failed. The major chip manufacturer in Taiwan, TSMC, accepted$ 15 billion in cash incentives and tax credits from the Biden administration to construct a facility in Arizona, but the plant won’t be operational until 2025 due to labor shortages.

US attempts to remove Chinese components in critical facilities may be hampered by the same bottlenecks. Over the next two years, the US faces an air sack in the supply of qualified labor.

The reality is that by the end of 2025, 22 % of skilled manufacturing workers will be retiring. According to the consulting company HBK, this could lead to between 2 million and 3.5 million unfilled manufacturing employment by 2025.

According to calculations from the Federal Reserve, America’s capital investment of manufacturing technology has remained constant since 2000.

US manufacturing equipment orders have remained steady at between$ 1.5 billion and$ 2.2 billion per month, which is roughly half the level prior to the 2008 recession.

America’s trade imbalance increased as the expansion rate of production capital investment fell.

While the US also relies on China for a significant amount of capital goods sources, it is correct that China continues to rely on the West for an array of chip-making products. Both are capable of seriously hurting one another.

The issue is whether they will or not. Officials in the johnson management are wary of escalating the tech war with China to the point where China will retaliate because they are acutely aware of American weaknesses.

Even with a full mobilization, it may take the US many years to develop enough accommodating manufacturing capacity to replace essential Chinese parts.

Follow David P. Goldman at @ davidpgoldman on X, formerly Twitter.

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