Cheaper outpatient costs mulled

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PUBLISHED: 26 Sep 2024 at 04: 00

Somsak Thepsutin, the minister of public wellbeing, has suggested lowering the cost of outpatient hospital care, claiming that if implemented, it would help produce a level playing field through more equitable distribution of funds.

Mr. Somsak claimed that he has assigned the National Health Security Office ( NHSO ), which is in charge of the Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS), also known as the 30-baht healthcare scheme, to carry out a feasibility study of the idea.

As health professionals have expressed concern that hospitals have insufficient budgets to pay for the UCS, which causes them to become debts, Mr. Somsak brought up the idea.

He asserted that this would lead to more equitable treatment of patients at hospitals and clinics.

He continued, claiming that the commission’s committee on national health security had just informed him that hospitals get 1,500 baht for each inpatient visit while the UCS paid 500 ringgit for each outpatient visit.

Given that both clinics and hospitals offer outpatients the same health care, Mr. Somsak questioned the existing structure.

” We’re aware of the issue, but we want to make sure clinics receive medical care in a good environment.” We’re looking into the possibility of lowering hospital outpatient health costs.

” We are trying to accomplish the best we can to minimize any health costs as much as possible,” he added.

Recently, the NHSO came under the fire after it decided to reduce the in-patient charge to 7, 000 ringgit per visit.

Since more than 130 billion baht are allocated annually for treating people with NCDs, Mr. Somsak claimed that non-communicable diseases (NCDs ) are now a threat to the government’s finances.

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Finland zoo returns pandas to China early due to cost

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Two giant panda will be returned to China eight years earlier by a park in Finland because it can no longer afford to care for them.

After the two nations signed an agreement to protect the animals, Lumi and Pyry were brought to Finland in 2018.

They were supposed to stay for 15 years in the Northern nation, but they will be sent home in November. The Kohtäri Zoo attributes the panda’s eviction to inflation and loan linked to the Covid pandemic.

It said it had spent €1.5m ( £1.2m ) a year on the pandas upkeep, as well as more than €8m on their enclosure.

That yearly cost included a survival charge to China, the park’s chairman said.

Another factor in the decision to return the penguins was the Scandinavian government’s rejection of state revenue requests next year.

Although it was anticipated that the animals would attract visitors, the park revealed last year that it was considering their profit.

Before returning to China, Lumi and Pyry will soon be subject to a month-long isolation.

The return of the pandas was a firm decision, according to a spokesman for Finland’s foreign ministry, and it should not have an impact on bilateral relations between China and Finland.

Finland’s Chinese ambassador, however, told the Reuters reports agency that while efforts had been made to try and aid the zoo, a join decision was finally made to give the animals again.

China sends pandas to foreign zoos to strengthen its trading ties, relationships and image abroad – termed ‘panda diplomacy’.

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Unwielded sword: Taiwan’s indigenous diplomacy in the Pacific – Asia Times

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This article first appeared on Pacific Forum, and it has since been republished with your type agreement. Read the original below.

In the tumultuous geopolitical pot that is the Indo-Pacific, Taiwan finds itself locked in a battle for identification, its every diplomatic maneuver shadowed by Beijing’s light. However, amid this battle lies an unnoticed instrument of impact: the&nbsp, indigenous communities of Taiwan.

Here, there is a case for asserting Taiwan’s indigenous diplomacy, a strategy that would give Taiwan’s Pacific diplomacy new life and provide a counterweight to China’s drumbeat of investment and infrastructure. No for financial posturing nor violent bluster.

Taiwan’s indigenous cultures, from the&nbsp, Amis&nbsp, to the&nbsp, Atayal&nbsp, and&nbsp, Paiwan, include a mural of nations, histories, and customs stretching back into antiquity. For instance, the&nbsp, Amis Harvest Festival—a important cultural event—symbolizes the group’s strong link to their property and traditions, which could relate with other indigenous populations across the Pacific.

Also, the&nbsp, Atayal women’s weaving traditions&nbsp, function as an emblem of cultural survival in the face of modernization—skills resonating greatly with other indigenous populations striving to keep their heritage.

Unseen possibility of indigenous soft energy

These communities are now poised to become Taiwan’s most improbable ambassadors after surviving colonization and the homogenizing hands of civilization. Unlike China’s Han-centric historical monolithism, Taiwan’s indigenous individuals exemplify variety, endurance, and a dedication to preserve what others would remove.

Taiwan has made significant strides in empowering its indigenous groups, demonstrating a responsibility that can be immediately reflected in its politics. For instance, the&nbsp, Council of Indigenous Peoples&nbsp, ( CIP ) was established in 1996 to advocate for indigenous rights, preserving their languages, culture, and traditions.

Also, the&nbsp, inclusion of aboriginal representatives&nbsp, in the Congressional Yuan, and the 2005&nbsp, Indigenous Peoples Basic Law&nbsp, provide proper mechanisms to ensure that aboriginal voices are heard, not just internally but on worldwide stages.

Aboriginal soft power is a tale of endurance, life, and self-assertion that sounds across the Pacific and Southeast Asia, where aboriginal cultures, too, have been trampled by history’s heavy shoe.

China may bring roads, railways, and bridges, but it cannot build identity. In the ideological chessboard of the Pacific, Taiwan’s indigenous diplomacy is a counterweight to China’s infrastructural blandishments, appealing to hearts rather than wallets.

Taiwan is a living parody of China’s cultural homogenization, praising plurality over conformity and the few’s rights over the many’s oppression.

Building bridges, not barges

For Taiwan, the Pacific Islands—with their significant indigenous populations—create ideal conditions for a renewed form of diplomatic interaction. Nations like Palau and the Marshall Islands, which already recognize Taiwan diplomatically, are ripe for a meaningful, culturally infused diplomacy.

For instance, &nbsp, Palau’s traditional knowledge systems, grounded in environmental sustainability, align perfectly with Taiwan’s indigenous wisdom about conservation. Taiwan’s indigenous peoples have centuries-old knowledge of sustainable practices, such as the&nbsp, traditional Amis agricultural system, which has long emphasized balance with the environment. This knowledge is germane to Pacific Island nations&nbsp, grappling with climate change&nbsp, and rising sea levels.

Imagine, if you will, the impact of Taiwan’s indigenous environmental wisdom on island nations confronting similar ecological challenges. The&nbsp, Indigenous Television Channel, which promotes indigenous languages and culture, has been a major supporter of cultural and language revitalization initiatives in Taiwan that aim to preserve this indigenous wisdom.

Programs like these highlight Taiwan’s indigenous diplomacy as a powerful tool for forming cultural and environmental alliances with Pacific Islanders.

While Beijing pours its resources into grand infrastructure projects, Taiwan can present something more rewarding: knowledge, solidarity, and a sustainable future embedded in indigenous understanding.

Fostering indigenous exchanges—in art, language and traditional practices— Taiwan can cultivate bonds transcending geopolitics. For instance, cultural exchange programs such as between&nbsp, Taiwan and Palau, focusing on traditional crafts, dance, and language, offer a personal and profound connection. Cultural exchanges, unlike China’s transactional diplomacy, breed a loyalty that cannot be bought.

As I have argued&nbsp, regarding UK-Taiwan educational diplomacy, such soft power initiatives go beyond state-to-state relations and foster enduring partnerships through shared cultural heritage and academic collaboration. No amount of checkbook diplomacy can replace Taiwan’s indigenous diplomacy once it has gained popularity among Pacific Islanders.

Cultural resonance as a weapon

China’s ambitions in the Pacific, framed as economic outreach, are transparent to anyone willing to look. Investments and infrastructure projects, as grand as they may appear, frequently leave a bitter aftertaste—debt-laden populations and cultural erasure.

Herein lies Taiwan’s opportunity: China’s inability to resonate culturally. Taiwan’s indigenous diplomacy provides a model of cooperation built on mutual respect, shared heritage, and cultural preservation. Taiwan’s advocacy for indigenous rights, solidified through domestic policies and Taiwan’s participation in forums like the&nbsp, United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, aligns it with global movements for indigenous recognition.

For example, Icyang Parod, the incumbent&nbsp, minister of the CIP, has been an outspoken advocate for indigenous issues internationally, showing that Taiwan is not just protecting these rights at home but exporting such values to the world.

Indigenous empowerment is a cause China is ill-positioned to counter, given the treatment of its&nbsp, own ethnic minorities&nbsp, such as the Uyghurs and Tibetans. Indigenous diplomacy, for Taiwan, delivers not purely trade and aid, but dignity and recognition.

A blueprint for action

Without strategy, Taiwan must turn this latent soft power into diplomatic clout, because all the potential in the world amounts to little. To do so, it must act decisively.

First, indigenous-led diplomatic missions should be dispatched to Pacific and Southeast Asian nations, prioritizing cultural diplomacy and environmental knowledge-sharing. Taiwan must put indigenous diplomacy at the center of its international strategy, moving it from a cultural gesture to a fundamental component.

Second, government-sponsored educational and cultural exchange programs must be launched, enabling Taiwan’s indigenous communities to connect with their overseas counterparts. The&nbsp, Taiwan Indigenous Education and Cultural Exchange Initiative&nbsp, has begun laying this groundwork, but these efforts need to be expanded to create sustainable connections.

Taiwan’s indigenous peoples, with their centuries-old wisdom, can offer much in areas like conservation and sustainable development, both of which resonate strongly in the Pacific Islands.

Third, Taiwan must make an assertive statement in international forums about indigenous rights, establishing itself as a global champion and trailblazer for these issues. Taiwan’s participation in forums like the&nbsp, World Conference on Indigenous Peoples&nbsp, will undeniably bolster its soft power, differentiating itself from China’s rigid authoritarian approach.

Of course, such a strategy is not without its pitfalls. The political sensibilities that surround Taiwan’s indigenous communities must be handled with caution because they are not monolithic. Anything less than that runs the risk of patronizing the very communities Taiwan aspires to elevate must be conducted by indigenous voices.

And then, inevitably, comes China. The red dragon will not take kindly to Taiwan’s foray into indigenous diplomacy, likely viewing it as a direct affront to its “one China” mantra. Yet, with the right framing—cultural exchange, not political provocation— Taiwan can weather this storm and come out stronger.

New frontier in Taiwan’s diplomacy

Taiwan’s indigenous diplomacy is a sharpened sword waiting to be wielded. It gives the island a rare opportunity to redefine its standing on a global scale, setting it apart from China’s crass, transactional dominance, through economic coercion.

Indigenous diplomacy has the power to shift the Pacific’s axis of influence by being used with precision and crafting alliances that are rooted in connections of shared heritage and genuine mutual respect. In doing so, Taiwan can rewrite the region’s balance of power.

Taiwan must fully embrace this tactic in order to allow its indigenous peoples to lead a diplomatic revolution. Taiwan needs to speak boldly to both governments and people.

Taiwan’s indigenous diplomacy is a breath of fresh air in a world that is suffocated by the brute force of economic might. It reminds one that cultural bonds are more lasting than any contract ever signed ink.

Mitchell Gallagher ( hj0003@wayne .edu ) is a PhD candidate at Wayne State University, focusing on international relations, Taiwan studies, and the geopolitical dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region. His research examines cultural diplomacy and soft power tactics.

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Cambodia’s Mu Sochua cries out against China – Asia Times

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In an exclusive interview with Asia Times, important exiled opposition lawmaker Mu Sochua said that without a real democracy and a functioning anti-graft program, Cambodia is destined for high debt, utilized lands, utilized lands, and depleted natural resources.

Mu Sochua, president of the Khmer Movement For Democracy&nbsp, ( KMD), a United States-based activist group, was vice president of the nation’s largest opposition party, the Cambodian National Rescue Party ( CNRP ), when the Supreme Court banned and dissolved it in October 2017.

After CNRP leaders Kem Sokha was arrested on crime charges, including unsubstantiated claims that he was working with the United States, the group has consistently maintained that these allegations were false, she and another CNRP members fled the country.

Mu Sochua continues to challenge the democratic legitimacy of the currently dominant Cambodian People’s Party ( CPP)-dominated political order, which was established through recent stage-managed elections, which the CNRP claims were neither fair nor free.

In particular, she says the West should review the application of the Paris Peace Agreements, signed in October 1993, to maintain Cambodia’s independence, self-determination through free and fair elections, and human right after years of painful legal war fueled by competing fantastic and regional power. &nbsp,

That freedom, Mu Suchua asserts, is under rising risk from China’s growing power and influence over the decision CPP.

She noted that China’s influence has grown rapidly in recent years, as evidenced by the expansion of China’s military, cybercrime, and human trafficking operations led by the Chinese mafia, the availability of loans through the Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI), and the influx of Chinese mining and construction companies. &nbsp,

As relationships with the West deteriorated on issues relating to democracy and human rights, former prime minister Hun Sen gave priority to China relations toward the end of his decades-long law. And there is no indication of a change in the royal dispatch to his brother Hun Manet, who became prime secretary in 2023.

” Cambodia is in arrears about US$ 11 billion, 40 % of which is owed to China”, she said. When we discuss the BRI, the income is not provided to us for free. It’s a loan and it has no conditions on rule of law, democracy, independent media and independent judiciary in Cambodia” .&nbsp,

” It is also a loan to force the plan of Chinese President Xi Jinping to get dominance, not just in a state or a place, but worldwide dominance”.

She said, under the Public model, Beijing offers loans to assist Cambodia develop its infrastructure, including airports, roads, dams and a new corporate canal. In return, Mu Sochua claims, China is allowed to boost its military presence in the country. &nbsp,

” It is a secret agreement made by Hun Sen and China. It is not transparent at all”, she said. Cambodia is intended to serve as a proxy power to China’s ability to influence ASEAN, the European Union, and the UN.

She asserts that with heavy debts owed to Beijing and China’s growing military presence in the country, Cambodia’s sovereignty is at stake. &nbsp,

” Our country is in debt, our people are in debt”, she said. ” Hun Sen is removing Cambodia from the West,” he said. We do n’t want to be with the West, either. We want our country to be a part of the world where people are governed by law and the people rule our country. We want the people to freely and fairly elect our leaders. We want to prioritize both human rights and freedoms.

An impoverished rural village in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. China’s wealth has not done much to help ordinary Cambodians escape poverty. Photo: Jeff Pao / Asia Times

On August 5, Xinhua reported that Cambodia began to build the US$ 1.7 billion Funan Techo Canal, designed to link the nation’s capital, Phnom Penh, to its coast.

The 180-kilometer-long canal, which was funded by China, will reduce Cambodia’s current dependence on Vietnamese ports for trade and give it access to the Gulf of Thailand.

However, the US, Vietnam and others are &nbsp, worried&nbsp, that the canal, as well as the newly expanded&nbsp, Ream Naval Base, will ultimately be co-opted by China’s military, giving Beijing a strategic southern flank in the South China Sea and pressure points on mainland Southeast Asia. &nbsp, &nbsp,

Mu Sochua said Cambodia’s strategic geography could reinforce China’s position in any invasion of Taiwan. She claimed that Cambodia would have a democratic government with the authority to overthrow the Chinese military presence, thereby preventing a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

Foreign troops cannot be deployed on Cambodian soil under the law. Hun Sen has consistently refuted claims that his previous administration had entered any” secret” agreements that would permit China to establish a permanent military presence in the nation.

Chinese mafia hub

Hun Sen was willing to look the other way, however, as Chinese crime groups established operations in the country, often under the guise of casinos.

In a report published in August 2023, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights ( OHCHR ) estimated that there are at least 100, 000 and 120, 000 people forcibly involved in online scam centers in Cambodia and Myanmar, respectively. &nbsp,

It said victims are mostly men who are “well-educated, sometimes coming from professional jobs or with graduate or even post-graduate degrees, computer-literate and multilingual”.

According to OHCHR’s report, they were lured by phony online jobs for high-tech jobs before being illegally trafficked into scam areas where they are held by armed gangs in prison-like conditions and forced to conduct online scams. &nbsp,

In a report released in May 2024, the independent US Institute of Peace ( USIP), which was established by the US Congress in 1984, stated that Southeast Asia’s China-origin criminal networks and their online scamming operations are putting more pressure on human security globally and pose a growing threat to the US and its allies and partners around the world. &nbsp,

In a slew of elite-protected criminality spread across Cambodia, it claimed that casinos and hotels that were left vacant by the Covid pandemic’s suppression of tourism have been fortified and repurposed for online scamming. &nbsp,

The report said the return on cyber scamming in Cambodia is estimated to exceed US$ 12.5 billion annually, which was about 39 % of the country’s gross domestic product ( US$ 31.77 billion ) in 2023.

According to Mu Suchua, Chinese criminal organizations are now using Cambodia as a hub for cybercrimes, and that billions of dollars made by online con artists from Cambodia are going straight into the pockets of local tycoons under the protection of Hun Sen.

She continued,” What the international community needs to do right now is coordinate its efforts to push for targeted sanctions against the high-ranking officials in Hun Sen’s regime who are engaged in cybercrimes,” making an apparent reference to Hun Manet’s successor regime.

Deep-rooted corruption&nbsp,

The non-governmental organization Transparency International released its annual Corruption Perceptions Index ( CPI ) in January of this year, which ranks 180 nations on a scale of zero ( highly corrupt ) to 100 ( very clean ). Cambodia scored 22 while ranking 158th among 180 surveyed countries.

” Cambodia is ruled by one man, one family. Look at the amount of money they possess. A watch costs$ 3 million and Hun Sen has five of those”, Mu Suchua claimed. ” All this ill-gotten wealth is coming from cybercrimes, the extraction of natural resources and the deforestation of Cambodia” .&nbsp,

” And why are the people in Cambodia and China now in such great debt to the micro-finance institutions”? she said. In Thailand, there are two million unskilled Cambodian workers. Why did they leave Cambodia? Because of their lack of education and land,

There are about 50, 970 Cambodian migrant workers in South Korea, 22, 262 in Malaysia and 20, 056 in Japan, the Ministry of Labour and Vocational Training in Cambodia said earlier this year.

A woman working at a money exchange shows 500 Cambodian riel notes to photographer in central Phnom Penh March 12, 2011. The much delayed stock exchange regulator Securities and Exchange Commission of Cambodia (SECC) said that all prices of securities will be quoted in local currency riel. Cambodia is highly dollarized and that many foreign investors want to see US dollars quoted in the upcoming bourse. REUTERS/Samrang Pring (CAMBODIA - Tags: POLITICS) - RTR2JSDU
According to Mu Suchua, corruption is deeply ingrained in Cambodian society as a result of the CPP. Image: Asia Times Files / Agencies

More than 2.2 million hectares of land in Cambodia, according to the Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights ( Licadho ), are controlled by economic land concessions ( ELCs ), a program that has resulted in numerous land disputes and environmental issues since 2022. &nbsp,

Concerning Mu Suchua’s accusations and criticizing, Asia Times reached the Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, and the Chinese Embassy in Cambodia, but they did not receive any responses. &nbsp,

KMD on a mission

Mu Suchua’s KMD was registered in the US state of Massachusetts in December and set foot in California in March 2024. Its main goal is to bring together Cambodian citizens by adhering to the terms of the Paris Peace Agreements of 1991.

” We want to create a platform where everyone who lives outside of Cambodia and is inside of it can come together to advance democracy, rule of law, and human rights,” she said. &nbsp,

She claimed that the KMD can communicate with local partners and users in Cambodia despite the country’s ban on social media. &nbsp,

Mu Sochua stated that the KMD will continue to lobby Western governments, chambers of commerce, and industry organizations to raise awareness of Cambodia’s deeply ingrained forced labor, political activist persecution, and general lack of democracy, rights, and freedoms. &nbsp, &nbsp,

Read: Chinese campaign blames US for Dhaka regime change

Follow Jeff Pao on X: &nbsp, @jeffpao3

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What Sri Lanka’s Marxist-leaning leader means for the economy – Asia Times

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On September 22, 2024, Sri Lankans voted for a new course in their government, naming a communist activist as its leader.

Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s rise is a departure from the traditional parties and politicians who are to blame for the country’s 2022 economic decline.

Dissanayake referred to the success as a “fresh start” for Sri Lanka, but he will still need to handle the financial baggage that his predecessors left behind and the effects of the painful poverty demands for an International Monetary Fund mortgage.

The Conversation spoke with Vidhura S. Tennekoon, an Indiana University economist with an emphasis on Sri Lanka’s market, to describe the challenge facing the new president and how Dissanayake will approach it.

What do we hear about Sri Lanka’s fresh president?

Anura Kumara Dissanayake leads both the National People’s Power empire, or NPP, and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, or JVP. Rooted in Communist philosophy, the JVP was founded in the 1960s with the aim of seizing electricity through a socialist revolution.

The party then shifted to democratic elections and has been so for more than three decades following two unsuccessful armed rebellion in 1971 and 1987-89, which led to the deaths of tens of thousands of lives.

Prior to this election, the JVP remained a small third party in Sri Lanka’s social landscape, while the majority of energy moved between relationships led by the United National Party and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, or their ilk.

In 2019, under Dissanayake’s command, the NPP was formed as a communist alliance with several other businesses. While the JVP continues to adhere to Communist rules, the NPP adopted a center-left, social democratic system – aiming to get broader public assistance.

Despite these attempts, Dissanayake garnered only 3 % of the voting in the 2019 national poll.

However, during the 2022 financial problems, the political scenery drastically changed. Some Sri Lankans, frustrated with the two traditional functions that had governed the country for over seven years, turned to the NPP, seeing it as a reliable alternative.

The group’s anti-corruption approach, in particular, resonated strongly because some people blamed political problem for the economic decline.

It helped provide 42 % of the ballot to Dissanayake.

Although it is a major accomplishment, it also marks a historic milestone for Sri Lanka because candidates from the two standard parties received the majority of the vote, and Dissanayake is the first leader to get elected without bulk support.

His main concern will be obtaining a legislative majority in the upcoming elections, which is a necessary stage for his leadership to properly manage.

What kind of business is Dissanayake obtaining?

Sri Lanka experienced the worst economic crises in its background two and a half years earlier. The nation struggled to pay its bills as foreign reserves almost ran out, leading to a significant shortage of important goods.

Standard blackouts became a part of daily life, as well as longer lines for cooking oil and gas. The Sri Lankan rupee dropped to a record low, causing 70 % prices. The nation’s first default on its foreign sovereign bonds was the country’s economy, which was contracting.

In response to this, a significant opposition action was born, which led to the resignation of Gotabaya Rajapaksa. In July 2022, Parliament appointed Ranil Wickremesinghe to finish the remaining of Rajapaksa’s name.

A group of people hold aloft a flag and a giant image of a face.
On May 28, 2022, protests against the former president’s standard property Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Photo: Tharaka Basnayaka / NurPhoto via Getty Images/ The Talk

In the two years that followed, Sri Lanka’s market made an unexpectedly fast healing under Wickremesinghe’s management. After securing an arrangement with the International Monetary Fund, the money stabilized, the central bank rebuilt foreign resources, and inflation fell to single figures. The business had grown by 5 % by the first half of 2024.

The government effectively restructured its private loan, followed by a reform of its diplomatic debt – that is, government-to-government money, mainly from China but also from India and Western counties, including the United States. An agreement was reached with foreign borrowers just days before the election to rebuild the remaining royal loan.

Despite these accomplishments, Sajith Premadasa and Dissanayake, the opposition chief, and Wickremesinghe won the election for president. Wickremesinghe’s unpopularity was generally a result of the harsh austerity measures put in place as part of the IMF-backed stabilization program.

Dissanayake then inherits an sector that, while more secure, remains vulnerable. Yet as voters anticipate him to fulfill common demands, he will have limited room to run away from the carefully planned financial course that his predecessor had charted.

How does Dissanayake plan to improve Sri Lanka’s sector?

Dissanayake will probably pursue policies that reflect the political parties’ social decisions rather than his own opinions as a leader of the Marxist party. He emphasizes the importance of “economic democracy,” and advocates for an economic system where actions are coordinated through a central government program.

His group believes that the overall quality of life should be taken into account when determining growth rather than just economic growth. They argue that people need more than just simple needs — they require safe housing, food, health care, training, access to technology and enjoyment.

Dissanayake’s long-term perspective is to convert Sri Lanka into a production-based market, focusing on industries like manufacturing, crops and data systems rather than services industries.

To reduce the need for imports, one of the important guidelines is to encourage local production of all worthwhile food products. To help these actions, the NPP plans to establish a growth bank. Moreover, they NPP proposes increasing state spending on education and health care, in line with Sri Lanka’s history of providing free, widespread exposure to both.

Where do IMF funding end now?

Generally, Dissanayake’s group has been critical of the IMF and its legislation tips. Given the seriousness of Sri Lanka’s economic problems, Dissanayake has acknowledged the need to remain a part of the IMF programme for the time being. But he has vowed to restructure with the IMF to make the plan more “people-friendly”.

The personal income tax deduction level should be doubled to the current level in accordance with Dissanayake’s recommendations, as well as eliminating taxes on vital goods. In addition, Dissanayake’s group intends to add jobs to the public business despite the ongoing efforts to reduce the authorities workforce to manage the deficit.

Dissanayake’s populist policies, aimed at attracting large support during the promotion, will eventually burden government revenues while increasing expenses. To ensure debt sustainability, Sri Lanka must maintain a primary budget surplus of at least 2.3 % of GDP.

Dissanayake has pledged to stay within this target while maintaining the nation’s economic stability. His plan is to increase the effectiveness of tax collection, which he believes will bring in enough money to pay for his policies.

Additionally, his party has criticized the deal struck by Wickremesinghe’s government with international lenders, calling it unfavorable to the country. Dissanayake has promised to look for more advantageous terms. Since these agreements are already in place, it is still unclear whether the new government will attempt to renegotiate them.

Vidhura S Tennekoon is assistant professor of Economics, Indiana University

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Xi’s property fix has a local government problem – Asia Times

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Local government leaders who appear to have failed to understand the importance of reviving China’s home problems are putting an unforeseen stop to Xi Jinping’s most daring attempt to do so.

The efforts that were announced four months ago had headlines surrounding the 300 billion yuan ( US$ 42.5 billion ) of central bank cash being used to buy up unsold homes. However, the true force of the plan was to encourage local authorities to increase the amount of housing available nationwide.

So far, though, fewer than 30 coast towns out of the more than 200 Beijing hoped to incentivize had heeded the telephone. This raises a enticing question: Are municipal leaders being criminal, or is their silence because they see a bigger portrait that Xi’s group is missing?

It might be the former, however. Local government officials who defy Beijing do n’t typically achieve high status in Communist Party circles. In contrast, provincial functionaries are more likely to succeed by producing economic growth rates and development indicators that are above the national average.

However, it’s likely that local authorities in the world’s funds, who are dealing with aging laborers, are more aware of their balance sheets than Premier Li Qiang or Finance Minister Lan Foan’s workers.

And this Beijing-ordered housing boom may be a result of the nation’s already depressed local government financing vehicle ( LGFV ) debt burden.

More than half of China’s property problems may pull on another two to five years, according to a Bloomberg study of 15 China analysts. If so, China’s negative forces had become much more entrenched.

And depreciation becomes even more difficult to eradicate over time as Japan continues to demonstrate this.

Team Xi rejected an International Monetary Fund proposal next month to launch massive waves of northern federal funding to finish empty housing projects in Asia’s largest business. A governmental collapse of almost US$ 1 trillion is suggested by the IMF.

The 300 billion yuan save deal, which Beijing unveiled in May, is far below the 1 trillion to 5 trillion yuan that some leading economists believe is required to solve the house problems.

The IMF, however, has taken pains to inform Beijing against creating any “expectation of potential state bail-out and so social hazards”, as Zhang Zhengxin, the IMF’s executive producer for China, puts it. Xi’s group, Zhang says,” may continue to apply market-based and rule-of-law rules in completing and delivering these products”.

Michelle Lam of Societe Generale SA uses the word” somewhat disappointing” when she refers to the IMF’s individual caution around. China’s financial jazz may last for as long as Beijing drags its foot on aiming enough financial power at the house industry.

China’s central bank made a number of new policy announcements to boost the economy on Tuesday ( September 24 ). Women’s Bank of China Governor&nbsp, Pan Gongsheng&nbsp, precise methods to reduce to its essential short-term interest rates, improve bank lending to companies and consumers, and lower mortgage rates for existing housing loans.

Pan speculated that there might be a further reduction in reserve requirement ratios of between 0.25 and 0.5 %. Nevertheless, though,” the rhinoceros in the room is the home business”, says Xu Gao, chief analyst at Bank of China International. He continues,” The current plan to maintain the property business is clearly not enough.”

Count Xu among those who believe a 3 trillion yuan investment may be required to stabilize the real estate industry.

Former PBOC Governor Yi Gang made headlines earlier this month when he claimed Beijing officials” should focus on fighting the negative pressure” through “proactive governmental policy and flexible financial plan.”

The PBOC’s concern now appeared to be being addressed, problems that were validated last week by its decision to remain neutral as the Federal Reserve cut US interest costs by 50 basis points.

In certain ways, Beijing’s reluctance to put stimulus in the short-run has had a magic coating. In light of industry conflicts with the US and Europe, according to economist Gabriel Wildau at consulting firm Teneo, Xi and Li are placing a higher priority on raising China’s competitive sport in technology and production.

However, current information on fixed property investments, industrial output, and retail selling suggested Beijing’s 5 % economic growth goal for this time is becoming more and more of a long-shot. This may have propelled the PBOC to take action.

At a business forum in Beijing last week, Zhu Guangyao, a former vice minister of finance, said that in the” short term, we must really focus to be sure to successfully achieve this year’s 2024 growth goals“. He added that” we still have confidence to reach” this year’s 5 %.

As such,” there’s a good chance that the People’s Bank of China will lower rates and banks to lower]benchmark rates ] soon”, write analysts at Commerzbank. The Fed rate cuts allow room for PBOC to reduce, and lackluster growth necessitates monetary policy easing.

The chance of a vicious economic cycle rises without more incisive policy decisions. In particular, the plunge in land sales that’s currently decimating local governments ‘ budgets could gain momentum. That would make it even more difficult for municipalities to finance their current priorities, ignoring the possibility of acquiring excess real estate to save Xi’s Beijing administration.

Local governments could in fact attempt to raise money to buy up housing through special bond issues. However, it is only if municipal leaders can find enough buyers before selling numerous local government bonds. If all investors, regardless of size, have doubts about China’s financial system, that is easier said than done.

Yet longer-term reforms are even more important. Although exports and domestic demand-driven growth are the focus of recent efforts to rebalance the growth engines, progress is slower than anticipated. Similar to how social safety nets are constructed to encourage households to save less and spend more, is the same.

The LGFV piece of the puzzle continues to be a significant wildcard. These roughly 4, 000 entities created to fund local infrastructure projects carry debts topping$ 8.5 trillion, by the IMF’s estimates.

One problem is the lack of information about these debts. Analysts at Fitch Ratings, for example, are skeptical about Beijing’s claims that the ratios of LGFV debt relative to local GDP have declined.

Rather, moves to reclassify debt to avoid LGFV status, often to bypass bond issuance restrictions, largely explain this supposed trend.

As Fitch analyst Harry Hu notes, the rating company identified 324 entities, about 8 % of the 4, 000 entities that, by June 2024, were no longer classified as LGFVs on a widely used Chinese bond data platform.

We rate 34 of these businesses, which indicates that reclassification was likely to facilitate bond issuance rather than be a result of business transformation, Hu says.

However, the LGFV conundrum is a challenging one. Independent economist Jonathon Sine explains that” a decade ago Beijing not only set out to constrain LGFVs, but eliminate them,” in a recent report on the “rise and fall” of these off-balance sheet entities. Fiscal restructuring proved insufficient. Localities still have incredibly broad roles and mandates today. Will they be forced to abdicate or will they find themselves without any funding?

Sine adds that “in this evolving context, will local officials face new incentives to keep their all-purpose handyman, the LGFV, alive and kicking? Will LGFVs vanish as Lenin once predicted the Soviet Union would? Who will make them? With a new round of audits sweeping the nation alongside top-down inspection tours and the ongoing anti-corruption campaign, what might become of China’s … LGFVs”?

As 2025 approaches, it’s anyone’s guess. However, it suffices to say that the extent to which local governments cooperate with Beijing will be crucial for property sector stability in the long run.

Finding a more activist response from Beijing may be necessary, in terms of providing state funding and developing a mechanism to revive non-performing assets. &nbsp,

Another key issue: Xi and Li ensuring expeditious and transparent implementation. That calls for a bold and obvious shift away from focusing on economic advancement.

Over the past two years, Xi’s team has stuttered from pledge to pledge to develop a plan to significantly lower the ranks of property developers by removing toxic assets from their balance sheets.

One possibility about which investors have long buzzed is Beijing adopting a&nbsp, Resolution&nbsp, Trust&nbsp, Company-like&nbsp, model the&nbsp, US used to address the&nbsp, savings-and-loan crisis of the 1980s. That could save a decade in Japan, where a sector essential to growth gains a new lease on life.

Doing so would afford Xi’s reform team&nbsp, an opportunity to confound the naysayers and reinvigorate&nbsp, China Inc. Additionally, it would fulfill Xi’s promises to prioritize the quantity over the quality of growth. Change the narrative that China is repeating the mistakes Japan made in the 1990s as a result of its bad-loan crisis and deflationary nightmare.

However, for the moment, at least one thing is certain: Beijing’s hopes that local governments will come to grips with the housing crisis are n’t working so far.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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Global economic activities increasingly viewed through security lens: PM Wong

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Against this backdrop, Singapore will have to get its own way forth, he said. Through local and international forums, this means remaining opened and pushing for complimentary flows of industry and investments. &nbsp,

We want Singapore to get their choice partner, “importantly, as countries and companies outside seem to diversify their risks and broaden their range of partners. We want to act as a trustworthy and trustworthy base from which they can operate, said Mr. Wong.

Using a fund comparison where professionals are always looking for “alpha” or the extra advantage that drives higher returns, Mr Wong said Singapore’s “greatest supply of alpha” lies in its reputation for respect, dignity and reliability.

” These features are a special source of competitive advantage… and it’s very difficult for others to recreate. I believe what’s real for Singapore applies to Temasek”, he said.

Yet as Temasek embarks on its second phase of transformation, these values&nbsp, – ranging from an adherence to excellent standards and values, an ability to think long-term, grow with proper discipline and to add to the Singapore brand of quality, reliability, discipline and integrity -&nbsp,” cannot and must never change”, said Mr Wong.

These qualities make Temasek a well-known brand, and these qualities will help him maintain his value and reputation as a long-term partner.

Mr. Wong also touched on Temasek’s belief that “doing well, doing right, and doing good” in his speech.

Balancing and achieving all of these multiple goals is challenging, he said. Temasek and its portfolio companies ‘ ability to accomplish their goals depends a lot on their leadership and workforce.

He then expressed his gratitude to all the board members who have and continue to serve on Temasek’s behalf.

At the anniversary dinner, former chairmen Mr. Y Pillay and Mr. S. Dhanabalan were among those who were present. &nbsp,” They gave their hearts and minds, and their sweat and tears to build what we have today … We owe them all a great debt of gratitude”, said Mr Wong.

The prime minister&nbsp, noted that the government “has been careful not to have any role or influence in Temasek’s investment’s decisions”. Instead, its approach “has been to hold the board accountable for Temasek’s performance” .&nbsp,

” But this approach has been made possible only because we have board members who are committed and capable, and who can be trusted to work with the management to protect what we have inherited from Temasek, build on it, and pass it on to new generations in better shape than we started,” he said.

In closing, he said:” Tonight, I would like to put on record my appreciation to everyone in Temasek and the portfolio companies. Over the past five decades, we appreciate your numerous contributions.

I want to say a big” thank you” to everyone who has contributed to Temasek and the wider Temasek family, both past and present.

Temasek, which celebrates its 50th anniversary this year, has marked 2024 with initiatives such as the set-up of a S$ 150 million fund for skills training and talent development in Singapore.

It announced at the anniversary dinner that it would set aside$ 100 million as a concessional capital for climate change to help raise money for less-than-bankable projects.

It also launched a commemorative book- titled” By Generations, For Generations: Fifty Years of Temasek As Told By The People Who Shaped It’ ‘ – that chronicles key events and milestones of the firm over the past 50 years.

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Pacific Island security cooperation still crucial for Australia – Asia Times

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This article first appeared on Pacific Forum, and it has since been republished with your type agreement. Read the original below.

Australia launched its National Defense Strategy ( NDS ) in April 2024 by&nbsp, stating&nbsp, that the country will remain the “partner of choice” for the Pacific Island countries ( PICs ) when it comes to security cooperation. But why does this standing subject to Australia?

Australia, as a&nbsp, end energy, is a vital regional head in the Pacific. Since the end of World War II, Australia has been in the Pacific place for safety assistance. Australia continues to be one of PIC’s biggest dealing partners and sponsors. Since 2008 Australia has &nbsp, invested&nbsp, nearly A$ 14 billion of its official development assistance in the Pictures.

Being “partner of option” remains a key component of Australia’s NDS for the PICs, for many reasons, and now that competition with China for influence in the Pacific is a continuous reality, this means using Australia’s foreign influence and relationships to advocate for the Pacific’s needs.

First, climate change remains one of Australia’s best foreign policy interests. As a pro-Paris Climate Accord position, Australia has &nbsp, played&nbsp, a major responsibility since 2015 in addressing the climate change matter in the Pacific and worldwide. In reality, Australia’s major &nbsp, global growth initiatives&nbsp, have been driven mainly by its climate policy agenda.

Climate change remains the&nbsp, second largest safety threat&nbsp, in the region and since Anthony Albanese’s Labor authorities took office in June 2022, a more transformative&nbsp, approach&nbsp, has been taken to address the issue. Through its assorted&nbsp, climate investment work, Australia aims to&nbsp, reduce&nbsp, carbon emissions by 43 % in 2030 and reach net zero in 2050.

Australia’s increased engagement in the Pacific in its climate action efforts has led the country to&nbsp, <a href="https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2351128-pacific-islands-back-australia-joint-bid-to-host-cop-29″>receive the full support&nbsp, of the Pacific Islands Forum ( PIF ) members of Australia’s bidding to co-host the 31st&nbsp, Conference of the Parties ( COP31 ) in 2026 with PIF.

Second-largest challenge for Australia to be a companion of choice for the Pictures in security cooperation is geostrategic competitors. The geostrategic competitors between the US and China has &nbsp, intensified&nbsp, in the region.

As a key ally of the US Canberra has been involved in a variety of initiatives to counteract the rise of China in the Pacific even though the great power rivalry continues to be a  concern  for the PIF members ( including Australia ).

China has emerged as a global powerhouse and is advancing regionally in the Indo-Pacific. China’s wedding in the Pacific has thus far largely been about economic growth.

Through its Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI), for instance, China has provided infrastructure projects in countries like Papua New Guinea ( PNG ), &nbsp, Solomon Islands&nbsp, and&nbsp, Vanuatu.

However, China’s energy to&nbsp, establish&nbsp, a bilateral security deal with Solomon Islands in 2022 has changed the entire narrative of energy relationships in the Pacific given that Australia and the US have been the PICs ‘” standard safety partners”.

The term “partner of option” in security cooperation falls under the umbrella of a standard protection partner, in which Australia tightly adheres to its foreign policy through dialogue with its Pacific neighbors and ensures that the US maintains its status as the Pacific power.

While Australia, within the course of a season, &nbsp, signed three diplomatic security agreements&nbsp, with Vanuatu, Tuvalu, and Papua New Guinea to maintain its influence in the region in security assistance, China’s growing influence in the Pacific issues and concerns the concept of “partner of selection”.

In her recent interview, Sen. Penny Wong, Australia’s foreign affairs minister&nbsp, stated&nbsp, that:” ]w ] e are now in a position where Australia is a partner of choice, but the opportunity to be the only partner of choice has been lost and we’re in a state of permanent contest in the Pacific]with China ] —that’s the reality”.

Australia, apart from its security engagement with the PICs, also supports a free and open Indo-Pacific through engagement with key partners.

This include AUKUS, the trilateral security partnership&nbsp, established&nbsp, in 2021 with the US and UK in which both countries would build Australia’s nuclear-powered submarine capabilities ( conventionally armed ), including through&nbsp, acquisition&nbsp, of five Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines from the US over the next three decades for$ 368 billion.

The AUKUS partnership also entails technology and information sharing among the three countries as well as&nbsp, deployment&nbsp, of US and UK submarines as early as 2027 to have rotational presence in Western Australia at HMAS Sterling through Submarine Rotational Force-West, a strategic move not just to help Australia build its nuclear-powered submarine fleet but also&nbsp, counter&nbsp, China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific.

As one of the members of the&nbsp, Quadrilateral Security Dialogue&nbsp, (” Quad” ) with the US, Japan and India, Australia’s status as a founding member of PIF ensures that humanitarian assistance, the key reason why the Quad was &nbsp, established&nbsp, in 2004, is delivered to PICs, who remain vulnerable to non-traditional security threats like climate change.

Australia, along with New Zealand, Japan and South Korea also maintains the presence of NATO through&nbsp, Partners in the Indo-Pacific&nbsp, ( IP4 ).

Although NATO was &nbsp, established&nbsp, to counter Soviet threats during the Cold War in Europe after World War II, its partnership with IP4 exists to&nbsp, maintain&nbsp, the international rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.

There is this&nbsp, notion&nbsp, that” countries in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific count on the US to guarantee their security —a guarantee]that ] they have not had…to question for three-quarters of a century”.

However, China in the Indo-Pacific is already battling that security guarantee from the US. The US and its NATO partners see China’s emerging superpower status and its&nbsp, provocative actions&nbsp, in the South China Sea, particularly with the Philippines, as a threat to the liberal order.

Second, Australia sees the Pacific as a crucially important region for both its national security interests and the security interests of its allies as a US ally and as a NATO partner.

This implies that Australia seeks to prevent China from imposing coercion or attempts to establish bilateral security arrangements with PICs and to ensure that PICs remain under its control in security cooperation.

For instance, the former prime minister of Solomon Islands, Manasseh Sogavare was &nbsp, described&nbsp, as the polarizing, pro-China figure in the Pacific when he&nbsp, signed&nbsp, the security deal with China and PNG was &nbsp, urged&nbsp, early this year by Washington and Canberra to reject China’s bilateral security offer.

When responding to China’s bilateral security offer to PNG, Australia’s Prime Minister Albanese&nbsp, stated:” ]W] e are a security partner of choice for]PNG], as we are for most of the countries in the Pacific”.

PNG did not take up China’s bilateral security offer, intended to help improve PNG’s internal policing, as PNG already has a similar&nbsp, bilateral security arrangement&nbsp, with Australia.

Geoeconomic competition is the most important factor in Australia’s choice for partner of choice in security cooperation for PICs. Both the US and China are &nbsp, key trading partners&nbsp, of Australia, and the Pacific region is critical to their economic development as it houses the&nbsp, trans-Pacific route, the world’s largest shipping lanes linking Asia and North America.

In 2023 alone, approximately 30 million 20-foot equivalent units ( TEU) of cargoes were transported across the trans-Pacific route.

Secondly, while China has done significant investment in infrastructure development through the&nbsp, BRI in the Pacific, Australia through its Pacific Step-up&nbsp, introduced&nbsp, the$ 2 billion Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific to increase its engagement in the region, as the BRI was &nbsp, accused&nbsp, of a “debt-trap” diplomacy.

Australia’s membership in the Partners in the Blue Pacific helps&nbsp, support Pacific priorities&nbsp, envisaged in the&nbsp, 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, as PICs are not included in the US-led&nbsp, Indo-Pacific Economic Framework&nbsp, for Prosperity except Fiji.

PICs are aware of Australia’s traditionally dominant position as a key regional influencer in security cooperation. While China’s interests, apart from economic development, are also to&nbsp, constrain&nbsp, Taiwan’s diplomatic presence in the Pacific, PICs perceive all parties involved, including big powers as its key development partners without any geopolitical interest in security and economic cooperation.

Australia will need to work more closely with the PICs as a traditional leader to maintain its position as the partner of choice in security cooperation while maintaining the sovereignties of each individual PIC.

For instance, the Pacific Policing Initiative ( PPI), just&nbsp, endorsed&nbsp, by PIF leaders in their 53rd&nbsp, meeting in Tonga late last month would be a good start for Australia’s investment in its effort for regional leadership in security cooperation as the PPI will be entirely funded by Australia in the next five years.

Moses Sakai ( sakaimoses@outlook .com ) is a Research Fellow at the Papua New Guinea National Research Institute and a Young Leader of the Pacific Forum. He taught at the University of Papua New Guinea from 2018 to 2023.

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New Sri Lanka president needs to balance campaign promises with debt obligations, say analysts

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He was referring to the Rajapaksa family, which remained in power in Sri Lankan politics until large demonstrations in 2022 over the financial collapse ousted then-president Gotabaya Rajapaksa and prime minister Mahinda Rajapaksa.

Despite the contentious history of his Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna ( JVP ) or People’s Liberation Front, voters sided with Dissanayake. It orchestrated failed rebellion in the 1980s that resulted in tens of thousands of fatalities.

He has since apologised for the group’s violence, but problems remain on what part the JVP might enjoy.

” He has given every sign that he will act politically. But given the political problems that Sri Lanka has faced in recent years, some may be sceptical”, said Kugelman.

AUSTERITY MEASURES VS IMF Problems

Sri Lanka is still suffering from the most severe financial crisis in decades and from the hardships brought on by the International Monetary Fund’s ( IMF) strict bailout.

Millions of people are now struggling to make ends meet thanks to the US$ 2.9 billion deal, which included spending cuts and tax increases.

Dissanayake has stated that he will deal with the bank for a better offer and go against some conditions that the IMF loan has set in order to fulfill his strategy promises of lower taxes and utility bills.

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