In case a future Fed withholds needed bailout: a dollar coalition – Asia Times

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In the event of dysfunction in dollar funding markets, the Federal Reserve can supply liquidity through standing central bank swaps. This column considers a scenario in which the Fed declines to extend such credit. It argues that 14 major central banks hold roughly $1.9 trillion in US safe assets. They could form a dollar coalition of the willing by pooling their dollar holdings and swapping them when needed. An inferior international lender of last resort beats no international lender of last resort.

On 16 April 2025, Federal Reserve Chair Jay Powell (2025) assured Professor Raghu Rajan that the Fed stands ready to supply dollar liquidity through standing central bank swaps. 1  When needed, the Fed can lead international last resort lending of dollars by extending hundreds of billions of its credit to partner central banks that in turn lend to their banks against collateral. Powell stressed that in doing so, the Fed ensures the transmission of its own policy when global dollar funding markets dry up. He cited the example of a foreign bank funding a security backed by US household debts (Reis and Bahaj 2018).

In 2008 and 2020, the amounts that the Fed swapped were not small, but offshore dollar funding – both on- and off-balance-sheet – is measured in the tens of trillions of dollars. Thus, with pennies on the dollar lent and repaid with interest, the Fed and co-operating central banks calmed dollar panics.

In the light of events in early 2025, this column considers the unlikely possibility that the Fed does not take the lead in international dollar lending of last resort in the event of dysfunction in dollar funding markets. What if some future Fed leadership were to decline to extend its credit through central bank swaps, taking the view that they “just hate bailing out Europe again,” in the unguarded phrase of the US Vice President (Goldberg 2025)? Or to condition swaps on bilateral political considerations?

US Vice President JD Vance (center), discussing Trump administration plans to bomb Houthi rebels, said he disliked “bailing Europe out again.” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth (left) responded, “I fully share your loathing of European free-loading. It’s pathetic.” They assumed the world wasn’t listening but they were on a Signal chat and a magazine editor had been invited by mistake. (This picture shows an earlier public ceremony, in which Vance swore in Hegseth.) Photo: Wikipedia

This scenario is worth exploring even if one deems it very unlikely. A new Fed Board leadership would have to persuade the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) to reverse the policy just affirmed by Chair Powell. By law, the FOMC controls Fed open market operations, including the central bank swaps. 2

A glance at the recent additions to the current FOMC lineup suggests that it would not readily agree to withhold standing central bank swaps for political reasons. On 21 April, the New York Fed appointed European Central Bank (ECB) operations veteran Anna Nordstrom to head its markets group, managing the FOMC’s $6.3 trillion System Open Market Account. Her crisis-tested predecessor, Lorie Logan, has headed the Dallas Fed since 2022. 3 Last year, another New York Fed veteran, Alberto Musalem, and a former Goldman Sachs global treasurer, Beth Hammack, became the heads of the St Louis and Cleveland Feds, respectively. By the wisdom of the Congressional framers of the Federal Reserve Act, none is a presidential appointee. 4

That said, after trans-Atlantic differences surfaced over NATO, Ukraine and trade in March 2025 5 but even before the so-called reciprocal tariff announcement in early April, the reliability of the Fed as a source of dollar swaps came into question (Smart 2025). On March 20, a think tank report to the European Parliament considered a scenario of politicized “recourse to the dollar swap lines” (Tudoir et al. 2025). More telling was a Reuters story on the same day, widely sourced by a large team of writers, that reported that European central bankers were discussing how to make do without the Fed swaps. 6 Citing the Reuters story, Deutsche Bank’s foreign exchange strategist George Saravelos (2025) called this a “nuclear button.” 7

This scenario takes us to the Kindleberger Trap, the risk that a fading world power lacks the ability, but the ascendant power lacks the will, to provide the world with vital public goods — such as stable international money. In 1931, the Bank of England (BoE) was not able, but the Fed was not willing, to serve as lender of last resort to Austria. As a result, the crisis rolled on to Germany, Britain and ultimately the US. The Kindleberger Trap caught the “world in depression,” as Charles Kindleberger (1973) titled his seminal work. 8 Nowadays, it is not, as Joseph Nye (2017) imagined, that the Fed is unable to play lender of last resort and the People’s Bank of China is unwilling.

Instead, the hazard to the world economy now is that:

  • 1. The Fed is able to lead a dollar lender of last resort operation, but
  • 2. A future Fed may not be willing to do so, and
  • 3. No one else is able to do so.

This column proposes a work-around:

  • 4. A coalition of central banks can pool dollars to lend as a last resort.

Central banks without access to the Fed could form a dollar coalition of the willing.9 The 14 central banks that had standing and temporary Fed swap lines in 2008 and 2020 span dollar funding markets to a remarkable extent, which is not generally recognized (Ito et al. 2021). Among them they cover about three-fourths of offshore dollar liabilities of non-US headquartered banks and about five-sixths of global turnover against the dollar in the foreign exchange swap market (Figures 1 and 2 from McCauley 2024).

Figure 1 Dollar liabilities of banks headquartered outside the US

Figure 1 Dollar liabilities of banks headquartered outside the US
Figure 1 Dollar liabilities of banks headquartered outside the US
Note: 1 Cross-border and local liabilities in all instruments vis-à-vis all counterparty countries. Excludes intragroup positions but includes liabilities to other (unaffiliated) banks. From end-2015, includes positions reported by China and Russia (the latter up to end-2021).
Sources: BIS consolidated banking statistics; BIS locational banking statistics; author’s calculations.

Figure 2 Coverage of dollar foreign exchange swap turnover by Fed central bank swaps in 2007-2022

Figure 2 Coverage of dollar foreign exchange swap turnover by Fed central bank swaps in 2007-2022
Figure 2 Coverage of dollar foreign exchange swap turnover by Fed central bank swaps in 2007-2022
Note: Big 5: European Central Bank, Bank of Japan, Bank of England, Bank of Canada, and Swiss National Bank, advanced economy (AE) 5: Reserve Bank of Australia, Riksbank, Norges Bank, Danmarks Nationalbank, Reserve Bank of New Zealand; emerging market (EM) 4: Monetary Authority of Singapore, Banco de Mexico, Bank of Korea, and Central Bank of Brazil.
Source: BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey of foreign exchange of 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2019, 2022, author’s estimates for Danish krone, author’s calculations.

A key fact is their collective firepower: The 14 central banks hold lots of dollars. Their collective holdings of US safe assets amounted to an estimated $1.9 trillion at the end of 2021. 10 The 14 central banks cannot, like the Fed, create dollars without limit, but they could pool their holdings and swap them when needed.

There is ample precedent for central banks to lend each other international money that is not of their own creation. In the 19th century, precious metal loans did not lack a geopolitical dimension but could not be unlimited.

A legendary story tells how the Silver Train (Silberzug) chugged from Vienna to Hamburg in 1857. Agreeing to a call for help on 8 December, the Bank of Austria loaded a train with almost ten million ounces of silver. 11   It arrived on 12 December “in highly visible fashion” (Deutsche Boerse 2025, Roberds and Velde 2014, p 45) in time to prevent the impending failure of most of Hamburg’s banks and to allow ship captains to unload their cargoes with some hope of getting paid (Aliber et al. 2023, pp 294-295). The Bank of Prussia evidently regretted having joined London and Paris in turning Hamburg down, before Vienna said yes – and having thus “missed an opportunity.” 12  

During the 1890 Baring Crisis, it took the Banque de France about a day to send 707,547 ounces of gold, worth £3 million, from Paris to London by wagon, train, and ship. 13 The crates of gold “supposedly” recrossed the channel unopened (Flandreau 1997) 14 but, in any case, signaled that sterling was as good as gold. The BoE Governor “and the City were uneasy about asking the French and the Russians for help…. Suppose for some political-financial reason they had been unwilling to oblige?” 15 These metallic last resort loans calmed panics even though neither drew on alchemy to extend unlimited support.

In the modern era, central bank mutual support has mixed money creation and dollar reserve use in varying proportions. In the record-breaking $3 billion support for the Bank of England in November 1964, the US, German, French and Swiss central banks pledged 59% in their own currencies and the other G-10 members and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) pledged 41% in dollars (Schenk 2010, p 276). The June 1976 record-breaking $5.3 billion credit to the Bank of England reversed the proportions, as apparently only the Fed pledged its own currency for 38% and the other G10 members and the BIS stumped up dollars for their 62% share. 16  

Thus, in an historical perspective, the 2008 pattern of the Fed, the ECB and the Swiss National Bank (SNB), each swapping its own currency, stands out as an exception. Much of last resort lending by central banks to each other has involved lending their own reserves rather than freshly created money.

With this perspective, the $1.9 trillion possible pool is big money. It’s triple the previous maximum drawing on the Fed swap lines in 2008 ($598 billion) and quadruple the peak 2020 usage ($449 billion) (Choi et al. 2022). The coalition would signal an independent judgement of the nature of the crisis, backed by money, like a Fed swap, as opposed to each central bank in need drawing only on its own resources. And if the Fed could trust the 14 central banks, how could they not trust each other?

Where the pool could fall short would be in signaling that there is plenty more where this came from. If the $1.9 trillion were deemed too small, coalition members could ex ante raise the dollar share of their reserves, reversing diversification into Canadian and Australian dollars, renminbi, and other currencies (Arslanalp et al. 2022). Or highly rated countries could borrow dollars ex ante to add to reserves at low cost. 17

Leadership could arise among the Fed’s standing swap partners – the ECB, Bank of Japan (BoJ), SNB, BoE, and Bank of Canada. The ECB and BoJ were the largest users of the Fed swap lines in 2008 and 2020, respectively. During the 2023 run on Credit Suisse, the SNB acquired unique experience in tapping the New York Fed for $60 billion against US Treasury collateral under the FIMA (foreign and international monetary authorities) repo facility (Martin 2024).

The coalition could enlist the BIS for technical support as an agent as European central banks did in 1973-95 (ECB 2025). Or the BIS could serve as intermediary, as it did when the New York Fed lent dollars through the BIS to offshore banks in the 1960s to prevent funding crunches (McCauley and Schenk 2020).

Using reserves rather than money creation to fund swaps has a snag: the $1.9 trillion is invested, and a crisis calls for electronic cash. If the Fed were to deny swaps, would it continue to provide same-day FIMA funding against Treasuries held in custody?

If it did, the coalition could arrange to access hundreds of billions of dollars in same-day funds to meet a panic. If the Fed did not, then it would end up providing ad hoc funding. Here is why.

Without the FIMA backstop, heavy central bank sales of US Treasuries would rock the US bond market. Such selling could prod the Fed into the market as buyer of last resort — as in March 2020, before the FIMA repo was introduced.

Without the FIMA backstop, central banks might seek to repo hundreds of billions in Treasuries for cash in the market. Such funding could well prod the Fed to cap market repo rates. After all, the recent benchmark rate shift from dollar LIBOR to repo-based SOFR means that the Fed’s own domestic monetary transmission requires well-behaved repo rates.

One way or another, the coalition would need to work with the Fed to manage any “dash for cash” (Barone et al. 2022).

Limits excite. It may well be, as Eurosystem sources grimly noted to Reuters, that “there is no good substitute to the Fed” (Martinuzzi et al. 2025). Even a large pool of dollar reserves would not stack up to “whatever it takes” Fed swaps, as demonstrated neatly in Korea during the 2008 Global Crisis (Baba and Shim 2014).

Nonetheless, a dollar coalition of the willing could pool trillions of dollars to backstop global dollar funding with no more than self-interested Fed help. An inferior lender of last resort beats no lender of last resort.

Robert N McCauley is a nonresident senior fellow of the Global Development Policy Center, Boston University, and an associate member of the Faculty of History, University Of Oxford.

This article was originally published by VoxEU, portal of the Center for European Policy Research. It is republished with permission.

References

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Alito, S (2024), “Dissent to Consumer Financial Protection Bureau et al. v. Community Financial Services Association of America, Ltd., et al.”, Supreme Court of the United States, argued 3 October 2023 — Decided 16 May 2024.

Allison, G (2014), Destined for war, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

Arslanalp, S, B Eichengreen and C Simpson-Bell (2022), “The stealth erosion of dollar dominance and the rise of nontraditional reserve currencies”, Journal of International Economics 138, 103656.

Baba, N and I Shim (2014), “Dislocations in the won-dollar swap markets during the crisis of 2007-2009”, International Journal of Finance and Economics 19(4): 279-302.

Barone, J, A Copeland, C Kavoussi, F M Keane and S Searls (2022), “The global dash for cash: why sovereign bond market functioning varied across jurisdictions in March 2020”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no 110, March.

Bordo, M D and A Schwartz (1999), “Under what circumstances, past and present, have international rescues of countries in financial distress been successful?”, Journal of International Money and Finance 18(4): 683-708.

Chinn, M and J Frankel (2007), “Will the euro eventually surpass the dollar as leading international reserve currency?”, in R Clarida (ed.), G7 current account imbalances: sustainability and adjustment, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Chinn, M, J Frankel and H Ito (2024), “The dollar versus the euro as international reserve currencies”, Journal of International Money and Finance 146, 103123.

Choi, M, L Goldberg, R Lerman and F Ravazzolo (2022), “The Fed’s central bank swap lines and FIMA Repo Facility”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review 28(1).

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Flandreau, M (1997), “Central bank cooperation in historical perspective: a skeptical view”, Economic History Review 50(4): 735-763.

Foulis, P (2015), “The sticky superpower”, Economist special report, 1 October.

Garcia-Herrero, A (2024), “BRICS is becoming a more solid construction”, Bruegel First Glance, 29 October.

Gislén, M, I Hansson and O Melander (2021), “Dollar liquidity from the Federal Reserve to other central banks”, Sverigis Riksbank Economic Review 1: 27-51.

Goldberg, J (2025), “The Trump administration accidentally texted me its war plans”, Atlantic, 24 March.

Hauser, A and L Logan (2022), “Market dysfunction and central bank tools: insights from a Markets Committee Working Group chaired by Andrew Hauser (Bank of England) and Lorie Logan (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)”, Markets Committee Papers, Basel: BIS, 11 May.

Ito, H, G K Pasricha and J Aizenman (2021), “Central bank swaps in the age of Covid-19”, VoxEU.org, 8 April.

Kamin, S and M Sobel (2024), “Dollar dominance is here to stay for the foreseeable future–the real issue for the global economy is how and why”, AEI Economics Working Paper 2024-02, January.

Kamin, S and M Sobel (2025), “Trump is undermining the dollar’s global financing and reserve role”, Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum, 10 March.

Kindleberger, C (1973), World in depression, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Martin, A (2024), “Presentation to ‘Policy session 3: The US dollar in the international financial system’”, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Financial Markets Conference, 21 May.

Martinuzzi, E, J Aguado, B Koranyi, S Spezzati and J O’Donnel (2025), “Exclusive: some European officials weigh if they can rely on Fed for dollars under Trump”, Reuters, 24 March.

McCauley, R (2019), “Safe assets: made not just born”, BIS Working Paper no 769, February.

McCauley, R (2024), “The offshore dollar and US policy”, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Policy Hub, no 2-2024, May.

McCauley, R and C Schenk (2020), “Central bank swaps then and now: swaps and dollar liquidity in the 1960s”, BIS Working Papers no 851, April.

Mehrling, P (2022), Money and empire, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Menand, L (2021), “The Federal Reserve and the 2020 economic and financial crisis”, Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance 295: 101-166.

Menand, L (2022), The Fed unbound, New York: Columbia Global Reports.

Nogueira Batista, P (2023), “BRICS financial and monetary initiatives – the New Development Bank, the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, and a possible new currency”, Valdai Discussion Club Opinions, 3 October.

Nye, J (2017), “The Kindleberger trap”, Project Syndicate, 9 January.

Perry, A R (2020), “The Federal Reserve’s questionable legal basis for foreign central bank liquidity swaps”, Columbia Law Review 120(3): 729-767.

Powell, J (2025), “Fireside chat with Raghuram Rajam”, Economic Club of Chicago, 16 April.

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Footnotes

  1. Powell (2025), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1o_9kO0zZQg, at minute 35:50. Rajan’s question was poignant, since he had called attention to the Fed’s not extending a swap to the Reserve Bank of India when he was the Governor in 2013.
  2. The Fed claims the authority of Section 14 of the Federal Reserve Act to do swaps as open market operations. Perry (2000) and Menand (2021, 2022) have questioned this use of the Section 14 authority. To a non-lawyer, that the Congress has received 60 years of reports on the Fed’s foreign exchange operations, including the swaps, implies something like consent. But Menand (2021, p 108) quotes the Supreme Court in a different context: “[u]nlawful acts, performed long enough and with sufficient vigor, are never enough to amend the law.” Perry (2020) predicted in early 2020: “If another crisis were to occur, public outrage might center on certain, legally dubious Fed activities, such as these swap lines.” In the event, there was little discussion of the 2020 swaps. Perry’s and Menand’s proposal that swaps be done under the Fed’s 13.3 authority would make the swaps subject to a Treasury veto, as required by the 2010 Dodd Frank Act’s amendment of 13.3. 
  3. See Hauser and Logan (2022).
  4. It is not certain whether the president has the legal authority to fire the Chair of the Federal Reserve Board without cause. Even if so, the former chair could remain as governor and be voted chair of the FOMC. In the 16 April interview, Chair Powell (2025) said that the Fed was carefully following the case of two labour board members fired by the president. The legal position of the Fed is different from many independent agencies in that the Congress has delegated to it monetary power that the Constitution clearly gives to the Congress. Justice Samuel Alito (2024), although a proponent of the unitary Executive, in a dissent against a ruling that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau can be funded by the Fed, set out the unique status of the Fed: “The Government also suggested that the Federal Reserve Board is a close historical analog for the CFPB…But that setup should not be seen as a model for other Government bodies. The [Fed] Board, which is funded by the earnings of the Federal Reserve Banks…is a unique institution with a unique historical background. It includes the creation and demise of the First and Second Banks of the United States, as well as the string of financial panics (in 1873, 1893, and 1907) that were widely attributed to the country’s lack of a national bank…. The structure adopted in the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 represented an intensely-bargained compromise between two insistent and influential camps: those who wanted a largely private system, and those who favored a Government-controlled national bank. … For Appropriations Clause purposes, the funding of the Federal Reserve Board should be regarded as a special arrangement sanctioned by history.”
  5. Steve Kamin and Mark Sobel (2025), formerly senior officials of the Fed Board and US Treasury, respectively, wrote on 10 March that “Trump is undermining the dollar’s global financing and reserve role…The world is openly questioning whether the US is a reliable partner…” Compare to the authors’ “Dollar dominance is here to stay…” in January 2024.
  6. Martinuzzi et al. (2025): “Some European central banking and supervisory officials are questioning whether they can still rely on the U.S. Federal Reserve to provide dollar funding in times of market stress, six [!] people familiar with the matter said, casting some doubt over what has been a bedrock of financial stability. The sources told Reuters they consider it highly unlikely the Fed would not honour its funding backstops — and the U.S. central bank itself has given no signals to suggest that. But the European officials have held informal discussions about this possibility — which Reuters is reporting for the first time — because their trust in the United States government has been shaken by some of the Trump administration’s policies.”
  7. Saravelos (2025): “Ultimately, a withdrawal of the Fed as the international lender of last resort is equivalent to a suspension of the dollar’s role as the safest of global currencies. Doubts about a commitment from the Fed to maintain dollar liquidity — especially against [sic] major allies — would accelerate efforts by other countries to reduce their dependence on the US financial system. It would ultimately lead to lower foreign ownership of US assets and a broad-based weakening of the dollar’s role in the global financial system.” This is a very different scenario of dollar decline from that of Menzie Chinn and Jeffrey Frankel (2007), who imagined a shift from the dollar based on high US inflation. An update by Chinn et al. (2024) finds little role for inflation.
  8. The Kindleberger Trap, one of a vacuum of power, must be distinguished from the Thucydides Trap of Allison (2014), in which the dominant power fears the rising power and goes to war. See Mehrling (2022) for a discussion of Kindleberger’s global public goods that the leader (or ‘hegemon’) needs to provide to supply global financial stability.
  9. Ten years ago, the Economist’s Patrick Foulis (2015) argued that those central banks that were not included in the Fed’s swaps could pool their dollar reserves and thereby insure each other against a sudden need for dollars. Then and now, the undisputed key dollar reserve holder in this negatively defined group is China. Already in 2015, the odd gathering – a case of life imitating an investment bank strategist’s conceit — of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) – started down the road to a swap facility. They have not gotten very far. In the event, “BRICS is ending up as a hub and spoke model with China as the centre” (Garcia-Herrero 2024), but the swap arrangement is according to an insider ‘small’ and ‘frozen’ (Nogueira Batista 2023). This leaves China’s network of bilateral swaps as the real game, which Argentina has demonstrated can be tapped for dollars in extremis.
  10. The author thanks Colin Weiss (2022) for his estimates based on publicly available data, which are doubtless closer to the mark for aggregates like the 14 than for particular countries. For example, Weiss’s procedure overstates known UK dollar reserves, but understates known Swiss dollar reserves. The 14’s total foreign exchange reserves at the end of 2024 were about double the $1.9 trillion. Note that Weiss is working only with dollar reserves held in the US. McCauley (2019) estimates that $1 trillion in dollar reserves were held offshore in 2017.
  11. Oddly, the Bank of Austria was in a position to help owing to earlier fiscal dominance: “After years of unbalanced budgets and seigniorage finance, Austria was in a regime of inconvertible paper and fluctuating exchange rates, which partly insulated it from shocks on convertible countries: the specie reserve of the Bank of Austria was thus useless and could be profitably [at 6% interest] used in foreign support…” writes Flandreau (1997, p 750).
  12. The British consul in Hamburg noted that it was fortunate for Britain that Austria and not Prussia had brought the aid since there would then be no pressure on Hamburg to join the Zollverein.” Note that the borders of the German economy were at issue again in 1931, when the French demanded that Austria renounce a customs union with Germany as the price of another BIS-arranged credit from 11 central banks (Aliber et al. 2023, p 302). 
  13. It must have required five separate loadings (two in Paris, one in Calais, one in Dover, and one in London). Martin (2024) notes that central bank swaps are sometimes affected on the same day but often are T+1.
  14. Flandreau’s general scepticism about central bank cooperation as opposed to profitable central banking sits uneasily with his report on the parliamentary debate on the 1890 gold loan: “On the French side, the operation resulted in hostile interpellation in the chamber of deputies. But the minister of finance replied that such help had been necessary to prevent harmful repercussions for France of a deeper crisis in London.” Flandreau (1997, p 761) concludes, ”In all cases, international help had not resulted from a bilateral realization of common interests. In its most favourable form, it was a consequence of the unilateral perception of the possible gains associated with unilateral support.” In 2025, such enlightened self-interest would be most welcome. See also Bordo and Schwartz (1999), who rate the 1890 help by the Banque de France to the Bank of England a success. 
  15. Aliber et al. (2023, p 296), citing Clapham, the historian of the Bank of England.
  16. Schenk (2010, p 373-374) notes that drawings on the swap paid interest at the US Treasury bill rate, so the swap was presumably all in dollars. Dollar reserves had grown significantly since 1964.
  17. Or even at a profit. In the Global Crisis, the SNB sold dollar paper to fund its rescue of UBS. Where central banks do not have such power to borrow dollars, the government debt manager could borrow dollars and deposit them with the central bank; for top-rated sovereigns the cost of such borrowing net of the return on the reserves is close to zero. In Sweden the Swedish Debt Office borrowed dollars and euros after the GFC and the net cost given the returns earned by the Riksbank was close to zero. See Gislén et al. (2021, p 30) on ex ante versus ex post dollar borrowing.

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US-China tariff truce gives Asia time and space to reset – Asia Times

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A critical wait in a business battle that is straining global supply chains and testing the compassion of capital industry has come to an agreement between the US and China to quickly lower taxes for the next 90 days. &nbsp,

The deal, which was signed in Geneva, Switzerland, reduces Chinese import duties from 125 % to 10 % and reduces US tariffs from 145 % to 30 %. &nbsp,

The arrangement now has a significant impact on Asian markets, currencies, and sentiment, despite its length and uncertain results.

Producers, semiconductor manufacturers, and industrials led the rally in Eastern equities in the immediate aftermath. Hong Kong’s Hang Seng Tech Index closed with the biggest gain in two weeks, up 5.2 %.

Foreign exchange markets might get the best place to react. On a trade-weighted base, the penny had its best moment in over a month, but the big issue for future Derivatives markets is whether the injury to the greenback’s long-term position has already been done.

The original market reaction today was undoubtedly positive in terms of the dollar, but it also showed that stretched short positioning was being broken, according to Bloomberg. Prior to today’s news, the Taiwan dollars surged and increased by more than 8 % against the dollar this year, and some other Asian economies followed suit. &nbsp,

This is a shift in positioning, not only sound or temporary rebalancing. Two important factors are at play in the current strength of Asian assets. First, a structural one: lower taxes lower the inflationary pressure on imported goods, giving central banks in emerging Asia more room to breathe. &nbsp,

Countries like India, the Philippines, and Indonesia, which previously had to walk a tightrope between rate increases and growth support, now have a little more room to give local issues a prioritization over exterior risk defense.

Next, and most important, is the movement of money. Asian businesses will be repurchasing gains from overseas. Out of overbought money deals are stock money and property managers resuming their positions. &nbsp,

Businesses in Japan are using the option to lock in more advantageous terms after months of uncertainty as desire for money hedging tools increases. The industry has begun to price option instead of just risk.

What has changed is not that investors have a sudden belief in a US-China peace. It indicates that the persistent assumption of additional decline has stopped. A slight directional shift frequently leads to a more significant response than a trend continuation in the financial markets.

The defining financial threat of the past six months has been the trade war. Asia has not only been truly exposed, but it has also consistently been sensitive due to its complicated production ecosystems and deep trade links. &nbsp,

All of Taiwan’s factories are part of multi-step supply chains that depend on predictability, including North Korean exporters of electronics, Chinese machinery companies, and Asian assemblers. Taxes didn’t just put costs; they also added immobility.

Some of that paralysis did finally subside. Companies can now start making decisions afterwards regarding purchasing, hiring, shipments, and capital costs with a 90-day windows of reduced tariffs. &nbsp,

Lenders in the region will likely experience renewed interest from business owners in restarting earlier postponed investment programs. There will be nearly immediate signs of renewed planning task in Southeast Asia, where some businesses had delayed cross-border expansions according to price doubt.

This rise in action will be further bolstered by the US dollar’s weakening. This time will not be the same as a weaker dollar does, which is normally how flows into emerging markets are amplified. &nbsp,

Money loan is less expensive to support and less costly to service. Dollar-priced goods increase in value. Additionally, Asian sovereign bonds and securities, which had been priced competitively, are seeing once more hesitant inflows.

However, it would be harmful to misinterpret this shift in tone with a real end to US-China conflicts. The scope of the Geneva deal is constrained, and it was intended to be transitory. It lacks a law enforcement device, and its base is delicate. &nbsp,

President Trump’s comments following the agreement, which suggested an “80 % price” might be appropriate “next moment,” underscore how smooth the situation is. However, this does indicate that the country’s two largest economy are under siege. &nbsp,

The US is addressing voting apprehensions over stagnant economic growth and consumer prices. China is attempting to re-anchor investor confidence and regulate business activity. Both parties can’t purchase a completely tense business relationship right now, at least not at this time.

That shared barrier is what gives the ceasefire its momentary pounds. It’s enough to knock the marketplaces out of battle method. It’s enough to give Asia’s policymakers a place to transition away from response and toward strategy. And it’s enough to cause traders to reevaluate their investment decisions in Asia.

Some of the world’s most successful export-driven countries, powerful consumer markets, and quick-changing tech players still reside in Asia. By introducing additional threat, the tariff battle obscured that strength. Just enough of the fog is removed by the truce to re-establish the local case.

Also, dangers persist. A collapse in talks, a change in Washington’s social climate, or new measures that target technology or the capital markets was quickly derail optimism. If the detente proves brief, investors who rush in unhedged or overweight may find themselves going off the rails.

Given today’s rise in capital markets and strengthening assets, Asia is expected to restore its standing for the time being.

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Philippines election: Bongbong Marcos, the man battling the Dutertes

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Oh Ewe

BBC News

Getty Images Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos shows his inked finger after voting in the mid-term election at a polling station in Batac town, Ilocos Norte province on May 12, 2025.Getty Images

Ferdinand Marcos, the late president of the Philippines, is gearing up for a conflict that may determine his social potential.

The midterm elections on Monday are essentially a battle between Marcos and his vice president, Rodrigo Duterte’s girl.

The couple, who each reflect the most powerful people in the country, unified in their vote of 2022, but their alliance has since broken.

They are currently battling for control of the senate, which may offer Marcos the authority to remove Sara from office and protect Sara from such action.

It’s a check for Marcos, the 67-year-old son of an ousted despot who rebranded his father’s troubled era to make a remarkable comeback in the 2022 vote.

Destined for administration

When his father became leader, Bongbong was only eight years old when he was born in 1957 to Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos. The only natural boy was the second of three. After that, the few made a child.

While his family was a performer and former beauty pageant success, Bongbong’s parents, a former prosecutor, served in the Congress and Senate. Both families would gain popularity because they became associated with excess and problem as the family amassed massive wealth under a terrible regime.

Ferdinand Marcos Sr enjoyed a decent following during his first term, which spanned 1965 to 1969, and won a re-election by a disaster. However, he declared martial law in 1972, one month before his second expression was set to end.

More than a decade of tyranny followed, during which the country’s foreign debt rose, prices rose, and common Filipinos struggled to make ends meet. Additionally, there was a time of persecution, when opposition figures and detractors were imprisoned, disappeared, or killed.

Marcos Sr was training his brother for leadership throughout.

A photograph of Bongbong, who wore a gold crown and a white horse, hangs in his youth home in llocos Norte, the mother’s stronghold in the north, which is now a gallery.

However, the elder Marcos was likewise concerned about whether his brother would take on the position. ” Bongbong is our main care,” according to a journal access from 1972. He is very obedient and lazy.

Getty Images Marcos Sr, wearing a white long-sleeved button-up shirt and black pants, raises his fist as he speaks into a microphone while standing on a balcony. Behind him is his family. Standing beside him is a young Bongbong Marcos, who is dressed in dark green overalls and putting one hand on the balcony railing.Getty Images

Marcos attended Oxford University to study philosophy, elections, and economy, but it eventually became clear that he did not, as he claimed, have earned a bachelor’s degree.

Oxford claimed in 2021 that he received a special certification in social experiments in 1978. According to local media reports, that was the result of Asian diplomats ‘ campaigning in the UK following Marcos Jr.’s failing tests.

He left for elections and became the vice-governor of Ilocos Norte before becoming the government.

However, a trend in 1986 may have ended his political career that his parents had planned for him.

Although an economic crisis had now caused unrest, the death of a popular opposition leader had smacked tens of thousands of people onto the streets.

A significant portion of the army was eventually persuaded to remove its support for the Marcos government, which expedited its death.

Getty Images Rows of colourful high heeled shoes being displayed behind clear glass cabinetsGetty Images

The home emigrated to Hawaii with whatever goods they may bring, but they still had enough evidence to show how beautiful life they had led.

The now-infamous 3, 000 pair of designer boots owned by Imelda Marcos were discovered by demonstrators who stormed the presidential palace, which contained imaginative oil photos of the home, a tub with gold-plated accessories, and the now-infamous Imelda Marcos.

While in power, the family is accused of plundering an estimated$ 10 billion in public funds. His name was already tarnished by the time Marcos Sr. passed away in captivity in 1989.

His child was able to paint that previous enough to win the presidency, some thirty years later.

assuming office of president

After moving back to the Philippines in the 1990s, Marcos worked as a provincial government, representative, and lawmaker before winning the presidential election in 2022.

Social internet was a significant component of this restructuring, helping Marcos gain new followers, particularly among the younger generation in a nation where the median time is around 25.

The Marcos home tradition has been revised on Facebook, with advertising posts claiming that Marcos Sr’s rule was really a “golden interval” for the nation.

A military law anthem from the Marcos Sr time was the music to a pretty concern for Gen Z users on TikTok, where they would record older community members marching to the beat.

With Sara Duterte running for vice-president as his reputation increased, Marcos launched his political campaign. She vowed to collaborate with Bongbong to bring the nation together and bring it “rise afterwards.”

They combined the two families ‘ strong foundations, the Marcos’s in the north and the Dutertes’ in the south, under the name “uniTeam.”

Getty Images Former first lady Imelda Marcos (2nd L) holds hands with her son, the new Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. (2nd R), as they stand with family members after he took his oath of office, during the inauguration ceremony at the National Museum in Manila on June 30, 2022. Getty Images

It was successful. More than twice as many seats did Marcos receive as his closest rival, with a thumping 31 million.

As success came to light, Marcos said,” Judge me not by my predecessors, but by my activities,” vowing to “be a senator for all Filipinos.”

Three times into his presidency, Marcos has aided Manila’s relationship with the US and has increasingly faced a forceful China in the South China Sea, a significant departure from Duterte’s.

Not just that, which caused a tangle between him and Sara Duterte, which gradually turned into an ugly, open spit.

She had boldly sought the more powerful Army collection, but he gave her the Education investment. He started a court case against her for the alleged use of state money. Therefore, in” jokes,” Sara Duterte claimed that she hired assassins to eliminate Marcos, and that he paved the way for her dad to be detained and taken to the Hague for his part in a bloody war on drugs, which resulted in the death of thousands.

The lower apartment has approved Sara Duterte’s prosecution, which will now have to be argued in the senate, making the senatorial elections on Monday potentially decisive decisions.

Whatever happens, these former friends ‘ conflict won’t stop on Saturday.

Will the Marcos ‘ ability to outsmart the Dutertes remain to be seen.

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ABOUT POLITICS: A sound bit of advice

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In: South-East Asia
Sirikanya: Being rather premature?
Sirikanya: Being somewhat early?

A concept has been conveyed by a former finance minister to an aspiring a– don’t be too comfortable with the state when it comes to income issues.

Such was the caution from Korn Chatikavanij, who was the financing secretary under Abhisit Vejjajiva from December 2008 to August 2011.

Mr Korn was making references in a recent Facebook post to a statement by Sirikanya Tansakun, a list MP and deputy leader of the People’s Party ( PP ), who said the main opposition party was shortlisting members to debate the national expenditure bill for the next fiscal year in October.

She even shared that she would walk behind the Finance Ministry if it were to issue a decree to increase the government’s borrowing power to mitigate far-reaching effect expected by the US taxes.

Ms Sirikanya, the favorites to become the finance secretary if the PP leads a government, even warned the Paetongtarn Shinawatra leadership not to purchase or been foolish in spending a potential loan.

Ms Sirikanya’s thoughts, but, were anything but reassuring for Mr Korn.

” Was Khun Sirikanya being quite early in finding the mortgage program acceptable? ” he said.

Mr Korn said he wished the federal social support in weathering the financial storm sweeping the country and the world. He insisted that now was not the day to be republican as he was watching to see if federal laws yielded any effects.

However, his interest has been grabbed by the state mulling over sponsoring a mortgage bill, which it wants to make successful in time for the next fiscal month’s expenditure.

Mr Korn said he failed to grasp the logic behind a push to load the country with a loan at a time when the latest macroeconomic year budget is hardly half through its cycle and the next fiscal year budget expenditure bill is in its early stage.

One bold fact which the government might find hard to swallow is that it had over-projected economic growth, which necessitated the current fiscal year budget to have a heavy deficit.

To offset the budgetary shortfall, the government has resorted to borrowing, nearly maxing out its public debt threshold.

The borrowing has hit the ceiling, which has put the country’s finances in a tight spot.

To compound the precarious situation, the ruling Pheu Thai Party’s flagship campaign policy– the digital handout scheme– implemented in phases in cash rather than digital money, has been ridiculed for being disbursed through a misguided concept. The policy is also being revised as it goes along, according to critics.

The initial plan to borrow 500 billion baht was also condemned for potentially violating the State Financial and Fiscal Discipline Act, as the country was not in a crisis as required by the law.

The rationale for the scheme, according to Finance Minister Pichai Chunhavajira, was that Thailand’s economy has been in a prolonged state of stagnation for more than 15 years.

Over the past decade, average GDP growth was only 1. 9 %, while household debt soared to more than 90 % of GDP. A lack of competitiveness led to a decline in the production sector, which caused a dip in export volume.

The administration viewed it as necessary to inject money into the economy while simultaneously tackling structural economic issues to enhance the country’s competitiveness.

The digital wallet scheme requires citizens to register using the government’s Tang Rat app. The programme was initially supposed to help all Thais aged 16 and older, with an estimated budget of 500–600 billion baht.

However, following criticism about the appropriateness of distributing 10,000 baht to everyone, eligibility criteria based on income were introduced. Eligible individuals must have an annual income of no more than 840,000 baht and bank savings of no more than 500,000 baht. This adjustment reduced the number of eligible recipients to 50 million people, with the government estimating that about 90 %, or 45 million, would register.

As a consequence, the programme’s budget was cut to 450 billion baht. Recipients were required to spend their handouts in the district where their registered residences were for the first round.

The digital wallet policy has so far undergone two phases. The first involved distributing 10,000 baht to 14. 5 million people who hold state welfare cards and disability cards.

The second phase, which was distributed to about 4 million elderly individuals aged 60 and above, got underway in January.

For the third phase, the Finance Ministry will distribute money through a digital payment platform system. To qualify for this phase, recipients must be Thai citizens aged 16 or above.

Meanwhile, Mr Korn said the Trump tariff issue may serve as a front to hide the underlying reason for the government’s large appetite for additional funds. The country’s treasury needs replenishing, with tax revenue falling short of targets.

However, the priority was not to borrow to balance national coffers. Rather, it should look to cut back on non-essential expenses, which are burdening the current fiscal year budget.

” This trimming of expenses, as I recall, was a recommendation Khun Sirikanya made during scrutiny of the current fiscal year budget in parliament last year. “

Mr Korn said if the government remained adamant in passing the loan bill, the legislative process from start to finish would span at least three to four months. By this time, the budget expenditure bill would be close to being enacted.

” In that case, why bother having a separate law when the borrowing could be incorporated into the budget expenditure bill? ” he said.

A possible explanation for a specific bill is that it could override the Public Debt Act and provide the government with an avenue to borrow beyond the legally permitted maximum.

” We must think it through extremely carefully. Don’t give in and be agreeable too easily,” the former finance minister said, referring to Ms Sirikanya.

Taking a turn for the worse

For the first time, former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s controversial hospital “imprisonment” faces intense scrutiny now the courts have stepped in, according to observers.

Thaksin: No sign of frailty

Thaksin: No sign of frailty

The Supreme Court’s Criminal Division for Holders of Political Positions has launched an inquiry into whether Thaksin’s transfer from Bangkok Remand Prison to the Police General Hospital ( PGH) two years ago was justified or part of a scheme for him to avoid actual jail time.

The inquiry comes despite the dismissal of a petition filed by former Democrat MP Charnchai Issarasenarak, who argued that Thaksin’s transfer from prison to a VIP ward at the hospital violated protocol and was therefore unlawful.

While the court rejected the petition because Mr Charnchai was not a direct party to the case, it found the claim serious enough to warrant an investigation.

” When it appears to the court that a final ruling may not have been properly enforced, it has the authority to hold an inquiry and issue an order,” the court said in a statement.

It has ordered all parties, including the National Anti-Corruption Commission ( NACC), the Attorney-General’s Office, the Department of Corrections, the PGH, and Thaksin himself, to submit documents and evidence within 30 days.

The court has scheduled a hearing for June 13, with many legal experts anticipating a relatively swift process as they believe there is no need for witness examination.

Thanaporn Sriyakul, director of the Political and Public Policy Analysis Institute, pointed out that the court had rejected Mr Charnchai’s petition twice before finally deciding to act.

This suggests the court now believes there may have been procedural violations in Thaksin’s detention and witnesses may be summoned if the documents are found to be insufficient for deliberating the case, said Mr Thanaporn.

” Thaksin must not let his guard down. He can’t afford a misstep. This is the closest call he’s had [to serving jail time in an actual prison],” he said.

Stithorn Thananithichot, director of the Office of Innovation for Democracy at King Prajadhipok’s Institute, told the Bangkok Post that scepticism persists because Thaksin has shown no sign of frailty despite serious health issues. If his illnesses are a pretense, someone may have to take the fall to keep him out of jail. Unless Thaksin foresaw this and prepared documentation, he might not get out of this legal predicament, he said.

According to a press briefing by Pheu Thai Party spokesman Danuporn Punnakan early last year in response to growing questions as to how seriously ill Thaksin was, Thaksin was found to be suffering from cervical spondylosis, a degenerative disease that affected the neck, which explained why the ex-premier was seen wearing a neck collar.

The former premier also had shoulder tendon degeneration for which he underwent surgery while at the PGH, and Thaksin still needed physical rehabilitation for a full year following that operation, according to the spokesman.

Mr Stithorn said if treatment records had been non-existent or no medication had been prescribed to Thaksin, any documents produced pertaining to a” treatment” may be assumed to have been fabricated, he said. However, the analyst questioned whether anyone would make up documents and lie in court, as doing so would result in severe penalties.

” Giving false testimony carries harsh punishment, and this raises the possibility of Thaksin fleeing the country again,” the analyst said.

Still, some political analysts believe Thaksin may get out of trouble due to political circumstances. If he manages to strike a deal with those in power, a behind-the-scenes actor could emerge to help him out of this.

” Taking Thaksin from the political scene does not bode well for conservatives. Pheu Thai will fall apart and the votes will go to the People’s Party ( PP ), not conservative parties,” said Mr Stithorn.

Thaksin returned to Thailand on Aug 22, 2023, after 15 years in self-imposed exile. He had been sentenced to a total of eight years in prison in three corruption cases.

In the first case, Thaksin was sentenced in absentia to three years in prison for conflict of interest. The court said Thaksin, while serving as PM, had ordered the state-run Export-Import Bank to lend 4 billion baht at a below-cost interest rate to Myanmar so it could buy products from Shin Satellite Plc, a company owned by his family.

In the second case, Thaksin was convicted of illegally launching a two- and three-digit lottery between 2003 and 2006. This amounted to abuse of power as the scheme was not supported by any legislation, the court said.

In the third case, the court sentenced Thaksin, who made his fortune in the telecoms industry, to five years for malfeasance in connection with the handling of telephone concessions and conflicts of interest from 2001 to 2006 during his two terms as prime minister.

Within hours of his arrival at the Bangkok Remand Prison, he was hospitalised due to unspecified health issues. He later received royal clemency that reduced his sentence from eight years to one.

Thaksin did not spend a single night in a standard prison cell, remaining in a special suite on the 14th floor of the PGH until he received parole. He has gradually resumed a political role and is believed to be leading neo-conservatives to counter the rising popularity of the progressive “orange camp”, a reference to the PP.

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A sound bit of advice

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In: South-East Asia
Sirikanya: Being rather premature?
Sirikanya: Being rather premature?

A sound bit of advice

A message has been conveyed by a former finance minister to an aspiring one — don’t be too agreeable with the government when it comes to money matters.

Such was the warning from Korn Chatikavanij, who was the finance minister under Abhisit Vejjajiva from December 2008 to August 2011.

Mr Korn was making references in a recent Facebook post to a statement by Sirikanya Tansakun, a list MP and deputy leader of the People’s Party (PP), who said the main opposition party was shortlisting members to debate the national expenditure bill for the next fiscal year in October.

She also shared that she would stand behind the Finance Ministry if it were to issue a decree to widen the country’s borrowing capacity to offset far-reaching impacts expected by the US tariffs.

Ms Sirikanya, the favourite to become the finance minister if the PP leads a government, also warned the Paetongtarn Shinawatra administration not to splurge or be reckless in spending a future loan.

Ms Sirikanya’s words, however, were anything but reassuring for Mr Korn.

“Was Khun Sirikanya being rather premature in finding the loan initiative acceptable?” he said.

Mr Korn said he wished the government moral support in weathering the economic storm sweeping the country and the world. He insisted that now was not the time to be partisan as he was watching to see if government policies yielded any results.

However, his attention has been grabbed by the government mulling over sponsoring a loan bill, which it wants to make effective in time for the next fiscal year’s expenditure.

Mr Korn said he failed to grasp the rationale behind a push to burden the country with a loan at a time when the current fiscal year budget is barely halfway through its cycle and the next fiscal year budget expenditure bill is in its formative stage.

One bold fact which the government might find hard to swallow is that it had over-projected economic growth, which necessitated the current fiscal year budget to have a heavy deficit.

To offset the budgetary shortfall, the government has resorted to borrowing, nearly maxing out its public debt threshold.

The borrowing has hit the ceiling, which has put the country’s finances in a tight spot.

To compound the precarious situation, the ruling Pheu Thai Party’s flagship campaign policy — the digital handout scheme — implemented in phases in cash rather than digital money, has been ridiculed for being disbursed through a misguided concept. The policy is also being revised as it goes along, according to critics.

The initial plan to borrow 500 billion baht was also condemned for potentially violating the State Financial and Fiscal Discipline Act, as the country was not in a crisis as required by the law.

The rationale for the scheme, according to Finance Minister Pichai Chunhavajira, was that Thailand’s economy has been in a prolonged state of stagnation for more than 15 years.

Over the past decade, average GDP growth was only 1.9%, while household debt soared to more than 90% of GDP. A lack of competitiveness led to a decline in the production sector, which caused a dip in export volume.

The administration viewed it as necessary to inject money into the economy while simultaneously tackling structural economic issues to enhance the country’s competitiveness.

The digital wallet scheme requires citizens to register using the government’s Tang Rat app. The programme was initially supposed to help all Thais aged 16 and older, with an estimated budget of 500–600 billion baht.

However, following criticism about the appropriateness of distributing 10,000 baht to everyone, eligibility criteria based on income were introduced. Eligible individuals must have an annual income of no more than 840,000 baht and bank savings of no more than 500,000 baht. This adjustment reduced the number of eligible recipients to 50 million people, with the government estimating that about 90%, or 45 million, would register.

As a consequence, the programme’s budget was cut to 450 billion baht. Recipients were required to spend their handouts in the district where their registered residences were for the first round.

The digital wallet policy has so far undergone two phases. The first involved distributing 10,000 baht to 14.5 million people who hold state welfare cards and disability cards.

The second phase, which was distributed to about 4 million elderly individuals aged 60 and above, got underway in January.

For the third phase, the Finance Ministry will distribute money through a digital payment platform system. To qualify for this phase, recipients must be Thai citizens aged 16 or above.

Meanwhile, Mr Korn said the Trump tariff issue may serve as a front to hide the underlying reason for the government’s large appetite for additional funds. The country’s treasury needs replenishing, with tax revenue falling short of targets.

However, the priority was not to borrow to balance national coffers. Rather, it should look to cut back on non-essential expenses, which are burdening the current fiscal year budget.

“This trimming of expenses, as I recall, was a recommendation Khun Sirikanya made during scrutiny of the current fiscal year budget in parliament last year.”

Mr Korn said if the government remained adamant in passing the loan bill, the legislative process from start to finish would span at least three to four months. By this time, the budget expenditure bill would be close to being enacted.

“In that case, why bother having a separate law when the borrowing could be incorporated into the budget expenditure bill?” he said.

A possible explanation for a specific bill is that it could override the Public Debt Act and provide the government with an avenue to borrow beyond the legally permitted maximum.

“We must think it through extremely carefully. Don’t give in and be agreeable too easily,” the former finance minister said, referring to Ms Sirikanya.

Taking a turn for the worse

For the first time, former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s controversial hospital “imprisonment” faces intense scrutiny now the courts have stepped in, according to observers.

Thaksin: No sign of frailty

Thaksin: No sign of frailty

The Supreme Court’s Criminal Division for Holders of Political Positions has launched an inquiry into whether Thaksin’s transfer from Bangkok Remand Prison to the Police General Hospital (PGH) two years ago was justified or part of a scheme for him to avoid actual jail time.

The inquiry comes despite the dismissal of a petition filed by former Democrat MP Charnchai Issarasenarak, who argued that Thaksin’s transfer from prison to a VIP ward at the hospital violated protocol and was therefore unlawful.

While the court rejected the petition because Mr Charnchai was not a direct party to the case, it found the claim serious enough to warrant an investigation.

“When it appears to the court that a final ruling may not have been properly enforced, it has the authority to hold an inquiry and issue an order,” the court said in a statement.

It has ordered all parties, including the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), the Attorney-General’s Office, the Department of Corrections, the PGH, and Thaksin himself, to submit documents and evidence within 30 days.

The court has scheduled a hearing for June 13, with many legal experts anticipating a relatively swift process as they believe there is no need for witness examination.

Thanaporn Sriyakul, director of the Political and Public Policy Analysis Institute, pointed out that the court had rejected Mr Charnchai’s petition twice before finally deciding to act.

This suggests the court now believes there may have been procedural violations in Thaksin’s detention and witnesses may be summoned if the documents are found to be insufficient for deliberating the case, said Mr Thanaporn.

“Thaksin must not let his guard down. He can’t afford a misstep. This is the closest call he’s had [to serving jail time in an actual prison],” he said.

Stithorn Thananithichot, director of the Office of Innovation for Democracy at King Prajadhipok’s Institute, told the Bangkok Post that scepticism persists because Thaksin has shown no sign of frailty despite serious health issues. If his illnesses are a pretense, someone may have to take the fall to keep him out of jail. Unless Thaksin foresaw this and prepared documentation, he might not get out of this legal predicament, he said.

According to a press briefing by Pheu Thai Party spokesman Danuporn Punnakan early last year in response to growing questions as to how seriously ill Thaksin was, Thaksin was found to be suffering from cervical spondylosis, a degenerative disease that affected the neck, which explained why the ex-premier was seen wearing a neck collar.

The former premier also had shoulder tendon degeneration for which he underwent surgery while at the PGH, and Thaksin still needed physical rehabilitation for a full year following that operation, according to the spokesman.

Mr Stithorn said if treatment records had been non-existent or no medication had been prescribed to Thaksin, any documents produced pertaining to a “treatment” may be assumed to have been fabricated, he said. However, the analyst questioned whether anyone would make up documents and lie in court, as doing so would result in severe penalties.

“Giving false testimony carries harsh punishment, and this raises the possibility of Thaksin fleeing the country again,” the analyst said.

Still, some political analysts believe Thaksin may get out of trouble due to political circumstances. If he manages to strike a deal with those in power, a behind-the-scenes actor could emerge to help him out of this.

“Taking Thaksin from the political scene does not bode well for conservatives. Pheu Thai will fall apart and the votes will go to the People’s Party (PP), not conservative parties,” said Mr Stithorn.

Thaksin returned to Thailand on Aug 22, 2023, after 15 years in self-imposed exile. He had been sentenced to a total of eight years in prison in three corruption cases.

In the first case, Thaksin was sentenced in absentia to three years in prison for conflict of interest. The court said Thaksin, while serving as PM, had ordered the state-run Export-Import Bank to lend 4 billion baht at a below-cost interest rate to Myanmar so it could buy products from Shin Satellite Plc, a company owned by his family.

In the second case, Thaksin was convicted of illegally launching a two- and three-digit lottery between 2003 and 2006. This amounted to abuse of power as the scheme was not supported by any legislation, the court said.

In the third case, the court sentenced Thaksin, who made his fortune in the telecoms industry, to five years for malfeasance in connection with the handling of telephone concessions and conflicts of interest from 2001 to 2006 during his two terms as prime minister.

Within hours of his arrival at the Bangkok Remand Prison, he was hospitalised due to unspecified health issues. He later received royal clemency that reduced his sentence from eight years to one.

Thaksin did not spend a single night in a standard prison cell, remaining in a special suite on the 14th floor of the PGH until he received parole. He has gradually resumed a political role and is believed to be leading neo-conservatives to counter the rising popularity of the progressive “orange camp”, a reference to the PP.

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Advice to Tokyo about that US debt weapon: Use at your own risk – Asia Times

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In: Asia

Japan’s mountain may be a hill, but pulling the trigger may also result in China and Japan working together to counteract America’s position.

Japan holds more than$ 1 trillion in debt under the US Treasury&nbsp. Or, to put it another way, the US owes Japan a trillion dollars, which was borrowed to pay off America’s excessive saving. &nbsp, &nbsp,

Japan’s finance minister, Katsunobu Kato, and others, suggested last week that Tokyo may use its bank holdings and the danger to dump them as a weapon against Washington. This would be a part of approaching discussions regarding the recently imposed tariffs andnbsp on Japan and the majority of other countries, Donald Trump‘s, and various administrations.

Japan’s anger over being “tariffed” is understandable. Japan has been a reliable partner. And US officials consistently refer to their diplomatic ties as being “rock-solid,” the most significant bilateral relationship. &nbsp, &nbsp,

Therefore, it’s stingy to be treated like the People’s Republic of China ( PRC ), a nation that has killed well over half a million Americans with fentanyl over the past ten years or more.

However, Japan should be cautious about making actually veiled threats about its US loan, as opposed to acting on them. This is not a US-Japan winner-takes-all scenario.

And Tokyo needs the US more than America needs Japan, both physically and economically, despite its disapproval of the fact. If the PRC doesn’t help Japan, it will find itself under intolerable force.

The unending ring effect that no one wants

Nobody wants to think about it, but foreigners have a reputation for possible using America’s bill as a weapon.

The typical scenario is that China, which holds about$ 800 billion in US debt, dumps its T-bills on the market to hurt the Americans. Some people, however, thought Japan would start a chain of events that would render the US politically and economically incapable of responding to Taiwanese attacks on Japan, Taiwan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and/or Japan itself. &nbsp, &nbsp,

On February 12, 2025, the Japanese destroyer Kaga (center ) and American and French aircraft carriers will sail alongside one another in waters off the Philippines. Photo of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force

Destroy debt, and the US-Japan ally will stop. The sell-off of the Treasury by Americans will be seen as betrayal in a large portion of the nation.

In addition, if Japan pulls the debt-related bill set, it will work with China to undermine US dominance. This might impair America’s ability to maintain its military reputation, which has stabilized relations with other countries and protected Japan.

Japan had to think about its steps in terms of trade negotiations no. What, according to one observer,” What Japanese errors will fill the Dragon with glee and pique the dragon’s hunger for conquerorship”? China is a potent acidic broker. Why do Japan want to “become an accelerant or a partner in its own fate”?

Misinterpreting the American feelings

One has the effect that Chinese officials and their social elite have a limited knowing of America and Americans. Their opinions are largely influenced by the ambassadors, think-tankers, scientists, and activists in Washington.

Japan is unable to comprehend how large swathes of the US have much faith in the state and little interest in international conflicts.

Warren Buffett presides the May 6 gathering of the 2023 Berkshire Hathaway. snapshot of the image

Warren Buffett made a number of remarks about Japan, company opportunities, and taxes at the current Berkshire Hathaway annual owners meet. He made a “free trade” statement that essentially supported the imprisonment of US work, and it was met with enthusiastic acclaim.

The investor-class split is clearly visible in the response, which is the so-called bridge country in middle America. To the Japanese who were tuned in, please note that the US investment category is not the US hero group. The top 10 % of Americans, who are wealthiest, own 88 % of assets. The next 40 %, in contrast, hold the last 12 %.

The middle 50 % are debt-owners, not stockholders. The recruiting offices for the government are also based there.

The pompous elite can no longer hold the peasant group to be a slave to their own devices. &nbsp,

No more being the “attending practitioner.”

Americans have adopted a post-World War I approach toward the world following the crisis of 20 years of body works, expended regional wealth, and lost opportunity fees. The globalists and neoliberals are in decline, in fact.

Many people are simply waiting for the bad people to infuse loyalty into their eyes. Particularly after Joe Biden, years of burning banners, and the age of toppling statues.

The Gulfstream-riders and the southern leaders are clueless when it comes to people outside their thin school, so the Japanese may become informed.

Threatening the people Japan depends on to defend it may think otherwise, but it won’t be well received by those who do so. &nbsp, &nbsp,

Don’t believe that? The ambassador from Japan may travel to Akron, Ohio, or Erie, Pennsylvania to give the local Rotary Clubs information. Consider the implied risk presented by US bill of trillions. The market will make the case that a US service member who dies while defending a nation where younger people don’t want to enlist in the military is worth far more than a trillion dollars.

Tokyo would be a better place to serve as a “attending doctors” to assist the nation in recovering from its agonizing spending woes in the past 25 years. It does provide support for America as the US rebuilds its military and manufacturing center.

If the individual returns, it will be appreciative and even more eager to defend Japan.

Former US minister and previous US Marine official Grant Newsham. When China Attacks: A Warning to America is his book, which he is the publisher of.

This content was republished with authority from JAPAN Forward.

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Europe repositioning between US and China in new global order – Asia Times

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The term that perhaps best describes the international impact of the first 100 days of Donald Trump’s second term is “disruption.”

His tariff policy, his abolition of USAID, his questioning of the transatlantic alliance, and his attempted rapprochement with Russia have neither destroyed the liberal international order nor established anything new in its place.

But the prospects of liberal internationalism under Trump are vanishingly small. And Trumpism, in the guise of an “America First” foreign policy, is likely to outlast Trump’s second term.

That the US is no longer the standard bearer of the liberal international order has been clear for some time. Trump and his Russian and Chinese counterparts, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, appear to see themselves as dominant players in a new multipolar world order. But it is not clear that a grand bargain between them is possible – or that it would endure.

Europe is particularly vulnerable to these changes in the international order. Having been able to rely for the past eight decades on an iron-clad American security guarantee, European countries have chronically underinvested in their defense capabilities, especially since the end of the Cold War.

Defense spending as a proportion of GDP may have increased over the past decade, but remains lackluster. And investment in an independent European defense industrial base faces many hurdles.

These deficiencies predated Trump’s return to the White House. Addressing them will only be possible in a time frame beyond his second term. With no dependable partners left among the world’s great powers, Europe’s predicament – unenviable as it may be for the moment – nonetheless offers an opportunity for the continent to begin to stand on its own feet.

Early signs of a more independent Europe are promising. In March, the European Commission released a white paper on defense which anticipates defense investment of €800 billion ($903.5 billion) over the next four years.

The bulk of this will rely on the activation of the so-called “national escape clause”. This allows EU member states to escape penalties if they exceed the normal deficit ceiling of 3% of GDP.

Once activated for the purpose of defense spending, they can now take on additional debt of up to 1.5% of their GDP. By the end of April, 12 EU member states had already requested that the national escape clause be activated, with several more expected to follow.

Defense is clearly the most urgent problem for Europe. But it isn’t the only aspect to consider when it comes to achieving greater strategic autonomy, something that the European Union has grappled with for more than a decade. In other areas, such as trade and energy, the starting point is a very different one.

Regarding energy independence, the EU has achieved a remarkable and quick pivot away from Russia. It has just released a final plan to stop all remaining gas imports from Russia by the end of 2027.

On trade, Trump’s America First tariff policy has done significant damage to the global system. This has, in turn, created opportunities for the EU, as one of the world’s largest trading blocs, including greater cooperation with China, already one of its largest trading partners.

Complex relationships

China and the EU clearly share an interest in preserving a global trade regime from which both have benefited. But their economic interests cannot be separated easily from their geopolitical interests. So far, China has sent very mixed signals to Europe.

Beijing has, for example, proposed to lift sanctions against some members of the European Parliament who have been critical of China in a show of goodwill. But China’s support for Russia continues as well, most recently with Xi’s commitment to visit Moscow for the Victory Day parade on May 9.

Standing with Moscow may benefit Beijing in its rivalry with the US by solidifying the “no-limits partnership” that Xi and Putin announced on the eve of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. But it does little to win the EU over as a partner in defense of the open international order that Trump is trying his best to shutter.

On the contrary, in reaffirming China’s commitment to its partnership with Russia, Xi may well have lost whatever chances there were for a European realignment with China.

The complexities of the EU-China and EU-US relationships – a curious mix of rapidly shifting interests – reflect the EU’s position as the natural center of gravity of what is left of the West.

This is evident in the rapid evolution of the “coalition of the willing” in support of Ukraine, which brings together 30 countries from across the EU and NATO under French and British leadership.

Beyond Europe, Trump’s tariff policy has given plans for a strategic partnership between the EU and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) a new lease of life.

The CPTPP is a group of 11 Indo-Pacific countries and the UK, which joined last December. It is one of the world’s largest free trade areas, accounting for approximately 15% of global GDP.

Even without US and Chinese membership, a partnership between the EU and the CPTPP would wield significant power in the global economic system and could play a future role in shielding its members from an intensifying US-China trade war.

Limited alternatives

None of the steps taken by the EU and its partners on the continent and elsewhere require the breakdown in the transatlantic relationship that the Trump administration appears keen to engineer. But speeches by both US Vice President J.D. Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio were clear that America’s relationship with Europe is changing.

Washington, under its current leadership, increasingly leans towards the political forces in Europe that are opposed to the values on which the continent has been oriented since 1945. This leaves Europe few options but to seek more independence from the US.

A more independent Europe is unlikely to become a global superpower on par with the US or China. But it will be better able to hold its own in a geopolitical environment that is less based on rules and more on power.

The EU currently enjoys historically high approval ratings among its citizens – who also support more unity and a more active role for the EU in protecting them from global security risks.

It’s increasingly clear that EU leaders and their partners have a unique opportunity – and an obligation – to carve out a more secure and independent space in a hostile global environment.

Stefan Wolff is professor of international security, University of Birmingham

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Struggles at the farm gate

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Calls for govt help as prices for key crops plunge, write Sitthipoj Kebui, Assawin Pakkawan and Panumet Tanraksa

Farmers across Thailand are sounding the alarm as plunging prices for key crops push rural communities deeper into debt, prompting urgent calls for government intervention.

In Phichit, watermelon growers are grappling with a price slump that has left tonnes of fruit unsold in fields.

Kanda Sawangsuk, a village head and farmer in Moo 15, tambon Nong Plalai of Wang Sai Phun district, said she planted 38 rai of watermelons this season.

While previous years brought wholesale prices of 7–9 baht per kilogramme, this year prices have plunged to as low as 2 baht for smaller fruit — and even then, buyers are scarce.

“Big watermelons over 3kg fetch just 5 baht/kg, medium-sized ones 3 baht, and small ones only 2 baht,” she said.

“We’ve got sweet, crisp fruit but no market. I ask fellow Thais to support us by buying locally grown watermelon — it’s delicious, refreshing, and affordable.”

Meanwhile, in Mae Hong Son, garlic farmers are in dire straits. Pharuhas Suntornsitsak, a village head in tambon Na Pu Pom, Pang Mapha district, said garlic prices have fallen to 30 baht per kilogramme, with no traders turning up to buy — a stark contrast to previous years. The lack of buyers has left farmers with no income to pay off debts, especially with the school term looming and families in need of money for uniforms and supplies.

Some, like Yupadee Praipattanajit, said frustration has boiled over: “We typically sell our entire harvest to traders, and are now left with unsold stock. No one is buying, and some farmers are so stressed they’ve begun burning their garlic crops in despair.”

Local farmers blamed middlemen for withholding purchases in early harvests to drive prices down, leaving growers at a disadvantage as they scrambled to repay loans, many from the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) or informal lenders.

Further north in Chiang Mai’s Omkoi district, the chilli crisis has reached critical levels. Villagers are abandoning their harvests as prices for green and bell chillies fall to below 5 baht/kg — the lowest in ten years.

Phra Khru Aod, a monk from Wat Chedi Luang, has stepped in to provide relief by purchasing produce and distributing it to city residents.

He joined locals in harvesting chillies and organised the donation of over 8,000 kilogrammes of fresh produce — including tomatoes, pumpkins, and leafy greens — to communities across Chiang Mai.

Ms Nadue, a representative of the local Muser ethnic group, said the crisis has persisted for over two months.

Some farmers have only managed to sell a fraction of their harvest, while others are forced to let their crops rot as the cost of labour and transport outweighs the potential earnings.

“Our hope of supporting our families through farming has crumbled,” said farmer Nadue. “Even if we manage to sell, it doesn’t cover loan interest.”

Community leader Nanla said many farmers across Omkoi and nearby districts like Mae Sariang are similarly affected.

Despite efforts to distribute produce, most crops go to waste, highlighting the urgent need for market solutions and systemic support.

In the South, durian farmers face a different but equally devastating crisis. Torrential rain has caused widespread flower drop, decimating yields in provinces like Phatthalung and Yala.

Ismael Chuayphrik, a grower from Tamot district, said over 50% of his durian crop was lost due to storm damage in April.

Even large-scale growers, like Kampanat Wongchuwan in Yala, report massive losses. Some orchards have seen entire trees fail to fruit, and the spread of fusarium wilt — a fast-moving fungal disease — is compounding the problem.

“There’s hope for an off-season yield later in the year if we get a dry spell,” said durian adviser Prawan Choomai, “but the disease threat is real and needs immediate attention.”

Across the country, farmers are urging the government to intervene with emergency purchases, debt relief, and sustainable market access. But systemic support remains elusive.

“Thai agriculture cannot survive on hope alone,” said Supap Musikasiri, chairman of the Phatthalung Farmers Council. “The government must act — not just with short-term relief but long-term strategies to stabilise farm incomes.”

Rural communities are suffering under the weight of debt, failed crops, and market neglect, he said.

“We urgently need government intervention to stabilise farm prices, provide financial relief to struggling growers, and address the systemic issues that leave farmers vulnerable.”

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