Commentary: Japan’s new prime minister has barely the concept of a plan

Ishiba’s position on China is even harder to map out. He’s by turns hawkish and pragmatic, and seeks active diplomacy with Beijing that would benefit both sides – rhetoric that has changed little in almost a decade, the last time Ishiba held a significant position in the party – despite the geopolitical changes.

His self-styled identification with Tanzan Ishibashi, a journalist who became prime minister in the 1950s and who had promoted a pre-war “Small Japan-ism” that called to mind the Little Englanders of the 19th century who protested the British Empire’s expansion, might be the most telling:  A vision of Japan as an aloof country with strong borders but little ambition.

His economic policy is similarly slippery. He talks of boosting the lot of the less fortunate, and revitalising regions outside Tokyo. His political inspiration, the former prime minister Kakuei Tanaka, had similar promises – but also a plan to do so through great infrastructure projects such as the Shinkansen bullet train network.

FEW NEW IDEAS

If Ishiba has similar dreams, he’s not telling anyone. On Friday, he had few new ideas to help boost growth that is expected to be flat this year, and mostly called for continuing Kishida’s goal of raising wages.

In past remarks, as well as in his opposition to Abenomics, he has seemed to favour austerity. He has expressed support for Bank of Japan rate hikes, has said there’s room to raise both corporate and capital gains taxes, and has emphasised the importance of reducing Japan’s debt.

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Government ups flood compensation to flat B9,000

Soldiers clean up flooded Mae Sai district of Chiang Rai late last month. (Photo: Disaster Response Association of Thailand)
Soldiers clean up flooded Mae Sai district of Chiang Rai late last month. (Photo: Disaster Response Association of Thailand)

The cabinet has revised compensation for flood victims to a flat rate of 9,000 baht per household instead of the previous 5,000-9,000 baht range.

“The government decided that all affected households will each receive 9,000 baht due to the severity of the flood situation,” said Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra on Tuesday after a cabinet meeting.

She said the cabinet had received reports from the frontline operation centre for disaster relief for flood, storm and landslide victims and has reviewed the details of the financial relief to flood victims previously announced at 5,000 baht, 7,000 baht and 9,000 baht.

The cabinet agreed in principle on the new single payment, but more details have been requested for further approval on Oct 8, she said.

Following discussions with Deputy Interior Minister Theerarat Samrejvanich and Deputy Defence Minister Gen Nattaphon Narkphanit, who had also been inspecting flood-hit areas, the PM reported that assistance has been provided to those in need.

The premier said the cabinet approved a proposal from the Ministry of Finance to revise the Government Savings Bank’s (GSB’s) low-interest loan (soft loan) programme, with a budget of 50 billion baht out of the total of 100 billion baht.

This programme will provide low-interest funds to financial institutions for lending to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and freelancers affected by the floods.

In addition, the GSB has suspended debt and waived interest for three months from October to December 2024 for some SMEs to ease the financial burden.

Meanwhile, Pornchai Thirraveja, spokesman for the Finance Ministry, said the cabinet has approved raising the top level of the GSB Boost Up soft loan programme and a loan guarantee proposal to help SMEs affected by flooding from the Thai Credit Guarantee Corporation (TCG).

For the soft loan programme, the GSB will offer loans to financial institutions at a 0.01% interest rate for two years to lend to those affected by the flood at an interest rate not exceeding 3.5% per year for two years.

Borrowers can receive up to 40 million baht, and loan applications are open until Dec 30.

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Govt ups compensation to flat B9k

Soldiers clean up flooded Mae Sai district of Chiang Rai late last month. (Photo: Disaster Response Association of Thailand)
Soldiers clean up flooded Mae Sai district of Chiang Rai late last month. (Photo: Disaster Response Association of Thailand)

The cabinet revised compensation for flood victims to a flat rate of 9,000 baht per household instead of the previous 5,000-9,000 baht range.

“The government decided that all affected households will each receive 9,000 baht due to the severity of the flood situation,” said Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra on Tuesday after a cabinet meeting.

She said the cabinet had received reports from the frontline operation centre for disaster relief for flood, storm and landslide victims and has reviewed the details of the financial relief to flood victims previously announced at 5,000 baht, 7,000 baht and 9,000 baht.

The cabinet agreed in principle on the new single payment, but more details have been requested for further approval on Oct 8, she said.

Following discussions with Deputy Interior Minister Theerarat Samrejvanich and Deputy Defence Minister Gen Nattaphon Narkphanit, who had also been inspecting flood-hit areas, the PM reported that assistance has been provided to those in need.

The premier said the cabinet approved a proposal from the Ministry of Finance to revise the Government Savings Bank’s (GSB’s) low-interest loan (soft loan) programme, with a budget of 50 billion baht out of the total of 100 billion baht.

This programme will provide low-interest funds to financial institutions for lending to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and freelancers affected by the floods.

In addition, the GSB has suspended debt and waived interest for three months from October to December 2024 for some SMEs to ease the financial burden.

Meanwhile, Pornchai Thirraveja, spokesman for the Finance Ministry, said the cabinet has approved raising the top level of the GSB Boost Up soft loan programme and a loan guarantee proposal to help SMEs affected by flooding from the Thai Credit Guarantee Corporation (TCG).

For the soft loan programme, the GSB will offer loans to financial institutions at a 0.01% interest rate for two years to lend to those affected by the flood at an interest rate not exceeding 3.5% per year for two years.

Borrowers can receive up to 40 million baht, and loan applications are open until Dec 30.

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Indonesian miner BUMA secures 1 trillion Rupiah bond issuance | FinanceAsia

Mining services firm Bukit Makmur Mandiri Utama (BUMA), the principal subsidiary of Indonesia Stock Exchange-listed Delta Dunia Makmur, has completed the successful issuance of the BUMA II 2024 Rupiah bonds (BUMA II 2024 bonds) with a total value of Rp1 trillion ($65.7 million).

The bonds were oversubscribed by 1.4 times and were issued in three series: Series A with a nominal value of Rp251 billion at a fixed interest rate of 7.25% per annum, maturing in 370 calendar days; Series B with a nominal value of Rp332.71 billion at a fixed interest rate of 9.25% per annum, maturing in three years; Series C with a nominal value of Rp416.26 billion at a fixed interest rate of 9.75% per annum, maturing in five years.

A “wide range” of Indonesian pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, asset managers, and banks invested in the offering, a BUMA spokesperson told FinanceAsia.   

Indra Kanoena, president director of BUMA, commented, “The strong market response to BUMA II 2024 bond offering reinforces confidence in BUMA’s strategic direction, robust cash flow management, and credit profile. This bonds issuance allows us to further diversify and solidify our financial foundation, driving growth in our business while strengthening our position as a leading mining service provider and advancing toward becoming a diversified global mining company.”

The proceeds will be used to manage its debt maturity profile and fuel future growth. BUMA has operations in Indonesia and Australia, and in June this year it bought the Atlantic Carbon Group in Pennsylvania for around $122 million, and subsequently BUMA became the leading producer of anthracite coal in the US. 

42.29% of the proceeds, amounting to Rp422.9 billion, is being allocated to repay debt under BUMA I 2023 Series A, which matures on January 8, 2025. Additionally, 28.86% of the funds will be used for capital expenditure to purchase heavy equipment, enhancing BUMA’s production capacity and operational efficiency, the media release said. 

The remaining 28.85% will support BUMA’s ongoing operational activities, enhancing the company’s ability to manage cash flows and control costs effectively.

The issuance has further diversified the company’s financing strategy, which consists of both USD and IDR bonds, conventional and Shariah bank loans, and leasing financing schemes. The strategy strengthens the company’s financial resilience, enhances its ability to navigate market volatility, broadens its financial base, placing the company in a better position for future growth, according to the media release.

The BUMA II 2024 bonds received an A+ rating from Pemeringkat Efek Indonesia (Pefindo) and Fitch Ratings. BNI Sekuritas and Trimegah Sekuritas Indonesiawere the joint lead underwriters for the bonds’ issuance.

Delta Dunia Group also owns two new subsidiaries: Bukit Teknologi Digital (BTech), offering mining technology solutions, and BISA Ruang Nuswantara (BIRU), a social entity dedicated to education, vocational schools, and fostering a circular economy. In July 2024, the group established Katalis Investama Mandiri to support its long-term strategy in environmental, social and governance (ESG).


¬ Haymarket Media Limited. All rights reserved.

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Israel invasion could push Lebanon into total state collapse – Asia Times

Some people have been worried for the past year that the conflict between Israel and Hamas will spread to neighboring nations and cause a damaging conflict in the Middle East. There is no denying that the conflict has now spread to Lebanon, despite the fact that there is still hope that the most bleak regional rumors wo n’t materialize.

The main characters are Israel and Hezbollah, the self-styled weight group-political group that is significantly rooted in Lebanon’s social structure, business, and much of its world. The main players are Israel and Hezbollah, the country’s northern and southern Lebanon.

In mid-September, Israel announced it was shifting its defence policy towards its northern borders, where 70, 000 persons had been displaced over the past month by missiles fired by Hezbollah. Yoav Gallant, the minister of defense, stated that its battle goals had changed to ensure that these citizens may return to their homes in health.

Israel claims that a large portion of the Hezbollah management has been eliminated as well as a significant portion of its military infrastructure following a weekend of missile attacks into Lebanon. All parties involved may face more difficult issues during this conflict’s next stage, which also poses a significant threat to the region and beyond.

The possibility that Lebanon could fail as a state if this war escalates is perhaps lost in the debates about whether Israel can defeat Hamas ( and Hamas in Gaza ), how Iran ( Hezbollah’s main supporter ) will respond, and who will ultimately prevail. And that serves no person’s objectives.

Lebanon is a fragile nation that has experienced devastating economic and political problems, fraud, human rights violations, and a collapse in trust between the government and society over the past ten years.

Its market is unstable, having not recovered from the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. The Palestinian economy was still reeling from the collapse of its economic structure in 2019 and the default on its intolerably high debt levels in 2020 as a result of the Covid-19 crisis.

The skill of regular Palestinian citizens to provide for themselves and their families has been further hampered by world inflationary pressures and cost of living pressure.

In recent years, the nation has hemorrhaged its capital, and very few overseas buyers have the guts to take their money there. Per person incomes have decreased significantly, and they still stand at around US$ 3,300, along from around US$ 9 000 in 2018.

Lebanon’s economy has gone into reverse since the crisis in 2019, with gross domestic product ( GDP ) declining from$ 59 billion in 2018 to just$ 22 billion today. Nearly half of the population is now living below the poverty line, which is combined with inflation at a rate of 200 % and a 95 % loss of the Lebanese pound.

There has been a breakdown in waste disposal and electricity supplies ( Lebanon’s state power company struggles to provide even two hours of electricity per day ). Lebanon has a trade deficit of around$ 9 billion annually, and its reserves of foreign currencies are extraordinarily low. This has made it even more difficult for regular Lebanese to obtain the necessities to survive ( let alone prosper ).

Even a small war can have devastating economic outcomes that endure well after the conflict has ended. If history can provide any insight into the present conflict, we can anticipate a protracted and extreme conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, one in which Israeli troops will be stationed in Lebanon. This war is likely to completely destabilize the Syrian market, bringing the entire nation to the brink of collapse.

This has not been the case previously. Similar events occurred in the stormy early 1970s and the Syrian civil war that erupted between 1975 and 1990. Since the start of the civil war in Lebanon in 2011, there have been intolerable pressure being put on the delivery of goods and services there. The need for healthcare, education, resources and accommodation has far exceeded offer.

With a number of activities, including the 2016 EU-Lebanon Compact, financial assistance in the region of several billion dollars, the global community has assisted Lebanon in welcoming Syrian refugees.

However, the financial and material assistance provided was inappropriate. Lebanon has grown disturbed and strained as a result of having the highest refugee-to-citizen amount in the world.

A failed position?

As if the region’s political landscape of conflict and suffering were n’t bad enough, the country’s political landscape still ranks among the most fractious and contentious in the area.

In many ways, Lebanon has not for the past five years had a fully functioning collection of state organizations. The government may function completely due to intense social conflict and divisions between the political parties.

And with little assistance from the government, thousands of ordinary citizens are now facing serious threats to their lives and livelihoods as a result of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah.

In Lebanon, there have been displaced for up to a million civilians, and a lot of the country’s equipment and real estate have been destroyed. And yet to be completely successful is an Israeli floor invasion.

Poised: Jewish troops massing back of a possible floor invasion, September 30 2024. &nbsp, Photo: EPA-EFE via The Conversation / Atef Safadi

But there’s little doubt that one is on the method. By ensuring Hezbollah is no longer a feasible military threat, Israel intends to forever change the balance of power.

There are &nbsp, clear parallels&nbsp, between Israel’s 2006 invasion of Lebanon ( the 34-day war ) and the much broader 1982 war. The 2006 fight devastated Lebanon’s system, while the 1982 war lasted until 2000, leading to huge damage, hardship, insecurity and instability.

Lebanon’s recent conflict has the potential for a second civil war, to the extent that it could destroy it. This would provide no one’s attention. A volatile, devasted, and failing Lebanon will only have adverse effects on Israel and allies in the Middle East.

Just decline and damage may occur in Lebanon, the Middle East, and elsewhere if the Hobbesian logic of the powerful doing what they will and the poor suffering what they must is allowed to continue. It is crucial that purpose and purpose prevail, and that Israel, Hamas, and Hezbollah’s conflict de-escalate.

Imad El-Anis is associate professor in foreign relationships, Nottingham Trent University

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

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Xi Jinping is worried about the economy – what do Chinese people think?

Getty Images A group of Chinese young people play on their mobile phone as they rest on a bench at a park in Beijing on November 7, 2013Getty Images

The nervous leaders of China are pulling out all the halts to gurgling economies.

They have unveiled stimulus measures, offered rare cash handouts, held a surprise meeting to kickstart growth and tried to shake up an ailing property market with a raft of decisions – they did all of this in the last week.

Less obvious is how the downturn has affected regular Chinese people, whose anticipation and frustrations are frequently heavily censored.

However, two recent studies provide some information. The second, a study of Foreign attitudes toward the economy, revealed that people were becoming more optimistic and unsure about their futures. The second is a record of demonstrations, both real and online, that noted a surge in situations driven by economic problems.

Although the image is far from finished, it never ceases to give a unique insight into the country’s current economic climate and how Chinese people view the future.

Savings and investing have been negatively impacted by the rough public debt and rising poverty, aside from the real estate crisis. The nation’s second-largest economy properly miss its personal growth target- 5 %- this year.

The Chinese Communist Party is somber about that. A authoritarian regime that would never lose its grip on power offered the carrot of a repressive regime that had made China a world power as a result of violent progress.

Bullish to grim

The decline hit as the crisis ended, largely driven by three years of rapid and full lockdowns, which murdered economic activity.

The study by American faculty Martin Whyte of Harvard University and Scott Rozelle of Stanford University’s Center on China’s Economy demonstrates that there was a distinction between the ages before and after the crisis.

They conducted their studies in 2004 and 2009, before Xi Jinping became China’s chief, and during his law in 2014 and 2023. The trial sizes varied, ranging between 3, 000 and 7, 500.

Nearly 60 % of the respondents in 2004 reported that their families ‘ economic situation had improved over the previous five years, and that they were also optimistic about the upcoming five years.

The figures jumped in 2009 and 2014- with 72.4 % and 76.5 % respectively saying things had improved, while 68.8 % and 73 % were hopeful about the future.

But in 2023, only 38.8 % felt life had got much for their households. And less than half ( or about 47 % ) of respondents believed things would improve over the following five years.

Meanwhile, the proportion of those who felt pessimistic about the future rose, from just 2.3 % in 2004 to 16 % in 2023.

Getty Images Buildings in Pudong's Lujiazui Financial District in Shanghai, June 2023Getty Images

Although the studies were conducted on a nationwide representative sample of people between the ages of 20 and 60, getting access to a wide range of viewpoints is difficult in authoritarian China.

Respondents came from 29 provincial and operational areas in China, but Xinjiang and some of Tibet were exempt, according to Mr. Whyte, who argued that “extra costs are brought on by remoteness and political sensitivity” Home to ethnic minority, these tightly controlled places in the north-west have huge bristled under Beijing’s law.

The poll was not conducted by those who were unable to express their opinions, according to the experts. Those who did shared their opinions when they were told it was for educational purposes, and may be private.

Their anxieties are reflected in the choices that are being made by many young Chinese people. With unemployment on the rise, millions of college graduates have been forced to accept low-wage jobs, while others have embraced a “lie flat” attitude, pushing back against relentless work. Still others have opted to be “full-time children”, returning home to their parents because they cannot find a job, or are burnt out.

Experts believe China’s iron-fisted administration of Covid-19 played a major role in undoing people’s enthusiasm.

It served as a turning point for many because it demonstrated how totalitarian the state was in the eyes of anyone. Individuals felt policed like they had never when, according to Alfred Wu, an associate professor at Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy.

He continued, noting that the later pay cuts “exacerbated the trust crisis” and that many people were depressed.

Moxi, 38, was one of them. He left his job as a physician and relocated to Dali, a seaside town in southwest China that is now a favorite with young folks who want a break from demanding tasks.

” When I was still a psychiatrist, I did n’t even have the time or energy to think about where my life was heading”, he told the BBC. ” There was no place for enthusiasm or despair. It was just work”.

Does challenging labor paid off? Foreign citizens today say “no.”

Job, however, no more seems to indicate a promising future, according to the poll.

In 2004, 2009 and 2014, more than six in 10 respondents agreed that “effort is often rewarded” in China. Those who disagreed amounted to 15 %.

Travel 2023, the mood flipped. Only 28.3 % believed that their hard work would pay off, while a third of them disagreed. The disagreement was strongest among lower-income families, who earned less than 50, 000 yuan ($ 6, 989, £5, 442 ) a year.

Chinese people are frequently told that the hard work and pursuit of degrees will pay off in economic success. A turbulent history has shaped a large portion of this desire, where individuals gritted their teeth through the suffering of war and hunger and plodded on.

Foreign leaders, too, have touted such a work ethics. Xi’s Taiwanese Dream, for example, echoes the American Dream, where hard work and skill give away. He has urged young persons to “eat bitterness”, a Taiwanese word for enduring pain.

However, the majority of the respondents to the Whyte and Rozelle review attributed the privileges enjoyed by their families and contacts to being wealthy in 2023. A decade before, interviewees had attributed success to ability, skills, a good education and hard work.

This is despite Xi’s signature “common prosperity” policy aimed at narrowing the wealth gap, although critics say it has only resulted in a crackdown on businesses.

According to the China Dissent Monitor ( CDM), there are other indicators of discontent, such as an 18 % increase in protests in the second quarter of 2024 in comparison to the same period last year.

The study defines protests as any instance when people voice grievances or advance their interests in ways that are in contention with authority – this could happen physically or online. Such episodes, however small, are still telling in China, where even lone protesters are swiftly tracked down and detained.

A least three in four instances are due to economic problems, said Kevin Slaten, one of the CDM article’s four readers.

Starting in June 2022, the team has documented nearly 6, 400 like events thus far.

They observed a rise in protests led by remote people and blue-collar employees against land catches and low wages, but they also observed middle-class citizens organizing due to the real estate crisis. In more than 370 cities, protests by people and building employees accounted for 44 % of the cases.

” This does not immediately think China’s market is imploding”, Mr Slaten was swift to stress.

Although, he added, “it is difficult to predict” how like “dissent does accelerate if the market keeps getting worse”.

How worried is the Communist Party?

Taiwanese officials are truly concerned.

Between August 2023 and Janaury 2024, Beijing stopped releasing youth unemployment figures after they hit a record high. At one point, Chinese officials coined the term “slow employment” to describe those who were taking time to find a job – a separate category, they said, from the jobless.

Censors have been cracking down on any source of financial frustration – vocal online posts are promptly scrubbed, while influencers have been blocked on social media for flaunting luxurious tastes. State media has defended the bans as part of the effort to create a “civilised, healthy and harmonious” environment. More alarming perhaps are reports last week that a top economist, Zhu Hengpeng, has been detained for critcising Xi’s handling of the economy.

According to Mr. Slaten, the Communist Party attempts to” shape what is perceived as bad” by” shaping what information people have access to or what is perceived as bad”

Moxi A photo of Moxi taken at a basketball court near where he lives in DaliMoxi

CDM’s study shows that, despite the level of state power, anger has fuelled demonstrations- and that will care Beijing.

In November 2022, a deadly fire which killed at least 10 people who were not allowed to leave the building during a Covid lockdown – brought thousands onto the streets in different parts of China to protest against crushing zero-Covid policies.

Professors Whyte and Rozelle do n’t believe their findings suggest that “popular anger about… inequality is likely to explode in a social volcano of protest.”

However, they claim that the economic downturn has begun to “undermine” the legality the Party has cultivated through “decades of continual economic development and improved living requirements.”

The pandemic also haunts some Chinese citizens, said Yun Zhou, a sociology professor at the University of Michigan. Beijing’s” demanding already capricious responses” during the pandemic have heightened people’s uncertainty about the prospect.

And this is especially intense among marginalised groups, she added, quite as people caught in a” greatly biased” labour market and rural people who have long been excluded from welfare coverage.

Under China’s contentious “hukou” system of household registration, migrant workers in cities are not allowed to use public services, such as enrolling their children in government-run schools.

However, young people from cities have flocked to remote towns, drawn to low rents, picturesque landscapes, and greater freedom to pursue their dreams.

Moxi is relieved to have found a more leisurely pace in Dali. He said, quoting his previous work as a psychiatrist,” The number of patients who came to me for depression and anxiety disorders only increased as the economy boomed.”

” There’s a big difference between China doing well, and Chinese people doing well”.

About the data

Whyte, Rozelle and Alisky’s research is based on four sets of academic surveys conducted between 2004 and 2023.

In-person surveys were conducted together with colleagues at Peking University’s Research Center on Contemporary China (RCCC ) in 2004, 2009 and 2014. Participants ranged in age from 18-70 and came from 29 provinces. Tibet and Xingiang were excluded.

In 2023, three rounds of online surveys, at the end of the second, third and fourth quarters, were conducted by the Survey and Research Centre for China Household Finance ( CHFS ) at Southwestern University of Finance and Economics in Chengdu, China. Participants ranged in age from 20 to 60.

In all surveys, the same questions were used. The researchers excluded participants aged 18-19 and 61-70 and reweighted all responses to be nationally representative in order to make responses comparable across all four years. A margin of error is included in all surveys.

The China Journal has accepted the study for publication, and it is anticipated to be published in 2025.

Since June 2022, researchers for the China Dissent Monitor ( CDM) have gathered data from a variety of non-government sources, including news reports, social media platforms that are active in China, and civil society organizations.

Dissident events are defined as those where a person or individuals use official and unofficial means of communication. Through physical repression or censorship, the government may react to any event that is highly visible and potentially dangerous.

These can include viral social media posts, demonstrations, banner drops and strikes, among others. Many events are challenging to independently verify.

Charts provided by Pilar Tomas of the BBC News Data Journalism Team.

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Cause to buy, cause to sell China’s new bull market – Asia Times

As Beijing’s signal campaign sends China stocks skyrocketing, matter analyst Stephen Jen&nbsp, among the bull who think China’s biggest protest since 2008 is just getting started.

” Foreign equities&nbsp, are really devalued”, says Jen, the chief executive officer of Eurizon SLJ. Because “investors are so thin everything Taiwanese”, he notes,” a severe rally is entirely feasible”.

Chinese shares rose for a ninth straight day on Monday ( September 30 ) thanks to China’s bold moves last week to slash interest rates, lower mortgage rates, relax regulations for homebuyers in major cities, reduce the amount of cash banks must keep in reserve, and telegraphed moves of stimulus to come.

Today’s wave by as much as 9.1 % in the standard CSI 300 Catalog is the biggest since 2015, a month drenched in relevance for President Xi Jinping’s state. In July and August 2015, Shanghai shares plunged to a third of their worth in just three months.

Fast-forward to the present, the People’s Bank of China’s ( PBOC ) actions, coupled with the US Federal Reserve’s big easing and falling global oil prices, mean China’s risk assets “ought to do very well”, Jen says. ” After the US vote, I expect world stocks to march profoundly into year-end”, he adds.

No so fast, warns Stephen Roach, past Asia-region chair for Morgan Stanley. Is China’s long-term financial problem over now that the Politburo has issued a message of further emergency meetings, asks economist Roach? If it were only that easy”.

Roach remains “increasingly concerned that China was at risk of falling into a&nbsp, Japanese-like quagmire&nbsp, –&nbsp, a&nbsp, balance strip recession&nbsp, characterized by slowdown and depreciation as an extension of the bursting of a big debt-fueled property bubble”.

Matter Roach among the academics wondering what, oh what, the share bulls rushing China’s means are thinking.

In fact, investors are rushing up into everything China without project plans to restore the still troubled real estate market, rebalance growth engines toward services and apart from exports, enhance local governments ‘ struggling balance sheets, and create strong safety nets to encourage China’s families to save less and spend more.

President Xi’s staff should be focused on the gap between those reversing China little posts, which Bank of America Corp discovered was one of the most crowded industry in the world, and the unrelenting China bears if it wants to keep the bulls work going.

That means entering the march with bold plans to carry out the liberalizing measures his Communist Party has promised to do since 2013 but has failed to deliver.

For today, China’s rapid return to economic stimulus setting has the nation’s attention. However, Zhiwei Zhang, an economist at Pinpoint Asset Management, is right to say that” the key policy to address the macro challenge remains to be fiscal.

In order to help China meet its 5 % economic growth target, local media are buzzing about an additional 2 trillion yuan ( US$ 285 ) worth of bond sales. Much more may be needed, nevertheless, to improve poor household demand and offset headwinds from overseas.

Japan’s increase in interest rates to their highest level since 2008 poses a risk to other countries. Another shows signs of strain in the US economy as a contentious election draws near, with both Democrats and Republicans threatening new tariffs on everything made in China.

Last week, PBOC Governor&nbsp, Pan Gongsheng&nbsp, unveiled a barrage of support measures, including a reduction in the seven-day reverse repurchase rate to 1.5 % from 1.7 %. Additionally, the PBOC announced the largest-ever rate reduction for its one-year policy loans, cutting loan prime rates and deposit rates.

The Politburo, Beijing’s top decision-making body, called for a “forceful” implementation of these and other measures supposedly to come. Additionally, it highlighted a new need to” stop declining” the real estate market.

These efforts might include removing some of the restrictions on home purchases that are still in place. Top cities could impose restrictions on visitors who are not from their own neighborhoods. In other words, liberalizing China’s “hukou” residence permit system.

Beijing has n’t yet provided a detailed timeline or procedure for getting bad assets off the balance sheets of large property developers to lessen their default risks. Or to encourage local governments to purchase unfinished real estate projects without further deteriorating their already fragile fiscal standing.

Premier Xi Qiang’s team has also made significant efforts to make more market space available for small and medium-sized private companies by reducing the dominance of state-owned enterprises. And global investors still are n’t clear on the state of Xi’s crackdown on China’s biggest tech companies.

Roach is one of the people who is concerned that last week’s Politburo statement only “paid lip service to fiscal stimulus imperatives,” even on fiscal issues. These actions were more likely to be viewed as broad promises than as a comprehensive list of planned actions.

Roach points out that while the Politburo vowed to stop the housing market’s decline, policy choices were made in support of this goal, primarily through lower mortgage rates, downpayment requirements for second homes, and lower interest rates on so-called social housing.

Roach remarks that the long-awaited fiscal program, which would absorb the surplus of unsold homes and turn it into low-income public housing, had a notable lack of detail.

China continues to be wary of implementing the kind of fiscal bazooka that was so successful in sparkeding its recovery in 2009-10, like Japan, where fiscal actions in the 1990s were repeatedly strained by rising public sector indebtedness. And perhaps that’s with good reason”, he says.

Roach points out that the Chinese government’s debt-to-gross domestic product ratio was 85 % in early 2024, nearly three times what it was in 2009. Following Lehman Brothers ‘ demise in the US, Beijing finally started using the stimulus apparatus.

It’s imperative, though, that Team Xi do more to deal with investors ‘ underlying concerns about China’s financial system than just throw money at the problem, economists say.

Last week, the PBOC cheered stock punters by unveiling a new 500 billion yuan ($ 71 billion ) swap facility that funds, securities firms and insurance companies can tap to buy equities. The facility could be increased to 1.5 trillion yuan ($ 214 billion ).

Beijing is also introducing a lending facility for publicly traded companies to buy back shares and increase holdings. It will start at 300 billion yuan ($ 42 billion ) and possibly grow to 900 billion yuan ($ 128 billion ). Additionally, a type of market stabilization fund might be in the works.

Last week, Wu Qing, the chairman of China Securities Regulatory Commission, said Beijing will roll out moves to encourage mergers and acquisitions.

With all that, there’s little doubt the stimulus floodgates have been opened. We believe that the persistent growth weakness has hit policymakers ‘ pain threshold, and the policy put has been triggered, as Goldman Sachs analysts wrote in a note.

Yet Team Xi needs to combine supply-side actions to further strengthen China’s investment environment for the long run to ensure the bull run continues.

As Roach explains, comparisons with Japan are far from perfect. There are many characteristics of China that are fundamentally different from those that contributed to Japan’s numerous “lost decades,” he claims.

” Other than being a large developing economy with several still untapped sources of future growth– namely, &nbsp, household consumption, urbanization, and&nbsp, insufficient capital endowment&nbsp, of its large workforce – China also benefits from understanding the lessons of Japan”.

For now, Roach admits,” China’s seemingly outsized policy stimulus took most of us by surprise”. He adds that” the financial authorities apparently came to the rescue with their own version of a “big bazooka” just as we had grownaccustomed to Beijing’s grudging response to increasingly serious economic problems. ‘&nbsp, At least that’s the verdict of the Chinese equity market”.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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Ishida must strike a balance of continuity and change – Asia Times

Questions abound about how much Shigeru Ishida may stay in power and alter the plans and paradigms of his father, Fumio Kishida. His rise to prominence could have a significant impact on Japan.

While Ishida is widely expected to uphold several of Kishida’s initiatives, including on international relations and financial strategy, he may also implement large departures in private policy amid the nation’s some evolving and profound challenges.

The administration under Kishida’s eventually unhappy presidency had a focus on economic stimulus measures that attempted to balance growth and inflation, and was characterized by careful yet constant policy-making.

His administration aimed to upgrade Japan through online transformation while looking for ways to address socioeconomic issues brought on by a rapidly aging population and a shrinking workforce. Social happiness reforms, especially on pensions, were so integral to Kishida’s plan.

On international policy, Kishida prioritized enhancing Japan’s alliances, especially with the United States, while boosting Japan’s part in international structures such as the Quad. In an effort to strike a balance between financial objectives and security concerns, Kishida took a very measured political stand toward China and Russia.

His efforts to recover relations with South Korea and strengthen relationships with Asian nations, including Indonesia, were renowned political accomplishments.

In addition, during Kishida’s career, discussions about the creation of a NATO contact office in Japan, which reflected Japan’s growing integration with European security frameworks in response to local threats, were also a result of discussions.

Ishida’s strategy to home policy is expected to combine consistency with innovation. Financially, he will assuredly support Kishida’s fiscal signal policies, especially if the world economy remains weak amid slowing development in China and the US.

However, there is already rumor that Ishida may adopt a more conservative outlook on finances by implementing poverty actions and tax measures to lower the country’s high debts. Such a move would be a significant change from Kishida’s strategy and have considerable effects on Japan’s economic stability.

Ishida will also be under pressure to handle Japan’s growing gray people more fully. While Kishida’s income reforms provided a basic model, Ishida may need to develop more comprehensive policies to address labour shortages, possibly by encouraging more immigration or investing more in robotics and artificial intelligence.

On international plan, Ishida’s strategy to Japan-South Korea relations will be fast and carefully scrutinized. Considerable efforts were made by Kishida to ameliorate these frequently tense relations, specifically through cooperation on regional security issues.

Ishida is likely to proceed along this line, although he may even attempt to address unanswered historical disputes with a new perspective, which might ease persistent tensions and open the door to a stronger diplomatic partnership.

On Japan-Indonesia relationships, Ishida is expected to establish on Kishida’s efforts aimed at strengthening economic and coastal security cooperation. Given Indonesia’s fame in Southeast Asia, Ishida may seek to develop this young relationship, particularly in sectors such as the modern economy and infrastructure development.

This strategy not only offers financial benefits to Japan, but it would also help it strengthen its control throughout ASEAN by putting an end to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and its rapid-growing trade ties.

To be sure, Japan-China relationships may present Ishida with perhaps his most varied and important challenge. The management of Kitshida’s government struck a delicate balance between maintaining economic ties, which were frequently complicated and stifled by the US-led software conflict and China’s efforts to impose sanctions, and addressing safety concerns head-on, especially those posed by the two parties ‘ territorial issues in the East China Sea.

As a result, previous defense minister Ishida may adopt a more confrontational approach to security issues, which could lead to further accelerated remilitarization of Japan while pursuing a more comprehensive security cooperation with other regional powers. At the same time, he will need to keep economic ties with China, Japan’s leading business lover, to maintain financial stability at a gentle juncture for the world economy.

Ishida’s approach to Japan-Russia relations, meanwhile, is expected to reflect Kishida’s cautious stance, particularly in the context of ongoing global tensions involving Russia, including in Ukraine. The two sides ‘ energy cooperation will be front and center, which Ishida might lower downgrade in favor of more stable and secure sources in the name of economic and supply chain security.

One of the most intriguing prospects for Ishida will be the potential for a more open relationship with North Korea. The Japanese government continued to impose strict sanctions and put new pressure on North Korea over its nuclear program and the ongoing thorny issue of Japanese abductees.

Ishida may seek diplomatic resumption, especially if Pyongyang offers fresh indications of a willingness to engage in dialogue, despite the likelihood that he wo n’t abandon these hard-line positions. This would be a significant change that would have significant effects on Japan’s role in East Asia and regional security.

Japan-United States relations will, of course, remain the cornerstone of Tokyo’s foreign policy. In light of shared concerns about China’s growing influence and growing aggression in nearby waters, the alliance was significantly strengthened under Kishida’s leadership.

In spite of who wins the US elections in November, Ishida is anticipated to maintain and possibly deepen the relationship, in line with the evolving Indo-Pacific strategy used by the United States to counterbalance China’s rise and power.

The potential opening of a NATO liaison office in Japan would bolster the country’s commitment to international security standards and help it more closely align with Western defense initiatives. In a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape with no end in sight, Ishida’s administration could use this relationship to strengthen Japan’s security posture.

On the global stage, Ishida’s participation in the Quad will likely remain robust as the grouping shifts toward more economic and wider-reaching security initiatives, perpetuating Kishida’s multilateral efforts to counter China’s influence in the region.

Ishida will likely uphold Japan’s commitment to multilateral dialogue while taking steps to improve global governance in an increasingly multipolar world in the Trilateral Commission, which includes Japan, the United States, and Europe.

Overall, Ishida’s leadership is poised to strike a delicate balance between change and continuity. Although he is expected to uphold many of Kishida’s policies, particularly those that are related to international relations, his approach to domestic issues and some international relationships may lead to new directions for Japan.

Ishida’s ability to strike a balance between continuity and change, addressing Japan’s immediate challenges, and positioning the nation in a more complex geostrategic and global environment.

Former Indonesian Foreign Ministry diplomat Simon Hutagalung He graduated from the City University of New York with his master’s degree in political science and comparative politics. The views expressed in this article are his own.

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Ishiba must strike a balance of continuity and change – Asia Times

Assuming Shigeru Ishiba’s ascendance to the top of the leadership leaves a lasting impression on Japan, issues abound about how much he will stay in line with and alter Fumio Kishida’s plans and models.

While Ishiba is widely expected to uphold several of Kishida’s initiatives, including on international relations and financial strategy, he may also implement large departures in private policy amid the nation’s some evolving and profound challenges.

Kishiba’s finally unhappy administration was characterised by careful yet regular policy-making with an emphasis on monetary stimulus measures that attempted to balance growth and inflation.

His administration sought to modernize Japan by using digital transformation while looking for ways to address demographic issues caused by a rapidly aging population and workforce decline. Social welfare reforms, particularly on pensions, were thus integral to Kishida’s agenda.

On foreign policy, Kishida prioritized enhancing Japan’s alliances, particularly with the United States, while amplifying Japan’s role in multilateral frameworks such as the Quad. In an effort to strike a balance between economic interests and security concerns, Kishida took a very measured diplomatic stand toward China and Russia.

His initiatives to restore relations with South Korea and strengthen ties with ASEAN nations, including Indonesia, were notable diplomatic accomplishments.

In addition, during Kishida’s tenure, discussions about the establishment of a NATO liaison office in Japan and its increasing alignment with NATO were a sign of Japan’s growing integration with Western security systems in response to regional threats.

Ishiba’s approach to domestic policy is expected to integrate continuity with innovation. Economically, he will likely sustain Kishida’s fiscal stimulus policies, especially if the global economy remains sluggish amid slowing growth in China and the US.

However, there is already rumor that Ishida may adopt a more conservative outlook on finances by implementing austerity measures and tax reforms to lower the country’s high debt. A change of this nature would significantly alter Kishida’s strategy and have significant effects on Japan’s economic stability.

Ishiba will also be under pressure to address more directly the problems posed by Japan’s graying population. While Kishida’s pension reforms provided a foundation, Ishiba may need to implement more comprehensive policies to address labor shortages, possibly by encouraging more immigration or investing more in artificial intelligence and automation.

On foreign policy, Ishiba’s approach to Japan-South Korea relations will be quickly and closely scrutinized. Significant progress was made by Kishida in resolving these frequently tense issues, particularly through cooperation on regional security issues.

Ishiba is likely to continue along this line, although he may also attempt to address unresolved historical disputes with a fresh perspective, which might lessen tensions and open the door to a stronger bilateral partnership.

On Japan-Indonesia relations, Ishida is expected to build on Kishida’s initiatives aimed at strengthening economic and maritime security cooperation. Given Indonesia’s prominence in Southeast Asia, Ishida could seek to expand this budding partnership, particularly in sectors such as the digital economy and infrastructure development.

This strategy would help Japan increase its economic impact while reducing China’s Belt and Road Initiative’s rapid-growing trade ties and its potential economic benefits.

To be sure, Japan-China relations will present Ishida with perhaps his most multifaceted and crucial challenge. The administration of Kitshida’s government struck a delicate balance between maintaining economic ties, which were frequently complicated and stifled by the US-led tech war and China’s efforts to impose sanctions, and addressing security concerns head-on, particularly those posed by the two parties ‘ territorial disputes in the East China Sea.

Ishiba, a former defense minister, may thus adopt an even more assertive approach to security issues, which could lead to further accelerating Japan’s already robust remilitarization while pursuing even greater security cooperation with other regional powers. At the same time, he will need to maintain economic ties with China, Japan’s top trade partner, to maintain economic stability at a delicate juncture for the global economy.

Ishiba’s approach to Japan-Russia relations, meanwhile, is expected to reflect Kishida’s cautious stance, particularly in the context of ongoing global tensions involving Russia, including in Ukraine. Energy cooperation between the two parties will be at the forefront of the conversation, which Ishida might downgrade in favor of more stable and secure sources in the name of economic and supply chain security.

The potential for a more open relationship with North Korea will be one of Ishiba’s most promising prospects. The Japanese government continued to impose strict sanctions and put new pressure on North Korea over its nuclear program and the ongoing thorny issue of Japanese abductees.

Ishiba may seek diplomatic resumption, especially if Pyongyang offers fresh indications of a willingness to engage in dialogue, even though he is unlikely to abandon these hard-line positions. This would be a significant change that would have significant effects on Japan’s role in East Asia and regional security.

Japan-United States relations will, of course, remain the cornerstone of Tokyo’s foreign policy. In response to shared concerns about China’s expanding influence and rising aggression in nearby waters, under Kishida, the alliance was significantly strengthened through increased military cooperation.

In spite of who wins the US election in November, Ishiba is anticipated to maintain and possibly deepen the relationship, in particular in the vein of America’s evolving Indo-Pacific strategy to counterbalance China’s rise and power.

A NATO liaison office could be established in Japan to show its commitment to international security standards and help the country become more in tune with Western defense initiatives. In a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape with a view to strengthening Japan’s security posture, the government of Ishiba could use this relationship to leverage this relationship.

On the global stage, Ishida’s participation in the Quad will likely remain robust as the grouping shifts toward more economic and wider-reaching security initiatives, perpetuating Kishida’s multilateral efforts to counter China’s influence in the region.

Ishiba will likely uphold Japan’s commitment to multilateral dialogue while taking steps to improve global governance in an increasingly multipolar world in the Trilateral Commission, which includes Japan, the United States, and Europe.

Overall, Ishiba’s leadership demonstrates a delicate balance of change and continuity. Although many of Kishida’s policies are expected to be upheld, particularly those involving international relations, his approach to domestic issues and some international relationships may pave the way for Japan.

Ishiba’s ability to strike a balance between continuity and change, addressing Japan’s immediate problems, and positioning China in a more difficult and complex world.

Former Indonesian Foreign Ministry diplomat Simon Hutagalung The City University of New York gave him his master’s degree in comparative politics and political science. The views expressed in this article are his own.

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