Europe warned to change fast or become a ‘shock absorber’ of US-China trade war

Senior European Union officials are breathing a sigh of relief over a US-China tariff deal that may delay a diversion of Chinese exports to Europe.

However, they have been cautioned that the union must quickly adjust or it will” impact absorb” global trade imbalances due to tectonic shifts.

The climbdown in superpower tensions following high-wire talks in Geneva last weekend has led to a mutual reduction in tariffs and a respite in the turmoil that has roiled markets since US President Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January.

Do you have inquiries about the most popular issues and styles from different parts of the world? With SCMP Knowledge, our innovative platform of customized content featuring explanations, FAQs, assessments, and visuals brought to you by our award-winning group, get the solutions.

However, it does not, according to academics, make a significant difference to Europe’s dark perspective if it doesn’t respond immediately to Washington’s attempts to reorganize commerce with China and the rest of the world.

embedded content ]

According to Michael Pettis, a finance professor at Peking University,” there is talk in Brussels about Europe becoming a” next pole” in a US and China-dominated world.” This passion risks remaining a phrase rather than a strategy because it doesn’t involve more political inclusion and better coordination of fiscal and business policies.

” Europe does not turn into a pole at all, but quite a shock absorption – forced to make decisions without making the decisions themselves,” said Pettis, a thought leader on the changing nature of international trade.

“I say this because of some pretty simple arithmetic,” he continued. “The US currently represents nearly half of global deficits, and with the UK and Canada they together comprise roughly two-thirds of all deficits.”

The Beijing-based doctor believed it may eventually come along and that Washington had put pressure on others to do the same. However, last year’s agreement does not lead to a reduction in America’s gaping trade deficit with China.

One of two things must happen, according to Pettis, who is also a member of the US think container Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

According to him, “either world surpluses must decrease, and China accounts for roughly half of global surpluses, which implies that China’s surplus must decrease,” or” somewhere else must run the significant deficits needed to balance global surpluses, which typically refers to Europe,” he said.

Last year’s Sino-American agreement may have saved them time in what is thought to be a storm of diverted Chinese exports to EU ports, according to European governments.

” We are seeing signs of de-escalation on the British side,” said Michal Baranowski, Poland’s assistant secretary for development and technology.

” China has begun meetings with the US.” They came to an agreement with [the ] UK, which is a good thing, he continued. ” The EU is negotiating more quickly.”

The minister referred to the US-China deal as” a good first step,” claiming that it was” good for us as well because Europe is very focused on trade diversion.” We’re less probable to see it in Europe now that US-China conflicts are dwindling.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz attends a press conference in Berlin, Germany, on Wednesday. Merz opposes EU-wide joint borrowing that some in the bloc advocate as a way to compete with the US and China. Photo: AP

However, experts cautioned against preventing the EU from undergoing major inside reform that is necessary to survive in a severe new world order.

The bloc is divided, too, on areas of industrial policies that may afford it better financial means to compete with the US and China, with new German Chancellor Friedrich Merz appearing last week to rule out EU-wide joint borrowing.

” We cannot go into never-ending spirals of bill,” Merz said in Brussels last year.

Former part of the European Parliament and former participant of the London School of Economics Luis Garicano urged the EU to change its focus away from pursuing free trade agreements.

“The IMF puts the hidden cost of trading goods inside the EU at the equivalent of a 45 per cent tariff. For services, the figure climbs to 110 per cent, higher than Trump’s ‘Liberation Day’ tariffs on Chinese imports – measures many saw as a near-embargo,” Garicano wrote in a blog post.

The European Commission may be incorporating new domains, but it is leaving the single market as its primary goal to become more and more unoccupied.

A quick resolve is doubtful, despite EU leaders ‘ acknowledgment of the need for inner reform.

Instead, the bloc is expected to adopt a multipronged approach of trying to cut trade deals with partners including India and the Mercosur group of South America as it also negotiates directly with the economic superpowers themselves.

Trade captain Maros Sefcovic and US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick are still in conversation over a phone call on Wednesday. There hasn’t been a bargain in the past.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated this year,” I think the US and Europe may be a little slower.” ” I have a feeling that Europe does have a social activity difficulty, that the Italians want something unique than the French,” I believe.

However, Brussels officials are awaiting the first results of a work force’s initial assessments of Trump’s taxes. They are prepared to implement safeguards that can quickly shut down the business from unexpected product surges that could harm local businesses.

embedded content ]

Traditions statistics suggest that circumstances may have changed even during the brief period of US and Chinese joint tariffs of up to 120 percent.

April’s Chinese industry statistics revealed significant increases in US supplies and significant increases in European shipments. China’s shipments to the US increased by 21 %, while its shipments to Germany increased by 20.44 %.

Union shipments to China are also cratering at the same time. According to the Post’s calculations of its official trade data, China’s imports into the EU fell 16.46 % in April. In the first four weeks of 2025, Bloomberg reported that China’s trade deficit with the EU exceeded history US$ 90 billion.

Amid these shifts, Brussels seeks to convince Beijing to take action that would address the potential trade diversion and China’s manufacturing overcapacity. Otherwise, officials say, the EU market will start closing down.

However, these challenges appear to be coming off as deaf ear.

The EU delegation’s head of trade in China, Marjut Hannonen, stated during a board debate in Beijing on Wednesday that the overcapacity problem is “hears large, it’s growing, it’s huge, and it affects all sectors.”

” Overcapacity is a problem that we don’t see China addressing at all,” Hannonen continued. On the other hand, they are simply doubling down on their production capacity, which will only make the situation worse and pose a global problem.

In a sign that Beijing was playing hardball with Europe, talks between French and Chinese ministers this week failed to yield a deal that would see tariffs lifted on France’s cognac imports, French Finance Minister Eric Lombard said following meetings with Chinese Vice-Premier He Lifeng.

The EU’s efforts to change Beijing’s political economy, according to Yanmei Xie, an independent researcher of China’s political business based in Barcelona, were likely to fail.

Europe is constantly enticing China to take action, but this is nothing short of enticing it to alter its financial system, according to Xie. The Chinese concept of techno-industrial upgrading requires unwavering manufacturing scaling, never overcapacity, according to the statement.

China needs to collect more Chinese products, according to her, while Europe demands that China reduce its export and import volumes. Their goals are “diametrically opposed.”

South China Morning Post’s latest news:

Download our smart application for the most recent information from the South China Morning Post. Copyright 2025.

Continue Reading

Coalition cracks deepen as Pheu Thai, Bhumjaithai feud escalates

Chaiwut: Won't kiss and make up
Will not love or make up; Chaiwut

The empty fighting between the ruling Pheu Thai Party and its largest coalition partner, Bhumjaithai, has prompted an opposition group to go on the defense, according to observers.

Pheu Thai and Bhumjaithai have not experienced a more difficult relationship since forming the alliance more than two years ago.

Over the years, the two parties have come to terms with one another, starting with Bhumjaithai’s attempt to legalize marijuana, which Pheu Thai attempted unsuccessfully to overturn under Srettha Thavisin’s management, moving from the election law’s dual majority necessity, which Pheu Thai wanted to change to a second majority need, to the most recent casino legalization bill, which Pheu Thai is pushing hard but has met resistance from Bhumjaithai.

The fighting had put the two parties ‘ connection to the check, as had the claims of land encroachments by leaders of the two events. According to the spectators, the allegations were rumored to have been made by members of the two parties as part of a plot to prevent one party from gaining more democratic bargaining power than the other.

Despite both events minimizing their love-hate marriage, there has been more rumors among experts that the state, in its present form, does not serve out its four-year name.

Debate was rife that Bhumjaithai, with 70 MPs to its name, was about to be thrown out of the partnership. But, Paetongtarn Shinawatra, the party’s leader, has said that the party will not be allowed to attend, at the very least for the time being.

The watchers said it is still to be seen whether Ms. Paetongtarn’s confidence may be valid given that her father, previous top Thaksin Shinawatra, has a lot of influence in Pheu Thai and is accused of being the wire puller.

Many political experts have conjured up a scenario in which Bhumjaithai is replaced as a coalition partner by the 150-MP main opposition People’s Party ( PP ).

The coalition may control a pleasant majority if the two largest events came together. With 36 tickets and the 25-MP Democrat Party, a Pheu Thai-PP empire could actually afford to clean the ultraconservative United Thai Nation Party.

Yet, the experts agreed that the possibility of the PP being enthused by the prospect of joining Pheu Thai and playing second fiddle is isolated, considering there are hardly two years left before the next general election.

The PP has every reason to believe it may continue to be in opposition and have the advantage over Pheu Thai, which is increasingly under pressure for failing to stop the country’s vital industries, including crops, where farmers of important vegetables are suffering from lower costs.

The PP has never been in power, just like its political president, the Move Forward Party. The presence of a damaged report could be the PP’s ticket to a significant victory in the next general election as some voters are fed up with wheeling and dealing politics and may be tempted to voting for a party which may claim a fresh slate, according to the experts.

Talks about Bhumjaithai and the PP being excluded from the mix have fueled rumors that the Palang Pracharath Party ( PPRP ), which is currently in power, may be re-elected as the government.

However, the party led by former deputy prime minister Gen Prawit Wongsuwon is likely to view the PPRP as unforgivable because they were kicked out of the Pheu Thai-led coalition at the end of Srettha Thavisin’s administration.

The PPRP leadership felt the party had been double-crossed by a faction controlled by former PPRP secretary-general Captain Thamanat Prompow, who, along with more than 20 MPs, split from the party over a conflict with Gen Prawit. The PPRP was split down by the departure of the Thamanat group, leaving it with just 20 MPs.

Later, Capt. Thamanat’s group changed to the Kla Dharma Party, which Pheu Thai subsequently chose as a coalition partner after purging the PPRP.

The bitterness evidently still lingers as deputy PPRP leader Chaiwut Thanakamanusorn recently declared the PPRP reuniting with Pheu Thai was out of the question.

We haven’t a single thought about making up with the government, according to our colleagues.

We don’t agree with the casino industry’s [entertainment complex legalization], he said, adding that the government has always been poorly positioned to run the nation and that the highly contentious casino bill being proposed is bound to undermine it.

” When a boat is about to sink, it would be insane to even think about hopping on board.

The Pheu Thai Party has never considered weighing the benefits and drawbacks of the proposed casino project. The hundreds of billions of dollars in baht that the project was going to generate was all that it was interested in, Mr. Chaiwut said.


It’s more than just Thaksin

The medical council of Thailand’s (MCT) decision regarding the controversy surrounding former Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s hospital detention is not just about one man’s fate.

Paetongtarn: potential fallout

Paetongtarn: potential fallout

It is about the very survival of the Pheu Thai-led government and Thaksin’s daughter, Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, according to observers.

Due to concerns that the prison sentence may not have been properly enforced, the Supreme Court’s Criminal Division for Holders of Political Positions recently ordered an investigation into Thaksin’s detention at the Police General Hospital ( PGH).

The MCT made disciplinary decisions against three doctors who had been transferred from Bangkok Remand Prison and then placed in a six-month hospital after that.

One was given a formal warning, while the other two had their medical licences suspended for providing inaccurate medical information and documents.

In light of the findings from the MCT, there has been a lot of speculating about Thaksin going to prison. If that is the case, it would have a negative impact on Ms. Paetongtarn’s ability to lead the coalition government.

Critics have long accused Ms Paetongtarn, Thaksin’s youngest daughter, who took office in September last year, of lacking independence and requiring “guidance” from her father, if not being his puppet.

The Paetongtarn administration will be dead in the water if Thaksin is imprisoned, according to Olarn Thinbangtieo, a lecturer in political science at Burapha University.

The government is currently under fire for using debt repayment funds to fund the digital wallet scheme, and Thaksin’s imprisonment could derail Ms. Paetongtarn’s political career.

Mr Olarn said this scenario may prompt Thaksin to flee again and could spell doom for the Pheu Thai Party and crush the chances of fugitive former prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra returning home. Thaksin claimed that he anticipated that his sister would travel to Thailand this year to celebrate the Songkran festival.

Yingluck fled the nation in 2017, just before the Supreme Court sentenced her to five years in prison for failing to stop government-to-government rice sales that were allegedly corrupt.

Mr Olarn pointed out that in such a scenario, Ms Paetongtarn may also go down with Thaksin and face charges for allegedly lying or concealing her father’s condition.

The Supreme Court’s investigation into Thaksin’s protracted stay is widely regarded as a crucial opportunity to restore public trust in a system of justice that many people believe is flawed, according to the analyst.

Thaksin spent the entire sentence of his jail sentence in the PGH’s premium ward until he was granted parole in February of last year. When he was discharged, he was spotted wearing a neck collar. However, he showed signs of fitness days later, despite the fact that he had just recovered from life-threatening illnesses.

Thaksin’s protracted stay has raised questions about whether the DoC had actually enforced the prison sentence imposed on him.

However, the analyst acknowledged the possibility that Thaksin could be detained at his home under Department of Corrections ( DoC ) regulations approved during the Prayut Chan-o-cha administration.

As the alleged de facto leader of Pheu Thai and allegedly responsible for launching a campaign to defeat the progressive People’s Party, known as the “orange camp,” Thaksin has a chance to escape, according to Mr. Olarn.

” The orange camp needs him to oppose,” the conservatives claim. The Bhumjaithai Party has yet to win the hearts of the middle class. Thaksin will be their best option as long as they can’t find anyone with the same level of respect and credibility as Gen Prayut, who ruled for nine years.

According to Mr. Olarn, the coalition’s failure to resolve its economic issues, border security issues, the southern insurgency, and internal conflicts is putting the government in a state of paralysis.

He said Pheu Thai is trying to regain its image as a defender of democracy by pursuing a probe into alleged vote rigging in last year’s Senate election. However, this action has strained relations with Bhumjaithai.

Mr. Olarn stated that the two parties’ power fight is a high-stakes one, and both will strike deals to defend their own interests.

Under these circumstances, there are growing concerns that some elements might see a chance to reset politics, a reference to a power seizure, he said.

A certain group of people may be considering it, while most people don’t want one [a power seizure]. The analyst claimed that what we are seeing are early indications of a dead-end situation.

Continue Reading

Operation Sindoor showed India’s strategic restraint – Asia Times

Pakistan has disseminated narratives of corporate triumph in response to India’s lethal terrorist attack in Pahalgam, portraying India’s determined and restricted response as a sign of strategic weakness.

For a description, but, ultimately disregards the determined and intentional character of India’s operation, which was grounded in a doctrine of equal response and proper restraint.

Additionally, it ignores India’s unwavering military superiority and the structural flaws that are inherent in Pakistan’s interior social, financial, and military structures, which are both factors that severely limit Islamabad’s ability to start and sustain a full-fledged conflict.

The deliberate misstatement of India’s caution as powerlessness serves neither the people of Pakistan nor its defense creation and business in the long&nbsp, work.

Operation Sindoor: a specialized, calibrated punishment

On April 22, 2025, India experienced a devastating terrorist assault in Baisaran Valley near Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, in which 26 citizens, including overseas visitors, were killed. On May 7, 2025, India launched Operation Sindoor, a detail military operation aimed at Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, in answer.

Despite the operating performance of India’s response, Pakistan quickly declared a proper victory, citing little damage and hostile actions reportedly taken against Indian Air Force assets. However, these assertions fail to account for the deliberate and proper caution that India exercised.

Operation Sindoor was never conceived of as a full-spectrum military relationship but rather as a military operation intended to deliver a targeted and unambiguous information. American forces carried out precision strikes that targeted criminal launchpads and administrative nodes, using advanced airpower and missile technology. Verified open-source cleverness and satellite surveillance corroborate the elimination of important criminal support infrastructure.

One of the key achievements of the activity, according to media reports, was the unmistakable elimination of Abdul Rauf Azhar, the mastermind of the murder and killing of Wall Street Journal journalist Daniel Pearl in 2002, along with dozens of other terrorists.

Abdul Rauf Azhar was apparently operating from a guarded area within Pakistan-administered place and had reestablished effective links with several multinational fundamentalist networks. His death, along with the elimination of numerous other highly-regarded criminal workers, highlights India’s level of intelligence sophistication and its ability to provide justice across borders.

This attack was not merely symbolic, it represented India’s unwavering commitment to destroy the ecosystem of impunity that has allowed international terrorism to live.

The operation fits perfectly within India’s long-standing doctrine of “active but restrained” military engagement, which seeks to reduce non-state militant capacities without compromising the regional order as a whole. This strategic calculus reflects not only India’s military capabilities but also its broader commitment to responsible international behavior.

India’s overwhelming military prowess

India’s restrained approach in Operation Sindoor should not be misinterpreted as an indicator of strategic limitation or military deficiency. It is a product of deliberate doctrinal planning and mature strategic thinking, rather than. India possesses one of the most powerful military establishments globally, equipped to address a wide spectrum of conventional and unconventional threats.

India’s armed forces have over 1.45 million active members as of 2025, which puts it in second place globally in terms of troop strength. The country’s defense budget for fiscal year 2024–25 stood at approximately US$ 81 billion – eight times larger than Pakistan’s allocation of around$ 10 billion. This financial advantage has made it possible for India to carry out significant modernization initiatives, including investing in technological advancement, force restructuring, and multi-domain capabilities.

The Indian Air Force ( IAF ) operates a fleet exceeding 2, 200 combat and support aircraft, including advanced platforms such as the Su-30MKI, Rafale, and Tejas.

The IAF’s effectiveness during Operation Sindoor was further demonstrated by its use of loitering munitions and long-range drones that precisely struck Pakistani targets, including Noor Khan and Rahimyar Khan, while avoiding and encircling Chinese-supplied air defense systems. The mission was completed in just 23 minutes, demonstrating India’s operational and technological superiority.

India’s air defense capabilities include the Pechora, OSA-AK, LLAD guns, and the short-range surface-to-air missile system Akash, as well as a mix of traditional and contemporary indigenous systems. Integrated with the Indian Air Force’s IACCS ( Integrated Air Command and Control System ), these platforms formed a multi-tiered shield that effectively neutralized multiple retaliatory attempts by Pakistan on military installations across northern and western India.

India’s ability to identify and defeat sophisticated foreign-supplied threats, such as Turkish-made UAVs and PL-15 missiles, underlined the strength of its indigenously developed electronic warfare and counter-UAS systems.

On land, the Indian Army commands over 4, 200 main battle tanks and a formidable complement of mechanized infantry and artillery units. The use of advanced systems, such as the Dhanush artillery platform, the indigenously built Arjun MBT, and the ATAGS ( Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System ), exemplifies the” Make in India” initiative’s modernization drive. These technologies played a critical role in layered ground-based air defense and strategic deterrence throughout Operation Sindoor.

With 12 destroyers, 17 frigates, and two fully operational aircraft carriers, the INS Vikramaditya and the domestically constructed INS Vikrant, the Indian Navy has made significant strides toward becoming a blue-water force, which is credible maritime dominance in the Indian Ocean Region. Complementing these assets are indigenous naval platforms including frigates, corvettes, and submarines, which contribute to a robust maritime security posture.

India’s nuclear triad, which consists of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and air-delivered nuclear weapons, strengthens its strategic deterrence. With the development of MIRV-capable systems such as Agni-V, India has firmly established itself among the world’s elite nuclear-capable states. Significant deterrent power and strategic flexibility are provided by these attributes for New Delhi.

Moreover, India’s strategic posture has evolved to encompass new domains of conflict, including space and cyber operations. The creation of the Defense Cyber Agency and the Defense Space Agency is a pro-active change in Indian military strategy that will ensure readiness in emerging and hybrid warfare environments.

India’s space-based capabilities, particularly through ISRO, were evident in Operation Sindoor, where at least ten satellites continuously monitored India’s 7, 000 km coastline and northern borders, providing critical situational awareness and command synchronization.

Additionally, the drone warfare industry has undergone a transformative evolution. India’s drone industry, supported by the Production Linked Incentive ( PLI ) scheme and a ban on imported drones, has matured rapidly. More than 550 businesses and 5,500 pilots are represented by organizations like the Drone Federation of India.

Indigenous UAVs and suicide drones, such as those developed by Alpha Design Technologies, Tata Advanced Systems, and IG Drones, were central to the success of Operation Sindoor, making India’s UAV capabilities both strategic and scalable.

Operation Sindoor should be understood as a deliberate display of disciplined power projection when viewed through this lens. The limited nature of the operation was designed to assert deterrence, reestablish red lines, and prevent destabilization in an already volatile region. The strategic restraint approach used by India in this situation is an articulation of state responsibility, not a failure of will.

Despite possessing unmatched coercive capabilities, India remains steadfast in its commitment to non-violence and peaceful coexistence, in line with the Gandhian ideals that underpin its national identity. For India, the use of force is only a last resort when national security and civilian safety are seriously endangered.

India’s historical responses to terrorism further support this pattern of calibrated and judicious conduct. India has consistently chosen precision over escalation, legality over unilateralism, from the 1993 Mumbai bombings and the 2001 Parliament attack to the 2008 Mumbai siege and the 2019 Pulwama incident. In every instance, it has pursued a path that balances deterrence with diplomacy.

Pakistan’s structural and strategic weaknesses

Pakistan’s strategic posture, in contrast, is deeply undermined by its persistent internal vulnerabilities– ranging from economic fragility and political instability to deteriorating domestic security conditions. Pakistan lacks the institutional, fiscal, and social resilience to continue fighting a protracted conventional war with India despite its public declarations of readiness.

According to projections by the International Monetary Fund, Pakistan’s GDP growth in 2025 is expected to remain subdued at approximately 2.6 %, with inflation averaging 6.0 %. The country’s external debt obligations now exceed USD 130 billion, which severely limits Islamabad’s fiscal capacity to finance large-scale military operations. The public debt has now surpassed 73 % of GDP.

Politically, Pakistan remains in turmoil. The military establishment’s interference in the 2024 general elections sparked widespread accusations of rigging, authoritarianism, and interference, which undermined democratic legitimacy and stifled national consensus. The civilian leadership remains in conflict with the military, further eroding institutional cohesion at a time when unity is critical for national defense.

Pakistan is increasingly threatened by a number of extremist and insurgent groups domestically. The resurgence of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan ( TTP), along with escalating sectarian violence and an active Baloch separatist insurgency, has claimed over 300 lives among security personnel in the past year alone. Due to these internal security issues, Pakistan’s military and intelligence apparatus is under enormous strain, reducing its operational bandwidth in order to effectively respond to external threats.

Beyond domestic turmoil, Pakistan’s military readiness for sustained conflict is deeply questionable. Despite having a sizable military force, independent assessments have raised concerns about maintenance issues, munitions shortages, and outdated command structures. Reports suggest that Pakistan lacks the capacity to engage in prolonged high-intensity warfare without external assistance – a fact that further highlights the asymmetry in military preparedness between the two nations.

Additionally, political discord prevents effective strategic planning. The absence of a unified political vision and frequent civil-military friction prevent the formation of coherent long-term defense strategies. In this situation, Pakistan’s ability to effectively combat an appropriately executed Indian military campaign is severely limited.

China’s strategic overdependence is a double-edged sword.

Pakistan’s growing strategic alignment with China, particularly in the context of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor ( CPEC ), has introduced additional complexities. Despite promising investments worth more than USD 62 billion, CPEC has also raised questions about sovereignty dilution, localized resistance, and debt dependence, particularly in Balochistan.

Military cooperation with China, including joint exercises and arms transfers, has increased Islamabad’s tactical capabilities. However, strategic autonomy is at stake as a result of this dependency. The deepening asymmetry in the Sino-Pak relationship risks transforming Pakistan into a subordinate geopolitical appendage of Beijing, vulnerable to political coercion and economic exploitation.

Domestic unrest over Chinese-funded infrastructure projects, particularly those involving marginalized ethnic groups, is a reflection of wider societal unease caused by this strategic entanglement. These dynamics raise serious questions about the long-term viability of Pakistan’s current external alignments and their implications for national sovereignty.

Reevaluating the claims of victory in Pakistan

The temporary cessation of hostilities after Operation Sindoor should not be mistaken as a concession by India. Instead, it was a conditional and compassionate choice. Indian officials made it unequivocally clear that the continuation of peace is contingent upon the cessation of cross-border terrorism. In the event that Pakistan doesn’t comply, India retains both the legal justification and operational readiness to resume hostilities.

Claims of intercepting certain Indian missiles or downing a few aircraft – largely unsubstantiated when assessed against satellite imagery and independent verification – hold little significance in the broader strategic calculus. In terms of strategy, success is not based on a few tactical victories; rather, it is based on the ability to influence outcomes, maintain escalation dominance, and bolster deterrence.

Operation Sindoor accomplished its core objectives: delivering a clear message, degrading militant capabilities and reaffirming India’s regional primacy without triggering widespread destabilization.

India’s behavior both before and after the operation demonstrates a remarkable maturity of strategic thinking. It embodies a responsible power’s refusal to be baited into uncontrolled conflict while defending its citizens and sovereignty with resolve and precision.

Pakistan, in contrast, needs to reevaluate its national priorities right away. It has to abandon adventurist policies, address its internal fragmentation and pursue meaningful reforms to ensure both domestic economic and political stability and regional peace.

Not bellicose rhetoric, but rational policy, mutual respect, and an unwavering commitment to coexistence will be the key to South Asia’s strategic stability in the future. India has demonstrated its commitment. Pakistan now bears the burden of doing the same with equal responsibility and seriousness.

Continue Reading

Man apologises to ministers over Su Haijin Facebook posts, offers community service instead of damages

PROPOSAL TO OFFER COMMUNITY SERVICE

In response to economic difficulties, Sng offered to do community service in lieu of economic compensation in his article.

He claimed that because of prices, rising rents, and rising energy costs, he shut down his company on April 1.

I used up my personal savings and loans just trying to stay afloat, like many SME ( small-medium enterprise ) owners, he wrote. I’ve never had any money since then, managed my debts, and done everything I can to help world.”

He suggested that each open slave named in the words receive 100 hours of community service, or 300 hours total.

He cited instances of him carrying out “volunteer and generosity” work since 2019. &nbsp,

” My time, breath, and labor are what I can give. Let me use hands-on work rather than money to help the people you intended to benefit from your charitable donation, remarked Mr. Sng.

Continue Reading

Trump’s trade beef more with Global South than China – Asia Times

As Donald Trump gears up for his big trade battle with Xi Jinping’s China, is the US president fighting the wrong economic war?

A perusal of Federal Reserve data shows, rather convincingly, that the US now imports roughly four times as much from Global South nations, ex-China, than from Asia’s biggest economy.

In March, for example, the US imported about US$29.3 billion worth of goods from China and $114 billion from the Global South.

This is no aberration, as the accompanying chart shows. US-bound shipments from Latin America, Africa, Turkey, India, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand and elsewhere are, taken together, increasingly bigfooting those directly from the mainland.

Caveats abound, of course. The magnitude of indirect trade passing through third countries and re-exported to another is literally off the charts. The nature of modern-day supply chains is that economies like Mexico or Vietnam use Chinese components in their wares, which are then put on tankers to American shores.

Graphic: Asia Times

Even so, the extreme bilateralization of trade as a foundational concept in the Trumpian mindset unravels, circa 2025, when you look at the biggest sources of US trade flows. It’s a reminder that Trump’s economic strategy is ripped from the pages of the mid-1980s.

The rationale behind Trump’s tariff policies dates back to a time when the five most industrialized nations held vast sway over economic dynamics. His obsession with a weaker dollar is inspired by a deal struck 40 years ago in New York’s Plaza Hotel, an iconic property Trump owned for a while. His tax priorities have critics linking them to the “trickle-down economics” era.

The problem with a US leader having his head stuck in 1985, aside from the obvious, is that “Made in China 2025” is upending the global economy now. And at a moment when China is investing in where it thinks the world will be in 2035. This goes, too, for a Global South that’s increasingly forging its own path – one that barely factors in where the US might fit in a decade from now.

“The world economy is splitting into competing groups instead of a single connected system of globalization of the 1990s,” says Gilles Moëc, chief economist at AXA Investment.

So, despite what Trump appears to believe, nothing he does with tariffs is going to shrink cross-border trade. What Trump World missed is that “instead of bringing production back to the countries where products are used, global companies have been reorganizing their supply chains around groups of countries or “clubs with similar values or security concerns.”

Moëc adds that “this rejig is a diluted version of globalization but can still keep the wheels moving. As long as clubs include both low-wage nations and high-spending economies, the adverse effects of fragmentation – such as inflation and lower efficiency – could be mitigated.”

Now that Trump seems to have segued from pushing tariffs to pushing Boeing planes and American semiconductors, the hope is that his assault on China Inc is losing momentum. But the reordering of global trade dynamics, evidenced by Fed data, suggests the Trump administration is firing tariffs at the wrong economic foe.

That is becoming even truer as traditional US allies like the European Union pivot to where the real future growth is.

“China is likely to double down on ties with the Global South and Europe, the latter now its most crucial market given its purchasing power and relatively restrained trade stance,” says Lauren Gloudeman, analyst at Eurasia Group.

Of course, China’s ability to reroute exports from the US to Europe will probably be quickly curtailed by forthcoming EU measures to prevent dumping by other countries,” Gloudeman notes. Still, this is trade that Trump is leaving on the table with policies that look backwards, not to the decade ahead.

Trump doesn’t have a monopoly on Panglossian views of the future. The Chinese side can also go too far with half-glass-full takes on the magnanimity of Beijing’s policy mix. Or the Chinese economy’s perceived invulnerability.

Take Yang Guangbin, international relations expert at Renmin University, who argues that “unlike the order brought to the world by the rise of the West, the new form of human civilization created by Chinese modernization will be shared development rather than beggar-thy-neighbor, common security rather than security dilemmas and civilization mutual learning rather than civilization conflicts.”

In Yang’s view, China’s policy priorities “set an example for Global South countries to independently and autonomously move towards modernization and will inevitably be emulated by some countries.”

Perhaps, but even BRICS nations — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — compete far more amongst each other than they cooperate. Yet, at the same time, the more Global South to Global South trade there is, the less there might be old-school trade with big roles for US companies.

As Fabian Zuleeg, chief economist at the European Policy Center, notes, multipolarity is often linked to countries aligning flexibly with other powers, rather than being forced into camps, or worse, becoming unwilling parties in a cold war or open conflict between superpowers.

“On one level,” Zuleeg says, “multipolarity is a description of the emerging global landscape. It also reflects the justified dissatisfaction with the global economic and governance system that was designed, and has been dominated by, the West, led by the US. This system is neither fair, nor is it underpinned any longer by the support of the US, let alone of the Global South.”

However, he stresses, “multipolarity is not an ordering principle, especially if it lacks a clear plan for reformed and inclusive international organizations able to define jointly acceptable rules, allowing for the peaceful mitigation of conflict.”

Yet Aparna Bharadwaj, managing partner at the Boston Consulting Group, adds that the US takes the Global South for granted at its own peril. She points out that global attention lately has fixated on the challenges and tensions fracturing the Western-led world order, such as “America First” policies, the fraying of decades-old alliances, dramatic US tariff increases on all its global trade partners, and Europe’s struggle to remain competitive.

“Less-noticed,” Bharadwaj says, “has been a development with perhaps even greater long-term implications for the global economy—the rise of a ‘third front’ on the world stage spanning more than 130 nations outside the orbits of the West and China and that accounts for more than three-fifths of global population. Nations in the Global South … are emerging from the shadows to craft their own paths in a multipolar world.”

And that world is now, collectively, becoming a bigger trading force for the US than the one over which Trump obsesses. This linear focus, of course, also dates back to the 1980s. Back then, it was Japan that Trump accused of exploiting US workers. Now it’s China in the role of economic bogeyman.

One could look at the destination of the first overseas trip of Trump’s second presidency — the Middle East — as a sign of situational awareness. But Trump family business seems to be the main objective of this Gulf tour, not spreading America’s economic wings.

The good news for the global economy is that Trump is retreating on tariffs, at least for now. “The transition from tariff rates, retaliation and ultimately to trade deals is an important sequence for the recovery in US equity markets,” says Adam Turnquist, chief technical strategist at LPL Financial.

And the recovery in global markets, too. But Trump can’t be happy about the dominant narrative that he blinked on his ballyhooed trade war. Nor is he likely to sit quietly as Xi’s government fails to offer loads of trade concessions in the days and weeks ahead. The odds are still high that “Tariff Man” returns, wreaking fresh havoc in stock, bond and currency markets around the globe.

The dollar has strengthened since Donald Trump's election.Photo: AFP / Jewel Samad
Trump’s tariff policies are driving de-dollarization. Photo: Asia Times Files / AFP / Jewel Samad

The dollar is of particular concern as the US national debt races toward $37 trillion and Team Trump angles for more tax cuts. Markets worry, too, about Trump’s assault on the Federal Reserve’s independence.

And his musings over time about engineering a weaker dollar. As Trump continues to do his worst to trading partners and foes alike, the dollar’s future as the top reserve currency is becoming more and more wobbly.

The market is “re-assessing the structural attractiveness of the dollar as the world’s global reserve currency and is undergoing a process of rapid de-dollarization,” says Deutsche Bank economist George Saravelos. “Nowhere is this more evident than the continued and combined collapse in the currency and US bond market” in recent weeks.

What’s not collapsing, though, is US trade, thanks largely to the Global South, ex-China set. If Trump wants to boost US exports, he might want to start looking to the world that exists beyond China. 

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

Continue Reading

Vingroup tests the line of Vietnam’s new capitalism – Asia Times

Asian media reported on May 11, 2025, that one of the country’s most effective personal businesses, Vingroup, offered to take complete control of the North–South high-speed rail project.

Yet, less than 24 hours later, the stories immediately vanished as links disappeared, articles went offline, and state-controlled media stopped reporting. The repression was caused by the fact that the entire plan had been leaked online, revealing terms that shocked the community and sparked a backlash.

The document, signed by Pham Nhat Vuong, Vietnam’s second businessman and founder of Vingroup, was reportedly addressed to Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and Deputy Prime Minister Tran Hong Ha on May 6, 2025.

VinSpeed, a previously established Vingroup subsidiary, requested in the letter that it be the only investment and operator of the$ 61 billion railroad job. A zero-interest loan over 35 years was requested from VinSpeed to pay for 80 % of the figure, or$ 49 billion, while the state was required to cover the remaining 20 %. The plan did not include expenses for removing weeds, which led to rumors that the position would cover them.

In order to raise additional funds, the company also requested to be designated the buyer for real estate and urban development projects along the railroad route, particularly those that are close to channels. Additionally, it requested the right to employ the state loan as time working capital for its larger business operations.

Finally, it suggested setting a price floor for tickets at 60–75 % of the current airfare rate caps.

The public outcry, which was mostly expressed online, wasn’t the plan’s motivation, but rather its terms. Some people questioned in chat rooms why a private company may ask tens of billions of dollars worth of interest-free open loans, regain control of located real estate, and set value levels with little transparency and no competition.

By May 12th, the proposal’s majority in the news had vanished. The story was reintroduced two days later, on May 14; this time depicted as a patriotic initiative that was in line with the Communist Party’s objectives.

However, the initial leak had already sparked a much larger discussion about private capital, political power, and the future direction of Vietnam’s economy under new leadership.

Interpreting the fallout

The media fallout and the VinSpeed leak turned into a live experiment with how power, capital, and policy are bargained over in communist-ruled Vietnam. Three broad interpretations have come into play.

One interprets the incident as proof that Vingroup, which is regarded as the country’s most politically connected private conglomerate, may have lost some of its unspoken Party protection.

Despite VinFast’s difficulties and rising debt, the organization continues to receive limited state support. VinFast’s campaign abroad and, most recently, the government’s approval of a metro line to Can Gio suggest strong political influence within the Party.

The proposal is perceived as being overreach in a second sense. In light of this analysis, Vingroup made a knowingly unviable bid to appear patriotic without taking any risks. The group might have preferred to bow out without appearing obstructive given its tight finances.

However, this view is undermined by the state media campaign on May 14. VinSpeed reaffirmed its interest far away from backing away, in full compliance with Party messaging and in public. The group is now clearly committed to the pitch, regardless of any errors that might have occurred.

A third, and arguably more grounded, perspective views the proposal as a genuine offer from a powerful actor who erred in the moment. The North–South high-speed railway is not just another infrastructure project. It’s a significant national initiative because it’s politically symbolic, daunting, and economically significant. Many people saw Vingroup’s attempt to take full control as the only investor as a strategic overreach.

Other political or business wing groups that saw Vingroup’s bid as a threat to their own interests were likely to encourage or intensify the leak, and from this perspective, the resultant public outcry.

The state’s choice to halt the publication of the proposal likely contributed to the state’s decision to do so. The quick resumption of media coverage on May 14th, now with carefully worded patriotic framing, suggests not a rebuke but a rebalancing.

There is also a more obscure possibility. What if Vingroup’s Party leadership and those close to Vingroup’s Vuong were the ones who decided to restrict state media coverage following the leak?

The state media’s purge may have been more about damage control than censure because of growing public outcry and elite resistance in the air. People close to Vuong may have worked in the background to buy time, rewrite the narrative, and reintroduce the proposal under safer political cover. Faced with unexpected public blowback and intra-elite friction.

Private-Partnership Partnership

The VinSpeed incident sent a fresh, unambiguous message from the Party’s apex. To Lam, the general secretary of the Communist Party, published a significant economic article titled” A New Driving Force for Economic Development” on May 11 the same day the Vingroup headlines broke.

To Lam has consistently emphasized that the private sector is essential to Vietnam’s economic future since taking office as party chief in July 2024. To Lam makes the observation that Vietnam’s economic growth depends on a stronger private sector in his various articles. He has stated that he wants private companies to account for 70 % of GDP by 2030.

This change in perspective is supported by policy. The Politburo made its most pronounced declaration of support for private enterprise in decades, Resolution 68, in May 2025.

The resolution calls for “rapidly developing large enterprises, medium-sized enterprises, and regional and global private economic groups,” stronger legal protections for property rights, and easier access to capital.

Although it borrows from China’s playbook, the language is new and compelling, suggesting a move to encourage strong, homegrown conglomerates as state-supported champions in a socialist-oriented market economy.

The leaked VinSpeed proposal blew up just days after Resolution 68’s release. The conflict exposed a deeper conflict between the new pro-private reform movement’s political repercussions and the perceived privilege’s political cost.

Resolution 68 calls for fairness in the game, fair access to legal protections, transparency, and civil, not criminal, remedies. In his own words, “administrative thinking must shift from control to collaboration—treating enterprises as partners as partners, not police,” Lam writes in his article.

What happens when those “partners” demand more than the general public will tolerate? The inconsistentness it revealed may soon be forgotten, but it won’t.

Vingroup privilege, public outcry, etc.

Public legitimacy still matters in a system that claims to combine socialism and private enterprise. The general public can protest even in Vietnam or China through backlash and mockery rather than through courts or ballots.

Private entrepreneurs are protected by Resolution 68’s legal protection. However, it runs the risk of acting as a shield only for the wealthy and powerful unless it clearly stops cronyism.

The VinSpeed case demonstrates that even overreach can be corrected if the actor changes. The real danger is not that elites try to extract more than their fair share; rather, it’s that with the right message and timing, they can succeed. A memo that is leaked later turns into patriotic policy.

What happens when the next business simply declines to request a zero-interest loan on paper but instead quietly accepts it through land swaps, land swaps, or zoning adjustments done in a legal sense?

In that case, Vietnam might still be expanding. However, it will be a model with shared rules rather than selective access. The Party must now determine whether it can bring about growth and prosperity, as opposed to whether it can draw a line that even its preferred businesses can’t cross.

Without it, Vietnam’s reform will be a volatile agreement that will bring prosperity to a select few, limited improvements to some, and ultimately a bad deal to many.

Leo Tran writes about global strategy, trade, and international affairs. His articles have appeared in Kyiv Post, The Chicago Tribune, and The Diplomat. He also writes for Vietnam Decoded.

Continue Reading

Asia without America, part 2: Japan’s Tang renaissance – Asia Times

Tokyo woman, Tokyo woman
You’ve got the techniques to rule the world
That adorable inscrutability
Tokyo woman, you’re a secret

basic ace

The democratic governments of Northeast Asia – Japan, South Korea and Taiwan – have survived and also thrived in a nightmarish equilibrium where their death is centered on:

    an America in Asia but not in Asia ( see here ), and

  • a China gathering its power and biding its time.

There are costs associated with this position status, this endless present, not just those associated with proper danger and wealth but also those associated with national incoherence and stagnation.

While Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have avoided the British trash fires of violence, drugs and fat, they have not been able to dodge the relativism and cultural alienation of end-state socialism and liberal democracy. The great professor did include his back on the pitfalls awaiting the Last Guy at the End of History, even though this writer enjoys bash Francis Fukuyama.

Liberal democracy produced “men without trunks”, composed of need and cause but lacking thymos, brilliant at finding innovative ways to satisfy a host of trivial desires through the analysis of long-term self-interest. Without the next man’s desire to be acknowledged as superior to others, no excellence or accomplishment was possible. Articles with his pleasure and unable to feel any sense of shame for being unable to rise above those wishes, the next man ceased to be individual.

Reddit / Jordan Peterson

In liberal democratic Asia, men without chests are the product of political design more than they are naturally occurring Last Men at history’s end.

The Liberal Democratic Party ( LDP ), which has been in power almost exclusively since its founding in 1955, is what made Postwar Japan.

The dark but now open secret of the LDP is that it was founded by accused war criminals ( including Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi ) and had received financial and intelligence support from the US Central Intelligence Agency ( CIA ) for decades.

After Mao’s communists won China’s civil war in 1949, the US “reversed course” in Japan while Germany went through a denazification program. Japan’s right-wing militarists, expecting to be purged and charged with war crimes, were instead rehabilitated to form a political bulwark against communist expansion.

Many were certainly right to condemn Cold War opportunism, but ultimately it meant that the Japanese nation was less than sovereign, never adequately confronted its former wartime past, and never had a real say in the US’s military occupation.

Japan became a bonsai nation – a well-tended miniature state denuded of thymos. Sanctions against Toshiba, the Plaza Accord, and “voluntary” export quotas quickly reminded the Japanese of their place when they dared to challenge the US in the auto and semiconductor industries and pretend to be bonsai.

Japan is sui generis – no economy has stagnated for so long after outperforming so spectacularly for even longer. That is the tragedy of a bonsai country: only men with chests can dream so big. And so, Japan– once the land of samurai warriors and hardened salarymen – has been reduced to a theme park filled with kawaii anime, Pokémon, Super Mario and schoolgirl manga in not-so-hidden corners.

Japan will have to find a new equilibrium in the Western Pacific in the event that America’s military is no longer able to sustain itself. Japan’s interminable bonsai present cannot be all that satisfying, hanging over the nation the way regret haunts a Murakami novel.

Without America, Japan will have to fight for its right to self-determination, leave its bonsai pot, and leave its creepy hentai, hikikomori, and tentacle porn to become men with chests once more.

Much of this will be very off-putting to many Japanese. It will be terrifying to leave behind the comfort of a long-established equilibrium for an unknown future. Much of Asia has unfinished business with Japan. Not just any unfinished business, but blood debt of the most raw, most passionate kind, remembered for generations if not already immortalized in legend.

Japan had little to fear from China for almost all of its history prior to World War II. The Yuan Dynasty’s Mongols twice attempted to invade the Japanese islands, but they were defeated by bad weather each time. ( England and France, in comparison, fought 41 wars against each other since the Dark Ages. ) &nbsp,

This time, however, is different. It can be a bit unsettling to see China have a military that is powerful enough to crush the US ( hypothetically, of course ) and suffers from deep historical grievances. Without the US military, much of Asia – from China to South Korea to Southeast Asia – will want to settle unfinished family business.

However, World War II a long time ago. A lot of water has passed under the bridge. Only a select few of the Japanese war veterans are still alive. Few living Asians have memories of Japanese atrocities. It’s difficult to imagine Asia demanding anything but” symbolic” atonement gestures from Japan.

But in the land of thymos, symbolic gestures, like teaching war atrocities in Japan’s schools or removing war criminals from the Yasukuni Shrine, are the most difficult to swallow.

On November 25, 1970, novelist Yukio Mishima led by four disciples into a military base in central Tokyo, tied up the commander, blocked the doors, donned a white headband, stepped onto the balcony, and delivered a rousing speech to soldiers gathered below.

Yukio Mishima at the headquarters of the Japan Self-Defense Forces ‘ Eastern Region on the day of his death. AAP photo

Meant to inspire a military coup d ‘état restoring direct rule to the emperor, the speech was met with puzzlement and jeers. Shortly after his speech, Mishima apologized to the imprisoned commandant and committed hara-kiri ( seppuku ), disemboweling himself like a samurai in the past before being killed by a disciple.

Mishima spent all his adult life trying not to be a “man without a chest”. Mishima avoided almost certain death in the hopeless final days of the war by being turned down by the army for a false tuberculosis diagnosis he may or may not have faked.

Cheated from or having cheated the glory of battlefield death, Mishima lifted weights obsessively, became a skilled kendo swordsman and lamented the emptiness of modern Japan. Before Francis Fukuyama, Mishima identified Japan’s men without chests:

Japan has lost its spiritual tradition, and instead has become infested with materialism. Japan is currently suffering from a green snake curse. The green snake is biting Japan’s chest. There is no way to get out of this impure condition.

In 1959-1960, protests erupted across Japan in opposition to the United States-Japan Security Treaty, Anpo in abbreviated Japanese. The agreement would formally grant the US the right to keep its military installations in Japan.

Opposition was immense from both the left and the right. Hunderts of thousands of protestors crowded the Tokyo-based parliament of Japan at its height. On June 15, 1960, students breached the building, resulting in violent clashes with police.

The first Anpo had egregious terms in it:

  • no specific end date or means of abrogation,
  • allowing the US military to use bases without consulting the Japanese government, in any way.
  • authorization for US troops to put down domestic protests.

Even with those terms being specifically removed, the 1959-1960 protests were opposed to Anpo. Despite the protests, the revised Anpo was ratified, but at the cost of Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi’s resignation and the cancellation of a celebratory visit by US President Dwight Eisenhower.

Student protests erupted again in 1968-1969, but this time in much less egregious form. The revised Anpo provided abrogation opportunities every ten years. Today, opposition to Anpo is largely confined to residents of Okinawa who bear the brunt of the environmental impact ( noise pollution, chemical run-offs, live-fire exercises ) and service member criminality of the US occupation.

The Anpo protests led to the radicalization of Yukio Mishima. In 1961, Mishima wrote the short story” Patriotism”, which was made into a popular 1966 short film in which he directed and starred.

The movie reached its climax when Lieutenant Takeyama committed hara-kiri while struggling to reconcile his love for both his comrade-in-arms and the Emperor’s strings. In an interview, Mishima explained:

The sense of beauty was always associated with death in samurai tradition. For instance if you commit hara-kiri, the samurai was requested to make-up his face by powder or lipstick in order to keep his face beautiful after his suffering death.

I don’t want to revive the hara-kiri itself, but through the very strong vision of hara-kiri, I want to inspire and stimulate younger people spiritually and spiritually by bringing back some sense of honor or sense of very strong responsibility. That’s my purpose.

The suicide of Mishima at the height of his life was a political call to arms, a personal cri de coeur, an artistic expression of supreme beauty, and a reclamation of the glorified death that slipped through his fingers as a young man.

This all proved too much for 1970 Japan. When the country was beginning to become cosmopolitan, its most well-known writer, blatantly conjuring up unpleasant memories, makes a feudal spectacle of himself. The stunt was certainly beyond the pale in neighboring China and both Koreas, whose inhabitants likely had had enough samurai swords, bushido and hara-kiri for a few centuries.

Mishima was trying to restore Japan to its former glory. Unfortunately, World War II survivor guilt bound him to the most objectionable period in Japan’s history.

After Commodore Perry and his black ships opened Japan under threat of cannon fire, tumultuous changes swept through Japanese society, toppling sworn-for-forgotten institutions like the shogunate and the samurai.

The Meiji restoration overturned the isolationist Edo period, centralized government and industrialized the economy, but ultimately went down an unfortunate militarist path. The remainder is, shall we say, history. Any hint of Meiji-Shōwa militarist revival surely would set off ear-piercing alarm bells across all of Asia.

Fortunately, Commodore Perry’s black ships do not need to be the beginning of Japan’s renaissance. Modern Japan has almost certainly retained more of the Tang Dynasty than modern China.

In Chang’an, the capital of the Tang Dynasty, kimonos, geisha makeup, and Kyoto-style architecture would look more appropriate than anything else in Beijing, Shanghai, or even Shenzhen.

Emperor Taizong ( Li Shimin ), the second emperor of the Tang dynasty, ruled from 626 to 649. He saw himself as a servant of the people because he was a follower of Confucius and a rationalist. Japan learned much from the Tang Dynasty. National Palace Museum photo via Wikimedia Commons

The Tang Dynasty (605 to 907, minus a 690-705 interregnum ) had a profound impact on all facets of Japanese culture, from aesthetics to language to religion to government.

With 25, 000 foreigners living in its capital, The Tang was perhaps the most cosmopolitan of China’s dynasties. Japanese, Turks, Koreans, Vietnamese, Persians, Indians and Central Asians filled Chang’an’s restaurants, wine-houses and temples ( Buddhist, Nestorian Christian, Zoroastrian ). &nbsp,  

In this atmosphere, Tang China was in constant contact with Japan, receiving 19 official missions (kentoshi ) of up to 600 people who made the two-year round-trip journey ( some staying decades before returning ).

In their official capacity, Japanese ambassadors and scholars who had completed the Kyoto Institute established Chinese-style laws, bureaucracies, calendars, and measurements. In their unofficial capacity, they brought back Chinese fashion, literature, musical instruments and artistic taste. &nbsp,

Fears of China collecting on Japanese blood debt in draconian fashion are highly misplaced. The Communist Party of China can revert to its Confucianism without a barbaric military presence along China’s maritime border. While the political West swings left and right, political China swings between Legalism and Confucianism.

Legalism and its authoritarian tendencies rule in these troubled times; there can be no entertainment and fun when Qin Shi Huang is reviving the Qin Dynasty. And only after Emperor Taizong defeated the Eastern and Western Turks could the Tang Dynasty relax, allowing Chang’an and Yangzhou to become cosmopolitan cities where commerce, poetry, painting, calligraphy, drunken parties and dancing girls flourished.

President Xi Jinping has been battening down China’s hatches along Legalist lines for over a decade, reining in the loosey-goosey free-for-all of the Hu-Wen era. China is no longer feigning its strength and passing the time.

China’s shipbuilding capacity is more than 200 times that of the US. It is only a matter of time. Without the US Navy Seventh Fleet stationed in Yokosuka, the Qin-esque Communist Party of China will mellow out and become Tang-esque – a version of China much more amenable to an anxious Japan.

Abandoning a well-known equilibrium to confront Japan’s past and secure an unknown future is a high-risk/high-reward endeavor. Japan has everything to lose. An unforgiving China bent on vengeance would be the end of Japan without the US’s support.

Japan, however, also has everything to gain. Japanese politics and society have been hampered for decades by the US military presence. A forgiving China not interested ( much ) in settling scores is the only real future Japan has. The status quo has stunted Japan, turning its novelists into purgatorial torture.

Mishima went out in a macabre blaze of glory. For what could have been, Murakami is unstoppable. And Ryū ( the other ) Murakami wants to set it all on fire. Japan can finally let its Tang renaissance wash over Asia in a hypothetical future free of American alien invasion.

Continue Reading

Tariffs put fate of handout scheme in question

Finance minister says government has limited funds and they might be better spent elsewhere

Finance Minister Pichai Chunhavajira delivers an update on Thailand’s proposals to the US on improving the trade balance between the two countries, which could induce Washington to lower tariffs, at Government House on Wednesday. (Photo: Royal Thai Government)
Finance Minister Pichai Chunhavajira delivers an update on Thailand’s proposals to the US on improving the trade balance between the two countries, which could induce Washington to lower tariffs, at Government House on Wednesday. (Photo: Royal Thai Government)

The fate of the third phase of the government’s flagship digital wallet scheme is hanging in the balance in light of the impact of US tariffs on the Thai economy.

Finance Minister Pichai Chunhavajira confirmed on Wednesday that the 10,000-baht handout programme is under review as the government must reconsider its priorities in light of trade turmoil that is affecting the economy worldwide.

Thailand recently submitted its proposals to Washington, as it seeks to avoid having a steep 36% tariff rate applied to imports of Thai goods, on top of the 10% rate already in place. Dates for negotiations with the US have not yet been set. 

Mr Pichai said the committee on economic stimulus measures is gathering information for a reassessment of its policies, including the third phase of the populist scheme.

The first two phases of the cash handout delivered only marginal economic gains, and not the “economic tsunami” that former PM Srettha Thavisin promised when he was campaigning for Pheu Thai in 2023.

The government has 157 billion baht left to fund this final phase, and it needs an additional 27 billion baht to finance it. Under the policy, 2.7 million Thais aged 16 to 20 would be given 10,000 baht each in digital currency to ease their burden and help stimulate the economy.

Initially expected to be approved by cabinet last week, the scheme has since been deferred.

Mr Pichai said the government is open to adjusting spending within the 2025 budget if necessary, without having to wait for the expenditure plan for the 2026 fiscal year starting on Oct 1.

He expressed confidence that lawmakers would make the necessary changes when the budget bill comes up for its first reading in the House from May 28-30.

“Ultimately, we need a robust medium- and long-term economic plan. We need to review if we will obtain more loans or make debt repayments,” Mr Pichai said.

The minister said he would meet on Thursday with officials of the Export-Import Bank of Thailand (Exim Bank) to discuss support measures for exporters affected by the US tariffs.

Economy like ‘long Covid’

Meanwhile, People’s Party leader Natthapong Ruangpanyawut said on Wednesday that unless the economy in the Northeast, the country’s biggest region, is given a major push, the third phase of the scheme will have little or no impact.

Speaking at a party forum in Khon Kaen, he said the global economy has changed and cash handouts may not be the best solution.

“Even if the government proceeds with the handout, which will raise domestic spending, (domestic) production would remain low because the money is being spent on cheap imports,” Mr Natthapong said.

He likened the Thai economy to people suffering from long Covid, adding the situation could deteriorate further due to the intense global trade war.

While some sectors of the economy in the Northeast saw positive signs, the region’s industrial sector has yet to recover, he said. The issue of uneven development in the region also needs to be addressed.

Mr Natthapong called for strategic intervention to promote a “rising star” economy such as so-called “mutelu” tourism that is associated with mysticism and lucky charms.

More efforts must also be made to develop and strengthen IT and communications, both of which are lagging, he added.

Continue Reading

Maid who stabbed 70-year-old woman 26 times gets murder conviction reduced on appeal

A lady who was 17 years old when she murdered her employer’s 70-year-old mother-in-law successfully appealed her faith has been heard in Singapore.

Zin Mar Nwe, 24, was initially found guilty of murder at prosecution and given a life sentence in 2023.

On the grounds of grave and unexpected provocation, the Court of Appeal on Wednesday ( 15 May ) granted her partial defense.

This resulted in a reduction in her murder charge from a criminal homicide rather than murder.

A three-judge section, which included Justices Tay Yong Kwang and Discover Kee Oon, delivered the decision on behalf of Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon.

We believe a reasonable person could reasonably had been equally provoked given the specific circumstances of this accused person, particularly her junior, the challenges of her debt to her work broker, and her fear of being repatriated in these circumstances,” he said.

At a later time, parties may go back to court to submit comments regarding the word.

Guilty crime is punishable by life in prison or a fine of up to 20 times. Zin Mar Nwe may be caned because she is a female.

In June 2018, the lady, who is from Myanmar, stabbed the victim after the old woman threatened to send her up to her representative.

When Zin Mar Nwe knifed the survivor 26 days until she stopped moving, the victim was watching TV.

The lady then ran away with her things, washed the blade, and changed. At her work firm, she was detained.

The victim’s family members, the place, and her identity are all subject to a joke order.

MAID ABUSE RESULTS

One of the exceptions to the definition of criminal homicide is no death is grave and unexpected provocation.

A person who shares similar qualities with and is in the same position as the perpetrator may become deprived of self-control by the provocation, in order to establish this defense.

In order to determine whether Zin Mar Nwe was abused by the sufferer prior to the shooting, the Court of Appeal took the trial court’s results into account.

According to Chief Justice Menon, these findings directly contributed to the defense of grave and unexpected offense.

Justice Andre Maniam, the trial judge, had acknowledged that the sufferer had repeatedly retaliated against the girl because she had hit her to find her attention or to get her attention.

In his opinion, he had stated:” I do not think that the accused may have stabbed the accused if there were just an impromptu declaration by the accused that the accused may be returned to the agent.

Instead, that statement was made after the dying had repeatedly abused, abused, and harmed the accused.

The accused would not have stabbed the dying, he had continued,” but for the risk to deliver the accused up to the broker.”

Justice Maniam also recognized that the victim’s abuse of her to the rest of the family was not reported, and that she was “willing to tolerate for treatment, even though she was hurt, unhappy, and felt unrecognized.”

The accused, however, feared returning to the agent ( and, in turn, her home country in debt ), and that was the result of the stabbing when the deceased threatened to do so.

He added that Zin Mar Nwe had told the police that she was “very unhappy” when the sufferer said those words to her.

Events ‘ Quarrels

Lawyers Josephus Tan and Cory Wong Guo Yean of Invictus Law, who represented Zin Mar Nwe under the Criminal Legal Aid Scheme, fought her charm.

Mr. Tan argued that the trial judge should have taken into account the “ingredients” of burial and unexpected offense.

These included the allegations of abuse by the girl, her mounting debt to her work company, and the threat of being sent again to her company.

He also referred to her younger age and the fact that she had previously been turned down by two companies since arriving in Singapore in January 2018, which were both factors in her circumstances at the time.

The bride’s attorneys argued that this situation posed the offense that Zin Mar Nwe’s threat to return Zin Mar to her agency the following day raised.

They wrote in written proposals that it” struck straight at the heart of her grave job position in Singapore.”

” And at the tender age of 17 we suggest that ( Zin Mar Nwe ) would reasonably not have the appropriate coping mechanisms to deal with or attenuate the provocation’s gravity,” they continued.

A defense of grave and unexpected offense, according to Deputy Public Prosecutors Kumaresan Gohulabalan, Sean Teh, and Brian Tan, was not supported by the evidence, according to Deputy Public Prosecution Sean Teh, Sean Teh, and Brian Tan.

Mr. Kumaresan argued that the test judge was incorrect to determine whether Zin Mar Nwe had verbally or physically abused the victim because this was only based on the maid’s testimony, which was a disreputable see.

He noted that despite the family’s positive relationship with her, she previously reported the abuse to the rest of her family, and that she never even wrote about it in her book despite openly expressing her emotions it.

The maid’s statements about two “dark-skinned” men killing the prey before giving her account of the stabbing were “radically uneven,” according to the prosecutors.

The Court of Appeal determined, however, that Justice Maniam’s conclusions were supported by the substantial data, and established the provocation’s subjectivity.

He claimed that the jury did not apply those findings to admitted abuse that had taken place before the killing itself.

The blade attack’s “heinous” character and the lack of a justification for the shooting were both noted by Chief Justice Menon. The trial had also acknowledged the trial jury’s” troubles” in establishing goal during the charm.

Chief Justice Menon acknowledged that Zin Mar Nwe first came up with a fake accounts of how the victim was killed while addressing the lady’s trust.

But, she gave a “nuanced” account of what had happened four days after the shooting, including a confrontation with the target and a danger to be sent back to her broker, and how it had affected her.

He claimed that her version of events was largely unfactual throughout her test and that she had made up this for her defense when it wasn’t being advanced in her defense until now.

Continue Reading

Why Trump’s China trade war retreat may be fleeting – Asia Times

The day of Donald Trump’s independence in Tokyo seems like it was a long time ago. In its place comes Capitulation Day, as the self-proclaimed” Tax Man” caved in to China’s Xi Jinping faster than even the expenditure bull had hoped.

Blinked. sprained. Retreated. Quit. Swerved. Blanched. Forgotten. remained. All are thoughts America’s most feudal president in 125 times hates now that they’re being used to describe how China outmaneuvered his White House with the tax peace announced Monday in Geneva.

Trump and his aides are pretending to be trying to portray this as anything other than a fatal climbdown. However, as Trump’s 145 % tariffs are reduced to 30 % for at least 90 days, there is no way to disguise the popping of champagne corks in Beijing today.

But the odds of this financial truce having are also lower than Trump’s flagging authorization rating. Although there are many causes for this, the three most important are listed below.

One, the stories about Trump yelling in the face of falling areas are certain to force him back into the fray. If there’s anything that animates the art-of-the-deal leader, it’s being perceived&nbsp, as&nbsp, the “loser” in any dialogue.

Trump will undoubtedly be enraged by his remarks about his up-front and Xi’s masterful long game, which include giving him much in return for the delay beyond the new 125 % taxes.

News analysis reports on how Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and various Asian countries may defeat Trump in the same way Team Xi did.

This” total reset”, as the White House calls it, is by far” Trump ‘s&nbsp, biggest climbdown to date”, says Eurasia Group founder Ian Bremmer. Beijing has only” properly called Trump’s bluff,” according to Mark Williams, an analyst at Capital Economics.

Trump’s return to the battlefield of trade war is not certain. But the odds that he just sits up and lets a degrading news cycle play out in real time don’t look great. The volatile 78-year-old from Queens has rarely, if ever, displayed before, but it would require a degree of elegance and self-control.

However, Trump’s military retreat in the hottest trade-war conflict sends a message to another world leaders who dread their Oval Office visits: plunging markets may change Trump’s mind in a blink.

Events in Geneva are a” indication that the US is more determined than China to provide the’ de-escalation’ information to the market”, analysts at Jeffries, an investment bank, read.

Two, it is unlikely that China will lose the compromises Trump believes he deserves.

Of course, the difficult part is today. Trump is sure to notice his share selloff to a 30 % tax from 145 % as a surprise to Xi, deserving of some major cooperation.

Team Xi may probably have a very different point of view. Trump looked into the economical abyss and witnessed angry Wall Street titan glaring up at him from Beijing’s point of view.

JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon, who runs the world’s biggest banks by industry capitalization, spoke for The Street when he complained Trump’s tariffs were” too big, too large and very aggressive” — even if one thinks it’s wise to play hardball with foes and allies everywhere.

Retailers ‘ extremely ominous warnings about empty shelves and images of stale container ships crowded the coasts of Seattle, Los Angeles, and Baltimore finally came to an end.

The so-called “bond vigilantes” made headlines about many trillions of dollars in stock market losses, as well as speculation that Trump would experience a” Trumpcession.” This gave the White House a clear choice in terms of who his boss was and left him with much choice.

The exact went for China’s position going into the trip trade talks in Geneva. Team Xi demanded a kindness movement regarding taxes, and Trump complied in the end.

The phraseological dramatic excursion says it all. Around Liberation Day, Trump World argued the US is being “looted, pillaged, raped and plundered by governments near and way”. The topic of discussion is today” the value of a long-term, socially beneficial economic and trade relationship.”

Observers are free to interpret this as a split-screen second. What it really is, though, is the financial equivalent of a procedure. This is not a de-escalation; rather, it is an alternate academic world. &nbsp,

But by now, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer know full well that China is feeling emboldened, no cowed, by the last two months. Xi’s people are demanding that Trump’s are seen as Team Trump requests a compromises listing from China.

This won’t be properly received in Trump World. But finally, Trump’s quite determined business “deal” in name only with the UK set quite a law.

Given that the UK and the US trade deficit, it’s unclear why a US chief may engage in political labor negotiations with Keir Starmer‘s authorities. The answer is a burning desire for a frightened gain, if there ever was one.

How’s how University of Michigan analyst Justin&nbsp, Wolfers amounts of Trump’s business “deal” with London:” Laser focused on reducing rates for regular Americans from Day One, the senator has struck a deal that will lower the price of Rolls-Royces, Bentleys, Jaguars, Aston Martins, Range Rovers, and Minis. No other consumer goods were given carve-outs.

Three, Trump’s 40-plus-year belief that tariffs will magically restore America.

Trump’s most consistent economic view — one might say the only consistent view— through the decades is that Asia is exploiting the US and only import taxes can save the day.

Who else in the public would refer to tariffs as “beautiful” and claim that they will” supercharge” the US economy when everyone else is aware that they are inherently stagflationary?

Trump also doesn’t seem to understand that customers and retailers pay these taxes, not the nation that ships goods to Walmart, Target, and Amazon. He also believes, wrongly, that tariff “revenues” can replace income taxes in an economy carrying a US$ 36 trillion-plus national debt.

No one can currently respond to the where-to-now query. Investors can project their best-case/worst-case scenarios onto the white canvas of Trump’s 90-day pause in his 145 % tariff.

” If the US can get the Chinese to commit to meaningful trade rebalancing within 90 days, it would be historic”, says Jamie Cox, managing partner of the Harris Financial Group. There is still a very steep hill to climb to get a real agreement because the Chinese are quite adept at stalling.

Team Xi might take former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s example in this regard. In 2018 and 2019, the late Abe managed to slow-walk negotiations with the Trump 1.0 White House.

Abe cozied up to Trump like no other democratic leader at the time. He even nominated Trump for the prestigious Nobel Peace Prize, received expensive presents, including a$ 3,800 golf club, and flattered him ad nauseam.

It didn’t win Japan a perfect return. Trump left the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was at the heart of Tokyo’s effort to contain China economically, despite Abe’s pleas.

Additionally, Trump 1.0 did not waive the steel and aluminum taxes on “friend” and Abe&nbsp. And Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party was none too happy that Trump’s weird flirtation with North Korean tyrant Kim Jong Un came at the expense of Japan’s national security.

Abe managed to drag out the clock for so long, so a desperate Trump consented to a bilateral agreement that had no impact on US-Japan trade dynamics. Abe even persuaded Trump to remove all autos from the table.

As Jeffrey&nbsp, Schott, economist at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, notes, the pact “did little more than partly restoring the benefits that Trump recklessly threw away when he pulled the United States out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership”.

Without a doubt, Team Xi is busy planning their own Abe-like dodge, minus the aggressive flattery. Xi’s Communist Party, of course, does not have to contest mid-term elections 18 months from now. And Xi is aware of it.

Therefore, Beijing isn’t in a rush to sign a” Phase Two” trade agreement, with a US leader almost certain to demand a” Phase Three” round of negotiations in the coming year.

At the same time, US officials are learning the hard way that Trump’s chaotic Phase One process prompted China to pivot to other markets.

The 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN), which is China’s top trading partner, is now followed by the European Union.

Additionally, China is actively increasing its market share among the BRICS, including Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and the Global South. Xi’s” Made in China 2025″ strategy has been quietly making the nation more self-sufficient.

In a recent Foreign Affairs article, economists Brendan Kelly and Michael Hirson wrote that “de-risking is frequently described as a Western goal.”

” China has, however, intentionally pursued this approach for more than ten years. A central focus of the Made in China 2025 initiative, which Beijing launched in 2015, was to reduce China’s reliance on foreign products. And to make China a leader in the fields of semiconductors, batteries, biotechnology, aerospace, and artificial intelligence.

However, Kelly and Hirson also doubt that China and the Trump administration will ever form a productive partnership.

” Genuinely delivering on the terms of an ambitious deal would require enormous political commitment from both capitals to overcome the logic of de-risking”, Kelly and Hirson write.

Bottom line:” No significant de-risking reconsideration is likely to occur in the next four years, no matter how much Xi or Trump says he wants a deal.”

Trump refutes this assertion, and he does so severely. But the ways in which Xi has Trump’s number and this White House is boxed in by financial markets that are calling the shots, it’s hard to believe that the tariff truce agreed in Geneva can hold for very long.

Follow William Pesek on X using the hashtag# WilliamPesek

Continue Reading