Commentary: What mattered most to China about Australian PM Albanese’s visit

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The economic agenda was equally important to Beijing, given the difficulties China is currently facing.

Given the nature of Australia-China trade, there is a limit to the punitive measures China can impose on Australia. In fact, despite the tensions that existed with Australia under the Morrison government, overall bilateral trade has continued to grow, reaching nearly A$300 billion (US$192 billion) in 2022. This shows how complementary the two economies actually are, as well as the resilience of these economic ties.

This is what Chinese leaders and the media emphasised during Albanese’s visit and why they were highly critical of the idea of “decoupling” or “de-risking” from China’s economy.

They characterised “decoupling” as going against free trade and protectionism, but in reality, Beijing is deeply concerned over any specific measures that restrict trade in the high-tech sector, such as with semiconductors. The US and its allies have been increasingly adopting such restrictions in recent years.

THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WASN’T SAID

What wasn’t discussed much in the Chinese media was the gap between what Beijing presented as a successful visit and what was actually achieved.

One could argue both sides talked about the obvious – for example, that bilateral relations have more or less stabilised, compared to how they were 18 months ago. As China expert Richard McGregor astutely observed, Albanese was “pushing on an open door”.

This is not to belittle the progress made so far. The intention of both governments to resume and strengthen the many dialogues between officials from their countries is important – even critical – in “resetting” the relationship. These channels of communication are incredibly important during times of crisis as a way of managing disputes and avoiding conflicts from spiralling out of control.

Though resetting the relationship was a definite aim in the long term, there were also significant takeaways in the short term. This can be seen in how the state media coverage downplayed AUKUS and conflicts in the South Pacific, where China’s influence has raised alarm bells in Canberra and Washington.

China has signalled its displeasure over AUKUS and continues to consider it a major impediment to further improvement of bilateral relations. But Xi told Albanese they could work together on regional security challenges.

Where there are efforts to cause disturbances in the Asia-Pacific region, we must firstly stay vigilant, and secondly oppose them.

And in the Pacific, the Chinese side is seeing an opportunity for the two countries in terms of regional economic development – how Australia and China can both contribute.

Jingdong Yuan is Associate Professor of Asia-Pacific Security at the University of Sydney. This commentary first appeared on The Conversation.

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Commentary: South China Sea isn’t the place to play ‘game of chicken’

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On the one hand, China may be forced to show its hand by undertaking more forceful actions to stop the missions. On the other, doing this would risk direct confrontation with American forces. This puts China between a rock and a hard place.

All eyes will also be on Washington to see if it demonstrates less-than-desired resolve to back up a formal treaty ally. Yet a joint escort for resupply runs would strain existing capacities and potentially enter direct confrontation with the Chinese.

Manila appears more wary, having stressed that China’s aggressive behaviour to date would have to be assessed in determining the applicability of the mutual defence treaty with Washington.

That said, the possibility of a joint Philippine-US effort to resupply Second Thomas Shoal would become higher if Beijing shows no or little inclination to stand down from its aggressive blockading actions. It would therefore behove China to refrain from escalating beyond what it is already doing, lest it decides to gamble in a “game of chicken” to further test American resolve.

Unless of course, Beijing concludes that Washington will be the first to blink. This would definitely set the two powers on a course of collision in the South China Sea.

Collin Koh is senior fellow at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, based in Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

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Commentary: Joe Biden’s unsung shift on China

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As Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, this week pointed out: “High-level and repeated interaction is crucial to clear up misperception … and to arrest downward spirals that could erupt into a major crisis.” 

Nothing fundamental has changed about US-China rivalry. Chinese vessels and aircraft continue to intimidate others in its vicinity. America is tightening curbs on outward investments to China, and further restricting Chinese investments in the US.

Xi could cross the line by supplying Russia with military materiel in its war on Ukraine. With some reason, Xi continues to think that America wants to keep China down.

The more they can converse, however, the lower the existential risk. By my count, Sullivan has spent about 20 hours talking to Wang in Vienna and Malta during the past few months, which is as much time as a patient might spend with their therapist.

It is harder to read bad faith into your adversary when they are objecting civilly to you in private.

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Commentary: Xi-Putin Belt and Road meeting highlights Russia’s role as China’s junior partner

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Perhaps the most instructive aspect of the visit was Putin’s explicit acknowledgement of the different roles played by Moscow and Beijing in international politics.

Putin described the Russia-dominated Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) – a concept Moscow has promoted as a response to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that would fuse the Eurasian Economic Union with the BRI – as a regional or “local” project. Meanwhile he happily described the BRI as “global” in scale.

For the past decade, Russian policymakers and experts have consistently held up the GEP as symbolising Russia’s equality with China. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov has described it as “the creation of a continent-wide architecture”.

Putin’s words, coupled with the lack of any meaningful results of the meeting (bar a contract on food and agricultural products which has yet to be confirmed by Beijing), illustrate the extent to which Russia’s war against Ukraine has deepened the asymmetry between the two powers.

HOLDING BACK?

The lack of genuine progress on the issue of the Power of Siberia-2 pipeline, which will transport gas from Russia’s Yamal gas fields, which used to supply Europe, via Mongolia to China, was further evidence of this asymmetry. Xi was kind enough to express hope that the project could proceed quickly. But he did not outline any concrete steps in that direction.

China’s agreement, if confirmed by a contract, would have been the most clear signal of Beijing’s strategic support for Russia, especially given Gazprom’s shrinking European market. By prolonging negotiations, China seems to be trying to extract specific concessions from Russia, related to the price of gas, possible Chinese ownership of gas fields in Russia, or Beijing’s acquisition of shares in Gazprom.

Meanwhile, in May, China revived the prospect of building the so-called section “D”, enlarging the capacity of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline system, which will bring gas from Turkmenistan via Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to China, emphasising China’s other sources of energy supplies.

While continuing to offer Moscow political support and not interfering with Chinese companies’ attempts to take advantage of the exodus of Western companies to increase their presence in the Russian market, Beijing has clearly attempted to prevent any embarrassment related to Russia. A gas contract would have overshadowed the BRI summit and generated a strong reaction in the US and Europe, potentially strengthening China hawks in the West.

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Commentary: Xi and Putin's no-limits partnership is becoming a one-sided affair

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A JUNIOR-XI-JINPING PARTNER

Putin, who is now obviously Xi’s junior partner, is also expected to visit Beijing, indicating that Russia and China have a common goal in mind when it comes to putting an end to the western-dominated international order and limiting US and Western influence in what they both see as their wealthy interest zones across Eurasia.

Russia continues to emphasize its ties to China, in part because it has some other options besides countries that are considered to be international pariahs like North Korea and Iran.

Trade along the New Eurasian Land Bridge, an inland road connection between China and Europe that was once a significant transportation route for Chinese exports to European markets, has been significantly reduced by American sanctions against Russia in response to Moscow’s warfare against Ukraine.

Instead, transportation roads avoiding Russia have become more significant, such as the Middle Corridor, which connects China with the EU via central Asia, the Caspian Sea, and the South Caucasus. Soviet hopes for closer ties between the BRI and Moscow’s post-Soviet financial consolidation program, the Eurasian Economic Union, have also been dashed by this.

It is significant that Putin was invited to visit Beijing by Xi, but it is also noticeable that this is not just a intergovernmental matter. Putin’s trip to Moscow does, at best, give the Russian president a chance to speak with Xi in the margins of the summit intended to commemorate the BRI— a project that is closely related to him personally— in contrast to his trip there in March.

China also has and pursues different alternatives in its international relations. At the APEC conference in San Francisco in November, there is still a chance that US President Joe Biden and Xi will cross paths. Josep Borrell, the head of the EU’s foreign plan, also traveled to China, perhaps to get ready for an EU-China summit later this year.

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Commentary: Jokowi is right not to join BRICS for now - but the alliance is still important for Indonesia

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AVOIDING European Attitude IN THE ANTI.

In the past, BRICS has aimed to increase cooperation with other developing nations in the economy, business, politics, and social development as well as to encourage cooperation between nations within the so-called Global South.

In order to stabilize the economic hegemony of the Group of 7 nations— Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the United States— Russia launched BRICS in 2009.

However, as China and Russia attempt to place BRICS as a counterbalance to the G7 and other Western-led configurations, both the BRIC and G7 ) are unable to resist expanding their personal agenda towards broader global social and security issues.

For instance, the alliances have clearly taken opposing positions in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

For instance, BRICS rulers issued a joint statement during the conference expressing their concern over the ongoing conflict and requesting an immediate ceasefire.

South Africa, China, and India did not denounce Russia’s invasion of Ukraine despite the fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin was absent from the mountain due to an collar permit issued for alleged war crimes. Brazil has declined to impose sanctions on Moscow or visit European nations in sending weapons to Ukraine.

In contrast, Russia was subjected to harsher restrictions at the G7 conference in March.

This might imply that BRICS gives its members the opportunity to oppose and challenge the US-led European dominance. However, this type of anti-Western sentiment runs counter to Indonesia’s free and effective foreign policy, which forbids it from siding with other nations or adhering to any defense agreements.

Indonesia was one of the Non-Aligned Movement’s founding members. Therefore, it often upholds the principle of nonintervention in the conflicts between the great powers and just wants to concentrate on bringing about social justice and world peace.

During its 2022 G20 president, Indonesia made an effort to mediate between Russia and Ukraine. Therefore, joining BRICS would only make Indonesia’s situation excessively difficult.

Additionally, if Indonesia joins the BRICS, the West will likely interpret it as a sign of support for Russia and China, which could have an impact on Indonesia’s diplomatic ties with the US and other European nations.

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Commentary: Oppenheimer’s warning still holds true to this day

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Military expenditure in Europe saw its steepest annual increase in at least 30 years. NATO countries and partners are all accelerating towards, or are already past, the 2 per cent of GDP military spending target. The global arms bazaar is busier than ever.

Aside from the opportunity cost represented by these alarming figures, weak international law in crucial areas means current military spending is largely immune to effective regulation.

THE NEW NUCLEAR ARMS RACE

Although the world’s nuclear powers agree “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”, there are still about 12,500 nuclear warheads on the planet. This number is growing, and the power of those bombs is infinitely greater than the ones dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

According to the United Nations’ disarmament chief, the risk of nuclear war is greater than at any time since the end of the Cold War. The nine nuclear-armed states (Britain, France, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel, as well as the big three) all appear to be modernising their arsenals. Several deployed new nuclear-armed or nuclear-capable weapons systems in 2022.

The US is upgrading its “triad” of ground, air and submarine-launched nukes, while Russia is reportedly working on submarine delivery of “doomsday” nuclear torpedoes capable of causing destructive tidal waves.

While Russia and the US possess about 90 per cent of the world’s nuclear weapons, other countries are expanding quickly. China’s arsenal is projected to grow from 410 warheads in 2023 to maybe 1,000 by the end of this decade.

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Commentary: Instagram is making you a worse tourist

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1. Do your research

Even if you’re a seasoned traveller, you may not realise the impact your actions have on local communities. But a bit of information – from your own research or provided by local governments – might be enough to help you act more appropriately. Before you go, look up guidelines or background information on local cultural or safety norms.

Whether you agree with the customs or not is irrelevant. If it is a more conservative place than you are used to, you should be mindful of that – unlike the two influencers who were arrested for explicit behaviour in a temple in Bali.

2. Put down your phone

Research shows that when travelling, people can become alienated from their surroundings if they are more focused on their devices than the destination.

Often the most memorable travel experiences will be when you have a meaningful connection with someone, or learn something new that you’ve never experienced before. That becomes harder if you’re constantly looking at your phone.

3. Use your influence for good

In popular “Instagram versus reality” posts, influencers are revealing the huge crowds and queues behind the most Instagrammable locations.

Showing the less-than-glamorous conditions behind those iconic shots could influence your own social media connections to rethink their personal travel motivations – are they just going somewhere to get the perfect selfie? Having more evidence of these conditions circulating online could lead to a larger societal shift away from social media-induced tourism.

If you have the urge to post, try to promote smaller businesses and make sure you are demonstrating proper (and legal) etiquette on your holiday.

Lauren A Siegel is Lecturer in Tourism & Events, University of Greenwich. This commentary first appeared on The Conversation.

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Commentary: Oppenheimer could trigger useful discussion on nuclear weapons for Japan

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TOKYO: What can we learn from a country’s choice of when – or whether – to screen World War II drama Oppenheimer? Christopher Nolan’s blockbuster biopic was released in the United States just after the anniversary of the Trinity test, the culmination of the Manhattan Project on Jul 16, 1945, that paved the way for the postwar Pax Americana. 

In South Korea, it will hit screens on National Liberation Day, which marks Tokyo’s Aug 15 surrender in World War II – something the atomic bomb is credited with. And in Japan itself, which next month will see 78 years since Little Boy and Fat Man were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, respectively, the movie isn’t scheduled for release at all yet.

That might reflect the country’s complicated views on the war. 

In the US, the movie has reopened the debate on the bomb and whether it was a war crime. These revisionist discussions, which are based on what we know now, aren’t especially helpful. 

Contrary to some reports, Oppenheimer has absolutely not been banned in Japan – unlike some of its Asian neighbours, the country rarely takes such steps, even for politically insensitive content. But the movie’s distributor has yet to schedule a release date; assuming one comes at all, it will be some time after the Aug 6 and Aug 9 memorials.

JAPAN’S AMBIGUOUS STANCE TOWARD NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Even on those anniversaries, Japan tends to avoid discussion of the rights and wrongs. That’s not to say its citizens have a uniform position – far from it. A 2015 poll by public broadcaster NHK found that 40 per cent of the population agreed with the proposition that the US had no choice but to use the bomb. 

Interestingly, in Hiroshima, that number was 44 per cent – higher than the country at large – and topped those who called it “unforgivable”.

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Commentary: Forget Washington, Pyongyang’s most important target has always been Beijing

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BOSTON, Massachusetts: It’s easily forgotten now, but just over five years ago North Korea and China were not getting along. 

Beijing was adamant about implementing United Nations sanctions as a punishment for Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile testing. China had increased its military facilities, bolstered its defence capabilities, and constructed refugee camps along the China-North Korea border to prepare for any Korean contingencies. 

China even discussed the prospect of a North Korean regime collapse with the United States, perhaps anticipating such joint US-China economic and military pressure might contribute to North Korea’s decision to de-escalate tensions to break out of complete isolation.

TIMES HAVE CHANGED

How times change. North Korea and China have just celebrated the 62nd anniversary of the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance, having renewed the Sino-North Korean agreement for another 20 years in July 2021. 

Ever since North Korea mended fences with China in early 2018, it has been a regular occurrence for the two countries to emphasise their “like lips and teeth”, “immortal and invincible” friendship and “unbreakable” relationship. In contrast to the now hostile relations with the United States and South Korea, and the failed attempts to have sanctions lifted, North Korea’s charm offensive with China has been a resounding success.

The intense focus on US-North Korea and North Korea-South Korea summits, when they do occur, paints a distorted picture of North Korea’s diplomacy. In these efforts, Pyongyang’s most important target has always been Beijing.

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