Commentary: China needs immigrants to escape a ‘low fertility trap’

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But changing immigration policy will likely require a change in mindset.

In a recent story by The Economist, the reporter notes that Chinese “officials boast of a single Chinese bloodline dating back thousands of years”. And that taps into a seemingly deep-rooted belief in racial purity held by many leaders in the Chinese Communist Party. 

In 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping told former US president Donald Trump: “We people are the original people, black hair, yellow skin, inherited onwards. We call ourselves the descendants of the dragon”.

The best way to maintain this racial purity, many in China believe, is to limit or prohibit migration into China.

But relaxing immigration policy will not only boost numbers, but it will also offset any drop in productivity caused by an ageing population. Immigrants are typically of prime working age and very productive; they also tend to have more babies than native-born residents.

The US and many European countries have relied for decades on international migration to bolster their working-age population. 

For immigration to have any reasonable impact in China, the number of people coming into China will need to increase tremendously in the next decade or so – to around 50 million, perhaps higher. Otherwise, in the coming decades, China’s demographic destiny will be one of population losses every year, with more deaths than births, and the country will soon have one of the oldest populations in the world.

Dudley L Poston Jr is Professor of Sociology, Texas A&M University. This commentary first appeared on The Conversation.

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Commentary: Despite the excitement, India’s South China Sea policy remains unchanged

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NEW DELHI: An India-Philippines joint statement last month has caused a stir. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India’s Foreign Minister, and his Filipino counterpart, Enrique Manalo, issued a joint statement on Jun 29 calling for China to abide by the 2016 arbitral award on the South China Sea. 

It sparked a flurry of commentary in the media speculating a shift away from India’s long-standing neutrality on competing territorial claims in Southeast Asia. 

While India has long supported norms enshrined in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), some experts pointed out, this was the first time that New Delhi had explicitly called on China to heed the arbitral tribunal’s 2016 ruling.

The development – although significant – ought to be viewed in perspective. A joint statement by countries seeking improved ties follows diplomatic practice. Not infrequently, one side pushes the other to take positions the latter may not be entirely comfortable with but is potentially open to considering as the matter is deemed a core interest by its partner. This is often the case with Southeast Asian states and their partners in Asia and Europe.

When the G7, the Quad, and the European Union expressed their support for the Philippines’ claims in the South China Sea last month, for instance, some member states were wary of the prospect of riling China. 

Yet, they said what had to be, knowing full well that China would object. It did. Beijing slammed the move, terming it a blatant interference in its internal affairs.

OTHER FACTORS AT PLAY

It’s not as if geopolitics is the sole factor influencing the implementation of rules and norms in the South China Sea.

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Commentary: Why is NATO expanding its reach to the Asia-Pacific?

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And from a defence standpoint, NATO and the four partners will aim to improve the “interoperability” of their militaries – the ability of different military forces and defence systems to effectively work together and coordinate their actions.

This might entail deepening the knowledge of each other’s military assets, improving the relationships between their soldiers and other military personnel, and expanding joint drills.

DEEPENING RELATIONS BETWEEN NATO AND INDO-PACIFIC PARTNERS

The intensifying and deepening relations between NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners can be interpreted in two ways.

First, these partnerships form another important link in the expanding network of diplomatic and security ties between the US, its Western allies and the Indo-Pacific region. They complement partnerships like AUKUS and the Quad.

Beyond this, we can also view these agreements in the context of NATO’s evolving outreach with the rest of the world over the past couple decades.

Previously, NATO’s collaborations with Indo-Pacific countries involved pooling resources for security operations in non-NATO members, such as the Balkans in the 1990s and Afghanistan in the 2000s.

Nowadays, strengthening these partnerships is seen as a vital part of responding to the new challenges and threats posed by Russia and China.

Of course, this does not mean we will see NATO military equipment or troops permanently stationed in the Indo-Pacific. Nor would it be realistic to expect the Indo-Pacific countries’ military contributions to Ukraine to lead to a more permanent set-up in Europe.

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Commentary: How Barbie got caught in the South China Sea dispute

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It turned out, however, that this was not a widely known or shared view by the international community. Since then the commission has become something of a de facto legal battleground for various views regarding the status of the nine-dash line.

In addition to China continuously advancing its position regarding the legitimacy of the nine-dash line, countries including Australia, France, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, and Vietnam have rebutted China’s assertions.

But the commission is not a court and is comprised of scientists who assess continental shelf claims.

It was up to the Philippines, as the other nation with possible claims on the region, to separately challenge the legality of China’s nine-dash line claim under the law of the sea. In 2016, a United Nations Law of the Sea Convention Tribunal ruled unanimously that China’s claim had no basis in international law.

That ruling was clear-cut and conclusive, but it was immediately rejected by China. While the Philippines conclusively won the legal argument that the nine-dash line had no basis in modern international law or the law of the sea, China refused to respect the outcome of that case and continues to assert its South China Sea entitlements.

China does this in multiple ways. It has built artificial islands in the South China Sea, harassed foreign naval and military aircraft passing through the region, intimidated Vietnamese and other foreign fishermen, asserted rights to explore and exploit maritime oil and gas reserves, and continued to publish maps depicting the nine-dash line claim.

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Commentary: Jokowi’s visit to Australia is about much more than electric vehicles

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The EV ambition is emblematic of this vision for Indonesia and has become the focus of the President’s trip to Australia, particularly in securing raw materials required to establish successful battery production. But the ambition is wider.

In office, Jokowi has adopted a hands-on approach, frequently engaging with citizens, visiting remote areas, and listening to their concerns. Policy-wise he has maintained a focus on infrastructure development, economic reform, healthcare, social welfare, digitalisation, and sustainable growth.

Central to this is the government’s “downstreaming” policy, with the aim to unlock the full potential of Indonesia’s abundant natural resources as the basis for a more prosperous and sustainable future.

Jokowi wants Indonesia to capture a larger share of the value chain by moving out of raw material exports into processed and finished goods production. This is seen as key to unlocking greater economic value, creating jobs, and fostering innovation.

MORE THAN JUST EV PRODUCTION

For EVs, Jokowi’s administration has sought partnerships with other countries to leverage Indonesian advantages in nickel production, a crucial component in EV batteries.

However, Indonesia has limited lithium resources, another essential element in batteries and a resource Australia has in abundance.

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Commentary: Can China help bring peace to Myanmar?

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With more high-level engagement likely soon, the question of how China can encourage positive outcomes for Myanmar requires a focus on its core interests. While Myanmar’s economic growth until the coup was advantageous, the fact that the coup leaders are almost friendless – and despised even in ASEAN – offers a different upside.

CHINA’S COURSE OF ACTION

For now, China can harness the Myanmar military’s appetite for attack aircraft, heavy weapons and constant resupply of ammunition and technical equipment to bolster its role as the patron-in-chief. Russia has traditionally taken a similar approach. For Beijing and Moscow, Myanmar is part of a convenient global constellation of countries pushed to the outer edge of the international system.

Whatever its short-term strategy, it would help China’s standing in ASEAN, and even in countries like Australia, if it showed a creative instinct to use its wealth and influence to broker better outcomes for the people of Myanmar.

The fear is that China will instead continue to manipulate Myanmar’s impoverished and downtrodden status while fuelling, through its lucrative weapons exports, some of the most atrocious violence seen in Southeast Asia for generations.

When the dust finally settles in Myanmar, its people will rightly ask who sustained the reviled military regime. Right now, the answer is that Beijing offered “friendship” to the coup-makers, an irony for a Communist Party so committed to regime and institutional stability.

Yet with the right attention to China’s role and self-interests, it is still possible to imagine shifting positions, where Chinese institutions eventually work out how to negotiate a more peaceful settlement. At a time when China talks regularly about peace in European, Middle Eastern and African conflict zones, a positive contribution in Myanmar would be welcomed by all.

Nicholas Farrelly is Professor and Head of Social Sciences at the University of Tasmania. This commentary first appeared on East Asia Forum.

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Commentary: Thailand’s military machinations will define post-election political manoeuvring

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Prawit-loyalist Assistant Army Chief General Suksan Nongbualuang has a chance to beat out Jaroenchai as Army Commander, after which Pana would succeed him. Should Pita or Srettha become prime minister, they would likely prefer the weaker General Ukrit Boontanonda to be army chief.

But a military selection board, dominated by arch-royalist service chiefs, votes on promotions above the level of general and it is doubtful that Ukrit would get the nod. Moreover, though Pita or Srettha could try to cancel Prayut’s reshuffle, Jaroenchai, as Deputy Army Commander, would simply become the acting chief and only he or Suksan could pass the board. 

The leadership of Thailand’s army-dominant military will not be obedient to progressive civilian leaders and look set to oppose any reformist measures by Move Forward or Pheu Thai.

Thailand’s progressive 2023 election winners are confronted by a gauntlet of obstacles. Move Forward and Pheu Thai face cases before the Election Commission and must pass the junta-appointed Senate. 

An alternative coalition comprising only conservative parties or Pheu Thai with conservative parties could easily form, especially if the Election Commission disqualifies Move Forward MPs. 

If a progressive prime minister takes office, Thailand will likely look forward to growing pandemonium. Meanwhile, caretaker Prime Minister Prayut will use the reshuffle to ensure that the military leadership remains firmly independent of elected civilian control for years to come.

Dr Paul Chambers is Lecturer at the Centre of ASEAN Community Studies, Naresuan University, Thailand. This commentary first appeared on East Asia Forum.

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Commentary: Titanic sub - why is extreme ‘frontier travel’ booming despite the risks?

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In many instances that danger remains, but the commercial transaction strips away the perceived risks involved. Marketing materials aim to sell “safe” adventures, with the risks often listed in the fine print. A polar plunge in Antarctica, for instance, is often marketed as safe because participants are attached to a tether and the swim time is limited to prevent hypothermia.

Two decades ago, in forecasting the growth of space tourism, anthropologist Valene Smith said what tourists want, the industry will provide. This has become a truism, as the Titan voyages demonstrate.

The massive growth of frontier tourism could lead to even greater problems if the industry doesn’t respond in the right way. If travellers are going to expose themselves to extreme risks, whose responsibility is it, then, to ensure their safety and recovery should accidents occur?

Many tourism businesses and travel insurance companies make risks known to their guests. But regulations on disclosing risks differ between countries. This means travellers may have to evaluate the risks themselves, and this is fraught with danger if company standards are low.

One solution is frontier tourism might be best experienced in controlled and safe environments through digital storytelling or augmented and mixed reality. However, this may not be enough to satisfy the adrenaline junkies out there.

As the Titan incident illustrates, the unpredictable nature and unintended consequences of frontier tourism are very real things. While money can allow us to travel almost anywhere, it’s worth considering whether some places should just remain untouched, sacred and off-limits completely.

Anne Hardy, Can Seng Ooi and Hanne E F Nielsen are academics at University of Tasmania. Joseph M Cheer is Professor of Sustainable Tourism and Heritage, Western Sydney University. This commentary first appeared on The Conversation.

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Commentary: What to make of Biden’s bewildering remark equating Xi to “dictators”?

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Mr Biden’s words may rankle, but so did the Wall Street Journal report immediately following Mr Blinken’s visit that China plans to open a military training facility in Cuba, about 145km from the Florida coast. Nothing about Blinken-Xi meeting should suggest that US and China will neglect to pursue their own interests. 

WHEN IS A GAFFE NOT A GAFFE?

Mr Biden’s “dictator” remark is against protocol, and to the extent that it makes some of his goals vis-a-vis relations with China more difficult to achieve, a mistake. However, it is very much in keeping with his more general view about China and US interests. 

For Mr Biden, a central tenet of his foreign policy is that the competition between democracies and autocracies is a primary global struggle that will define the future, and that both America and the world are better off and more secure with a strong US capable of rallying democratic allies to meet contemporary challenges. 

Thus, while Mr Biden’s choice of language is ill-advised, it highlights the divide he sees between the US and China.

There is no question that words can stoke tensions. Mr Biden’s statement that the US would come to Taiwan’s aid if China were to launch an unprovoked attack annoys Beijing and sends US diplomats and aides into a frenzy of clarification that US policy on “One China” has not changed. 

Yet, having repeated the same “misstatement” on several occasions, Mr Biden is sending a message of a more assertive US foreign policy.

BIDEN’S REMARKS PLAY WELL DOMESTICALLY

While such messages are potentially destabilising for foreign policy, it is important to remember that they usually play well to a domestic audience. Mr Biden’s remark are unlikely to give him problems at home.

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Snap Insight: What progress did US Secretary of State Blinken make in China visit?

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Topics such as Taiwan, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, setting guardrails (especially for the US) and de-risking (instead of “decoupling”, since eschewed by US and G7 leaders) would all be on the agenda.

A breakthrough is unlikely, given the current lack of trust, but being able to “sense-make” the other in understanding how these issues are being spoken about might provide clues as to what policy steps may be possible moving forward.

In other words, a meeting – even in the absence of any clear policy outcomes – between both sides is better than refusing to meet, at the risk of further misunderstandings or suspicions towards one another. As Singapore Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan said when he met Mr Blinken in Washington DC on Saturday, the trip was “essential, but not sufficient”.

We are likely to witness more cycles of ups and downs. Both sides will have their own political calculations to make. So, anxious as the rest of the world may be when it comes to US-China relations, we should not be overly excited about the prospect of change nor be exasperated if things do not move the way we expect.

The hope now is that Mr Blinken’s visit will pave the way for more conversation between Mr Xi and Mr Biden after the two leaders last met on the sidelines of the G20 summit in November 2022. Ultimately, staying in the conversation is still better than not.

Benjamin Ho is an assistant professor and coordinator of the China Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

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