Woman cheated victims of S.39 million in investment scams, evaded police for 10 years

SINGAPORE: A woman cheated multiple victims of S$1.39 million (US$1.05 million) in investment scams, including her own “godson” and a property agent she was working for.

She then evaded the police for about 10 years, moving from place to place and continued to reoffend, until she went to the Institute of Mental Health (IMH), following a suicide attempt.

Low Mood Chay, 66, was sentenced to seven years’ jail on Monday (Jul 17) for her crimes.

She pleaded guilty to four counts of cheating, with another seven charges taken into consideration.

The court heard that Low, who is also known as Christy or Lowe, first targeted a 55-year-old property agent at Propnex Realty whom she was working for.

Low was the agent’s personal assistant and part-time telemarketer from April 2011, and helped the agent secure a few deals.

The property agent grew to trust Low as a friend. In July or August 2011, Low told the agent about a purported investment scheme which guaranteed yielding dividends of up to 18 per cent per annum.

Low claimed that this scheme was administered by the “AFIG Investment Company”, which was based overseas and gave benefits under its membership programme, including free cars or houses.

Low told the agent that she was a director of AFIG. In order to become members, applicants had to invest large sums of money into the supposed scheme.

The agent was interested in joining the programme for its benefits and began handing large sums of money to Low from late 2015 for this purpose.

She even allowed Low to rent a place together with her for five years, so that Low could “mentor” her closely to pass a test to qualify as AFIG’s property agent in Singapore.

Low got the agent to invest more sums by telling her that she had failed to join the programme, adding that she would lose all capital if she stopped now.

In total, the agent was cheated of S$274,500 and resorted to borrowing money from friends, family and loansharks.

Low also cheated a 34-year-old freelance tutor whom she worked for as an administrator.

The pair grew close enough to be like godmother and godson, the court heard.

Low lied to him that she was affiliated with “many rich and powerful people”, including the owners of Hong Leong Bank, a lawyer named Keith Ong and a UBS relationship manager.

She plied him into “investing” into a special scheme which she claimed to have access to due to the special relationship she had with Hong Leong Bank’s owners.

Low duped her “godson” into giving her S$1.01 million between 2020 and 2021. Of this sum, she returned him about S$291,000 that she claimed were “dividends” – meaning he suffered a net loss of about S$771,000.

Low also cheated another employee at the tuition centre her “godson” worked at, lying to her that she was a rich businesswoman with companies in the United States and New Zealand.

She also lied that she was good friends with a “former minister of Singapore” and with the owners of UBS.

This victim lost S$36,830 after being lured into the fake “investments” cooked up by Low.

EVADED POLICE FOR A DECADE

Low would use some money from one victim to pay off some promised dividends to another victim, and splashed the cash on jewellery and branded goods.

She did not make any restitution.

After the first police report for cheating was lodged against Low in 2010, she was identified for investigations and gave a statement to the police.

However, the police could not find her again when they wanted to produce her in court.

A police gazette was issued against her in March 2012.

Low evaded the police for about a decade by not staying at her registered address. She rented different places to live in, moving in with the property agent for five years, before staying with her “godson”.

However, after the agent lodged a police report of her own in 2018, the police identified and froze Low’s bank account, which she was using to receive funds.

On Dec 12, 2021, Low attempted suicide by inhaling smoke from burnt charcoal. 

She was living with her “godson” and the other tuition centre employee at the time. Both victims did not know of her crimes at the time.

The tuition centre employee convinced Low to admit herself to IMH.

While she was there, the two victims discussed the matter and realised that Low had been cheating them. They lodged police reports against her, and the police finally arrested Low while she was in IMH.

Low was remanded and listened to the hearing from her place of remand.

Deputy Public Prosecutor Tay Jia En sought a sentence between six-and-a-half years and seven years and eight months for Low.

He said the courts have recognised the increasing number of investment scam cases, a persistent and worrying trend that must attract “suitably stiff” sentences.

He also pointed to the large amount of money involved, the multiple victims targeted and the lengthy period of criminal conduct.

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China needs better and deeper bond markets

As Chinese tech equities rally, tensions building up in the US$20 trillion bond market risk pulling the rug out from under the sudden rush of bullish stock market sentiment.

China’s Big Tech shares are surging after Premier Li Qiang signaled a sharper pivot away from regulatory crackdowns toward championing the private sector.

Just days after letting Jack Ma’s Ant Group off with a nearly US$1 billion fine, Beijing said it’s increasing support for Tencent and other top tech platforms to raise China’s innovative game.

On July 12, Li said President Xi Jinping’s government is stepping up efforts to normalize China’s regulatory environment. The goal, Li said, is to “reduce the costs of compliance and promote the healthy development of industry.”

Li said that “on the journey of building a modern socialist country, the platform economy has great potential.”

He told tech chieftains in the audience – including officials from Alibaba Group, TikTok owner ByteDance and food delivery group Meituan – to “push to increase their international competitiveness and dare to compete on the global stage.”

To analyst Kelvin Wong at OANDA, “the latest rhetoric from the top man of China’s State Council is likely to boost positive animal spirits, in the short term at least.”

But China faces a longer-term threat to positive sentiment now shining on Asia’s biggest economy: a bond market that’s still not ready for global prime time.

Credit market strains are spreading as two large property builders reneged on a combined US$608 million worth of bond payments. Meanwhile, top mainland banks are avoiding the purchase of local notes, including in the Shanghai free trade zone.

The inclusion of Chinese government bonds in top global bond indexes, including the FTSE Russell benchmark, has pulled giant tidal waves of capital China’s way.

This opening has been a game changer — offering myriad opportunities to build diversified and resilient portfolios via new asset classes to ride the nation’s development.

The trouble is, though, China’s bond market is underpinned by a developing economy with limited liquidity and hedging tools, a giant and opaque state sector, and a rudimentary credit-rating system that often obscures risk and enables the misallocation of capital.

For all of China’s promises, this makes it more of a buyer-beware market in 2023 than many investors expected. It was 10 years ago, after all, that Xi took power pledging to let market forces play the “decisive” role in financial reform decisions.

The split screens of the last two years tell the story. On one screen, China’s inclusion in major benchmarks is luring bond giants like BlackRock Inc.

On screen No 2, the crisis of confidence among creditors of China Evergrande Group offers a stark reminder of the mainland’s opacity and excesses.

The Evergrande Center building in Shanghai. Photo: Asia Times Files / AFP / Hector Retamal

The globe’s most indebted property developer owes them more than $120 billion, potentially posing system risks.

For the rest of 2023, analysts at HSBC Holdings and Goldman Sachs recently raised projections for defaults among junk-rated property bonds to about 30%.

“If property sales remain lackluster with a lack of stimulus from the authorities, we do not rule out the possibility of a further uplift in default rates,” says HSBC analyst Keith Chan.

Chairman Yu Liang at China Vanke Co, the nation’s second-largest developer by sales, says the real estate sector is looking “worse than expected.”

The property industry is “indeed seeing pressure in the short-term,” Yu says. The “real situation,” he concluded, “is a bit worse than what was expected.”

The magnitude of the risks has many economists perplexed about why the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) central bank isn’t acting more forcefully.

Recent “easing, which focused on developer financing, is far from enough to stabilize the sector,” says economist Larry Hu at Macquarie Group. “After all, credit risk for banks would remain elevated if the housing market stays weak.”

One reason: the yuan’s nearly 4% drop this year makes it harder for higher-indebted developers to make payments on US dollar-denominated debt.

The PBOC’s restraint also could mean government steps to stabilize the property sector are soon on the way.

“Looking ahead,” Hu notes, “expect to see more easing on the demand side, such as lowering the down payment ratio and easing purchase restrictions.”

The real challenge, though, is fixing the property sector, which can generate as much as one-third of gross domestic product (GDP) in good times.

Kate Jaquet, a portfolio manager at Seafarer Capital Partners, says that “beyond the importance of this sector to the overall health of the Chinese economy, another motivation for orderly restructurings of the many troubled property developers is the extensive and opaque web of their liabilities.

“Stakeholders in the restructuring process – roughly in order of payment preference – include contractors and suppliers, banks, homebuyers, wealth management product investors and, finally, bondholders.”

Jaquet adds that “there are also off-balance sheet liabilities and other hidden debts to consider. Investors, rightly concerned over the lack of disclosures, struggle to understand some of these off-balance sheet – and largely heretofore hidden – debts. These concerns are further compounded by property developers’ failure to file audited annual results with the relevant authorities.”

The bottom line, Jaquet says, is that “hasty or ham-fisted restructurings might require write-downs by holders of these lesser-understood obligations, which could have unforeseen consequences in other parts of the Chinese economy. It seems that China’s regulators know this and are taking a careful and measured approach to property sector restructurings, particularly the big ones.”

China’s property market is a drag on the economy. Image: Twitter

Considering the large role that property plays in China’s economy, “a great deal hangs in the balance with respect to restructuring in the property sector,” Jaquet says. “The details of how onshore and offshore creditors fare – in absolute terms, and relative to one another – matters a lot for the future health of China’s bond markets”

Jaquet says that “hopefully the restructurings will consider corporate governance and the rights of creditors. Lack of ready access to international capital markets will take a toll on this sector. While it is increasingly clear that the days of housing driving the Chinese economy are likely over, the big question is: where do the funds come from to keep the economy on an even keel?”

One ever-present time bomb: China’s $9 trillion-plus market in local-government financing vehicles (LGFVs) that opaquely finance everything from airports to power grids to roads and rarely raise enough to cover their obligations.

That requires bigger capital injections from municipalities that should be using the funds to build bigger social safety nets and invest in human capital.

China’s ongoing real estate crisis made matters worse. Cash flow pressures weighing on local governments have state-owned banking giants struggling to stave off a credit crunch. If China’s bond markets were more developed and robust, authorities would have more options to defuse blowups in credit markets.

The dearth of alternatives means that when, say, state pension entities sell off weaker bond holdings, it destabilizes the broader market. That, in turn, adds to the headwinds faced by LGFVs and property developers, causing new sentiment-killing feedback effects.

While offloading weaker bonds may help the state pension protect the value of its investments, it risks heightening market concerns about the health of LGFVs and developers at a time when Beijing is trying to restore confidence in the world’s second-largest economy.

Now, both LGFVs and developers are shortening the time intervals for extending credit and demanding higher borrowing costs.

“The most important variables impacting China’s economic growth over the next two years will be the success or failure of local government debt restructuring, and Beijing’s approach to the role of local government investment within China’s economy in the future,” analysts at Rhodium Group write in a new report. “A collapse in local government investment would be comparable to the economic impact of the crisis in the property market.”

All this has Beijing mulling fresh moves to support cash-strapped cities and counties around the nation. According to local press reports, this could entail green-lighting municipalities to boost bond issuance programs to finance the clearing away of hidden debt.

Reducing the prevalence of new LGFVs has never been more important. At the start of 2023, S&P Global Ratings estimated these schemes amounted to 40% of China’s non-financial corporate bond market.

The prevalence of LGFVs can be a major turnoff for foreign bond funds. Not only are they opaque and difficult to analyze, their fingerprints touch the operations of everything from commercial banks’ wealth management units to mutual funds to hedge funds to insurers to the gamut of securities companies.

Hence the urgent need for deeper bond markets. And, of course, for regulators in Beijing to avoid steps that spook global markets anew. Among recent missteps by Xi’s Community Party: this year’s clampdown on foreign consultancy firms on which global investors and multinational firms rely to navigate their way through China’s opaque companies and systems.

The move, supposedly part of a nationwide anti-espionage campaign, reduced the appetite for investment from overseas firms. When US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen recently visited Beijing, the consultancy policy was among the examples of “non-market” practices and “coercive actions” against American firms her team highlighted.

Deeper debt markets would help sort out the cart-before-the-horse problem that afflicts China’s economy.

During the Xi era and before it, China too often believed that pulling in more foreign capital was a reform all its own. However, it’s been slower to strengthen China’s financial system to efficiently absorb those waves of overseas capital.

For example, China’s inclusion in the World Trade Organization in 2001 did less to recalibrate its growth engines than to remake the global economic system to its advantage.

The 2016 inclusion of the yuan in the International Monetary Fund’s “special drawing rights” didn’t stop Beijing from imposing capital controls or accelerate capital liberalization nearly as much as hoped.

China still applies capital controls. Photo: Asia Times Files / AFP / Nicolas Asfouri

In 2019, A-share stocks’ addition to the MSCI index didn’t suddenly make China’s financial system sounder, the government more transparent, companies more shareholder-friendly or the ginormous shadow-banking world any less of a menace.

Strengthening China Inc. requires significant heavy lifting to curb the dominance of state-owned enterprises, increase economic space for the private sector and eliminate the risk of dueling bubbles in debt, credit and assets.

The key now, says Li Yunze, head of the National Financial Regulatory Administration, is for vibrant debt capital markets to help catalyze growth of all sectors, but particularly those in the high-tech space — the realm Premier Li has been at least rhetorically elevating in recent months.

While it’s important Beijing ends the regulatory volatility of recent years, he adds, more efficient capital markets would accelerate China’s move upmarket.

One priority should be building a big and liquid mortgage-backed securities (MBS) market. The good news is that interest in securitized mortgage loans used to finance residential and commercial buildings is growing, particularly in the green space, says Fitch Ratings analyst Jingwei Jia.

This comes, Jia says, “as the Chinese government prioritizes construction of environmentally friendly buildings to meet its climate targets.”

As Jian Chen, an analyst at MSCI, notes, China’s residential MBS market is growing as global investors eye its relatively high yields and seek diversification options for fixed-income portfolios.

However, he adds, “attracting new foreign investment to Chinese RMBS may depend on improving credit ratings and transparency in data and pricing.”

Another positive sign could be the ways in which LGFVs may be pivoting to issuing more infrastructure real estate investment trusts (REITs). This, says analyst Sherry Zhao, also at Fitch, follows “the authorities’ latest reiteration of the significance of selling infrastructure assets to improve capital efficiency and reduce public-sector leverage.”

Zhao notes that “this is especially for infrastructure assets closely aligned with LGFVs’ public policy roles, such as transportation, public rental housing, urban utilities, and industrial parks, among others.”

When it comes to the direction of reform, the need for a deeper bond market must be goal No 1. The financial opening that Xi and Li claim to be pursuing suggests they are scaling back China’s command economy. This alone should reassure foreign investors.

But the opening China really needs is deeper capital markets, in particular more transparent debt markets. Boosting support for – and loans to – the property sector are fine for today. China coming into its own as a top and productive economy, though, requires a serious bonding experience.

Follow William Pesek on Twitter at @WilliamPesek

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‘Less for less’ could mean win-win in US-Iran talks

Last month, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken demurred about the status of indirect talks with Iran as he worked to deflect political pressures over contact with the regime regarding its nuclear activities and, reportedly, a possible release of wrongfully detained Iranian-Americans.

President Joe Biden’s administration has not denied that two senior diplomatic experts on the Middle East, Special Envoy Brett McGurk and Special Iran Envoy Rob Malley, have been in Oman conducting some form of indirect talks with Iranian officials, but Blinken made clear that there is no imminent agreement of any kind.

Nonetheless, critics in the US Congress are demanding more transparency, and are poised to take measures to constrain what may be a fragile and early-stage diplomatic initiative.

Progress by the Biden team may also have been hampered after it was announced late last month that Malley had been placed on unpaid leave while his security clearance was reviewed. Reports say the Federal Bureau of Investigation is examining the matter.

Analysis of these potentially significant talks with Iran is heavy on speculation, and light on facts. The administration does not seem willing or able to share any details of the putative talks, perhaps because they have not really produced any results, or, conversely, because officials are still hopeful and want to protect the process until both parties are ready to talk about it in public.  

The Biden administration has demonstrated in multiple ways that diplomacy is vital to its worldview and its idea of statecraft. Diplomacy is not just scripted meetings in friendly capitals with like-minded officials, but it’s the hard slog of finding ways to reduce tensions and prevent open conflict with adversaries. Sometimes it’s many weeks or months before even a common vocabulary is established. 

Doing diplomacy with Iran has been fraught for many decades. But it’s as hard in 2023 as it has been since the 1979 revolution and the severing of official relations. Often the parties misread what is motivating the other party, and whenever one side thinks it has the advantage, it overplays its hand and the momentum is lost. So a slow and discreet approach may be prudent. 

The previous administration’s bellicose approach – “maximum pressure” – moved the starting gate back for the Biden team in several ways.

Nuclear deal pullout

Strategically, the decision by Donald Trump to withdraw from the multilateral nuclear agreement signed in 2015 – the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – did nothing to advance the goal of preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons capabilities. To the contrary, the undermining of internationally negotiated constraints on Iran emboldened the country and made the task of restoring limits considerably harder.

Trump’s aggressive rhetoric only agitated the regional dynamics without sustaining US deterrence, and likely contributed to Iran’s expanding ties with Russia and China. Last week, Iran became a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Eurasian security and political bloc that could become a NATO of the East.

So the posturing of Iran hawks in the US about how the Trump approach led to Iran’s economic desperation and political isolation is simply not borne out by the facts. 

Using a quiet, reserved approach, the Biden team apparently did not give up on restarting a process to restore at least part of the JCPOA. They adopted a “less for less” strategy, rather than the overly ambitious and unrealistic goal to expand and strengthen the JCPOA.

Some movement in Iran’s cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in March may have also spurred the idea along, to probe via Oman or other trusted intermediaries whether Iran was open to talks. 

The tentative rapprochement between Iran and Gulf Arab states also helped Washington calculate the risks of such a diplomatic overture, given that after the JCPOA was signed in 2015, both Israel and Gulf countries felt betrayed by the deal and chastised the US.

This time, with Saudi Arabia and Iran agreeing in March to restore relations after talks brokered by China, one could anticipate less resistance from key Arab partners. Fierce opposition from Israel and Republicans in the US Congress was, however, to be expected.

According to some reports, the outlines of the US initiative include Iran’s commitment to cap its uranium-enrichment activities short of full weapons-grade levels, to cooperate with the IAEA, and to release at least three dual-national Iranian-Americans currently in Iran’s prisons. In exchange, Iran would be given partial sanctions relief in the form of access to funds in South Korean banks.

In late June, some Middle East watchers judged that the talks had stalled, possibly over the terms of the release of prisoners.  

If true, this “less for less” is more modest than what Ali Vaez and Vali Nasr recently argued in Foreign Affairs. They saw a bigger opportunity to reshape Iran’s regional role, by engaging all the states in the region, by reducing Iran’s destabilizing support for cross-border militias, and by imposing region-wide limits on nuclear enrichment activities.

Their approach is closer to the “grand bargain” that some have advocated over the years: Put all the issues on the table and see if there’s a radically different way for Iran, its neighbors, and Western powers to manage their relations and promote regional stability.  

Nonetheless, the purported Biden approach does entail taking on more than one issue, in a package understanding or arrangement, to use the careful vocabulary of US officials.

previously argued that the efforts to free wrongfully detained US citizens is premised on keeping that track free of entanglement with other contentious issues. In this case, perhaps the logic was turned on its head.

To be sure, there’s no perfect rulebook for diplomats. They have to test and probe what might work, what each party cares most about, and how to get to a win-win outcome. Whether that is a possible or likely scenario for 2023 is anyone’s guess.

This article was provided by Syndication Bureau, which holds copyright.

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China and the Chinese mafias overseas: quid pro quo

This article was originally published by ProPublica, a Pulitzer Prize-winning investigative newsroom.

PRATO, Italy – On a rainy June afternoon, six Chinese mobsters hurried across the plaza of a drab apartment complex near the medieval gates of this Tuscan textile capital. Their targets, two gang rivals in their early 20s, were eating in a small Chinese diner.

Drawing machetes, the attackers stormed in. They hacked one man to death, splattering tables and walls with gore. The second victim fought his way out. Trailing blood in the rain, he staggered through the plaza pursued by his killers, who finished him off on the sidewalk around the corner.

The slaughter on Via Strozzi in 2010 was part of a startling escalation of mob violence in Prato, which has one of Europe’s biggest Chinese immigrant communities. The ensuing police investigation was long and difficult, leading as far as China. For the first time, Italian police mapped the rapid spread of the Chinese mafias that were terrorizing immigrant enclaves and leaving a trail of casualties across Europe.

As the investigation culminated in 2017, detectives made another ominous discovery: The kingpins in Italy had high-placed friends in Beijing. Telephone intercepts detected a meeting between an accused crime boss in Rome, Zhang Naizhong, and a member of a high-level Chinese government delegation on a diplomatic visit to Italy, senior Italian law enforcement officials say.

“A guy like Zhang does what the consulate doesn’t do, or does it better,” a senior Italian national security official said. “If you want in-depth street information, intelligence, you go to a guy like Zhang. He has a network, power, resources. He knows the diaspora. He is feared and respected.”

As the regime of President Xi Jinping expands its international power, it has intensified its alliance with Chinese organized crime overseas. The Italian investigation and other cases in Europe show the underworld’s front-line role in a campaign to infiltrate the West, amass wealth and influence, and control diaspora communities as if they were colonies of Beijing’s police state.

Around the world, China’s shadow war of espionage, long-distance repression, political interference and predatory capitalism is drawing attention and alarm. Governments and human rights groups have denounced in recent months a global network of covert Chinese police stations that spy on Chinese migrant communities and persecute dissidents — wherever they live.

As ProPublica has reported, the Chinese state has sent illegal undercover teams to chase down fugitives in wealthy US suburbs, surveilled and silenced Chinese students on foreign campuses, and allegedly supported the Chinese money laundering underworld that fortifies cartels inundating the Americas with deadly drugs.

But the rise of Chinese organized crime in Europe has caught authorities largely off-guard. An examination of it offers an unusually vivid look at a covert alliance in action. ProPublica has documented a pattern of cases, some of them unreported and others little-noticed internationally, in which suspected underworld figures in Europe have teamed up with Chinese security forces and other state entities.

The partnership appears to mix geopolitics and corruption for mutual benefit. Gangsters help monitor and intimidate immigrant communities for the regime in Beijing, sometimes as leaders of cultural associations that are key players in China’s political influence operations and long-distance repression, Western security officials say.

ProPublica has learned that suspected underworld figures in Italy and Spain took part in launching several of the secret Chinese police stations that caused an uproar when their existence became public last year.

The Chinese Communist Party “takes the most powerful, richest, most successful figures overseas and recognizes them as the nobility of the diaspora,” said Emmanuel Jourda, a French scholar on Chinese organized crime. “And it doesn’t matter how they made their money. The deal, spoken or not, is: ‘You gather intelligence on the community, we let you do business. Whether legal or illegal.’”

In exchange for their services as overseas enforcers and agents of influence, the Chinese state protects the mobsters, Western national security officials say. Although supposedly wanted in China, a top figure in the Italian case traveled freely to his homeland and oversaw his European rackets from China without interference from authorities there, according to court documents and law enforcement officials.

And in Europe — as in the United States — national security chiefs say the Chinese government refuses to cooperate with their investigations of Chinese organized crime.

Money is another driving force in the alliance. Diplomatically delicate prosecutions in Italy, Spain and France have resulted in convictions and fines against Chinese state banks that worked with Chinese criminals to launder the proceeds of widespread tax evasion, customs fraud and contraband.

Chinese mafias have also become the preferred money launderers for the Continent’s drug traffickers, whose onslaught poses an unprecedented threat to several governments.

Stretching across Europe, the underground Chinese money networks pump billions of illicit dollars into China’s economy. During one recent year, police at Rome’s Fiumicino Airport arrested 16 couriers carrying a total of more than $41 million bound for China.

“It is hard to imagine that this activity is not welcomed by the Chinese authorities,” said the chief prosecutor in Prato, Giuseppe Nicolosi. “Large amounts of money are returning to China.”

The implications for the United States are urgent, authorities say, because the same tactics and networks plague Chinese American communities. US law enforcement has tracked interactions between Chinese government operatives and Chinese American mobsters who harass dissidents, engage in political interference and move offshore funds for the Communist Party elite, US national security officials say.

“Organized crime is doing services for the Chinese government” on both sides of the Atlantic, a veteran US national security official said. “There are deals between organized crime and the Chinese government. The government tasks them to expand influence and become eyes and ears overseas. Once they get themselves established, there are locals they can corrupt. It’s a classic modus operandi.”

US national security officials are also concerned because Europe is a vulnerable front in China’s offensive to divide and weaken the West.

Until recently, Chinese malign activities were not a priority in Europe. Although US intelligence agencies warned European counterparts about intensified contacts between the Chinese state and underworld, most security forces were busy with Islamist terrorists and Russian spies during the past decade, Western national security veterans said.

“When they started recognizing the threat, they didn’t have the resources,” said Frank Montoya, a former FBI counterintelligence chief.

Today, governments are scrambling to respond to what Europol, the agency that coordinates police cooperation on the Continent, has called “an increasing threat to Europe.” They have realized that the problem reverberates beyond Chinese immigrant neighborhoods and challenges national security and the rule of law.

“There was a lack of awareness of the danger,” said the chief anti-mafia prosecutor in Florence, Luca Tescaroli, whose jurisdiction includes Prato. He has created a unit to fight Chinese mafias. But, he said: “We cannot criminalize the Chinese community. We know they are also victims of intimidation, extortion and violence.”

The Chinese embassies in Italy, Spain and France did not respond to requests for comment from ProPublica. In the past, Chinese diplomats have denied involvement in transnational repression and other illegal activities abroad.

To assemble a picture of the intertwined agendas of the Chinese regime and its expatriate mafia groups, ProPublica interviewed more than two dozen current and former national security officials in Europe and the United States, as well as Chinese immigrants, human rights advocates and others. ProPublica granted anonymity to some sources because of safety concerns or because they were not authorized to speak publicly. In addition, ProPublica reviewed court documents, reports by governments and nongovernmental organizations, academic papers, press reports and social media posts.

The Boss from Beijing

Prato’s Chinatown starts just outside the stone ramparts, narrow lanes and Romanesque cathedral of the city’s historic center. Its immigrant energy extends to the Macrolotto industrial park on the edge of town, where signs on warehouses and workshops mix Chinese words with names like Flora, Kitty and Style.

More than 6,000 Chinese-owned businesses give Prato an outsized role in the diaspora. Numbers like that tell the story of the second-biggest city in Tuscany.

In 1990, there were 520 residents of Chinese origin, according to an Italian government study. Today, officials say Prato has one of the largest Chinese communities in proportion to the city’s size in Europe: close to 40,000 out of a total population of about 200,000. That includes as many as 10,000 undocumented immigrants. Italy has Europe’s third-largest Chinese population after the United Kingdom and France.

The immigrants came initially to work in the mills and factories of this longtime hub of the textile and garment industries. Gradually, they became owners and employers. In 2019, voters elected two Chinese Italians to the City Council — a first.

Still, life for many Chinese residents feels like a crossfire. Although the newcomers have invigorated the economy, some Italians accuse Chinese merchants of evading taxes, paying low wages and other shady practices. Non-Chinese robbers and thieves prey on them because of the belief that they carry large amounts of cash.

And Chinese immigrants, of course, were the prime victims of the rise of Chinese organized crime in the 2000s. As mobsters established themselves, unprecedented violence broke out among warring factions from Fujian, a coastal province known for smuggling and migration. Police in Prato started calling Fujian the Calabria of China, likening it to the mafia hotbed located in the toe of the Italian boot.

After the double murder on Via Strozzi in 2010, the half-dozen detectives of the local anti-mafia squad began an investigation christened China Truck. Despite the daunting language barrier and a lack of expertise on Asian mafias, it evolved into an all-out, eight-year effort to dismantle a criminal organization.

In 2011, witnesses told police about Lin Guochun, aka Laolin, the reputed boss of Prato, court documents say. Lin had made his way from Fujian to Italy via Portugal and the Czech Republic, where he had allegedly ordered the murder of a rival smuggler of migrants, according to Italian court documents and Italian law enforcement officials.

Lin’s empire encompassed extortion, gambling, contraband, prostitution and drugs. In Prato, he held court in his nightclub, a grim property with dark glass walls that offered package deals of prostitutes and ketamine. His swaggering crew ruled Chinatown, court documents say.

In 2013, the father of a massage parlor owner told prosecutors that two of Lin’s thugs had demanded 100,000 euros and given him a beating that put him in the hospital with skull trauma and a broken nose, court documents say.

“My countrymen are afraid of them,” the battered extortion victim said, according to court documents. “They are part of an organization of cruel people who threaten and demand money…. If someone challenges them, they beat and wound and use other violent methods.”

Zhang Naizhong. Photo: Gangsters Inc

Surveillance led to another breakthrough even higher in the criminal hierarchy. Police identified the alleged boss of bosses in Rome: Zhang Naizhong.

Zhang, a trim and dapper trucking executive, was from Zhejiang, a more prosperous province next to Fujian that sends many immigrants to Europe. After the slaying of one of Zhang’s rivals in Naples in 2006, a court convicted him of helping the accused killers escape, but appellate judges overturned the verdict, court documents say.

During conversations intercepted on the phone and in his BMW, Zhang described himself as a ruthless “madman” and ordered henchmen to threaten people, court documents say. Expounding on the “rules of the mafia,” he told a subordinate in 2013 that true loyalty meant being “ready to go to prison and to kill people,” court documents say.

“I’m the most powerful boss in Europe,” Zhang declared, according to court documents. “Ask anyone … if you’re not a friend, you’re an enemy … if you’re an enemy, then you’re finished! … A guy can point a pistol at me and because of my personality … I’ll tell him: ‘Pull the trigger!’ You understand, brother? … I am the boss and so the boss can decide anything.”

Zhang teamed with Lin to conquer the market for the distribution of goods among Chinese business enclaves in Europe, court documents say. Working with police in other countries, Italian detectives charted the kingpins’ alleged war on competing transport companies, court documents say: murders in Italy; shootings and stabbings in Spain, France, Germany and Portugal; a litany of arson attacks, assaults and threats.

Back in Prato, though, the accused gangsters did not keep a low profile. In fact, some of them were active in the array of Chinese cultural associations that shape the social landscape in diaspora communities. The associations, often named for the province immigrants came from, do good works: sponsoring cultural and sports activities, distributing protective equipment during the pandemic, raising money for charity causes in their home provinces.

But suspected underworld figures and their associates held posts in the Fujian Overseas Chinese Association in Italy that enhanced their power on the street and at a political level, according to court documents, Italian law enforcement officials and Chinese media. Lin, the alleged Fujianese boss of Prato, appeared on a list of “consultants” to the association in 2016.

Wiretaps, surveillance cameras and media reports documented meals, events and phone conversations in which Lin and other targets in the China Truck case interacted with prominent leaders of the Chinese community, Italian politicians, Chinese diplomats and visiting Chinese government officials.

In 2012, the president of the Fujian association in Prato intervened to resolve an underworld conflict involving Lin’s son, according to court documents and law enforcement officials.

That same leader of the association later attended a conference in Beijing with top officials of the United Front Work Department, the arm of the Chinese Communist Party dedicated to political spying and interference overseas, according to photos and media reports. The United Front has become a dominant force in the diaspora, which it exploits to gain political and economic influence.

Such well-placed homeland connections appeared to pay off. Although Lin was wanted by Chinese police for past extortion offenses in China, he spent long periods there unmolested by authorities while he supervised his criminal enterprises in Italy by phone, according to Italian court documents and senior Italian law enforcement officials.

He also enriched himself with investments in the Chinese mining sector, court documents and senior Italian law enforcement officials say. Lin “succeeded in resolving the judicial cases in which he was charged, and was thus able to resume thriving economic activities” in China, a court document says.

As the investigation peaked in late 2017, detectives stumbled onto startling evidence of Lin’s influence in high places. In interviews with ProPublica, Italian law enforcement officials said a series of intercepted phone calls revealed how close the Prato mob chief was to Chinese political figures.

According to the Italian officials, on the morning of December 11, 2017, Lin placed a call from Beijing to Zhang in Rome. Lin said an important friend, whom he described as a “boss from Beijing,” was visiting Rome. The boss had a busy schedule of meetings with Italian politicians, Lin said. But it would be good if Zhang could take him to dinner, see the sights, maybe a soccer game.

Zhang then called his secretary and driver to organize excursions to the Vatican and the Colosseum for the VIP visitor. That evening, Zhang had dinner with him, Italian officials said.

Analyzing translations of the calls afterward, detectives came to an alarming conclusion: The “boss from Beijing” was a member of a Chinese delegation that had met with Italy’s prime minister at the time, Paolo Gentiloni, and his cabinet ministers. Led by China’s Vice Premier Ma Kai, the delegation included senior officials in China’s ministries of foreign affairs, development, industry and commerce.

“It’s very probable that Zhang hosted and dined with a senior official from the delegation,” a senior Italian law enforcement official said. “We suspect that it was a prominent member of the delegation.”

Police reconstructed the episode based on the translated conversations rather than physical surveillance, law enforcement officials told ProPublica, and could not identify the visitor or the reason for the sit-down. But the analysis indicated he was a government official, national security sources said.

Italian and Chinese diplomats declined to comment on the episode, which was first reported in Italian media. Chinese state-mafia contacts like the one that allegedly took place in Rome are not unusual, Western national security officials said.

“China uses a range of proxies and cutouts, and organized crime is one of those proxies,” a US intelligence official said. “We see a growing brazenness in [Chinese] malign influence operations.”

Sometimes, expatriate gangsters even set themselves up in foreign countries with the blessing and support of corrupt allies in the Communist Party elite back home, a veteran US national security official said.

“The gangsters are told to go establish themselves in a certain country, given different business opportunities,” the veteran US national security official said. “Transportation help, getting consumer goods out of China, the government helps organized crime there. Chinese corrupt officials can make it easy to move goods out of China.”

The Chinese politicians who meet with Chinese gangsters overseas “represent their government as well as their own self-interest,” he said.

Weeks after the mysterious encounter in Rome, Italian investigators rounded up dozens of suspects on mafia-related charges resulting from the China Truck investigation.

Italian police conduct raids against Chinese organized crime in Prato, Italy, during the operation known as China Truck in 2018. Photo: Screenshot / YouTube

A police team swarmed a discreet hotel in Prato where Zhang was staying and arrested him and his adult son, Zhang Di, rousting them from their beds at dawn. The son got agitated and shouted at the officers, police said. But his father, the accused boss of bosses, stayed cool while officers took him into custody.

Zhang and his son have pleaded not guilty. Their lawyers did not respond to requests for comment. Prosecutors also charged Lin, but he remains at large. Lin’s son was not charged.

The China Truck prosecution painted the first detailed picture of alleged mob activity among Chinese immigrants in Italy. Soon, even more evidence would emerge of a brazen alliance between accused expatriate gangsters and the Chinese security forces.

Outlaw police

The headquarters of the Fujian Overseas Chinese Association in Italy occupies a corner building on Via Orti del Pero in the heart of Prato’s Chinatown. The two-story structure looks bedraggled. It has blue steel doors, barred windows and fading sand-colored walls.

But in March of last year, the place made headlines. Chinese media announced “good news” from Prato: the inauguration of the Fuzhou Police Overseas Service Station in the Fujian association’s headquarters. Leaders of the association would work with officers of the Municipal Public Security Bureau in Fuzhou, the capital of Fujian province, to enable immigrants to renew Chinese driver’s licenses and do other bureaucratic tasks in Prato, a Chinese media report said.

Among six community leaders pictured beneath the station’s blue banner was the association’s executive vice president at the time: Zheng Wenhua.

Zheng, also known as Franco, seemed a puzzling choice to open a police station. Four years earlier, Italian authorities had accused him of being a top figure in the Prato underworld.

Investigators first identified him in 2011 when police stopped him. He was in his Jaguar accompanied by an alleged enforcer for Lin, the reputed Fujianese mob boss, court documents say. Officers found a clasp knife and a marijuana cigarette in the car and confiscated Zheng’s license, court documents say.

In 2013, Zheng allegedly became involved in the aftermath of the incident in which two thugs beat up the father of a massage parlor owner. Zheng tried to silence the battered extortion victim by sending a “volunteer” interpreter into a police interview to control what he said, court documents say. In a phone call recorded by police, Zheng warned the victim not to implicate bosses, court documents say.

“Come on … this could have consequences for Laolin…,” he said, according to the documents. “…And that would not be a good thing.”

During the China Truck raids in 2018, authorities charged Zheng with “a prominent role” in Lin’s crew overseeing the “management of clandestine gambling dens and exploitation of prostitution,” court documents say.

Yet Zheng remains a civic leader. He has met with visiting Chinese dignitaries including the mayor of Fuzhou, spoken at community events and attended a gala in February featuring the mayor of Florence and the Chinese consul, according to media reports and photos. In March, he was elected president of the Fujian association. (Zheng has pleaded not guilty and is free awaiting trial. He and other representatives of the Fujian association did not respond to requests for comment.)

And Zheng wasn’t the only one with alleged ties to both the underworld and the new Fuzhou police station in Prato. China Truck prosecutors charged another vice president of the association with helping Lin obtain fraudulent immigration papers. Photos at the Fuzhou police station show three more community leaders whose personal and business links to gangsters surfaced during the investigation, according to court documents and senior law enforcement officials. None of them were charged, though authorities seized five bank accounts belonging to one man.

Despite the celebratory Chinese media reports, the station was part of a global campaign of repression, according to Western officials and human rights advocates. “You have criminals who terrify the community involved in a police station that further terrifies the community,” a senior law enforcement official said.

Safeguard Defenders, a human rights group, has revealed a network of more than 100 covert stations overseen by Chinese provincial police forces in more than 50 countries. Based in cultural associations, businesses and homes, the outposts help persecute dissidents and support Operation Fox Hunt, which deploys undercover police and prosecutors illegally across borders to track down people accused of crimes – justifiably and not – and take them back to China, according to Western officials and human rights advocates.

In Madrid, a video showed community leaders at a covert station of the Zhejiang provincial police talking via videolink with a fugitive in Spain and law enforcement officials in Zhejiang. In a typical pressure tactic, Chinese police and prosecutors back in Qingtian County sat with a relative of the fugitive, who eventually returned home and accepted a plea deal, according to Chinese media reports cited by the human rights group.

In Aubervilliers, a gritty Paris suburb, a Chinese French garment executive who managed a station admitted in a published interview to helping Chinese police “persuade” a fugitive to return to China in 2019, Safeguard Defenders found. Although no further details about the case were available, a senior French national security official told ProPublica that undercover Chinese police came to France and illegally repatriated two people during that time. The senior official did not say whether the head of the Aubervilliers station was involved.

After Safeguard Defenders issued its report last year, at least 12 countries began investigations.

The US reaction was the strongest. Targeting an illegal station in New York, federal prosecutors charged two Chinese American leaders with stalking and harassing dissidents for Chinese authorities including the Fuzhou police – the same force involved in the Prato station. (United Front officials also helped set up the New York station, US authorities say.)

“Harry” Lu Jianwang of the Bronx and Chen Jinping of Manhattan. Photos: FBI / US Department of Justice

“It is simply outrageous that China’s Ministry of Public Security thinks it can get away with establishing a secret, illegal police station on US soil to aid its efforts to export repression and subvert our rule of law,” the acting head of FBI counterintelligence, Kurt Ronnow, said at the time of the arrests in April.

In response, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin accused US authorities of making “groundless” accusations. “There are simply no so-called ‘overseas police stations,’” Wang said. “China adheres to the principle of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs, strictly observes international laws and respects the judicial sovereignty of all countries.”

The Chinese Embassy in Rome did not respond to a request for comment from ProPublica.

Some European national security officials downplayed the disclosures about the stations, echoing the Chinese government’s line that the outposts offer convenient consular-type services. The response to the problem in Europe has often been handled quietly by counterintelligence agencies rather than law enforcement. But most European officials interviewed by ProPublica said the stations aid spying.

“The suspicion is that the goal of these stations is to enable Chinese authorities to control and monitor the Chinese diaspora community,” Tescaroli, the Florence prosecutor, said.

There are 11 Chinese police outposts in Italy, more than any other country, and three in Prato. They multiplied during past Italian governments, which had notably close relationships with Beijing.

In 2016, Italy began a program that allowed visiting Chinese police officers to conduct joint uniformed patrols with Italian police. The stated goal was to improve protection of Chinese tourists and immigrants, but the patrol program fomented the spread of the unofficial stations, said Laura Harth, the campaign director of Safeguard Defenders. Photos show Chinese officers at the stations, sometimes joined by Italian police.

“They used the joint patrols to launch pilot stations,” Harth said. “China described it as one of its biggest achievements.”

Although Italian national security officials told ProPublica the patrols were largely symbolic, they said they have caught Chinese police officers using authorized visits as a cover to pursue people in the diaspora. “But when they tried to do anything more than patrol, they were warned to stop,” a senior Italian national security official said.

The policing alliance was “a bad idea” because it “reinforced the fear” in the Chinese Italian community, a senior Italian law enforcement official said.

Across the Mediterranean, Spain is another place where the secret Chinese stations allegedly converge with the criminal underworld. In Barcelona, two covert stations operate a mile apart in a translation agency and a restaurant, according to human rights activists and Spanish security officials.

The stations are based in the Eixample, a central area of tree-lined avenues, stately modernist architecture and octagonal intersections. As in Prato, the Fuzhou police administer the Barcelona facilities from afar, and the staff are mostly Fujianese members of groups including the Association of Fujianese Entrepreneurs in Catalunya, according to Spanish officials and human rights advocates.

And as in Prato, community leaders affiliated with the stations appear in the organized crime files of law enforcement, according to the police of the Catalan autonomous region, a force known as the Mossos d’Esquadra.

At least five of those community leaders have records in Spain for crimes including human smuggling, falsification of documents, receiving stolen property, labor law violations and fraud, Catalan police officials told ProPublica. Police have detected at least two of those people at meetings with suspected Chinese mob figures, the police officials said.

The leaders involved in running the stations interact frequently with Chinese diplomats as well as Spanish politicians, according to police officials. “These are people of great relevance in the Chinese community,” a police official said. “The local politicians may not always realize who they are meeting with.”

Representatives of associations and businesses tied to the Barcelona stations did not respond to requests for comment. The Chinese Embassy in Madrid also did not respond to a request for comment.

In France, authorities already knew about the Chinese stations and monitored them for intelligence purposes, a French national security official said.

After the revelations last year, French officials met with representatives of the Chinese Embassy and the Chinese community and told them to curtail the covert activities, a senior French national security official said. The senior official said a Chinese police attaché insisted he knew nothing about the matter – until French officials showed him a photo of himself at one of the stations.

China’s embassy in Paris did not respond to a request for comment.

Across Europe, investigators have discovered that the Chinese underworld makes itself useful to the Chinese state in another, crucially important arena: money.

River of money

Imagine a vast river of cash flowing from Europe to China.

It flows from the booming marijuana industry in and around Barcelona, where Chinese mobsters are players in illegal growing and international trafficking.

It flows from the garment industry in the Aubervilliers area (the site of a covert Chinese police station and the French branch of Zhang’s trucking empire), where merchants have been charged with laundering money for drug lords.

And it flows from shops, nightspots and warehouses in Prato and other Italian cities where the Guardia di Finanza, the agency that fights financial crime, has discovered a veritable underground banking system based on tax evasion, customs fraud and contraband.

This illegal machinery has pumped billions of dollars into the Chinese economy, authorities say.

Although China has the most formidable police state in the world, law enforcement chiefs in Europe complain about its steadfast resistance to helping their investigations into organized criminal activity by Chinese migrants. “We get no cooperation from the Chinese government,” said Tescaroli, the chief anti-mafia prosecutor in Florence.

Worsening suspicions of official complicity, Chinese state banks in Europe have emerged as active partners of money laundering organizations. Exhibit A: the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, a state-owned institution, the biggest bank in the world based on total assets.

The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China in Shanghai. Photo: Asia Times files / AFP

In 2011, ICBC opened a branch in Madrid on a thriving downtown boulevard filled with museums, luxury hotels and cafe terraces. The bank’s visiting global chairman marked the occasion with Spain’s economy minister, who said the new branch would be a bridge to emerging markets.

Five years later, a dramatic scene played out when Spanish police officers raided the bank, seized piles of documents and arrested executives, escorting suspects out with their heads covered.

The bank had surfaced during investigations of Chinese criminal groups that smuggle contraband and evade taxes and customs duties – activities that generate stockpiles of cash. Surveillance of suspects moving cash led police to the ICBC branch in Madrid.

Thanks to wiretaps and an inside witness, police learned that bank executives set up an audacious system in which criminals delivered suitcases and boxes full of euros to the bank day and night, court documents say.

The bank sent hundreds of millions to China through illegal mechanisms such as fake identities and fraudulent invoices. Managers advised crime bosses about how to transfer funds to China covertly. The Madrid branch did not issue a single alert about suspicious financial operations to Spanish authorities between 2011 and 2016, court documents say.

During the investigation, the top ICBC executive in Madrid became general manager at the bank’s European headquarters, indicating potentially wider corruption, prosecutors said. “The close connection between this Spanish branch and the headquarters in Luxembourg indicates that this illicit conduct could repeat itself in other European branches,” prosecutors warned in court documents.

Chinese diplomats complained publicly and in talks with Spanish leaders about the case, according to Spanish national security officials. But in 2020, the general manager in Luxembourg and three Madrid executives pleaded guilty to money laundering charges. The Spanish court imposed sentences of three to five months and a $25 million fine. ICBC issued a statement saying the bank was law-abiding and had cooperated with authorities.

It was not an isolated case.

In France, the Bank of China paid a $4 million fine in 2020 to settle a prosecution for aggravated money laundering. Authorities charged that the state bank failed to notify French tax authorities about more than $40 million sent from 168 accounts during a two-year period. The money came from fraud, tax evasion and other illicit activities by Chinese entrepreneurs based in France, prosecutors said. Bank of China officials said in a statement that the settlement was not an admission of guilt.

In Italy, the Bank of China paid $22 million in 2017 to settle a case in which a whopping $4.7 billion went illegally to China. Executives aided and concealed transfers of cash from Prato and Florence during a four-year period, authorities said. The former director general in Milan and three other employees received two-year suspended sentences in the aptly named “River of Money” prosecution. The bank said the settlement was not an admission of guilt.

The river of money has many tributaries, law enforcement experts say. Italian investigators have detected bulk cash loads smuggled to China in maritime containers, express mail packages and the luggage of airline passengers.

And police forces across Western Europe track couriers driving shipments of criminal proceeds east to Turkey, Bulgaria and especially Hungary, where it is easier to deposit and repatriate the funds in banks with little interference on either end, according to Italian prosecutors and other European officials. In a Spanish case, a jailed Chinese suspect told interrogators that a network smuggled cash “hidden in goods transported in vans” and used “passports of Chinese citizens to send the money as immigrant remittances” from the “Chinese Bank in Budapest, Hungary” to China, court documents say.

Italian investigators identified another bank in Hungary, China’s closest ally in Europe, that received more than $1.2 billion in clandestine cash deliveries from across the Continent and wired the money to China between 2017 and 2018.

Chinese financial crime networks pose “an elevated threat” in Europe, according to a recent French law enforcement report. They have become the preferred money launderers of the drug trade and act as brokers for international deals, delivering cash on demand so that cartels don’t have to transport funds across borders, European security officials say.

The clients are top drug traffickers: Italians, Albanians, Latin Americans and a violent Morocco-connected cartel, the Mocro Maffia, that has become a national security threat in the Netherlands and Belgium.

The trend resembles the rise of Chinese money laundering groups that have transformed the US drug trade by giving fast and cheap service to Latin American cartels. As ProPublica has reported, US national security officials say the Chinese state supports that activity.

European authorities have similar suspicions. “It is a kind of state criminality,” a senior Italian law enforcement official said.

Striking back

Five years after Italian police rounded up the accused gangsters in 2018, the continuing saga of the China Truck case illustrates progress and setbacks in the response to a threat that caught Europe largely unawares.

A total of 79 defendants are still awaiting trial in Prato. The proceedings have been slow because of the sheer scope of the case, the labyrinthine justice system and the laborious demands of translation. An acute lack of interpreters continues to plague the case. During the investigation, police at one point had to suspend wiretaps because taped conversations in the Fujianese dialect were piling up untranslated.

It is also Italy’s first prosecution of a Chinese organization for mafia-level conspiracy, which is a complex offense to prove. Appellate panels have questioned the evidence for the mafia-related charges, releasing defendants from pre-trial custody.

Last September, a court convicted some defendants for individual offenses and acquitted others such as Zhang, the alleged boss in Rome. In the case of Zheng, the community leader involved in the Prato station, the statute of limitations ran out on some charges against him. Lin is no longer facing trial because his whereabouts are unknown. But Zhang, Zheng and the others still face trial on the mafia conspiracy charges.

Although it has been an uphill battle, authorities say they have disrupted the underworld. “Like the Italian mafias, the Chinese mafia has understood, or is coming to understand, that if you are too violent, the police react,” a senior Italian law enforcement official said. “It is bad for business. Violence attracts attention. It has happened less since the China Truck prosecution.”

Europe is hurrying to respond to China-related threats. After an investigation, the United Kingdom’s minister of state security recently announced that the government had ordered China to shut down unauthorized police stations, calling them “unacceptable.”

The new Italian government of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has taken a tough line. Intelligence and law enforcement agencies have created units focused on Chinese organized crime and malign influence. A parliamentary anti-mafia commission will examine alleged wrongdoing in Prato’s Chinese manufacturing sector and illicit money flows to China. Public attention has led to the shuttering of the Fuzhou station in Prato.

As for the double homicide on Via Strozzi, the case opened a door into a secret world. Prosecutors charged 20 people in the murder and related crimes, winning convictions in the latter cases. But the accused killers remain out of reach, authorities say, in China.

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Death toll rises to 66 in India’s monsoon mayhem

At least 12 people were killed in neighbouring Uttarakhand state, including nine on Tuesday when debris fell on their vehicles on a national highway, officials said. A popular pilgrimage to the state’s Kedarnath temple, home to a revered shrine of the Hindu deity Shiva, was suspended due to heavy rains.Continue Reading

China banks under pressure as local debt crisis mounts

Large Chinese banks are under pressure from Beijing to sacrifice their margins and extend new loans to cash-tight local government financing vehicles (LGFVs).

Bloomberg reported that state banks have in recent months been offering LGFVs loans with a maturity period of 25 years, instead of the normal 10 years. Some of the loans came with waivers on any interest or principal payments for the first four years, though the interest will be accrued for later payment, unnamed sources were quoted as saying in the report.

Since the Bloomberg report appeared on July 4, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and the Agricultural Bank of China’s shares have fallen by 15.1% and 15.6% respectively. The Bank of China’s stocks have lost 12.7% while the China Construction Bank has declined 14% over the same period.

Some analysts surmised that the central government is dumping local debt problems on the big banks by making them lend more to developers and expand their loan books generally.

The People’s Bank of China (PBoC) said on July 11 that local financial institutions extended 3.05 trillion yuan (US$423 billion) worth of new loans in June, compared with 2.8 trillion yuan a year ago in the same month. The figure is above economists’ forecasts of 2.3 trillion yuan.

The Shanghai Securities News said on July 11 that China is expected to accelerate its policy roll-out in order to promote the “stable and healthy” development of the beleaguered real estate market.

Wang Qing, chief macro analyst at Golden Credit Rating, said policymakers may take further measures such as relaxing property purchase and mortgage rules as well as cutting mortgage rates to achieve a “soft landing” for the property market.

Goldman Sachs in the crosshairs

The recent downward pressure on Chinese bank shares was fuelled partly by a Goldman Sachs report published on July 5 that downgraded five Chinese lenders to “sell” ratings based on various downcast assumptions.

After being criticized by Chinese media, Goldman Sachs said on July 6 that its research report is not bearish as it had also rated four Chinese banks as “buy” and three others as “neutral.”

“Goldman Sachs’s report has made some investors worry about China Merchant Bank (CMB)’s asset quality,” a CMB spokesperson told the Shanghai Securities journal on July 10. “The report used data from the 2022 annual report, without any new numbers,” the spokesperson claimed.

The spokesperson also said the report was misleading as it has made errors in its calculations of CMB’s and LGFVs’ data.

Goldman Sachs has a “sell” on China Merchants Bank. Image: Twitter

He said CMB’s on-balance sheet local debt amounted to 132.56 billion yuan, or about 2.32% of the bank’s total loans, at the end of 2022. He added that the size of the bank’s LGFV loans is small and far below Goldman Sachs’s estimation of one trillion yuan. He asserted the bank’s overall risk exposure to local debt is manageable.

Other state banks have not yet commented on the Goldman Sachs report.

The Shenzhen-based Securities Times on July 7 published an article with the title “It’s undesirable to misunderstand the fundamentals of Chinese banks.” It said the Goldman Sachs report is misleading as it used “pessimistic” assumptions to recommend selling Chinese lenders’ shares. 

It noted that the PBoC launched 16 measures in November to ensure stable and healthy growth of property markets. It said due to the lagged effect of these measures, banks may still record more non-performing loans (NPLs) this year but their risk associated with LGFV loans is declining not rising. 

On Monday, the PBoC extended the implementation period of the 16 measures from this month to the end of 2024, aiming to help property developers and homebuyers borrow money more easily. 

No bailout?

There are two kinds of local debt in hina. Local governments are given an annual quota by the Ministry of Finance to issue bonds, which they rely on taxes, fees and land sales to pay. These bonds are welcomed by state banks as they are collateralized with high-quality assets and backed by the central government.

China’s outstanding local government bonds rose from 30.47 trillion yuan at the end of 2021 to 35.06 trillion yuan at the end of last year. The 2022 figure included 14.39 trillion yuan of bonds for “general purposes” and 20.67 trillion yuan for “special projects.” 

Local bonds for general purposes have 8.5-year maturities on average while those for special projects have a 10-year-maturities. The two categories together had an average coupon rate of 3.39% at the end of last year.

Another kind of local debt are LGFV loans. Most local governments set up LGFVs to finance their infrastructure and city renewal projects. They rely mainly on land sales revenue to repay their LGFV loans.

Homebuyers in China have been refusing to make mortgage payments. Image: Twitter Screengrab

Most of these LGFV loans, which often lack transparency, are off-balance-sheet items for their lenders. Chinese media estimated that all outstanding LGFV loans in China amounted to 65 trillion yuan at the end of last year, up from 56 trillion yuan at the end of 2021. 

On January 8, Chinese Finance Minister Liu Kun was quoted as saying by the National Business Daily that the central government will not bail out heavily-indebted local governments as it follows the principle of “all parents raise their own children.” Liu also said, however, the central government plans to launch a system for LGFVs to default.  

In the intervening months, Guizhou, Guangxi and Yunnan provincial governments  have said they cannot resolve their local debt problems and may default if Beijing does not intervene.

Property crisis

Some economists said the current local debt crisis is a result of the property market collapse that began in July 2021.

Li Chao, chief economist at Zheshang Securities, said in an interview earlier this year that the ongoing property crisis is having a negative impact on local governments and LGFVs. He said the central government should avoid a situation where the property and local debt crises form a vicious cycle and create systemic risks to the banking system.  

Last month, more economists and property experts called on the central government to stimulate home prices and resolve local debt problems.

An article published last month by a Henan-based columnist said that if local governments fail to generate enough revenue from land sales, they should sell their state-owned enterprises.

Read: China urged to boost home prices or face recession

Follow Jeff Pao on Twitter at @jeffpao3

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SUSTAINABLE FINANCE POLL 2023: Asian debt markets sharpen ESG focus | FinanceAsia

It’s looking increasingly like the time for sustainable finance to shine. After a fall in the year-on-year volume of green, social and sustainability (GSS) instruments globally during 2022, a rebound is forecast this year – to around US$1 trillion in issuance, forecasts S&P Global.

Asia Pacific (APAC) is well-placed to capitalise on this upswing. S&P Global’s projections, for example, are that GSS issuance volume in the region will jump by as much as 20%, to reach US$240 billion, roughly a quarter of the global landscape.

The longer-term story looks promising, too, especially amid ambitious climate goals. Even in South-east Asia alone, about US$180 billion needs to be invested in clean energy projects every year until 2030 to keep the transition journey on track, based on the International Energy Agency’s Sustainable Development Scenario. Putting this in context, from 2016 to 2020, investment in clean energy was $30 billion per year, on average.

Adapting to climate change is certainly a key driver. But according to more than 100 investors and borrowers in APAC who took part in the 6th annual poll by ANZ and FinanceAsia in April and May 2023, multiple dynamics indicate an ever-bigger role for GSS instruments.

Among the key factors is a mix of policy and regulatory initiatives to foster greater transparency. This should, in turn, boost investor demand and issuer appetite. At the same time, as this segment of the region’s capital market continues to mature, active GSS bond investors and issuers can expect greater potential for newer formats of issuance to help bridge social and environmental priorities such as biodiversity and gender equality.

10 top takeaways from the survey

  1. 92% of all respondents have integrated GSS factors within their strategy, with 77% confirming that the market volatility over the past 12-18 months either hasn’t changed or has increased their focus on GSS.
  2. Nearly half (49%) of investors now have their own in-house ESG research and analysis capability, a notable increase from the 42% poll finding 12 months ago.
  3. 70% of investors have some type of experience with sustainable finance, with bonds much more popular than loans.
  4. While just under one-third of investors have exposure to transition finance instruments, another 45% are interested in investing in them, either in the next year or over the medium to long term.
  5. Although 92% of investors haven’t yet invested in Orange (gender equality) bonds, half of them say they would do so if they were more widely available.
  6. 88% of investors and 90% of borrowers believe further regulation of sustainability and sustainable finance would have a positive impact on the market overall.
  7. 49% of investors and 41% of issuers say a ‘greenium’ of at least 4 bps is typically priced-in to new GSS bond issues.
  8. Alignment with sustainability objectives, better access to capital and investor diversification are the top three drivers for issuers of GSS instruments.
  9. Time, availability of targets and set-up cost are the biggest hurdles to issuing GSS instruments.
  10. Only 19% of borrowers have never issued a GSS instrument – compared with 64% in last year’s poll.

Read more survey findings and analysis here

 

¬ Haymarket Media Limited. All rights reserved.

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