China’s shipbuilders a likely Trump trade war target – Asia Times

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Professional ships are set to become the next hot button in the US-China trade war as a result of Washington’s accusations that Chinese shipbuilders use non-market strategies to increase market share.

After its Section 301 investigation revealed that China’s practices in shipbuilding, maritime, and logistics have all undermined fair competition, the US Trade Representative ( USTR ) has called for responsive actions. &nbsp,

The USTR released its conclusions on January 16 with the announcement that China would top the country’s manufacturing business for the 15th consecutive month in 2024. &nbsp,

According to the MIIT, 55.7 % of the global manufacturing implementation volume in 2024 came from China, which means that over half of the ships shipped globally last year were built there. China’s shipbuilding industry’s new orders accounted for 74.1 % of global volume and orders on hand accounted for 63.1 %.

The MIIT said China completed 48.18 million tons of shipping orders last year, up 13.8 % from 2023. Newly received orders totaled 113.05 million tons, marking a substantial 58.8 % rise year-on-year, while the order backlog reached 208.72 million tons, a 49.7 % jump.

China placed first among 14 of the 18 global popular deliver types, including multi-purpose vessels, auto carriers, and container ships, in terms of new orders, according to the report.

Data from China’s General Administration of Customs showed that the country exported 5, 804 ships in 2024, a 25.1 % increase from 2023. The total export value surged to$ 43.38 billion, up 57.3 % year-on-year.

China’s new shipbuilding orders for green power vessels represented 78.5 % of the global market last year, compared with 31.5 % in 2021, according to state-run China Central TV. &nbsp,

” China now is capable of building nearly all advanced types of ships, from 24, 000-TEU-level vessels to liquified natural gas ( LNG ) carriers and cruise ships”, Zheng Ping, chief analyst at industry portal Chineseport.cn, told the Global Times. TEU refers to” twenty-foot similar product”, a system of cargo power used for freight.

” From steel and aluminum products, renewable panels, to fresh strength vehicles and ships, the US has accused China of having’ unjust’ competition, fully exposing the absurdity of its concept of ‘ fairness'”, Bao Nan, a columnist at the Beijing Daily, writes in an article. &nbsp,

Bao claims that China has spent four years expanding its shipping business and significantly increasing its investments in 2008, when the country’s shipping market was hit by the global financial crisis. He claims that the US is only to chastise itself for allowing its industrialists to fail successively since the 1980s. &nbsp,

Socialist market economy

On April 17 last month, the USTR initiated a Section 301 analysis of China’s works, laws, and practices targeting the sea, logistics and manufacturing sectors for supremacy. On January 16, the USTR said in its statement that China’s targeting of the sea, transportation, and manufacturing industries for hegemony:

  • consumes foreign firms, robs market-oriented businesses and their workers of business opportunities, and lessens competitors,
  • creates relationships on China and increased threat, and reduces supply chain resilience,
  • is ridiculous because of China’s incredible control over these sectors and its economic actors,
  • serves a broader purpose to develop all of China’s instruments of national power through China’s Military-Civil Fusion (MCF ) plan.

” Today, the US ranks 19th in the world in commercial shipbuilding, and we build less than five ships each year, while the People’s Republic of China ( PRC ) is building more than 1, 700 ships”, said USTR Ambassador Katherine Tai. ” In 1975, the United States ranked number another, and we were building more than 70 ships a time”.

” Beijing’s targeted dominance of these areas affects fair, market-oriented competition, boosts economic security threats and is the greatest barrier to revival of US companies, as well as the communities that rely on them”, she said. These findings under Section 301″ set the stage for urgent action to invest in America and strengthen our supply chains.”

According to the USTR report, the Chinese Communist Party has significant influence over state-owned and state-invested companies in the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding industries to promote the nation’s” socialist market economy.”

Prior to this, the European Union had already pointed out in its report that China’s” social market economy” is the root cause of the country’s non-market practices. &nbsp,

On April 10, 2024, the EU’s&nbsp, report on state-induced distortions in China’s economy said the Chinese government’s financial support and economic planning system has distorted many industrial sectors, including metals, chemicals, telecommunications equipment, semiconductors, railways, environmental goods, new energy vehicles and shipbuilding. &nbsp,

Trump’s views

In an article published last May, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank, claimed that China’s shipbuilding empire is the most recent climax of the growing rifts between Washington and Beijing. &nbsp,

According to the statement, China’s shipbuilding prowess are also a matter of national security because numerous well-known Chinese shipyards, including the People’s Liberation Army Navy ( PLN), produce ships for both commercial clients and the People’s Liberation Army. &nbsp,

According to the most recent findings, the USTR will reportedly provide new reasons to escalate the Sino-US trade war for the newly elected US president, who will be sworn in on January 20.

Trump stated earlier this month in an interview that if it is unable to increase its production capacity in the short run, the US may outsource the production of its ships. &nbsp,

” We used to construct a ship every day. We don’t build ships anymore. We want to get that started. And maybe we’ll use allies, also, in terms of building ships”, he said. ” China’s building, from what I’m hearing, every four days, they’re knocking out a ship. We’re sitting back and watching, and we’ve suffered tremendously”.

” The Biden administration’s Section 301 investigation against China targeting the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors seriously violates World Trade Organization ( WTO ) rules and is purely protectionism”, Guo Jiakun, a spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said on January 17. ” China lacks factual justification and economic commonsense,” the Biden administration claims.

He claimed that numerous US studies demonstrate that the US shipbuilding sector lost its competitive edge many years ago as a result of over-protection. He claimed that China’s growing relevant industries are a result of tech innovation and market competition from other companies, as well as from China’s extensive domestic market and fully-fledged industrial manufacturing system. &nbsp,

The China Association of the National Shipbuilding Industry ( CANSI) stated in a statement that the Biden administration “irresponsibly initiated the Section 301 investigation into China’s maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding industries and drew erroneous conclusions based on the flawed investigation. It was full of lies and distortions, and it allegedly lied about the progress of China’s shipbuilding industry with malicious smears.

” Based on some false accusations, the Office of USTR insisted on launching a unilateral investigation, and made irresponsible and unprofessional wrong conclusions”, it said. Such a move” will significantly impede the global shipping and logistics system, global trade order, and the global maritime industry’s ability to transition toward green.”

Chinese shipbuilders are contributing to the global green economy, according to the CANSI because they produce a lot of green equipment for ships at reasonable prices. &nbsp,

Yong Jian contributes to the Asia Times. He is a Chinese journalist who specializes in Chinese technology, economy and politics. &nbsp,

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Commentary: Najib Razak’s new bid for house arrest leaves Malaysia in a political funk

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CAPITALISING ON UNCERTAINTY

As Malaysia watches this political crisis unfold, did Najib, who when stood at the height of authority, engineer a return that reshapes the region’s political landscape? Or does his request for home arrest turn out to be his most successful campaign on the political stage in Malaysia?

Najib appears to be capitalising on the confusion. Najib is aware that chaotic elections can make for the ideal setting for biblical returns, especially during times of crisis.

During the COVID-19 crisis, Najib carefully orchestrated his common picture, steering discussions on financial issues on social media platforms. He blasted the current government for downplaying the effects of the pandemic and dismissing a potential financial downturn while riding on hatred on the ground.

He was praised for” committed to contributing his day, strength, and thoughts as a team for the sake of the Malaysian Family” during a meeting with then-prime secretary Ismail Sabri Yaakob.

Despite his constitutional issues, many still view his career as a period of relative wealth.

While Malaysia’s economic indicators have been improving- improve estimates on Friday ( Jan 17 ) show GDP rose 5.1 per share in 2024 over 2023’s 3.6 per share- stagnant wages, poverty and a lack of high-paying work reflect development considerations.

Although not exclusive to Malaysia, there are numerous instances of officials regaining power in a time of conflict and discord.

The election in November in the United States is yet another illustration of how, despite doubt, people frequently gravitate toward well-known characters who have a stronger past, whether real or imagined.

For Najib, this worldwide tendency toward nostalgia may prove to be a potent tool in his campaign for democratic rebirth, possible allowing for a dramatic comeback to Malaysian politics.

Dr. Sophie Lemiere, a political anthropologist with a focus on South Asian and Indonesian politics, has worked as a researcher and educator at leading universities in Europe, the United States, and Southeast Asia. She is now a Research Fellow at College de France in Paris as well as an Complement Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank based in Washington.

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Youth, media ‘play key role’ in boosting Sino-Thai relations

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Discussed: 20 Jan 2025 at 04: 30

Pinit: Model forcoexistence
Pinit: Model forcoexistence

According to a conference, youth and advertising in Thailand and China can play a vital role in boosting assistance and shaping the future of both countries.

Pinit Jarusombat, president of the Thai-Chinese Cultural Relationship Council (TCCRC ), told the” One River, One Family” seminar, held in Bangkok on Friday, that the friendship between Thailand and China is not only crucial for both nations but also serves as a model for peaceful coexistence and collaboration.

He claimed that efforts to create a Thailand-China area with a shared future have grown as a result of the Thai-Chinese connection in different fields. He hoped that both nations would expand their friendship and encourage the use of internet and think tank to improve communication between citizens.

The conference took place as part of a series of events to commemorate Thailand and China’s 50th anniversary. It was also attended by Gao Anming, vice president and editor-in-chief of China International Communications Group, Li Jijuan, Counsellor at the Political Division of the Chinese Embassy in Thailand, and Gen Surasit Thanatthang, senior director of Asia-Pacific Think Tank and the Thailand-China Strategic Research Centre.

Jiraporn: Govt keento deepen relationships

Jiraporn: Govt keento deepen relationships

Mr. Gao urged both nations to strengthen participation in this area because he claimed that the internet and think tank play a crucial role in shaping public opinion.

Think tanks may help children form stronger relationships and share their experiences. The final goal is to establish a collection that showcases the potential of Thai-Chinese engagement, he said.

PM’s Office Minister Jiraporn Sindhuprai said Thailand and China are poised to further expand their assistance, particularly in the areas of the economy, business, purchase, tourism and the development of business roads and exclusive economic zones.

She added that exchanges of culture and education are crucial for boosting ties.

The Chinese Ambassador to Thailand, Han Zhiqiang, praised the partnership between the nations in a video message that had enabled both to overcome challenges.

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‘Stop the violence’: ASEAN tells Myanmar to prioritise peace over holding elections, says bloc chair Malaysia

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Previous Malaysian foreign minister secretary general Othman was chosen by the country to work with ASEAN to utilize its peace plan in Myanmar. Since the fight started in 2021, he is ASEAN’s five special envoy to Myanmar. &nbsp,

Othman said he would travel to Myanmar” immediately.”

The junta leadership’s failure to follow through on the harmony schedule, which has enraged the bloc’s most powerful nations, has harmed ASEAN’s most powerful nations.

The junta is urging a 2025 vote, an exercise that critics have labeled as a sham, despite being battered on numerous frontlines, dealing with a collapsing economy, and lots of political events banned.

FACILITATING TIMOR-LESTE’S Arrival

Mohamad added that ASEAN foreign ministries applauded Timor-Leste’s development in putting together a blueprint for its entire account in the union. &nbsp,

He added that the member nations remained committed to facilitating Timor-Leste’s entry to ASEAN. &nbsp,

” Some highlighted the need to help Timor-Leste’s efforts through capacity-building and certain technical support programs”, said Mohamad. &nbsp,

Timor-Leste participated in the surrender as an observer. Bendito windows Santos Freitas, the country’s foreign affairs minister, represented it. &nbsp,

The youngest nation in Asia has been a wait since 2011 to join ASEAN. The 10 ASEAN member states initially agreed on Timor-Leste’s membership and gave it outsider status in November 2022 while Cambodia was in charge.

In May 2023, the alliance adopted a strategy for Timor-Leste’s full account to help the country in fulfilling the account criteria.

In a new special interview with CNA, Timor-Leste’s President José Ramos-Horta expressed wish that his nation had become ASEAN’s 11th part in 2025.

” We have made tremendous progress ( since 2023 )”, said Ramos-Horta.

” At the same time, I think ASEAN officials, most of them, all of them, realize that it is enough, what Timor-Leste has done to significance instant account. That it is not realistic, (or ) even fair, to expect Timor-Leste to join ASEAN only when it has reached the level of Malaysia, Singapore or Thailand”.

A SINGLE ASEAN VISA FOR Visitors? &nbsp,

At the same time, ASEAN countries are examining ways to make cross-border travel between member states more convenient and promote hospitality.

Tourism is a key driver of economic growth in the region, according to Malaysia’s Tourism, Arts, and Culture Minister Tiong King Sing, who stated on Sunday that improving cross-border cooperation is necessary to create a dynamic and visible tourism environment.

” We need to improve laws to increase the number of visitors entering.” We can’t be tolerant on the security front, he said after chairing the 28th ASEAN tourism ministers ‘ meeting in Johor Bahru.” I believe this issue should be discussed further within our respective countries,” he said.

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ASEAN-wide digital payment system, regional power grid key amid geopolitical risks: Vivian Balakrishnan

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ON Thailand AND BRICS

Dr. Balakrishnan was even asked to comment on the Myanmar condition and how some ASEAN member states have freely engaged the Burmese military state. &nbsp,

Next December, Thailand hosted a meeting on Myanmar involving the war-torn country’s five neighborhood, including China, Bangladesh and India.

At the meeting, the regime’s foreign secretary Than Swe outlined a political strategy and progress on election arrangements, including a community survey and registration of 53 political parties.

&nbsp, Dr Balakrishnan stated that Myanmar’s neighborhood in ASEAN have “greater risks” as they are more exposed to violence, improper activities like drug smuggling and the flow of migrants. &nbsp,

Nevertheless, he stressed that even with various levels of risks, all the member states want Myanmar to reach “national peace”. &nbsp,

” None of us want to interfere with a fellow ASEAN ( member’s ) internal affairs.” So in that regard, the more channels of communication, the more potential market for all the various stakeholders in Myanmar to come up, the better”, he added. &nbsp,

Since February 2021, Myanmar has experienced upheaval since its military seized power and ousted a democratically elected government, causing protests and putting the junta at odds with its leadership.

Since the defense revolt, more than 5, 000 residents have been killed and over 3.3 million displaced, according to a United Nations report in September 2024.

Dr. Balakrishnan was also questioned about Singapore’s concern over some ASEAN member states ‘ efforts to develop closer relationships with the BRICS ( Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa ) cluster of emerging markets. &nbsp,

BRICS, established in 2009, first included Brazil, Russia, India, and China, while South Africa joined a year later. It has since expanded to encompass Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates. Indonesia became the first Southeast Asian nation to fully join the group earlier this month.

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Commentary: The report card for Prabowo’s first 100 days? A confused one

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Prabowo’s finance minister, Sri Mulyani Indrawati, had been talking up the plan for decades. After serving in former senator Joko” Jokowi” Widodo’s government, she stayed on as a sign of stability to the business group. The VAT boost would have been like a stability, as laid out by a 2021 rules.

Prabowo gave in to critics, reversing the entire VAT increase and shifting its focus to luxury goods. Similar to a shift from the Jokowi case, Sri Mulyani and Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs Airlangga Hartarto voted in favor of the program, saying that they would support the meals.

PRABOWO’S NEXT 100 DAYS

It’s an interesting comparison to the former president’s personal experiences with premature controversial economic measures.

Only months after his 2014 opening, Jokowi cut the gas payment. Although Jokowi wore it simply despite low-level demonstrations and annual inflation higher than current levels, it was a move that predated him and was introduced during the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono time.

Prabowo’s initial 100 days could be less significant than his future. He suggested last month that provincial primary elections be abolished and that a program be put in place where these positions are chosen by local legislatures.

The idea sparked fears among those who support democracy and those who oppose it, believing that Prabowo’s strongman ambitions are just beginning. Prabowo-aligned parties have already confirmed they would at least” consider” the plan. It may require a revision of the election law, which is already scheduled to be discussed this time.

Erin Cook is a blogger who writes about politics in Southeast Asia and writes the regular Dari Mulut untuk Mulut newsletter. &nbsp, This remark initially appeared on the Lowy Institute’s site, Interpreter.

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Japanese and Indian ventures tie up in space lasers – Asia Times

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Orbital Lasers, a Chinese walk firm, has reached an agreement with Indian start-up InspeCity Space Laboratories to discover opportunities for collaboration in satellite cleaning, in-space assembly and manufacturing and planetary security. The private sector initiative serves as a complement to the collaboration between the Indian Space Research Organization ( ISRO ) and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency ( JAXA ).Continue Reading

China tech shrugged off Trump 1.0 trade war – and can do it again – Asia Times

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When Donald Trump re-enters the White House, he’ll get accompanied by a group of China hawks who will use tariffs and trade restrictions to prevent Beijing from challenging the country’s technological superiority.

China has been subject to such industry force since Trump took office in 2017 and it has continued through the Biden administration. This isn’t completely new.

However, some commentators are suggesting that the magnitude of what Trump is now proposing, including taxes of up to 60 % on goods from China, had “keep Beijing on the defense and completely transform the rivalry in America’s favor,” according to one analyst.

For a watch is premised on the belief that China’s obsolete, state-subsidized, manufacturing-for-export type is mature for disturbance by US taxes.

However, as someone who has written and edited two books on China and creativity and studied China’s systems since the early 2000s, I believe this description of its economy is at least two years out of date.

China’s industrial sectors have grown fast since 2016 as a result of the removal of American tariffs. However, since the” business war” launched by Trump in 2017, Chinese systems has really emerged as a world leader.

China’s technology climb

Thirty years ago, China’s best technology company had yet to create a competitive personal computer internally, and the country scarcely had internet access. The nation was the nation’s manufacturer fifteen years ago, where iPhones and other technology products were assembled without the ability to produce any high-tech components on their own. They were stuck at the bottom of the value chain.

No Chinese planners could have predicted the future directions that China’s technology would take it even with the best glass game in the middle of the 2000s.

Fast-forward to now: China is today ahead of rival economies across large industrial areas. The think tank Information Technology and Innovation Foundation found in a 2024 statement that China is leading or internationally competitive in five out of nine high-tech businesses – automation, nuclear energy, electric vehicles, artificial intelligence and quantum computing – and quickly catching up in four others: chemicals, system tools, biopharmaceuticals and semiconductors.

A Bloomberg research also identified China as leading or internationally competitive in 12 out of 13 technology-intensive business. And China was identified as the leader of 37 of the 44 crucial systems tracked by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Why has the Chinese technology sector grown so fast? Some in Washington think that the decades of meticulous state planning have given rise to the world’s high-tech sectors.

But this, I believe, greatly overestimates Beijing’s vision and power. Although the Chinese government has certainly pursued the lofty objective of catching up with the West since the 1980s, having goals is not the same as having the ability to carry them out.

Many in the West level to the Chinese government subsidies that support local tech companies. While grants have contributed to some technical achievement, the Chinese government has also provided many problems.

Take electronics, for example: Despite massive Chinese state assets since the 1990s, China still lags in producing cutting-edge cards and is reliant on goods.

Dare to DREAM

In my view, China’s technological dynamism didn’t come from the magic of central planning, but through five key elements I call DREAM.

D stands for the exchange between the state and the market.

While China’s government wields significant power, the country’s private sector is neither submissive nor powerless. In 2022, businesses that are not owned by the government ( mostly private ones ) but also offshore ones in which Beijing does not hold a controlling stake accounted for 95 % of enterprise R&amp, D spending and 88 % of urban employment.

Beijing has stepped up its sanctions against tech giants, including a ban on Alibaba’s Ant Group from listing on the New York Stock Exchange in 2020 and a Covid-19 lockdown that hurt the private sector, but the government is not bound by strict ideology, as many in the West believe it to be. It has recently begun to support the private sector, and it has even begun to draft laws to protect them.

Indeed, it’s more accurate to describe state-market relations in China as dynamic, adaptive interaction– more dialogue than dictatorship.

R refers to domestic R&amp and D ( R&amp, D).

Over the past 20 years, China has heavily invested in domestic research capacity, once dependent on imported technology. Chinese scientists and engineers continue to be deeply involved in global networks despite the fact that political tensions have accelerated the development of self-reliance.

Further, China has a higher number of highly skilled workers thanks to a supposedly anti-espionage initiative launched under Trump’s first administration.

The” China initiative” that the US Justice Department introduced in 2018 promoted the idea that Chinese and Chinese American scientists might be spying for Beijing, leading to a flood of top scientists returning to China.

They continued to conduct cutting-edge research and train a fresh batch of Chinese scientists there.

E is for China’s industrial ecosystem, which it can exploit.

China’s vast manufacturing base enables rapid creation and scaling of new technologies. China was the only nation to cover every major industrial sector and contributed 35 % of the global gross manufacturing output in 2023.

Silicon Valley’s innovative ecosystem, which can rely on extensive venture capital and a booming stock market, may not exist in China. However, it has over the years developed comprehensive supply chains, and it excels at repurposing them to quickly introduce new products to the market.

Take the example of robotics. Only when labor costs increased sharply, did China take the robotics industry seriously. In 2010, China’s manufacturing labor costs were about US$ 2 per hour, similar to those of the Philippines or Vietnam, by 2022, that figure rose to about$ 8 per hour – more than double the average for Southeast Asian countries.

China installs more industrial robots each year than the rest of the world combined, and its robot quality has increased exponentially.

A stands for accumulative changes.

Chinese companies excel at incremental improvements, which add up to an accumulative transforming effect rather than new discoveries. Instead of a few brilliant ideas from any leader’s creative mind, the vast manufacturing networks offer opportunities to improve already-existing products based on market feedback.

Analysts in the US have long predicted that China’s rampant intellectual property violations would end its innovation drive, believing that it would stifle people’s desire to innovate if they believed they would be robbed of their ideas.

Instead, as Taiwanese tech expert and writer Kai-Fu Lee has explained, Chinese enterprises can be dynamic and innovative in an environment with less IP protection. They frequently grow their market share quickly and establish business ecosystems to stop rivals from catching up.

M means the middle market.

Chinese firms tend to target middle-income consumers, both domestically and globally. By prioritizing affordability and functionality over cutting-edge innovation, they avoid head-to-head competition with Western giants such as Apple.

Xiaomi and Oppo, two Chinese smartphone manufacturers, cost a third to a third as much as an iPhone but have comparable features. Tesla and other Chinese electric vehicles have comparable prices, but they still have some excellent features.

Chinese firms tolerate lower profit margins, as they can rely on the expanded sales in the middle market, both domestically and, increasingly, overseas.

Tariffs as a counterproductive measure

The incoming Trump administration’s issue is that, while tariffs may change how China’s manufacturing and exports are perceived globally, they won’t eliminate any of the DREAM components. They might actually have the opposite effect: boosting China’s capacity for self-reliance and bolstering its standing in the world’s middle-class.

The issue is primarily due to the fact that American policymakers frequently view technological competition with China as a zero-sum game. However, technological competition is not comparable to a race with separate lanes and a finish line. Rather, tech transformation is a complex process in which countries and companies compete, collaborate and build on each other’s work.

Ultimately, America’s technological prowess won’t be measured by the extent to which it manages to stop China, but by how successfully American companies can address humanity’s greatest challenges. There will be little progress made in the direction of tariffs and trade wars.

Vassar College’s professor of economic geography is Yu Zhou.

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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General Atomics tapped to close low-cost missile gap with China – Asia Times

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While the US attempts to solve its missile hoard squeeze with low, easily mass-produced missiles, China’s production surge forces a striking reckoning with current warfare’s business and protracted realities and the race to outgun near-peer adversaries.

This month, The War Zone reported that General Atomics has unveiled a fresh low-cost air-to-surface weapon, dubbed the” Hit Missile”, at the Surface Navy Association’s annual conference.

No word on the missile’s size, performance, or another specifications from the company is provided, but instead, the company developed an air-breathing engine structure with a single dorsal consumption and a slab-sided design with two lugs on top.

The US government’s concentrate on cost-effective, mass-producible weapons like the Strike Missile reflects an immediate need for flexible, long-range abilities in high-end issues. Similar initiatives, like the US Navy’s Multi-Mission Affordable Capacity Effector ( MACE ) and the US Air Force’s Extended Range Attack Munition ( ERAM ), highlight a broader effort to balance capability with affordability.

In addition to those projects, in September 2024, Asia Times reported that Anduril Industries, a US defense contractor, has introduced the Barracuda family of Autonomous Air Vehicles ( AAVs ) to address the critical depletion of US weapon stockpiles.

The Barracuda line, designed for inexpensive, hyper-scale creation, comprises the Barracuda-100, Barracuda-250, and Barracuda-500. These air-breathing, software-defined inconsequential AAVs are compatible with different loads and implementation methods and have varying sizes, runs, and payload capacities.

The Barracuda-M configuration offers a cost-effective, adaptable cruise missile capability, thereby addressing the imperative requirement for precision-guided munitions ( PGMs) that are both producible and upgradeable for the US and its allies.

The Barracuda AAVs are engineered for rapid, low-cost assembly, necessitating fewer tools and parts, resulting in a 30 % reduction in cost compared to their competitors. Utilizing commercially available components to increase supply chain resilience, their modular design enables quick adaptation to new technologies and changing threats.

These relatively inexpensive and simple missiles may have been developed as a result of recent US Navy operations in the Red Sea. These operations revealed the sizable number of expensive missiles required to neutralize threats posed by technologically inferior forces like the Houthis in Yemen.

The US Navy’s massive missile purchases against Houthi rebels raises the question of whether the US can have enough to launch a near-peer conflict in the Pacific.

The War Zone reported in July 2024 that the Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group ( IKECSG) expended 770 missiles and munitions targeting Iranian-backed Houthi militants in Yemen during a nine-month deployment as an illustration of the enormous expenditure of pricey munitions against low-cost targets.

According to the report, the IKECSG launched 155 Standard-series missiles and 135 Tomahawk cruise missiles, while its aircraft deployed 60 air-to-air missiles and 420 air-to-surface munitions.

Scaling up such numbers in a hypothetical war with China, a January 2023 report by Mark Cancian and other writers for the Center for Strategic and International Studies ( CSIS ) think tank noted that in three to four weeks of conflict with China, the US expended about 5, 000 long-range precision missiles, mainly the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile ( JASSM) and Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile ( LRASM).

Given the enormous amount of missile spending in a hypothetical war with China in the Pacific, it is difficult to tell whether the US defense industrial base can keep the US supplied with such firepower. The challenge lies in overcoming entrenched issues in production capacity, supply chain vulnerabilities, and bureaucratic inefficiencies.

The US defense industry base faces difficulties as it ramps up missile production, according to a report released in June 2021 from the US Congressional Research Service ( CRS ). Despite rising demand due to global conflicts and evolving threats, the US industrial base is constrained by aging infrastructure, limited production capacity, and supply chain vulnerabilities.

Current PGM initiatives involve complex technologies like GPS, laser, and inertial navigation systems, which call for the use of highly developed components and skills.

The proliferation of potent anti-access/area-denial ( A2/AD ) systems by adversaries like China and Russia, such as the HQ-18 and S-500 surface-to-air missiles, further stresses the need for longer-range and higher-precision munitions. These difficulties are made worse by budgetary constraints and the lengthy delays in developing and fielding new weapons.

Seth Jones and Alexander Palmer’s CSIS report from March 2024 highlights the rapid development of weapons systems, particularly PGMs, as a result of China’s transition to a wartime footing.

China has launched more ballistic missiles for testing and training for the fourth consecutive year than any other country combined, and both China’s arsenal and quantity are rapidly increasing. In contrast, there are shortages of US munitions, such as those from the LRASM and Tomahawk, which are made worse by a lack of multiyear procurement plans.

Innovative solutions like General Atomics ‘ Strike Missile represent a step in the right direction as the US attempts to close its missile firepower gap with China. However, overcoming the entrenched challenges of limited production capacity, aging infrastructure, and bureaucratic inefficiencies will require more than technological advances.

Without significant changes to its defense-industrial base, the US runs the risk of losing its strategic position in the Pacific, which it cannot afford. The question remains: Can the US retain its role as the “arsenal of democracy” in 21st-century great power competition?

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Trump claiming new world order in first 100 days – Asia Times

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Donald Trump’s resumption of office on January 20, 2025, is commonly believed to represent a significant shift in American foreign policy and a shift in diplomacy’s process.

Trump’s favoritism, which includes threats and rhetoric directed at foreign leaders, now seems to have paid off in helping to create a fragile peace agreement in Gaza. The offer was negotiated by Joe Biden and his team in cooperation with Trump’s coming management.

But analysts suggest Trump’s harsh comments on January 7 that” all hell had split lose” if the hostages weren’t immediately released were truly a threat to Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu, to get something done immediately. And this made the Israeli authorities obligated to make a bargain.

In his first name, Trump used this sharp confrontational language. And his most recent threats to conquer Canada, purchase Greenland, and retake control of the Panama Canal suggest it does occur again. That might not be all that positive, especially for US traditional friends.

Elon Musk, one of Trump’s closest confidants, is also explicitly haughty about his attempts to overthrow the UK and Germany, in an ostensible effort to bolster a global coalition of populist leaders.

Add to that a promised agreement with Russia to end the conflict in Ukraine, a resumption of the maximum-pressure battle against Iran, and a doubling down on confrontation with China, and you have the ingredients for a basic revision of US foreign policy.

Three distinct characteristics stand out as early indicators of the potential shape of the Trump foreign policy. First is the emphasis on the Northern hemisphere. Trump’s goal appears to be reaffirming US dominance in American affairs while also removing any perceived corporate flaws.

While Greenland, Canada and the Panama Canal have dominated the articles, there are also repercussions for US ties with Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, with Trump’s pull as secretary of state, Marco Rubio, being known for his aggressive approach.

Trump may inaccurately hype up China’s role in the Panama Canal, but Beijing has unquestionably increased its ( mostly economic ) footprint in Latin America. A Chinese-funded deep-water harbor in Peru has raised US safety concerns.

Mexico’s funding by China has opened a significant backdoor into the US market, making Mexico the US’s largest trading partner. In 2024, Latino exports of goods to the US stood at just under US$ 467 billion, compared with China’s$ 401 billion.

Trump is likely to use a combination of disturbing rhetoric, tariffs, and social pressure to lower the pressure in the Northern hemisphere.

His allies in Congress have now introduced a bill to “authorize the President to get to enter into discussions with the Kingdom of Denmark to stable the acquisition of Greenland by the United States” in an early indication of how seriously the incoming administration takes the matter.

The administration’s shifting emphasis on regional cooperation is the second key component of the emerging Trump international policy philosophy. Europe and the Middle East are the two primary focus regions in this environment.

Ukraine conflict deal

One of Trump’s important objectives is to focus on China and “un-unite” Russia and China while fulfilling the promise to end the conflict in Ukraine.

Nevertheless, he insists that the incoming administration continue to prioritize transatlantic security while also urging US allies to increase their defence spending.

It simply doesn’t want to be the one making the majority of the money. And Trump has a point: Washington currently shoulders 68 % of all NATO expenditure, compared with European members ‘ 28 %.

Trump’s strategy for the Middle East is supported by the same analysis of US-mediated deals that promote US passions while allowing for a reduction in pledges.

A little clearer path to correcting relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia is now possible thanks to a peace between Israel and Hamas, which does help the release of Jewish victims. This is still dependent upon an Israeli wink towards Palestinian sovereignty, but when this materializes, Israel’s ties with the rest of the Muslim world will also increase.

This will allow Washington to begin its maximum-pressure battle against Tehran and shift the stress of containing Iran to a likely more efficient and able coalition of US allies in the region.

What future for China?

While Trump’s approach to the Northern hemisphere and to Washington’s potential relations with Europe and the Middle East are largely unambiguous, there are a lot of questions about his China plan. With the exception of Elon Musk, who has considerable business interests in China, his national security group is typically viewed as aggressive toward Beijing.

Trump himself oscillates between obnoxious and cordial speech. One of his arguments for reaffirming US control of the proper waterway is that it is under the purview of China. He also spelled out Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ability to assist with a bargain in Ukraine and yet invited him to his inauguration.

Trump may be available to a package with China – and China, in turn, has signaled involvement in this as well. While Xi did not go the commencement, his vice-president, Han Zheng, does.

Even though their 2020 deal did little more than put an end to an escalating trade conflict, Trump and Xi have a track record of making deals. The negotiations on that agreement took two years, leaving many of the tariffs in place as of Trump’s first word, though occasionally at a lower rate.

Similar events might occur right now, with Trump honoring one of his campaign promises to raise taxes on Chinese products while also starting discussions on a new deal with Beijing.

In all likelihood, this is Trump’s final term as president. For the next two decades, at least, he controls both the Senate and the House of Representatives. He has every incentive to make good on his promises – and faces some, if any, restrictions. He sees himself as a disrupter, and his MAGA center expects him to be just that. Instability is all but guaranteed.

However, it is unclear whether Trump’s idea of a more stable global order with clearly defined spheres of influence for the US, China, and perhaps Russia will come to light, let alone whether such a result would be preferable.

The University of Birmingham’s Stefan Wolff is an assistant professor of global security.

The Conversation has republished this essay under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

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