Small modular nukes offer Asia energy answers

The increasingly prominent view in the energy expert community is that nuclear power includes a role to play within achieving the 17 “sustainable development goals” identified by the United Nations General Assembly within 2015 (and designed to be reached by 2030).

There has thus been rising interest in nuclear power development in a number of parts of the world, especially in the Indo-Pacific, where growth is the strongest.
 
This particular renewed interest comes not long after the failed “nuclear renaissance” of the 2000s. That renaissance never materialized primarily because the devastating mishaps at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in 2011 led many countries to reconsider their nuclear power ambitions.

Now, however , national energy plus climate objectives are usually again driving the countries to put the particular nuclear option back again on the table. This curiosity has only grown in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the subsequent initiatives to choke away Russian natural gas and oil exports, and the resulting increase in worldwide prices for fossil fuels.
 
Many believe that “small modular reactors” (SMRs) and their partner “floating nuclear energy plants” (FNPPs) keep considerable promise and they may be “the next big thing” within the nuclear power marketplace, even though they are not new concepts—they date back to the 1950s.

To explore this further and, in particular, the particular implications for the Indo-Pacific, the Pacific Forum recently commissioned 3 papers: one simply by Victor Nian that will unpacks SMR/FNPP technology and discusses their applicability in the region; one particular by Jor-Shan Choi that examines the particular nuclear safety, safety, and safeguards considerations associated with SMRs/FNPPs; and something by Miles Pomper, Ferenc Dalnoki Veress, Dan Zhukov, and Sanjana Gogna that addresses the potential geopolitical implications of SMR/FNPP deployments.
 
Seven key insights can be teased out from the papers, that are published in a just-released  volume   on “Small Modular Reactors: The Next Phase for Nuclear Energy in the Indo-Pacific. ” These insights include the subsequent:

1 ) SMR/FNPPs have attractive features

SMRs and FNPPs are popular because they are small, mobile, flexible, have user-centric features, and are empowered from the advanced (and safer) Generation IV technologies. What’s more, the advantage of SMRs and FNPPs is that they have the potential to offer cost-competitive plus clean energy without the shortcomings associated with traditional large-scale nuclear power plants. SMRs plus FNPPs can be effortlessly integrated into national energy planning, especially for newcomer countries with small grid sizes or even off-grid/remote communities or even for countries that are dependent heavily on energy imports.

2 . SMR/FNPP technology is not however ready, and its prospects are unclear

Most SMR and FNPP styles are still in the research phase or under development. Few are deployed. In the Indo-Pacific, the land- or even marine-based reactor forms of interest are water-cooled, high-temperature gas, smelted salt, or aqueous-fueled. Two reactors are deployed in the region: the particular KLT40S, a pressurised water reactor FNPP developed by OKBM (Russia) and commissioned in Pevek in the Russian far east that is designed to generate 70 megawatts of one’s; and the HTR-PM, a high-temperature gas reactor developed by the China Nuclear Engineering Company and Institute associated with Nuclear New Power Technology that is designed to generate 210 megawatts of energy.

Based on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), SMR and FNPP technology are unlikely in order to contribute significantly towards the expansion of nuclear power in the next 10 years. If the adoption associated with such technologies matches the current level of attention, reactor development plus deployment will take time for you to materialize.

3. There is a pathway to the successful utilization of SMRs/FNPPs

There are several factors associated with the successful utilization of SMRs and FNPPs. Advancing them as early as possible in the commercial supply chain is essential for proper incorporation into energy creation. Developing industry requirements, to ensure compatibility plus interoperability with other techniques, and adopting and scaling up SMR/FNPP technologies adequately to relish the economies of the multiples are also important. Finally, ensuring “green passage” for transportable SMRs/FNPPs is a main factor in facilitating safe and efficient mobilization of these technologies with regard to nearshore, offshore, and maritime applications.

4. Security, security and safe guards considerations are a challenge for SMRs/FNPPs

One problem with SMR/FNPP technologies is that they are not devoid of protection, security, and safeguards challenges. SMRs plus FNPPs, notably “first-of-a-kind” reactors, have unique features, specific techniques, and novel operating conditions, introducing challenges to the established regulating bodies, potentially leading to safety concerns.

The particular features of SMRs and FNPPs, notably their particular transportability, more flexible siting options to incorporate remote or city locations, and new fuel designs also present new nuclear security challenges, some possibly more serious than those of large reactors. Moreover, because they make use of different types of fuel that require new technologies in manufacturing and handling of nuclear components, some SMRs plus FNPPs present distinctive challenges to IAEA safeguards.

The best way to address these safety, security, and safeguards challenges would be to adopt a holistic method. Such a “3S” strategy helps better understand the challenges (and opportunities) associated with SMR and FNPP deployments.

5. SMR/FNPP deployment will happen within a competitive security environment

Nuclear power development is definitely intimately linked to geopolitics. There is no reason to think that it will be different these times, especially given that the safety environment is becoming progressively competitive.

Because Russia has been relentless in its designed nuclear energy (traditional and SMR/FNPP) exports, notably in the Indo-Pacific, and because China looms large over the horizon as a major nuclear exporter in the context of its Belt and Road Initiative, there are fears in Wa that the United States might lag behind (because it has a limited nuclear export industry) plus lose potential markets or surrender influence in the region to possibly Moscow or Beijing, or both. Considerably, a few other regional countries are entering the particular nuclear export business as well.

6. It is not clear (yet) in the event that SMRs/FNPPs will have far-reaching geopolitical implications

Caution is in order, however. The current renewed interest in nuclear power may, as its predecessors, dissipate. Even when it materializes, it will be a very slow procedure. The United States, then, ought to keep an eye on key developments and dynamics however, not rush into something.

In the event that Washington wants to help US manufacturers of SMRs and FNPPs gain new marketplaces in the Indo-Pacific, the priority should be Philippines given Jakarta’s urgent (and massive) requirement for new power sources. Doing so in the Philippines, Thailand, or Vietnam would only end up being judicious if these three countries confirm their intentions in order to pursue nuclear strength.

Either way, selling (or failing to sell) US manufactured associated with SMR and FNPP technologies is not likely to change radically the recipients’ approach to Wa as a trade or security partner.

7. The us should ask alone if it benefits from growing or limiting the nuclear export market

It is an open question whether or not the United States should focus on competing aggressively to expand the traditional plus emerging SMR plus FNPP export marketplace (and shape it to its advantage) or if, rather, it should focus on limiting such expansion. Conducting a thorough study to the benefits, costs, plus risks of each choice would be useful and timely.
 
This list of key insights is not comprehensive. There is much left to unpack to understand fully the particular renewed interest in nuclear power and the seemingly high enthusiasm regarding SMRs and FNPPs, plus the implications for the Indo-Pacific specifically. Our own volume’s papers provide preliminary analyses to help jumpstart this study.

David Santoro  ( david@pacforum. org ) and  Carl Baker  ( carl@pacforum. org ) are respectively president/CEO and older advisor at the Pacific Forum. Follow Brian Santoro on Tweets at @DavidSantoro1.

This article was originally published simply by Pacific Forum’s PacNet and is republished simply by Asia Times with permission.