Setting the table for when Putin meets Xi

Setting the table for when Putin meets Xi

On October 17, Vladimir Putin is scheduled to visit China’s Xi Jinping for the first time in 20 times outside the edges of the former Soviet Union.

If the attend takes place, it is likely to strengthen a partnership in which Russia has emerged as an important tool in China’s larger strategy to increase its impact in Europe and the Americas.

Putin’s likely visit to Beijing coincides with the Belt and Road Initiative( BRI ), a bold Chinese initiative to broaden international trade routes with other countries and improve transportation and infrastructure ties.

On October 17 and 18, China’s leader Xi may host ambassadors from about 130 nations in Beijing to commemorate this occasion.

Putin is probably going to be the main attraction. Putin reportedly accepted Xi’s proposal in September, according to Russian options, though Beijing has declined to confirm this.

There is no doubt that the two leaders may have a lot to talk about. The world has undergone a significant change since they declared their” no-limits” agreement in February 2022, just before Russia invaded Ukraine on full-scale.

There is no sign of an ending to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Twitter picture

The South Caucasus and the Middle East, both regions where Russia and China have interests at stake, are engulfed in unrest.

However, their unrestricted relationship has evolved into a much more one-sided affair. Russia today likely aligns its policies to serve Chinese interests, whereas Moscow and Beijing may have once coordinated their strategies.

At least temporarily, the Ukraine war has weakened Russia and reduced its effect not only in the Middle East and the South Caucasus but also in northern Asia. As a result, China has been able to establish its dominance it and strengthen its ties to the area.

Putin, who is now obviously Xi’s junior partner, also suggests that Russia and China have a common goal in mind when it comes to putting an end to the Western-dominated global order and limiting US and European influence in what they both see as their privileged interest zones across Eurasia.

Russia continues to emphasize its ties to China, in part because it has some other options besides Iran and North Korea, which are considered to be global pariah states.

Trade along the New Eurasian Land Bridge, an inland road connection between China and Europe that was once a significant transportation route for Chinese exports to European markets, has been significantly reduced by American sanctions against Russia in response to Moscow’s warfare against Ukraine.

Instead, transportation roads avoiding Russia have become more significant, such as the Middle Corridor, which connects China to the EU via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, and the South Caucasus. Additionally, this has dashed Russian expectations for the BRI and Moscow’s Eurasian Economic Union ( EAEU ), a post-Soviet economic integration initiative.

It is significant that Putin was invited to visit Beijing by Xi, but it is also noticeable that this is not just a intergovernmental matter. Putin’s trip to Moscow does, at best, give the Russian president the chance to speak with Xi in the margins of a summit intended to enjoy the BRI, an initiative that is closely related to him personally.

In its international relations, China also has and pursues different options. At the APEC summit in San Francisco in November, US President Joe Biden and President Xi may also cross paths. Josep Borrell, the head of the EU’s international policy, also traveled to China, perhaps to get ready for an EU-China summit that will take place later this year.

On November 14, 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden watched the G20 height from Bali, Indonesia. Photo: Pool

What Xi hopes to accomplish

None of this suggests that Xi will soon stop supporting Putin.

The key issue is how Xi will strike a balance between his support for Putin and his desire to prevent widespread European” de-risking ,” which would restrict Chinese technology exports to China, scrutinize Chinese investment, and reduce China’s reliance on China-only supply chains and further restrict access to EU markets for Chinese goods, services and capital.

Xi is unlikely to renounce Putin given the growing signs of discord fatigue among Ukraine’s American allies and the possible advantages Putin will receive from the current harsh escalation in the Middle East.

Nevertheless, he might see an opportunity to facilitate a settlement more on Russian terms than on Ukrainian terms, which would give Putin the advantage of the doubt and allow him to declare victory while maintaining some degree of stability in an area that is still vital for the BRI’s long-term success and, ultimately, for Chinese superpower ambitions.

If Xi were to succeed in doing this, it would also solidify China’s position in a potential safety get involving the Euro-Atlantic and European Union.

This might also be Putin’s best chance to spare himself the humiliation of a never-ending war, even though it would instantly turn Russia into an conceivable permanent second-order power in the shadow of China.

But, that possibility is still very much a possibility, particularly if China and the West continue to support Russia and Ukraine at their existing levels, which provides just enough support for each side to avoid defeat.

Professor of International Security at the University of Birmingham, Stefan Wolff

Under a Creative Commons license, this essay has been republished from The Conversation. Read the article in its entirety.