In some important business, Kazakhstan has been experiencing a” head dump” of skilled and educated staff for more than ten years. This might be beginning to alter.
Fuel and gas-fueled economic development in Kazakhstan has slowed in part as a result of changes in commodities prices around the world. The government has made an effort to extend the market in order to encourage long-term growth. However, a severe skill shortage has resulted from insufficient primary education, and some skilled workers have moved abroad in search of better opportunities.
With initiatives like the Bolashak programme, which offered scholarships to Kazakhs to pursue their education at unusual universities, officials in Kazakhstan have made an effort to stop the brain drain. The system was partially successful, but it fell short in important areas like data technology. Additionally, some academics decided never to go back to Kazakhstan for personal or professional reasons.
Surprisingly, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to a significant emigration of both individuals and businesses from Russia to Kazakhstan. This is opening up a brand-new possibility for long-term” head gain” and economical advancement. However, due to an overly optimistic balancing of competing policy objectives, Kazakh policymakers run the risk of missing this chance.
Russia has experienced three significant ripples of migration since its invasion of Ukraine. Software workers and outspoken war opponents were among the first wave to flee persecution. This marked the start of a tendency for Russian small and medium-sized businesses to relocate to Kazakhstan, where Almaty is the country’s largest metropolis. The number of Soviet businesses in Kazakhstan increased by about 4,000 between January and September 2022.
Around July 2022, a second immigration wave took place. This included people with less portable businesses and families with children who were in school age who planned to leave at the start of the battle but needed longer periods of preparation.
Following the limited participation order issued by Russian President Vladimir Putin on September 21, 2022, a second wave appeared. In the week after the mobilization, 98, 000 Russians fled to Kazakhstan & nbsp.
Even as state media pundits branded the emigrants( relokants ) traitors during the first two waves, Russian officials’ responses were muted. More rage was sparked by the third wave & nbsp. For” draft dodgers and those who surrender willingly ,” Russia introduced lengthy prison sentences. In the third wave, about 700,000 Russians — mostly men qualified for partial mobilization — fled.
Relokants & nbsp, a sizable portion of the population, are fighting-age men with their families and partners. Many of them are experienced professionals in fields like artistic industries, health services, and information technology.
Some areas of northern Kazakhstan experienced significant labor shortages prior to the war, which were alleviated by the Russian immigrants. 20 job openings for Russian doctors were advertised by one district hospital in Ayagoz, Abai Province, & nbsp, and they were given” comfortable housing” as an incentive.
Obviously, a large number of immigrants likewise flocked to Almaty and Astana, two of Kazakhstan’s major cities, which helped to boost the real estate market. Rents for one-room apartments in Almaty & nbsp’s middle-income neighborhoods increased by$ 415 to$ 1040 per month between March and July 2022.
Kazakh policy must strike a balance between its domestic and foreign policy priorities and relokants & nbsp. Kazakh officials must be cautious to avoid upsetting their northern neighbour given Russian military involvement in towns like Zhanaozen during andnbsp, as well as widespread unrest in Kazakhstan during 2022. & nbsp,
Some Kazakh institutions still have remnants of Communist rule, and Kazakhstan’s primary working terminology is still Russian.
However, since the invasion of Ukraine, Kazakhs’ attitudes toward Moscow have deteriorated. The number of Kazakhs who thought Russia would invade Kazakhstan had doubled six months after the initial intrusion. Mood against war was mixed with sympathy for common Russians fleeing its repercussions.
Around the middle of 2022, a backlash against Soviet immigration started to appear on Telegram and online chat board. According to an A & nbsp poll conducted in December 2022, 38 % of Kazakhs were against the immigration of migrants. According to the ballot, worries about rising costs and apprehension about immigrant social unrest were the main causes of the growing foe. & nbsp,
30 % of respondents to the survey also expressed concern that” followers of the Russian earth” were infiltrating Kazakhstan in a concerted effort to destroy the nation.
The Kazakhstan-Russia border has historically been somewhat open because both nations are members of the Eurasian Economic Union. The Kazakh government changed its border restrictions in December 2022, prompting instructions andnbsp that officials were making long-term living in the nation unaffordable for many & nBsP, relokants. & nbsp,
More than 90 out of 180 times were no longer permitted for approaching Eurasian Economic Union visitors to stay in Kazakhstan. As a result, Soviet immigrants were compelled to obtain official documents like property permits.
Some Russians who entered Kazakhstan rather registered to stay in Uzbekistan without much trouble because they were able to get stable employment there. However, Kazakh politicians kept tightening their immigration restrictions in 2023 by mandating that registration be accompanied by knowledge of the language, history, and culture of their people.
When Kazakhstan gained its independence in 1991, Kazakhs made up only 40 % of the population and Slavs 44 %. Kazakhs will make up the majority of the people in 2023, but Russian effect will still be felt strongly. The president’s ability to accommodate immigrants is constrained by domestic political and transnational sensibilities.
The wartime wave of relokants & nbsp offers an influx of new talent, regardless of the reason for the government’s tightening of immigration. This represents Kazakhstan’s best opportunity in years to combat the supremacy of oil and gas and sluggish economic development.
Misha Monteiro-Benson works as a research associate at the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute.
This andnbsp, post, and was initially published by East Asia Forum and are being reprinted with permission from Creative Commons.