Major US martial installations have been severely damaged by major US export control violations that the US State Department has allowed RTX Corporation to avoid liability. The dealings involved China, Iran and Russia, among people, and the procurement of essential components for defence systems , from China.
Despite reporting more than 750 transgressions, RTX was fined US$ 200 million, although the de facto real good is just half that amount. There were no visible visits to the Department of Justice, and no other steps were taken.  ,
No measure was made of problems to US safety. Given the seriousness of the violations, the great is just a number that has been taken out of a scarf. It is actually a pointless penalty. RTX profits are near$ 69 billion annually.
The State Department reports that the majority of the transgressions took place in RTX’s Collins Aerospace department, but there were also trade violations in other areas of the company.
The State Department claims that because the business freely disclosed the violations and worked with it to improve export compliance, its response was no harsher.
The transgressions include shipping to Iran, Lebanon, Russia and China. China was hired by US defense systems as a subcontractor for parts, and the company was given export-controlled design and complex data to make components.
With these transactions, Collins, which is now a division of RTX, could purchase components from China for less money and probably less. Collins runs activities in Shanghai and works with China Aerospace Systems Corporation.
For controlling US imports, there are three different systems in place. The State Department publishes the International Traffic in Arms Regulations ( ITAR ) and administers the Arms Export Control Act. Security firms are aware that the majority of what they produce is covered by ITAR regulations.
The Commerce Department publishes the Commodity Control List (CCL ) regulations and administers the Export Administration Regulations. The CCL covers national security, foreign policy, short-supply, nuclear non-proliferation, missile systems, chemical and biological weapons, regional security, crime power and criminal issues.
The Office of Foreign Asset Controls manages a number of US export restrictions for the Treasury Department. The US has sanctions on Russia, China and Iran. Additionally, all three countries engage in extensive computer hackers, which is frequently referred to as an “advanced frequent threat,” against the United States.
There can occasionally clash and conflict over groups that joint mechanisms are tasked with sorting out despite the three organizations that administer the applications.  ,
In addition, other agencies, most notably the Defense Department, the Department of Energy (especially for nuclear-related technology ) and US Intelligence ( mainly the CIA ) participate in establishing technology controls, tracking adversaries and adjudicating export license applications.
Collins Aerospace
Rockwell Collins was acquired by , United Technologies Corporation , ( UTC )  , on November 27, 2018, for$ 30 billion and now operates as part of , Collins Aerospace, a subsidiary of the , RTX Corporation , ( formerly Raytheon Technologies ).
Business aviation accounts for a sizable portion of the company’s business, but many of the same items are used in military aviation.  ,
Rockwell Collins has been involved in defense projects with , Common Avionics Architecture System , ( CAAS ),  , Joint Tactical Radio System , (JTRS ),  , Tactical Targeting Network Technology , ( TTNT ),  , Defense Advanced GPS Receiver , ( DAGR ) and , Future Combat Systems. Interestingly, Collins Aerospace, the son division of RTX, specializes in incorporated field control and has earnings of$ 26.2 billion.
As the , business says,” With our long history of providing software-defined transmitters, gate solutions and conversation systems, we know what it will get to join the battlespace. With innovative solutions that incorporate legacy and fresh assets, available systems architecture, electronic engineering, and militaristic commercial technologies, we are accelerating the deployment of new technologies and capabilities to allies.
According to the State Department, since 2020, there have been 27 volunteer statements concerning Collins Aerospace. According to “at least two instances, these unauthorized exports led to the production of thousands of defense articles ( comprising roughly 45 distinct part numbers ) in China, their importation into the United States, and their eventual integration into various US and partner military platforms. In 16 situations, Respondent]Collins? or RTX? ] or its international members reexport or export security articles related to military aircraft and missile system initiatives without license.
The State Department asserts that the majority of these breaches occurred before UTC acquired Rockwell Collins in 2018.
Particularly concerning is how the State Department did not take any action for four decades after being informed of these breaches, which included acquisitions of Chinese goods for US defence techniques. Was the US government informed of the presence of Taiwanese weapons in its military installations? If so, the State Department’s statement does not contain any information.  ,
The State Department’s” Charging Document” also reveals that the , US AWACS ( Airborne Warning and Control System ) was also compromised.
” In two disclosures that Respondent initially submitted to the Department in 2021 and 2022, it disclosed unauthorized exports that occurred at Respondent’s facility in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, in the form of unauthorized releases of USML]US Munitions List, namely the ITAR] … technical data related to the , Boeing E-3 Sentry Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft , and the Embraer KC-390 Millennium Medium Weight Transport Plane to a Chinese foreign-person employees ( FPE)” . ,
There is no explanation as to why a Taiwanese national worked for Collins Aerospace or for any other inquiries regarding different Chinese nationals. Are these workers also employed in Cedar Rapids?
Collins, through its company in Shanghai, even sought Chinese-company bids for copper screen housing components for the US secrecy F-22 warrior bomber. At least two Collins Chinese people were present.
Collins also” contemporarily and individually exported the same professional information to four PRC companies without authorization.” In another publication in 2023, RTX reported that Collins “released specific circuit card gatherings” to PRC businesses.  ,
These printed circuit boards are covered by Indian regulations ( for example, specifically designed for military use ). Collins says they were inadvertently , flagged as falling under Commerce Department Export Administration Act laws.  ,
No details are available that suggest Collins was given a license by the Commerce Department, suggesting that the business handled the purchase as a business without one requiring an export trade license. What security products were used in the charging document?
For the following US techniques, Rockwell Collins even sought printed wires ( printed circuit boards ) from China, according to the Charging Document:
• VC-25 Presidential Transport Aircraft ( Air Force One )
• A-10 Thunderbolt II Close Air Support Attack Aircraft
• B-1B Lancer Supersonic Strategic Heavy Bomber
• B-52 Stratofortress Strategic Bomber
• C-17 Globemaster III Strategic Airlifter
• C-130J Super Hercules Military Transport Aircraft
• CH-53 Super and King Stallion Cargo Helicopter
• F-15 Eagle Fighter Aircraft
• F-16 Fighting Falcon Fighter Aircraft
• F/A-18 Hornet Fighter Aircraft
• KC-46 Pegasus Tanker Aircraft
• KC-130 Tanker Aircraft
• KC-135 Stratotanker Tanker Aircraft
• MQ-4 Triton Surveillance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle ( UAV )
• MQ-8 Fire Scout UAV Helicopter
• MQ-9 Reaper Combat UAV
• MQ-25 Stingray Refueling UAV
• P-8 Poseidon Maritime Patrol Aircraft
• U-2 Reconnaissance Aircraft
The “wiring sheets” are never disclosed in the Charging Document, merely stating that Collins was attempting to outsource them to China.
The company also disclosed that it reexported and retransferred to 25 countries, including China, items ( not otherwise described ) that are parts of the following military systems:
• Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System
• B-2 Spirit Bomber Aircraft
• F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet Fighter Aircraft
• F-15 Eagle Fighter Aircraft,  ,
• F-16 Fighting Falcon Fighter Aircraft
• F-22 Raptor Fighter Aircraft
• F-35 Lightning II Fighter Aircraft
• National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System
• PATRIOT Air Defense System
• Phalanx Close-In Weapons System
• RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile
Iran and Russia
” In March 2019, an individual hand-carried a company-issued notebook, which contained ITAR-controlled technical information, to Iran.
The business detected the individual ‘s , try to use the computer to connect to the internet while in Iran and initiated a” ice “in reply, restricting access to the computer’s hard drive.
Following the , company’s return to the United States, the organization determined that the computer contained USML Category… , complex information related to the B-2 Spirit Bomber Aircraft , and F-22 Raptor Fighter Aircraft”, according to the Charging Document. The owner’s name is not included, nor is division of the company that employed this , people.
Also, in 2021 an Pro individual traveled to St Petersburg, Russia with a company-issued computer. Unlike the Iranian laptop which the company was able to “freeze” , , that did not happen in , St Petersburg, as the cyber team in RTX decided that the use of the laptop in Russia was a “false positive” . ,
It is n’t clear if this , trip was for personal reasons, but the report says the staff made four personal visits to Russia to see his fiancé. The computer contained highly sensitive information, including 152 documents that contained complex data “related to the F-15 Eagle Fighter , Aircraft, F/A-18 , Hornet Fighter , Aircraft, the F-22 Raptor Fighter Aircraft, the F-35 Lightning II Fighter Aircraft, and the U-2 Reconnaissance Aircraft”.
It is well known that the Russians and the Iranians have considerable cyber-hacking features.
RTX was fined$ 200 million, but the State Department approved putting the business on hold to use the rest of that money to comply with import laws.  ,
One hundred million dollars for trade conformity makes no sense, since a couple million invested in compliance would be more than enough, even in a sizable business. So we can conclude that the$ 200 million fine is only intended for public relations purposes and is actually$ 100 million.
No attempt was made to determine the true value of the US’s hacked surveillance systems or the Chinese goods stuffed into US arms.
It is extremely unsettling that the State Department has been keeping track of this data for centuries. Extremely dangerous is the lack of punishment and prosecution. For unknown reasons, no one is obviously being held responsible.
Since there is n’t much proof that the State Department looked into any of the disclosures to see if they accurately captured what transpired, we are n’t sure if the voluntary disclosures actually captured what transpired. Bottom line: US law enforcement actually did everything in their power to advance National safety objectives.
At Asia Times, Stephen Bryen is the top editor. He served as the Near East Subcommittee of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee  and as the assistant undersecretary of security for coverage.  ,
This article  , was initially published on his , Weapons and Strategy , Substack, and is republished with authority.