In response to rising tensions with China in the South China Sea, the Philippines ‘ structure of its first BrahMos anti-ship weapon basic highlights a strong military modernization move.
However, the move’s success is imperiled by inadequate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ( ISR ) and air defense capabilities, potential logistical challenges and the complexities of regional geopolitics.
At the Naval Station Leovigildo Gantioqui in Zambales, Western Luzon, the Philippines is building its first BrahMos anti-ship weapon foundation, according to Naval News, which was released this month. The center, which is facing the tense South China Sea, is expected to house the hypersonic cruise missiles that India acquired in a location US$ 375 million deal in 2022, according to Naval News.
The Philippines ‘ purchase of three Icbm missile batteries, according to the report, was India’s first international sales of its highly regarded system, piqued interest from other regional countries like Vietnam and Indonesia, both of which have relations with China in the South China Sea.
The new weapon center has a high-bay service for weapon maintenance and council, as well as a protected magazine bunker for storage, according to satellite imagery. The center, which is carefully positioned to attack target up to 290 to 300 kilometers away, includes the disputed Scarborough Shoal occupied by China, will be run by the Philippine Marine Corps Coastal Defense Regiment.
The Naval News report adds that the BrahMos state’s smart nature allows for flexible implementation to various fire places, enhancing the country’s southern defence capabilities.
According to the report, the Philippines may soon issue follow-up orders for the BrahMos because the Philippine Army has expressed an interest in purchasing the system, leading to a potential wider adoption of innovative defense technology by the Spanish armed forces.
Although the Philippines ‘ purchase of BrahMos represents a major step in modernizing its defense, it may not be as effective as its military planners and regional analysts anticipate.
To take way, the Philippines needs to see much. The Philippines might not be able to use the full spectrum of the BrahMos weapon without long-range ISR features, and its ability may be limited to the range of its other ISR resources, which are measured in only lots of kilometers.
Although it may be apparent that the state lacks over-the-horizon ( OTH) sensor given that capability is typically limited to big military powers, it is unmistakable.
Although the Philippines has a few Hermes and ScanEagle robots, they are small, slow, and prone to powerful Chinese anti-air threats.
The US may contribute to the Philippines ‘ weak ISR capabilities, as evidenced by the BRP Jose Rizal frigate’s use of its MQ- 9A Reaper drone in support of a sinking exercise ( SINKEX ) last month that involved a decommissioned Chinese-made oil tanker, but those drones may perform poorly against China’s air defenses given that they were unable to survive even basic air defenses by Houthi rebels in Yemen.
The Philippines also does not work focused flying alert and control ( AEW&, C ) aircraft, having only a motley fleet of Beechcraft King Air C- 90, BN- 2A Islander and Cessna 208 flights. Compared to aircraft such as the E- 7 Sentry or P- 8 Poseidon, these planes are barely capable of maritime ISR tasks.
The Philippines might not require sophisticated ISR abilities to use its Brahmos missiles because Scarborough Shoal is a fixed target with a known location. The Philippines could easily be targeted by the contested and strategic feature, which would put an end to a small but significant portion of China’s revised” 10-dash line” in the South China Sea.
Command and Control ( C2 ) presents a significant challenge for its military, which raises questions about how to integrate these various ISR assets into a successful kill chain even if the Philippines had all of these assets and fired its BrahMos missiles at a simple target like Scarborough Shoal.
The Philippines, which has long struggled to develop credible air defense capabilities, may also find it difficult to defend its new BrahMos missile base from missile and drone attacks.  ,
The Philippines has relied only on a small fleet of a dozen FA-50 light fighters since the 1990s because it has n’t been able to acquire multi-role fighters ( MRF ) since then. Only a fraction of those aircraft’s capabilities are comparable to those of more advanced ones like the US-made F-16 and the Sweden’s JAS 39 Gripen.
While the Philippines maintains two bases of Israeli-made SPYDER surface-to-air missiles ( SAM ), it will have to decide whether to use those limited resources to protect crucial infrastructure and densely populated areas over military installations like its new BrahMos base.
Restocking BrahMos missiles may be a problem for the Philippines because of the country’s limited stockpiles in the event of a protracted conflict in the South China Sea.
The Philippines must rely on India for resupply because it is unable to produce BrahMos missiles. China might attempt to impose a naval blockade of the Philippines in the South China Sea and another blockade in the Philippine Sea, which would sever US supplies and reinforcements from Guam.
Such hopes may be overly optimistic while the Philippines attempts to use “extended deterrence” guarantees from the US by hoping that an attack on its BrahMos base will trigger their long-standing 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty ( MDT ).
In a May 2024 article, the US government acknowledged that the 1975 US interpretation of the 1951 MDT forbids Scarborough Shoal from US treaty obligations despite pro-active rhetoric from US officials. Scarborough Shoal may have a marginally important impact on US interests and not worth a significant conflict with China due to the partially divided US interpretations of the 1951 MDT.
Similarly, in a December 2023 HK 101 article, Zheng Zhen writes that while tensions with the Philippines are certainly on China’s agenda, they are not Beijing’s main concern in the South China Sea, which it views as a conflict mainly with the US. Zhen goes on to say that China’s main issue with the Philippines is preventing it from trying to persuade the US to support its territorial claims.
In an article for Carnegie China this month, Li Mingjiang and Xing Jiaying make reference to some Chinese officials ‘ belief that China’s “gray zone” strategy is the best way to end hostilities with the Philippines. They claim that using these tactics will help avoid the worst-case scenario of a direct military conflict while also advancing China’s territorial claims.
However, Li and Xing note that in the event that the Philippines chooses to use military force or to recruit US allies in order to counteract China’s actions, Beijing could use overwhelming military force to retaliate and defend its response as self-defense.
According to them, this could cause the Philippines to lose even more of its attributes in the South China Sea, including Scarborough Shoal, in comparison to China.