Sure A Not

When the previous government released the first-ever national security strategy last year, it forecast stormy geopolitical weather ahead. In the brief few months since then, the sky has darkened further still.

Beyond a slight rapprochement between China and the United States at the end of 2023, arms control remains poor, measures to prevent accidental war limited, and a genuinely rule-based international order patchy at best.

British foreign secretary David Cameron may have been speaking to his own government’s agenda when he said the “lights are absolutely flashing red on the global dashboard.” But the analogy still holds.

Three big issues are now rising to the boil: the war in Ukraine, tension in the South China Sea, and the widening disaster in Israel and Gaza. Each instance of global disorder touches Aotearoa New Zealand and its largely untested coalition government.

Ukraine in the balance

While New Zealand has not joined the fighting, it is not neutral on Ukraine. It has provided weapons, training and other forms of assistance – including joining actions against Russia at the International Court of Justice.

But the prognosis is not good. Russia’s military counterpunch is coming while external support for Ukraine is at risk of fading.

Defense officials in Sweden have warned their country should prepare for the possibility of conflict. A leaked plan from the German government shows it is also preparing for potential widening Russian aggression.

As a partner to NATO, New Zealand needs to consider its response should the tide of war turn against Ukraine – or worse still, spread to other countries.

New Zealand has said it is “deeply concerned” about China’s tactics over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Of particular concern have been Chinese efforts to stop Philippine vessels from resupplying citizens in the islands (to which the Philippines has sovereign rights).

The Permanent Court of Arbitration has affirmed Philippine claims to its territories. Although China opposes the court decision, a clear majority – including New Zealand – either positively acknowledge or support the ruling.

New Zealand also asserts “there is no legal basis for states to claim ‘historic rights’ with respect to maritime areas in the South China Sea.”

Meanwhile, US President Joe Biden last year promised to defend the Philippines should China attack. The region – where the Chinese navy confronted a New Zealand frigate during a freedom of navigation exercise last year – remains a raw nerve.

Widening Middle East threats

The situation in Israel and Gaza is a legal, political and ethical mess that risks spilling over. New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon has already joined Australia and Canada to reiterate the need for a negotiated two-state solution and the importance of respecting international law.

However, there has so far been no mention of accountability for war crimes through the International Court of Justice or the International Criminal Court.

New Zealand’s focus has shifted to the protection of global waterways, specifically the Red Sea. With nine other countries, it has pledged to defend lives and protect the free flow of commerce in one of the world’s most critical waterways.

New Zealand has not been involved in the first military actions against Houthi rebels trying to control the sea lanes. But if things escalate, the coalition government has effectively signed up to fight a proxy group directly connected to an angry and dangerous Iran.

To meet these challenges at a practical and logistical level, New Zealand will need to invest more in its military. While the new government wants to control spending, it would be prudent to increase defense spending to at least 2% of GDP to match various allies.

It makes sense for New Zealand to focus on inter-operability and shared spending on common military platforms with its one official ally, Australia.

New Zealand can still maintain its nuclear-free policy and work for arms control while improving its own self-defense. It does not need the offensive capacity of the next generation of armaments (from AI and cyber capabilities to bioweapons), but it must have access to defenses against them.

At the same time, self-defense need not be linked to new alliances such as the AUKUS security pact. The security issues outlined here are separate, not part of one large fire. China, North Korea, Russia and Iran are close. But they are not connected by mutual military obligations.

Independence and self-defense

It might make more sense for New Zealand to join agreements like AUKUS if other like-minded countries (such as Canada, South Korea and Japan) joined at the same time.

But this might also create problems. First, it could accelerate the divide of the world into two large blocs. And second, without the kind of trade agreements with the US that other partners enjoy, New Zealand would be more exposed than most.

An independent foreign policy where each issue is treated on its own merits should still be the preferred approach. There is much to be said for working with countries that have shared values and common histories.

At the moment, some challenges warrant New Zealand’s involvement but others do not. Defending the values and agreements that underpin the United Nations and a rule-based international order is the best guide.

Simply to follow the US, come what may, is a dangerous bet, especially given the uncertainties around the presidential election in November. At the same time, not being better militarily prepared is a utopian position New Zealand can no longer afford.

Alexander Gillespie, Professor of Law, University of Waikato

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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A shaky agreement to end fighting in northern Myanmar has served to highlight concerns in Beijing over the ongoing unrest – and the limits of China’s power to influence the ongoing civil war.

On January 12, 2024, China announced that it had brokered a cease-fire between the Myanmar military and a trio of ethnic armies, known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance.

There is, however, one caveat: The agreement only applies to the northern Shan state. The state has seen conflict since Myanmar’s independence in 1948, and especially after the once-Beijing-backed Burma Communist Party established its headquarters there in 1968 and engaged the country’s army in a prolonged war.

It is also a region where opposition to Myanmar’s military government has had the most success in the current civil war. Since launching a fresh push against the Myanmar military on October 27, 2023, the alliance has captured one town in Shan state every three days, according to media reports.

And despite the China-brokered agreement, sporadic fighting has continued in Shan state. Meanwhile, the truce has done nothing to end the civil war outside the state.

But that might not be the point: The agreement brokered by Beijing is, I believe, more about trying to safeguard the interests of China than about ushering in elusive peace to Myanmar. Beijing has increasingly been concerned over the threat of Myanmar’s turmoil spilling over into China.

Indeed, a statement by the Chinese foreign ministry announcing the truce noted that both sides in the conflict had “committed to not harming the safety of Chinese border residents and personnel involved in projects in Myanmar.”

There are clear reasons why China would like to see peace in Myanmar. The destabilized northern region has become a haven for Chinese criminal gangs that traffic humans and drugs, and run online scams from across the border.

Meanwhile, the war has blocked trade routes and seen Chinese citizens in border towns increasingly put at risk.

Military under siege

Regardless of China’s desire to see the truce hold, there appears little chance of that happening. Myanmar’s army has faced major losses since fighting began in 2021, sparked by a coup in which the country’s generals overthrew the democratically elected government.

Since then, a fierce resistance movement has emerged across Myanmar – one the generals have failed to subdue.

The recent truce has done little to end the violence, opposition successes or the threat to China. A day after the cease-fire was announced, one member of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, the Arakan Army, captured Paletwa, a border town with India in the west of Myanmar.

Meanwhile, the Kachin Independence Army shot down a China-made fighter jet – the third one in just a few weeks – and the Myanmar army lost control of one of its division headquarters in the cease-fire area.

In southeast regions of Myanmar bordering Thailand, the Karenni Nationalities Defense Forces and allied fighters launched “Operation 1111,” expanding their territorial and administrative control in the region. And in the central plains, the People’s Defense Forces, an umbrella resistance group, continues to engage in guerrilla warfare against the military.

Dwindling Chinese influence

In the context of the sprawling civil war, China has found itself in uncharted territory.

In the past, China has been able to exert its influence over Myanmar’s politics. But the civil war has seen the emergence of new resistance groups, such as the People’s Defense Forces, most of whose members are younger than the soldiers in established armies. And they have no intention of entering any agreement with the Myanmar military – despite the entreaties of Beijing.

Moreover, these new groups have made strategic and logistic links beyond Myanmar’s borders, giving them access to smuggled arms and supplies.

As such, China’s influence over Myanmar is constrained. This is even more so given the ethno-nationalism underpinning much of the fighting in Myanmar. Chinese efforts to end the fighting do little to provide solutions to tie the disparate ethnic groups in Myanmar together.

In fact, the one thing binding the ethnic groups that form the Three Brotherhood Alliance is the common goal of defeating the Myanmar army.

In addition, the safety of Chinese citizens in regions across the Myanmar border cannot be guaranteed by the cease-fire agreement with the military. The army’s inability to tackle criminal gangs in Shan state prior to the civil war suggests that even without warfare, the region will continue to pose a threat to China.

Meanwhile, China’s relationship with, and influence over, groups in northern Myanmar has changed as a result of the civil war.

Take the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), a resistance group in the Kokang region that borders China’s Yunnan province and shares linguistic and cultural ties with China. Since being formed in 1989, its support has switched back and forth from the Myanmar government to the resistance groups – as has China’s.

But the MNDAA cannot be viewed as a vassal state of China. In 2019, the MNDAA joined the Three Brotherhood Alliance with the Arakan Army and Ta’ang National Liberation Army, groups with different cultural and linguistic backgrounds.

China’s diplomacy and influence over the Three Brotherhood Alliance is limited: A truce threatens the unity that the group has developed in opposition to the military.

And there is little incentive among the Three Brotherhood Alliance to stop fighting at a time when it appears to be on the front foot, and morale among Myanmar’s soldiers is low.

Entering the truce is in itself risky for the alliance, as it may threaten the group’s standing with other armed groups – many of whom China never dealt with until 2021.

Losing faith in the junta

As such, Beijing’s power to influence Myanmar’s ethnic resistance groups is limited. But there is another reason why the truce Beijing brokered may not hold: Beijing’s desire to give any support to the military government has its limits, too.

China is losing patience with the Myanmar military, which has failed to crack down on criminal gangs that have targeted Chinese citizens. As many as 120,000 people, many of them Chinese citizens, have been trafficked into Myanmar by these organizations to help operate online scams.

China’s default position on Myanmar has traditionally been to support whoever is in power. And Beijing had a good relationship with the democratic government under Aung San Suu Kyi prior to the 2021 coup.

The corruption and non-governability of Myanmar’s border towns since then threaten the safety of Chinese citizens and undermine any faith China has in the military’s ability to deliver stability.

If Myanmar’s military cannot stabilize northern Myanmar, China is in a difficult situation. The status quo – with the Myanmar military in power, but unable to subdue resistance movements – will continue to present a threat to China.

Tharaphi Than is Associate Professor of World Cultures and Languages, Northern Illinois University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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