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After the surprise January 26-27 meeting between US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Taiwan independence remains the most problematic issue in US-China relations.

The Taiwan problem will remain, especially since the independence-supporting Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) held Taiwan’s presidency following the island’s recent election.

Although Washington underlined its long-standing policy against Taiwan independence in response to the DPP victory, more is needed to craft a balanced Taiwan policy to achieve American interests. Instead of words alone, the United States should put its One China policy into practice to boost cross-strait deterrence and avoid a war with China.

Critically, to assure Beijing and maintain the hope of a diplomatic resolution to the Taiwan question, Washington should more publicly assure Beijing that it would accept the peaceful reunification of China and Taiwan.

To his credit, US President Joe Biden indicated this to Chinese leader Xi Jinping during their November 2023 meeting in San Francisco. Not only should Biden and his successors restate this publicly, but US government agencies should also make this an official talking point for both bilateral and multilateral engagements.

Increasing awareness of US acceptance of peaceful reunification – through joint statements, communiques, and formal records – will encourage other countries to adopt similar policies and further assure Beijing of America’s intentions. When America speaks, the Western-leaning world listens.

Through Washington’s insistence, concern over China-Taiwan ties has found its way into multilateral and bilateral diplomacy. This subsequently led to an uptick in US, European, and Indo-Pacific engagement with Taiwan and interest in Taiwan policy. More official and active US acceptance of a peaceful reunification outcome could see the West, Japan and South Korea formally adopt the policy as their own.

Providing further assurance, the White House should make clear to both Congress and Beijing that the President has the sole Constitutional authority to recognize the sovereignty of states.

The White House Counsel and the State Department’s Office of the Legal Advisor should jointly release official guidance reinforcing this, specifically citing Zivotofsky vs Kerry – whereby the Supreme Court denied Congress has a right to recognize a state’s sovereignty through law. This would show China that when a US President says the United States opposes Taiwan’s independence, he or she means it.

Moreover, Washington should reverse its trend of official visits with Taiwan, which has worsened Taiwan’s security for the sake of symbolism.

To carry this out, the United States should return to conducting relations with Taiwan primarily through the American Institute in Taiwan. This would mean avoiding sending de jure US government officials to Taiwan and keeping relations unofficial, even though the Taiwan Travel Act allows up to the highest level of official visits.

Additionally, should Congress pass any law encouraging the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative’s Office (TECRO) in Washington to change its name to the Taiwan Representative Office, the Department of State should convey the negative implications of a name change to convince TECRO to maintain the status quo.

The State Department should advise that a name change would likely lead to trade disruptions, Beijing doubling its efforts to poach Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic allies and increased military activity around the island.

It would also likely signal to China that peaceful reunification is a dead end with the United States effectively declaring it would recognize an independent Taiwan. Of course, this would mean force is the only path to reunification.

Returning to a more unofficial relationship with Taiwan and avoiding symbolic activities would undermine China’s talking points that the United States is supporting or encouraging Taiwan’s independence forces. As a result, it would reduce the primary necessity – from a Chinese perspective – to rely more on forceful means in dealing with Taiwan.

However, Washington should pair assurance to Beijing on Taiwan with Chinese concessions on areas of US interest. These could include accelerating nuclear arms talks, trade and economic policy reciprocity and curbing economic espionage. Advancement in any of these areas would be a major win for US vital interests – far more than the cost to reassure Beijing.

By actively reassuring China and the world of its opposition to Taiwan’s independence, the United States can prolong the cross-strait peace. Beijing would have less need to use coercive measures in its relations with Taiwan with restored mutual trust in US policy, which Chinese Premier Li Qiang emphasized during his 2024 World Economic Forum address.

Concurrently, Taipei would be further constrained to maintain the non-independence status quo and avoid symbolic activities that may promote ideas of sovereignty but harm security.

Despite a more active assurance policy, US efforts ultimately underpin its One China policy and the strategic ambiguity that has contributed to cross-strait peace for decades. This policy can work together with US commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances to create a more restraint-oriented Taiwan policy.

Taiwan is the likeliest flashpoint for a US-China conflict. Establishing acceptance of peaceful reunification as official policy, doubling down on opposition to Taiwan independence and restoring prior diplomatic practices are cheap means to deter a war over Taiwan. Now is the time to change course to reassure Beijing, before it is too late.

Quinn Marschik is a contributing fellow at Defense Priorities.

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