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Great power competition has spread beyond the realm of microchips, artificial intelligence ( AI), and quantum computing. It is no longer only conducted on battlefields.

The US and China are engaged in a fierce conflict to determine the structural framework of the 21st century in this emerging “technopolar” order, where command over advanced systems may determine the trajectory of global power.

The rules of the upcoming world order will be dictated by those who control the data, computing power, and associated supply stores. And in this rapidly changing new world order, smaller countries will increasingly be subject to pressure to choose their technological stances. &nbsp,

AI, semiconductors, and quantum computing are not just resources for financial advancement; instead, they are power bonuses that are shaping everything from global governance frameworks to military supremacy.

One of the most important areas in which international techno-politics is being played out is AI. There are American, Chinese, British, and European models, each with their own unique interpretations of the strategic principles surrounding AI.

Crucially, a country with AI supremacy will outshine rivals in intelligent defense systems, security, and decision-making.

The modern electronic economy’s essence is also made up of electronics. It would be inappropriate to refer to it as the “new crude” of the world economy, where cards are used to power everything from smartphones to fighter jet.

The major inquiry is: If the world is in the process of a new techno-global order, where industrial “haves” and “have-nots” may be categorized according to which bloc a state is aligned, where does this leave developing states that lack the home business base and know-how to protect against modern dependencies?

The US-China tech war is more than just a fight for economic dominance; it is also history’s most defining moment. The winner of this contest will influence the international system’s ideological trajectory, the structure of global security, and the rules of the digital era.

This is no longer a time when relying solely on market forces is sufficient. Due to concern about China’s rapidly developing and leapfrogging industries, technology alliances are already being discussed in Western capitals.

Today’s semiconductor supply chains are highly fragmented across multiple countries, in contrast to the Cold War, where US technological dominance was clear and largely self-sufficient.

The main suppliers of semiconductor manufacturing equipment, for instance, are Japan and the Netherlands. Advanced chip production is dominated by Taiwan and South Korea ( TSMC). India is emerging as a major player in the manufacturing of crucial technologies and AI development.

Washington is attempting to forge a web of strategic partnerships, creating a new tech alliance to stop Beijing’s rise, for its strategic imperatives.

This “alliance” is characterized by, but not limited to, the Dutch-Japanese agreement to halt exports of high-end semiconductor equipment to China, the Quad’s focus on cutting-edge and emerging technologies, and US-Taiwan and US-South Korea agreements to protect semiconductor supply chains.

However, it’s not that simple to contain China. The US attempted the same with Japan in the 1990s, but there are still differences today. Through trade diplomacy, market competition, and selective interventions, the US managed to halt Japan‘s technological development.

China does not adhere to the same rules as Japan, and it does not. China’s industrial policy is profoundly intertwined with the state-security apparatus, in contrast to Japan’s operation within the framework of the global Bretton Woods system.

In this way, China actively stocks AI hardware and semiconductor tools, strengthening its self-sufficiency strategy. Tech companies like SMIC and Huawei can compete for global markets and create cutting-edge technologies thanks to China’s state-driven business model, which has fueled rapid industrial growth.

China has a dominant position in key industries like solar energy and lithium-ion batteries because the US and its allies have failed to coordinate industrial policies. China is also well on its way to rule the world’s EV markets.

Without tech blocs, it’s simply impossible to vitiate China’s advancing technology. There will soon be the conundrum of a binary choice for small nations like Pakistan. Technology will no longer be the “global common” it was after the globalization boom in the 1990s.

Countries will increasingly be forced to align themselves with a particular technological order as a result of the intersection of technology and global politics. For this, they will have to put their own technology behind it in their respective economies and societies.

Many countries in Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, which are all treading a tightrope between the US and China, are already in a Catch-22 situation due to a zero-sum approach.

Other players, like the EU, France, and Britain, are present, but it’s likely that they will follow the US-led tech order rather than the Chinese one.

Pakistan’s technological outlook includes everything from defense equipment, space satellites, EVs, 4G and 5G networks, to daily-use electronics, which is increasingly reliant on advanced Chinese technology.

However, too firmly rooted in the Chinese tech camp could stifle or restrict access to new, emerging Western technology. Pakistan will need to contribute in terms of manpower, knowledge-innovation, or open markets, even if it chooses a side. &nbsp,

One thing is done to balance security ties between powerful countries, but another is done to balance technological reliance. It’s a brand-new geopolitical reality that will make fateful geopolitical decisions for Pakistan and others like it.

The Strategic Vision Institute in Islamabad employs research associate Hammad Waleed. He received a distinguished degree from Islamabad’s National Defense University, and he writes about international relations, conflict, emerging technologies, and public policy. He can be reached at [email protected].

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