Sure A Not

With Iran’s firing of some 180 ballistic missiles at Israel overnight, the Middle East is again on the brink of what would be a costly, ruinous regional war. Israel and its ally, the United States, shot down most of the missiles.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu immediately vowed to retaliate for the attack. He called it a “big mistake” that Iran will “pay for.”

The strike marked a dramatic shift in Iran’s calculations following weeks of escalating Israeli attacks on the leaders of its proxy groups, Hamas and Hezbollah, and their forces in both Gaza and Lebanon.

Iran has traditionally outsourced its fighting to Hezbollah and Hamas. It has been very much concerned about getting dragged into direct confrontation with Israel because of the ramifications for the ruling regime – namely the possible internal dissent and chaos that any war with Israel might generate.

When Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh was killed in Tehran in late July, Iran’s leaders said they would respond appropriately. They basically left it to Hezbollah to do that.

And as Israel intensified its military campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon in recent weeks, another Iranian proxy group, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, claimed to have retaliated by launching missiles and drones at Israeli cities and US destroyers in the Red Sea. Israel responded with airstrikes on Yemen.

In this context, from the Iranian point of view, it looked like Iran was just sitting on the fence and not performing its leadership role in challenging Israel. So, to a large extent, Iran had to exert its role as the leader of the so-called “axis of resistance” and get into the fight.

Fighting Israel is very much a pillar of state identity in Iran. The Iranian political establishment is set up on the principle of challenging the United States and freeing Palestinian lands occupied by Israel.

Those things are ingrained in the Iranian state identity. So, if Iran doesn’t act on this principle, there’s a serious risk of undermining its own identity.

A delicate balancing act

Yet there are clearly serious risks to this type of direct attack by Iran.

Domestically, the Iranian political regime is suffering from a serious crisis of legitimacy. There have been numerous popular uprisings in Iran in recent years. These include the massive “Women, Life, Freedom” movement that erupted following the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody for allegedly not properly wearing her hijab.

There is also a major dissenting view in Iran that challenges the regime’s anti-US and anti-Israel state identity and its commitment to perpetual conflict with both countries.

So, the authorities in Iran have been concerned that direct confrontation with Israel and the US would unleash these internal dissenting voices and seriously threaten the regime’s survival. It’s this existential threat that has stopped Iran from acting on its principles.

In addition, Iran has a new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, who belongs to the reformist camp and has an agenda of improving Iran’s relations with the West. He has been talking about reviving the Iran nuclear deal with the international community, sending signals that Iran is prepared to talk with the Americans.

But the problem is the regional dynamics have completely changed since that deal was negotiated with the Obama administration in 2015. Iran has been a pariah state in recent years – and even more so since the conflict between Israel and Hamas began a year ago.

Since then, no Western country would deem it appropriate or politically expedient to engage in nuclear talks with Iran, with the aim of alleviating international sanctions on the regime. Not at a time when Iran is openly calling for the destruction of Israel, supporting Hezbollah and Hamas in their attacks on Israel, and now engaging in confrontations with Israel itself.

So the timing is awful for Pezeshkian’s agenda of repairing the damage to Iran’s global standing.

Ultimately, though, it’s not the president who calls the shots in Iran – it is Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Supreme National Security Council who consider matters of war and peace and decide on the course of action. The supreme leader is also the head of state and appoints the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The IRGC generals have been advocating for more serious and resolute action against Israel ever since the war in Gaza started. And it looks like the supreme leader has finally listened to this advice.

So, the regime has been maintaining a delicate balance of these factors: preserving Iran’s state identity and what it stands for in the region, and the need to manage internal dissent and ensure its survival.

In normal circumstances, it was easy for Iran to maintain this balance. It could manage its internal opponents through brutal force or appeasement and advocate an aggressive foreign policy in the region.

Now, the scales have tipped. From the Iranian perspective, Israel has been so brazen in its actions against its proxies that it just didn’t look right for Iran to continue sitting on the fence, not taking action.

As such, it has become more important for Iran to emphasize its anti-American, anti-Israel state identity and perhaps deal with an acceptable level of risk coming from a rise in internal dissent.

Where things go from here

With its attack on Israel, Iran is also prepared for another risk – direct retaliation from Israel and all-out war breaking out.

The conflict in the region is really going according to Netanyahu’s playbook. He has been advocating for hitting Iran and for the United States to target Iran. Now, Israel has the justification to retaliate against Iran and also drag the United States into the conflict.

Unfortunately, Iran is also now prepared to see the entire Persian Gulf get embroiled in the conflict because any retaliation by Israel and perhaps the United States would make US assets in the Persian Gulf, such as navy ships and commercial vessels, vulnerable to attacks by Iran or its allies. And that could have major implications for trade and security in the region.

This is the way things are heading. Iran would know that hitting Israel would invite Israeli retaliation and that this retaliation would likely happen with US backing. It seems Iran is prepared to bear the costs of this.

Shahram Akbarzadeh is convenor, Middle East Studies Forum (MESF), and deputy director (International) at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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A convergence of political and commercial interests has emerged between a rapidly rising economy on the Bay of Bengal and US Indo-Pacific strategy. This convergence aims to deepen the American presence in the Indian Ocean Region amid a tectonic shift in international politics.

Under the leadership of the Dhaka interim government’s Chief Advisor Mohammad Yunus and with support from Washington by President Joe Biden, Bangladesh and the United States are poised to leverage each other’s potential for growth and expansion.

Bangladesh seeks funds to replenish its depleting foreign exchange reserves and recover from the previous Sheikh Hasina administration’s mismanagement while Washington is focused on strengthening its strategic foothold in the Indian Ocean.

The US played a significant role in supporting the movement that ousted Bangladesh’s fallen autocratic leader. Washington views the new administration under Yunus as an opportunity to enhance its presence in the Indo-Pacific, capitalizing on the Nobel laureate’s openness to greater collaboration with the West.

This evolving partnership between the leading global superpower and Bangladesh holds immense promise but also carries substantial risks.

The new administration, comprising professionals from prominent NGOs, may lack the statecraft, strategic vision and diplomatic finesse needed to navigate the complexities of international politics. Before pursuing the opportunities that this partnership offers, Bangladesh must urgently strengthen its political institutions and ensure economic stability.

Yunus’s interim administration faces significant internal and external challenges that must be tackled with cost-effective solutions. A failure to achieve stability risks further economic decline and political disorder – an outcome that would benefit China, which seeks to disrupt Bangladesh’s democratization process to protect its vested interests in the region.

Meanwhile, India, despite being a US ally, is working at cross-purposes. New Delhi strongly opposed the removal of its protégé Hasina through a US-backed student movement.

It’s the economy, stupid!

For Bangladesh to recover from 15 years of autocratic rule, exploitation and mismanagement, stability must be the top priority. Yunus must address the concerns of the Bangladeshi people, recognizing that economic and political stability are intertwined with the restoration of law and order. As the adage goes, “It’s the economy, stupid!”

The US-Bangladesh partnership has significant potential, especially as the removal of trade barriers and the easing of trade restrictions across the Indo-Pacific could lead to exponential growth.

Bangladesh’s inland and coastal regions, along with the Bay of Bengal, offer significant strategic value to the US Navy in its efforts to monitor the activities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) including along the neighboring China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC).

Political developments in Bangladesh have also created a rift between the two largest democracies in the world – India and the United States. Though the two countries are aligned on many strategic issues, they are deeply divided on the Bangladesh question.

Ahead of the political upheaval in Dhaka on August 5, 2024, Washington and New Delhi diverged on their diplomatic approaches, each pursuing its own agenda without the other’s knowledge.

India supported Hasina’s autocratic government despite its human rights violations, while the US favored regime change, adhering to its democratic values at the risk of temporarily alienating a key regional ally.

This divergence had and has significant implications for regional power dynamics. The US could use its strategic position in Bangladesh to balance India’s obstinacy and China’s expansionism in the Bay of Bengal. With India no longer perceived as a benign hegemon by most Bangladeshis, new strong ties between Dhaka and Washington could provide crucial security guarantees for Bangladesh’s sovereignty.

However, this alliance may come with a price: Bangladesh might be required to support US interests in the region, particularly in the implementation of the Burma Act, which seeks to advance democratization in Myanmar amid a raging civil war.

Belt and Road

The US may also expect the Yunus administration to cooperate in curbing China’s growing presence in the region. However, many analysts doubt that Washington’s influence over the Yunus government will significantly affect China’s interests and operations in the Bay of Bengal.

The Chinese submarine base in the Bay of Bengal, built under the Belt and Road Initiative, serves both defensive and offensive purposes given its proximity to strategic chokepoints like the Strait of Malacca and India’s Andaman-Nicobar Islands.

China’s support for the Yunus government is based on its desire to protect its investments under the Belt and Road and maintain its strategic foothold in the region.

Bangladesh’s coastline is dotted with Belt and Road-funded infrastructure projects, such as the Karnaphuli Tunnel, Cox’s Bazar airport and the railways stretching to the Myanmar border.

These investments enhance the security perimeter of the PLA-Navy (PLAN), integrating the CMEC and coastal areas into China’s broader strategic defense.

India is unlikely to sit idly by as the US increases its influence in Bangladesh. Indian media and politicians have already begun to amplify allegations of US-engineered regime change and are waiting for an opportunity to reinstall an Indian-backed leadership in Dhaka.

Bangladesh’s concession to US demands, such as the installation of surveillance equipment and allowing naval warships near the Bay, could provoke a reaction from India.

Bangladesh is now officially recognized as a democratic country, reflecting not only regime type but also the widespread prevalence of democratic values among its population. This strong commitment to democracy provides Washington with the incentive to support the replacement of an authoritarian leader with a pro-Western democrat such as Yunus, steering the nation toward the liberal democratic order.

However, despite this optimistic turn, Bangladesh stands at a precarious crossroads. Its new democratic status and strategic value make it a key player in the Indo-Pacific but this also puts it in the crosshairs of great power competition.

The US-Bangladesh partnership may offer significant opportunities for economic growth and security. Yet it also comes with the risk of alienating India, a long-time regional power, and further provoking China, whose strategic interests are deeply entrenched in the Bay of Bengal.

In the coming years, Yunus’s administration will face the daunting task of balancing these competing interests. Bangladesh must carefully navigate these geopolitical currents to maintain its sovereignty and secure stability.

Whether the nation can manage the competing pressures from Washington, New Delhi and Beijing while fostering internal democratic growth will be the true test of its future.

Sheikh Rahman is a managing partner at Enertech International Inc in Dhaka.

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