Sure A Not

With only a few hours until the vote, pundits and the general public are checking the results in public opinion polls for any first indications.

We’ve had plenty of elections and months of campaigning. However, there are still very few convincing lessons aside from the disgruntling phrase used by election experts all over the country this year: “it’s too close to call.”

But, why is this happening? And what should we produce of the results?

Polling is n’t predictive

Both strategies have at different periods promoted positive and conflicting voting results. The issue is that no one seems to know which elections to think.

A new Des Moines Register surveys conducted on Sunday, led by renowned researcher Ann Selzer, revealed Kamala Harris with a shock three-point guide over Donald Trump in Iowa, giving Harris ‘ anxious campaign an unexpected increase.

Within days, a” private” Trump campaign letter dismissed Selzer’s numbers. Trump himself tweeted favorable polls from AtlasIntel that show him to be in the lead in all seven jump state.

Although there have been some notable falls in some important states, especially in Wisconsin in 2016 and 2020, polling averages have tended to be fairly accurate estimates of public view in new processes.

Other than what we now know, Americans are incredibly divided over their options, there is very little that can be learned from the latest swing state profits, which are all within the margin of error.

Part of the reason why is that elections are not predicted. They provide a gauge of the general opinion at the time of the ballot, allowing for accurate predictions about who might get a subsequent election.

However, their ability to predict electoral winners is limited by margins of error, which are considerably higher than what is generally understood, as well as frequently razor-thin last vote tallies in key states and the winner-takes-all character of the electoral college.

Polling errors are unpredictable in size and direction, especially because they frequently do n’t match up across the country and historically do n’t favor one party over another.

Little loses have outsized effect

Theoretically, accurate election voting is made more challenging in the United States by great non-response rates and non-compulsory voting ( which requires weighting responses based on expected good voters ).

In 2016, and 2020, polling issues were a major cause of these hypotheses ‘ problems. Surveys in 2016 reportedly underestimated Trump’s assistance by failing to control the amount of knowledge in their samples.

This meant they missed his support among light, non-college-educated voters who helped propel him to success in the Midwest.

However, polling averages were generally accurate going into the election day, despite the fact that 2016 is remembered as a catastrophic loss of opinion polling because it appeared to have failed to predict a Trump triumph.

National surveys were among the most reliable in the last 80 years, only slightly overestimating Clinton’s popular vote margin.

Across the ten closest state in the 2016 election, Trump was underestimated on ordinary by simply 1.4 %. Loses in a handful of important states such as Wisconsin, while substantial, had an enormous impact on the final outcome.

The profits were such that Trump could win the election in what most analysts had predicted would be an undeniable triumph if all the electoral errors were removed.

The polls were to blame for failing to make it clear that the unthinkable was actually very plausible, despite the margins of error making it clear that there was a high statistical likelihood of a different outcome, rather than scientific errors and poor media reporting.

Polls were much wider off the mark in 2020 but avoided the same level of public scrutiny given they correctly ( if narrowly ) “predicted” a Biden victory.

Have experts fixed past shortcomings?

A standard error in Trump’s prefer of less than 0.8 % in the seven essential swing states, based on polling averages in 2024, may mean he won the electoral college comfortably with a 312–226 margin.

Similarly, a standard shift of less than three percentage points in Harris ‘ favour may offer an extremely uneven 319–219 win for the Democrats.

The key question is whether experts ‘ weak methods, which underrated Trump’s support in 2016 and 2020, have been sufficiently corrected.

Changes to some surveys include a rise in the use of hybrid sampling techniques ( mixing both online and phone calls ) and a weight of previous seats.

However, using such techniques could be exaggerating the consequences of past errors and now underestimating Harris ‘ support because they did n’t properly sample them.

Until the votes are counted and the winner declared, there is no certain way of knowing.

Polls ca n’t do everything

Given that it is an effort to glean the opinions of hundreds of millions of people, polling continues to be extremely accurate. However, it is incorrect to assume that poll is reliable or reliable.

There is no point trying to read the tea leaves other than the general public’s perceptions that polling catches, which is because of the vagaries of voting and, most importantly, the vicissitudes of the US democratic system.

The outcome might actually come down to a small number of votes, or it might result in a lopsided electoral college success. Either way, do n’t blame the polls.

Samuel Garrett is exploration affiliate, United States Studies Center, University of Sydney

The Conversation has republished this essay under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

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In its base, there are over 9.7 million people living in Seoul, one of the world’s most densely populated towns, and there are 26 million people in the greater metropolitan area. Unavoidable damage may result from a nuclear explosion in the city’s center, making it a desert of destruction and despair.

By examining the fire effects mile by kilometer, we can get a glimpse of the people, climate, and infrastructural toll this catastrophe may impose.

When a atomic bomb bursts, its destructive energy is measured in terms of a fire, a flash, extreme heat and dangerous rays. The distance from the blast’s centre, or “ground zero,” is essentially what affects the population and infrastructure.

Let’s suppose the blast of a 1-megaton atomic bomb in northern Seoul, around Gwanghwamun Square, for picture. The injury may be broken up into certain areas that extend beyond ground zero. ( Maps: https ://www.mapz.com/ )

0–1 Kilometer: Earth zero and complete annihilation

Within the first mile diameter of the blast, the disaster is complete. Anything within this diameter may be completely vaporized by the fireball, which has temperatures higher than the sun’s surface. Houses, cars, and facilities would cease to exist, reduced to dust and ashes. The heat and energy would instantly kill nearly 100 % of the people.

In a matter of seconds, Gwanghwamun Square, along with ancient websites like Gyeongbokgung Palace and the big government buildings in Jongno-gu, may disappear. In less than a minute, the wave did radiate upwards, traveling faster than the speed of audio. By the power of the fire, anything that is not vaporized by the heat, such as reinforced concrete buildings, may be crushed.

1–2 Kilometers: Firestorm and extreme fire area

Beyond 1 mile, but nevertheless within a 2-kilometer diameter, the damage remains considerable. The intense heat would spread quickly, igniting common fires all over the area, causing a firestorm, even though the fireball’s core would not extend this way. The dense urban landscape, which may cause a lot of key Seoul to become a sea of flames, may fuel these fires.

Buildings would suffer significant damage or collapse entirely. Institutions made of glass, steel and concrete would still be greatly compromised, while most residential and commercial properties, such as those in neighborhoods like Myeongdong and Insadong, would crumble completely. Anyone living in this area would suffer horrifying injuries as a result of the pressure wave’s impact, which would break windows and give dangerous glass shards flying at high speeds.

2–5 Kilometers: Serious energy and blast damage

Although some buildings might still be standing, the explosion’s effects would still be fatal at a distance of 2 to 5 meters from ground zero. Survivors may be exposed to intense levels of radiation, known as the first rays, which is released in the first moment following detonation. In this region, the majority of people may pass away quickly and painfully in just an afternoon due to the exposure.

Significant structural damage may be done to neighborhoods like Itaewon, Yongsan, and the famous Dongdaemun business area. The extreme heat would also cause fires to burst across the city, and the majority of buildings would be destroyed or seriously damaged. People would still be thrown through the air and hurled into debris by the shockwave, which would also cause dangerous or important injuries. Roads and transport infrastructure do collapse, leaving the area impossible.

5–10 Kilometers: Moderate to severe destruction area

In the 5- to 10-kilometer circle, the effects of the storm and radiation undermine significantly, but the destruction remains severe. At this range, classic areas such as Gangnam, Yeouido, and the outer margins of Yongsan-gu do experience significant harm. The fire wave would destroy windows, decline weaker houses, and burn flammable materials. Several high-rises in Seoul’s tightly packed urban areas could half collapse, and fires may continue to spread.

Radiation exposure would still be risky in this situation, but it might not be fatal for those who are sheltered or home. There are more than 3, 200 weapon homes in Seoul. The majority of them are not prepared because there are radioactive homes, and some have been found to be ill maintained.

The US Command Post Theater Air Naval Ground Operations ( CP Tango ) complex, which is deep underground in an undisclosed location in the Seoul capital region, is protected by numerous blast-proof doors and serves as the main command center for military operations launched against North Korea in the event of hostilities. It has &nbsp, food and supplies for two weeks for up to 500 South Korean and US military.

If you’re the same as me, you’re definitely never invited. You can find out&nbsp, where to go&nbsp, here ( good luck ). Those of us who were exposed to the outdoors may experience severe burns and radiation sickness within days. Survivors may struggle to find medical aid, as clinics, clinics, and emergency services may become overwhelmed or destroyed.

10–20 Kilometers: Gentle injury and consequences zone

At a distance of 10 to 20 kilometers, while the most harmful effects of the fire and flash would be reduced, this place would face widespread system damage, along with publicity to radioactive fallout.

The southern sections of Seoul, including districts like Jamsil and pieces of Songpa-gu, may experience broken panels, damaged buildings and flames, although some buildings may be sitting. As aftermath, radioactive particles thrown into the environment by the explosion, may start to fall, putting survivors at risk of rays sickness.

Depending on the weather patterns at the time, nuclear fallout may cover the area. In addition to flames, this fallout may contaminate the air, water, and ground, making the area unsafe for weeks or even months. Long-term health problems like cancers and genetic abnormalities in individuals would be the result of global exposure. The risk of death may be great for the population in this area, especially those who had no shelter right away after the explosion.

20–30 Kilometers: Secondary damage and consequences

In the 20- to 30-kilometer circle, the physical harm to facilities would be less serious, but radioactive fallout would be a major concern. Incheon and Suwon, as well as other cities and regions beyond the Seoul town limits, did start to experience the dangerous effects of aftermath. Fallout particles, carried by storm currents, may sit over large areas, leading to long-term rays exposure.

While many buildings would remain intact, services such as electricity, water supply and communications would be severely disrupted, leaving survivors without access to basic necessities. Due to the extensive destruction and high radiation levels closer to ground zero, emergency response teams would not be able to reach these areas.

Long-term consequences

The explosion would only serve as the start of the city’s problems. Seoul would continue to experience rain for days, polluting the environment, and leaving vast swaths of the city uninhabitable for decades. Cancers and radiation sickness were among the serious health risks faced by those who managed to avoid the initial destruction.

Beyond the human cost, Seoul’s destruction would have a significant impact on both the economy and politics. South Korea, a global economic hub, would experience a catastrophic collapse of its economy, affecting industries such as technology, automotive manufacturing and shipping. There would be immediate disruptions to the global supply chain, which would cause global economic unrest.

One of the most vibrant cities in the world would completely collapse if a single nuclear bomb went off in central Seoul. Survivors would have to deal with the agonizing realities of radiation sickness, environmental destruction, and societal collapse, with a death toll of millions. The thing is, they rarely come as singles. A nuclear attack on Seoul would use a number of weapons, including artillery, chemical weapons, and biological weapons. When the shit hits the fan, ai n’t no one in this place escaping.

The once-thriving capital of South Korea would be reduced to a barren wasteland, forever changed by a single, catastrophic decision. North Korea would cease to exist as a functioning state, and historians would use the phrase” Pyrrhic victory” to explain its significance. It serves as a clear reminder of the unimaginable destruction caused by nuclear weapons and the need for continued efforts to achieve world peace and nuclear disarmament.

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This piece was composed after reading Annie Jacobsen’s incredibly frightening book&nbsp, Nuclear War: A Scenario. She details the impact of a nuclear war through time with a harrowing first twenty-four minutes, next twenty-four minutes, the final twenty-four minutes, and then the next twenty-four months. She starts the text with a prologue:

A 1-megaton thermonuclear weapon detonation begins with a flash of light and heat that is so great that the average person ca n’t even comprehend it. One hundred and eighty million degrees Fahrenheit is four or five times the temperature at the Earth’s core.

Every line that follows is just as powerful. Anyone who believes that using nuclear weapons would make them safer or more secure should read the book. Read the book and one question pops up: Why&nbsp, is&nbsp, there a nuclear weapons debate in Seoul?

Jeffrey Robertson is an academic, consultant and writer focusing on foreign affairs, diplomacy and the Korean Peninsula. &nbsp, This article was originally published on his Substack, Diplomatic Seoul, and is republished with permission. &nbsp, Read more here.

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A central issue looms heavily over the conflict in Myanmar as heavy monsoon rains transition to the year-end cold time: is day on the side of federal-democratic forces fighting the military coup government of the State Administration Council ( SAC)? Or, rephrased, does the extraordinary military momentum achieved by those causes over the last year been maintained in the year to arrive?

There are no clear answers to the question in either development now given the interplay of numerous domestic and external factors, some of which are” known unknowns” and others are “unknown unknowns.” But two overarching realities that before long will eventually – and possibly quickly – effect the war are already in full view.

The first is that coordinated activities by well-organized cultural makes organized as regiments and brigades with clear lines of command were carried out in the borderlands of Shan, Kachin, and Rakhine states, where the annual 1027 campaign started on October 27, 2023.

They were even able to absorb a amount of casualties not publicly revealed but which in particular engagements, notably the month-long struggle for Lashio town in Shan state and cruelly protracted sieges around army strongpoints in Rakhine state, certainly cost thousands of lives.

A much less skilled or well-organized group of ethnically majority Bamar Peoples Defense Forces ( PDFs ) will fight the war in the upcoming year primarily in the central country of Myanmar.

Indeed, this shift has already begun with PDF forces moving within rocket range of Mandalay, Myanmar’s second-largest city, while in neighboring Sagaing region PDFs loyal to the shadow National Unity Government ( NUG) and supported by the long-running ethnic forces of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA ) overran the strategically important town of Pinlebu on October 8.

Window of opportunity

The second stark fact now shaping the issue is that the SAC government is gearing up to fight for its success. The regime has undoubtedly been shaken to the core by the unprecedented blows to manpower, materiel, and morale of the past year.

But notwithstanding gung-ho opposition commentary predicting retreat without end and possible regime collapse, there is little evidence to suggest that the discipline and cohesion that has underpinned the military for seven decades has evaporated in a single year.

Despite this, advancements on the battlefield are already being made faster as a regrouping process that will likely only increase in the coming year is being made.

Against the backdrop of ramped-up diplomatic, material and advisory support from Russia and China, the military continues to push ahead with a conscription drive that is now in its sixth iteration. It was started in April, and it has reportedly dragged over 20 000 new recruits into the army’s already stale ranks.

How effectively this desperately needed infusion of manpower translates into battlefield capability remains to be tested. And that test will be challenging to measure given that newly trained draftees are being deployed to strengthen battalions already deployed in the field rather than forming new units that might fail and fail at the first opportunity.

But as Joseph Stalin famously noted of technically inferior Soviet tank power thrown against the German panzers of World War II, “quantity has a quality of its own”. History demonstrated that the conceited Soviet dictator was right.

At the tactical level, the army’s new directorate for unmanned aerial warfare is boosting the impact of the SAC’s largely unchallenged airpower. The directorate already receives Chinese material support thanks to an initiative launched earlier this year to expedite the introduction of drones to front-line battalions.

Russian expertise derived from the war in Ukraine is also almost certainly playing into a drone war in which opposition forces no longer dominate Myanmar’s battlespaces.

Despite the fact that these and other improvements to the SAC’s sagging capabilities are likely to gain popularity over the upcoming year, it is still safe to say that none has yet attained a critical mass that alone or in combination could give a decisive advantage over an enthralled resistance.

In the national heartland, often demoralized regime garrisons remain bunkered in mainly defensive mode. And where in the borderlands, the army plans significant counteroffensives in the upcoming weeks, a lack of manpower, mechanized mobility, and combined-arms experience all prevent dramatic, if not even significant, rebounds. &nbsp,

A more likely scenario is that army advances stifle grinding attrition battles that further reduce both manpower and morale. That scenario is already frustrating regime counterthrusts around the approaches to Mandalay, in Nawnghkio township on the Shan plateau to the east of the city and in Madaya on the Ayeyarwady River to the north.

China’s ambitious plan to end the conflict in the north by closing its borders on munitions, medicine, and fuel shipments that had previously reached the opposition tripartite Brotherhood Alliance and KIA in Kachin state is still in its early stages.

Even assuming a 2, 200-kilometer border can be effectively and indefinitely sealed – an improbable scenario – the impact of the embargo on front-line opposition forces will be mitigated over the coming months by the vast quantities of munitions captured from the Myanmar Army during Operation 1027.

In addition, it’s still to be seen whether Chinese threats and scolding can effectively stifle the lively commercial instincts of the United Wa State Army ( UWSA ), the well-stocked and ostensibly neutral faction that has long profited from its role as a back-room quartermaster for ethnic armed groups in northern Myanmar.

Against this backdrop, the current balance of forces leaves open a clear window of opportunity for the opposition to exploit the momentum gained in the year of Operation 1027 and press home its advantage before a still-stumbling enemy has the opportunity to regain its balance.

It’s difficult to predict how long that window will remain open. But it is almost certainly safe to predict that Myanmar’s loose federal-democratic alliance, severely challenged by a lack of external material and diplomatic support, does not have another three or four years to put in place the prerequisites for a military victory. It has one or at most two, which is more likely.

Regular forces

The opposition in the Myanmar heartland, the center of conflict in 2025, will need to use locally based PDFs as foundations to establish regular units, without which concentrations of Myanmar Army forces cannot be defeated. &nbsp,

A resistance to the idea of regular forces organized into battalions and brigades and exercising command-and-control at both district and regional levels would suggest that the war must continue if it is to not stall.

Raised spontaneously for local defense and hit-and-run attacks, PDFs are neither structured nor commanded for the coordinated mobile operations now indispensable in a conflict that the successes of 1027 and a shrinking window of opportunity have propelled into a broadly offensive phase.

The recent victory of the opposition in Pinlebu demonstrated the urgency of organizing regular forces in full force. If reports from the field are accurate, the town’s capture was undertaken by manpower from around 50 different PDFs pulled into the battle from over ten townships stretching across Sagaing region. It was the start of a 53-day campaign that had just begun in mid-August.

While a tribute to revolutionary solidarity, this” all pile in” approach to offensive operations is not a serious template for fighting a war against both a ticking clock and an army dug in across scores of towns and cities. Pinlebu’s capture was also supported by KIA regular units, which are active in northern Sagaing but whose advice and support cannot be found further south.

Similar problems with less positive outcomes have also been apparent in Mandalay region, where PDFs launched the” Myingyan District Special Operation” ( MDSO ) in mid-August. Local groups overran positions in several adjacent townships during a well-planned, albeit brief campaign before retreating in the face of regime airpower and ground forces ‘ rapid focus.

More recently, on October 21, the town of Ngan Myar Gyi, captured on August 19 as part of the MDSO, was retaken by a concerted regime operation involving ground forces, air strikes and naval bombardment from the Ayeyarwady River.

Without the direct support of major ethnic actors, PDFs lack the organizational resilience and logistical resources to withstand, let alone defeat, Myanmar Army forces.

Over the coming year, failure to draw on the best of PDF manpower and equipment and prioritize the formation of new regular battalions configured for mobile offensive operations beyond local boundaries and command structures likely risks strategic defeat over the long term.

Piecemeal reversals on the battlefield, popular exhaustion, and soon enough, the lure of SAC-sponsored “militia” status for business-minded PDFs will only be made worse by external factors. The acclaim, grudging or enthusiastic, with which an Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN ) -led international community will greet the travesty of SAC-staged “elections” in 2025 is only the most obvious.

building blocks for a battalion

In the dry season months ahead, it is unlikely that even newly constituted regular forces would be capable of overrunning and holding urban centers of any importance. Any assault on a major city the size of Mandalay could prove disastrous if rebel attempts to storm towns would arguably be foolish.

If properly equipped and deployed, however, regular units could prove crucially effective in maintaining the momentum of 1027 with high-profile and ideally well-coordinated attacks on the vital arteries of a severely overstretched regime.

The interdiction of crucial transportation and communication channels that gradually confine the military to urban-controlled islands would ideally be strengthened by airbase raids, ammunition production plants, and fuel convoys. &nbsp,

One of the more impressive aspects of the war is how not many people have the ability to launch serious attacks on airbases, which is directly related to the lack of local PDF capacity and strategic direction.

Virtually by default, the lead actor in addressing the challenge of forming regular forces will be the NUG, the only entity with broad enough legitimacy and some degree of authority in the Bamar heartland.

The Ministry of Defense ( MoD ) of the NUG has already provided financial and logistical support to some but not all PDFs in much of central Myanmar and has nominally renamed them “battalions” in response to persistent sniping from its critics.

In addition, several other armed Bamar actors could pivotally play a key role in creating a new force structure. One is the Bamar People’s Liberation Army ( BPLA ), a group originally based in eastern Karen state where it was trained by cadres of the ethnic Rakhine Arakan Army.

As part of the 1027 campaign, the BPLA has gained combat experience in northern Shan state over the past few years. Its leader, Maung Saung Kha, has recently repeated his intention of redeploying a claimed force of 1, 200 troops back into the Myanmar heartland.

Another potent player has emerged as the Mandalay PDF ( MDY-PDF). Since abandoning dreams of urban guerrilla warfare in Mandalay city, the group has trained and grown under the tutelage of the powerful Ta’ang National Liberation Army ( TNLA ) in hill-country on the borders of Mandalay region and Shan state.

The MDY-PDF, which currently has at least 3, 000 trained regulars, operates alongside the TNLA and under its command-and-control, while acknowledging the authority of the NUG.

Since July this year, it has pushed south along the east bank of the Ayeyarwady River to threaten Mandalay city and potentially extend its influence into the army-dominated flatlands south of the city where MDSO took place.

Other smaller, less frequent organizations include the People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ), which is operated by the TNLA, and the All-Burma Students Democratic Front ( ABSDF), a long-standing group of several hundred troops with significant combat experience who have participated in significant battles in the Indaw and Tigyaing regions of northeast Sagaing.

Who’s command-and-control?

However, the main resistance dissent in 2025 will be less dependent on manpower than on command-and-control, and by extension, on personality and political issues that may yet shape the tragic outcome of a failed revolution. &nbsp,

The main inquiries can be easily answered: Does the MoD of the NUG have the authority, vision, and organizational acumen to take on a central role in the development of strategic operations in the country’s heartland?

Could an open-door” coalition of the willing” form a joint headquarters under NUG auspices bringing together chiefs-of-staff from key commands, Bamar and ethnic?

Will powerful ethnic armies be willing to enlist in direct command-and-control or have operational control over the ethnic Bamar PDFs that could serve as the foundation for the heartland’s elite forces?

Would the BPLA or ABSDF be willing to recognize the command authority of either the NUG or a joint HQ or, alternatively, insist on operational autonomy?

What is not in dispute is that Myanmar’s federal-democratic opposition will soon need to field regular forces for coordinated operations against the SAC in the majority Bamar heartland, where the military is most militarily firmly rooted, using building blocks that are already largely in place.

Political failure to unite around that military objective will likely lead to spreading confusion, strategic incoherence and ultimately a defeat that leaves a blood-soaked military dictatorship in place. &nbsp,

Anthony Davis is a Bangkok-based analyst with Janes security and defense publications.

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