Two opposing perceptions of North Korea’s younger technology have been presented to the outside world.
In the outside media, children are portrayed as rebel and dramatic, ignoring the Kim regime’s increasingly severe crackdowns on international media and trends, and rather toting the latest North Vietnamese fashion trends and adopting North Vietnamese lingo.
However, position advertising perpetuates the notion that young people in North Korea are incredibly committed to Kim Jong Un and the government.
Both conceptions of North Korea’s younger technology fail to acknowledge a more sophisticated reality.
Kim Jong Un is aware of the importance of winning over the younger generation in order to maintain his administration’s life. Since coming into strength, Kim has increased the magnitude of consequences for importing, distributing and consuming international press. This stale details environment amplifies the effectiveness of a youth-focused youth-loyalty campaign intended to be a bear hug to the younger generation.
As a consequence, when compared with older groups, North Korean children have a more positive perspective of the government, juche philosophy, and Kim Jong Un himself. In summary, the plan is successful.
A revitalized international media transmission strategy is needed to split the deadlock and win the battle over hearts and minds. Despite the dangers, North Koreans continue to be very interested in foreign press. Study shows that those who consume tend to feel more warmly about South Korea and see the North Vietnamese government thoroughly.
European media provide a strong foundation for a common knowledge of concepts like animal rights and civil society and can serve as a strong foundation for regime propaganda. A revitalized approach should focus on content collection and modern propagation methods to maximize energy and decrease blowback for end users in North Korea.
There are two types of the children of North Korea.
The outside world is presented with two very distinct narratives of North Korea’s children. On the one hand, the state media in North Korea portrays the country’s youth and twenty-somethings as steadfast supporters of the “revolutionary” produce led by Kim Jong Un. But, on the other hand, illegal balances hint that these youngsters are extremely questioning the faithful orientation that represented prior generations.
The youth’s ideological orientation speaks to the regime’s long-term viability, prospects for reconciliation with the international community, and a soft landing: change from within, which does n’t lead to bloodshed, more than just an academic discussion.
Kim Jong Un’s decision approach necessitates that he inculcates the children to feel the outside world is a hostile area. His autocratic control is legitimized by this assault mentality. The challenge for young people’s hearts and minds — pitting passion for the Marshal against South Korean K-Pop — is live, and there are reasons to think that the government has taken a pleasant result.
Let’s begin by examining the two distinct ways that younger people in North Korea are depicted.
In the government’s version, the children are doting and obedient, aspiring above all else to make the affection and approval of Marshall Kim Jong Un. The Kim dynasty and the state media would make the world think that its young people are unquestionably committed to the ideals of socialism, juche ideology, and the Kim dynasty.
A recent Rodong Sinmun article showcased a glossy propaganda scene rife with symbolism: children at Mangyongdae Schoolchildren’s Palace “burst into cheers full of great excitement” when Kim Jong Un arrived. For his enjoyment, children danced and sang “full of excitement and joy” in their own costumes.
This performance reportedly reflects the determination of the children to become “young revolutionaries and patriots … guaranteeing that the Juche revolution is full of vitality”. Kim Jong Un served as a representative of” the mightiness of Korean-style socialism” while the “bright laughing of children” served as a representation of his role as the “benevolent father.”
But other sources reveal that not all children are as devoted as the regime wants us to believe. When they watched a well-known South Korean drama called” Full House,” North Korean children first encountered a song called” Three Bears.” Youngsters adapted the lyrics of the song to insult the Kim regime, singing:” Grandpa bear]Kim Il Sung ] is fat, papa bear]Kim Jong Il ] is also fat, and baby bear]Kim Jong Un] is foolish”.
Representatives from the Socialist Youth League were dispatched to catch and discipline students found singing the song or possessing foreign media in response. This was in 2015. However, traditional patterns are sadly lost. In 2022, Youth League monitors were again tasked with busting students for singing mocking, satirical versions of revolutionary North Korean songs and embracing South Korean music.
In fact, since a famine in the middle of the 1990s broke the social contract between the state and society, millennials have been referred to as the jangmadang ( market ) generation because of their resistance to state ideology and proclivity for adopting South Korean fashion, slang, and even dating culture.
This version of freewheeling youngsters conflicts with the version described by Kim Jong Un and broadcast in state media. Which is the truth, then? A careful analysis suggests that these conflicting characterizations represent extreme ends of the spectrum and both fail to reflect the complex reality.
North Korea recently increased penalties for those who speak the language of South Korea, which suggests that the government is trying to keep an ideological hold on the populace. A new law is especially telling. The anti-reactionary thought law, which was passed in 2020 and amended in 2022, “describes South Korean movies, dramas, news, and other outside content ] as ] reactionary thought and culture.”
Those caught with the banned content are subjected to heightened punishments: six years to life of reform through labor for consuming, and ten years or even death for importing or distributing.
Additionally, the law forbids the use of South Korean expressions like “older brother” and adding the honorific suffix “nim” to titles when addressing others. These phrasings are signifiers of South Korean influence that diminish the more stodgy and rigid North Korean values and conventions.
The law forbids” citizens from imitating puppet style ] South Korean intonation by raising and lengthening their intonationation obsequiously, lilting, and nauseatingly in aegyo speech.” Anyone who has watched South Korean movies or dramas knows what this is referring to.
While bribery and corruption have reduced the impact of previous crackdowns, this one is having a stronger impact: Video footage shows two teenage boys serving 12-years of hard labor in a show trial in front of hundreds of classmates for the crime of consuming South Korean media.
This is part of a larger trend that has its roots at the inception of Kim’s rule. In an effort to combat the flow of foreign media and information, Kim Jong Un oversaw the establishment of the Central 109 Inspection Command of The State Security Department ( now known as Group 109 ).
Since then, 85 % of respondents said that punishments are tougher now for consuming foreign media than they were under Kim Jong Il, according to a 2018 survey by the US Agency for Global Media.
According to a poll conducted by InterMedia of 350 refugees who left the nation between 2016 and 2018, two-thirds of North Koreans “personally experienced an inspection by Group 109.” North Korea ranked dead last in the 2023 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders.
North Korean refugees provide the most reliable information on this subject, but sadly, the number of people who have escaped has dramatically decreased since the Covid border lockdown. Much information is therefore out of date. Only as the border opens, will we be able to better understand how things have changed recently.
North Korea’s not-so-radical youth
Analysis of other defector surveys paints a much more complex picture than the persistent presence of North Korean interest in foreign media, which suggests that North Koreans are largely rejecting the regime’s narratives and ideology in favor of more entertaining foreign alternatives.
In particular, the younger generation is overall more positive toward the regime, juche ideology, and Kim Jong Un compared with older cohorts, according to defector surveys conducted by Seoul National University ( SNU).
A higher proportion of North Korean defectors in their 20s and 30s viewed Kim Jong Un as the country’s most popular leader from 2011 to 2020 than their elders did. Twenty and 30-somethings were also less likely to report hearing criticism about the government and the leader compared with those in their forties, fifties, and sixties.
The young generation had less pride in juche in 2014 than the older generation. But that dynamic flipped in 2020: over half of the young respondents had” a lot” of or” some” pride in juche, while the majority of older respondents had” not much” or “none”.
What justifies these surprising discoveries? There are a few factors at play. First, the Kim regime has launched a youth loyalty initiative to win back from Kim Jong Un and the party.
Young people are a captive and malleable audience. The days of students are jam-packed with Kim family history and ideological training, labor mobilizations, organizational activities, and criticism sessions.
The exploits of Kim Il Sung, expounded in a massive eight-part memoir, are akin to a Homeric epic that is genuinely entertaining to North Korean students. According to North Korean refugee Jae Young Kim, the book is even more challenging to borrow from the library because of its popularity.
One North Korean refugee turned activist, Kang Chol Hwan, described his childhood perception of Kim Il Sung as a” Father Christmas” who gifted children sweets and school uniforms. This education gave Kang, who would later be sent to a political prison camp and then defect,” a wellspring of admiration and gratitude for our political leaders and in the willingness to sacrifice everything for them.”
The foreign media crackdown is another factor. Although there is conflicting evidence regarding whether or not consumption has decreased in recent years, former US special envoy for North Korean human rights Ambassador Robert King contends that the crackdown has discouraged “more casual use of foreign media.”
This ca n’t help but have knock-on effects. Consuming foreign information slowly but surely alters the viewpoint of the North Korean people. Those who consume foreign media tend to have more negative feelings about the North Korean government and its intentions, according to surveys conducted by Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland for their book” Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea”.
Significantly, after Kim Jong Un’s increased crackdown on foreign media, survey respondents increased their likelihood of finding state media to be credible ( over 70 % ), while the percentage of skeptical people decreased to about 20 %.
The lack of disconfirming sources no doubt plays a role in youth’s perceptions. Consensusting foreign information has the effect of enhancing kinship ties between North and South. Nearly three-quarters of respondents said their perception of South Korea “improved a lot” after consuming South Korean media, according to a 2020 SNU survey.
Given that Kim Jong Un recently declared that North Korea would no longer pursue unification and labeled South Korea as the North’s “number one enemy,” the ability to improve South Korea’s image is especially relevant.
Finally, young people tend to have rose-colored glasses when looking at the government, compared with the older cohorts, because they have yet to spend any significant time in the sphere of North Korean life that tends to lead to the most antipathy towards the regime: the markets.
During Kim Jong Un’s rule, there has been a rise and remain high in the proportion of North Koreans who participate in the unofficial market economy, but there has been a steady decline in the proportion of respondents who participate in the official ( state ) economy. More significantly, only a tiny minority of respondents ( 13 % ) earn enough money per month to buy a single kilogram of rice from their state jobs, the SNU survey reveals.
This implies that the majority of people rely on market earnings for their household income, which places the state as a burden on their way of life rather than a resource. In fact, respondents spent an average of 20 % of their earnings on bribes and 46 % of people identified “bribes and crackdowns” as the greatest difficulty for their economic activity.
This explains why the older “money-making” generations in North Korea have resisted the regime. In contrast, the younger cohorts are busy with school and compulsory military service through their early 30s and therefore have yet to encounter the regime in this light.
Next steps
Despite Kim Jong Un’s severe crackdowns and harsh punishments, North Korean people remain interested in outside media. This presents a chance. Increasing the quantity and availability of foreign information inside North Korea will be crucial for:
- establishing a civil society, planting the seeds,
- challenging state propaganda that demonizes the outside world,
- educating people about their human rights in North Korea.
- increasing feelings of kinship with South Korea and
- creating conditions that can result in a long-term soft landing, making the peninsula a more stable and prosperous place for all Koreans.
It’s especially important to reach young North Koreans to counteract the Kim regime’s information blockade and loyalty campaign, which have proven surprisingly effective. The North Korean Human Rights Act of the United States authorizes funding for information programs.
The last iteration of the law authorized the government to spend$ 3 million per year to increase” the availability of sources of information not controlled by the Government of North Korea”. Although the law has bipartisan support, it expired in September 2022 and has not yet been reauthorized.
Reauthorization bills have been introduced multiple times, for example in the House by Congresswoman Young Kim (R-California ) and Congressman Ami Bera (D-California ) and in the Senate by Senator Marco Rubio (R-Florida ) and Senator Tim Kaine (D-Virginia ), but each of these efforts have ultimately foundered.
The National Endowment for Democracy funded a number of innovative initiatives, many of which were based in South Korea and were led by North Korean refugees, in order to reach the North Korean people through radio news programs in 2021.
A focus on both content and method is required to enhance North Korea’s foreign media presence. It will only be possible to outcompete regime propaganda if the content succeeds in meeting the needs, gaining the trust, and provoking the curiosity of the North Korean people.
According to a 2019 survey by Unification Media Group, when asked what types of media North Koreans need the most, the most widely received response was “news about South Korean society” ( 41.5 % ), followed by “entertainment programs made in South Korea” ( 18 % ).
Radio broadcasts that feature North Korean defectors provide a familiar voice that North Koreans can relate to. Heavy-handed content that explicitly criticizes the regime is counterproductive because it resembles North Korean propaganda and poses a risk to any North Koreans who consume it.
On the other hand, entertaining and straightforward depictions of ordinary South Koreans going about their lives with the freedom to choose their own jobs and vote for their own government officials can be subtly radicalizing.
Actionable content, such as market prices and weather forecasts, can also help to establish a foundation of trust, allowing for the introduction of topics like universal human rights and civil society.
Content should also be differentiated for audiences, as in the case of VOA’s Korean targeting elites.
Also, methods for distributing information need to be rethought and revitalized. With the border largely sealed, the most effective way to inject information into the country is currently radio broadcasts. However, radio is impeded by signal jamming, and surveys indicate that the older generation favors radio.
Distributing the kind of content favored by the young, like hallyu pop music and K-dramas, is typically done manually over the border via memory sticks like USBs and micro SDs. Although overused, distributors can now make money from this method. However, it is dangerous and very risky. To get around this, innovative new concepts like utilizing satellite technology or decentralized mesh networks should be looked into.
In this game of cat and mouse with the authorities, the key is to replace old, discoverable methods with new, innovative ones faster than the regime can keep up. Each method must also be carefully examined to make sure it is simple to use, deployable, and protects end users from detection. A balance must also be struck to avoid provoking too forceful a response from the regime.
Conclusion
Kim Jong Un is aware that winning the hearts and minds of his country’s youth is a crucial step in ensuring the continued rule of his family. For now, Kim has the edge. However, if they play it right, outside actors who want to spread foreign media within North Korea, such as those from the US and South Korea, can win.
Doing so can help foster the rudiments of a civil society capable of seeing through the Kim regime’s lies and imagining a brighter future.
The Korea Society’s director of policy is also a professor at SUNY Stony Brook University and Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. Chelsie Alexandre is the policy program officer at The Korea Society. At SUNY Stony Brook University, Alexander Tufto is a political science student.
First published by Pacific Forum, this article is republished with permission. Read the original here, complete with endnotes and charts.