More than money: Geopolitics drives Saudi sports spending – Asia Times

There’s a saying in sporting news:” The solution to all your concerns is money”. However, money is not the whole story in the case of Saudi Arabia’s large sports purchase programs during Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s rule.

In a basic feel, there is a clear revenue goal. Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund, which has assets worth US$ 925 billion in 2023, can increase its fuel revenues to generate even more federal money.

Last season, the government’s Public Investment Fund reported$ 36.8 billion in profits. Since 2016, it has spent$ 51 billion on activities properties.

The point is never to switch bin Salman into the nation’s greatest athletics artist. Instead, it’s more likely that he’s trying to improve Saudi Arabia’s economic and political situation through activities opportunities while ensuring the Saudi regime’s long-term viability.

Beyond Newcastle United, LIV Golf

Development nations frequently announce their appearance on the international level by investing in sports. Alternatively of one-and-done big events, Saudi Arabia is pursuing a more separated and different approach.

The Public Investment Fund’s most well-known opportunities include the order of Newcastle United of the English Premier League in 2021 and the LIV golf journey, which challenged the PGA’s decades-long supremacy of the game.

Beyond sport and sport, Saudi Arabia has also spent startling amounts on lower report investments in esports, wrestling and motorsports. In another activities, like games and netball, the profit goal is less clear.

The logical conclusion is that Saudi Arabia views its sporting opportunities as lost leaders, an unsustainable exercise meant to spur more lucrative exercise elsewhere. International funding pools “allow Saudi Arabia to expand its global reach and influence,” according to the Public Investment Fund’s 2022 monthly statement.

But what does that actually mean?

‘Sportswashing’

Sportswashing, a process of reputation-laundering in an effort to create a cleaner regional graphic, is the traditional term for Saudi Arabia’s technique.

But that explanation does n’t go far enough. The collection of sports opportunities and attributes is only a small component of a larger plan to make Saudi Arabia for a 21st era in which world oil demand is anticipated to decline by the middle of the century and geopolitics will become more complex, according to al Salman.

This is no solution: Saudi Arabia’s standard fantastic strategy — Vision 2030 — envisions the total development of the country’s economy and foreign policy. Saudi Arabia’s sports diplomacy serves as a part of a wider geopolitical plan to make the country for a multipolar society where power is distributed among various states.

Sports diplomacy even restores Saudi government financial and political ties to the West. Bin Salman wants to establish economical and safety partnerships with individuals whose passions correlate with those of the Saudi royal family and the Saudi position, thus ensuring the long-term heath of both.

Saudi Arabia and the West regularly interact with each other, forming an understanding that Riyadh is a “normal” place to conduct business, and that too much fanfare can be posed against the country for its authoritarian policies and poor human rights record. Sports investing, in short, is a Saudi hedge against western abandonment.

The allure of the big payday

The most troubling implication of Saudi sports investment, in the eyes of westerners, is the institutionalization of authoritarian capitalism as a symptom of the emerging international order.

Along with China, Russia, Singapore and others, Saudi Arabia represents an alternative to western democratic capitalism as a pathway to development.

This would surprise a generation of scholars and policymakers, who had previously believed that free markets and free societies were a self-reinforcing phenomenon.

However, doing business with dictators and strongmen has become inevitable and even desirable in some cases given the staying power of authoritarian capitalism. In the sports world, few have resisted the charms of a huge payday.

Democratic backsliding is closely related to authoritarian capitalism. Democracy and freedom are deteriorating all over the world, and the slow-drip normalization of economic relations with authoritarian capitalists is a result of this deterioration.

How to proceed?

So can anything be done? Western states have options, but they’re limited.

After all, both the private and public sectors are eager to pursue Saudi Arabia’s investments.

Officials in the West can object to the awarding of mega events to authoritarian governments. However, if liberal democracies are willing to cover the costs of hosting themselves, which they are increasingly reluctant to do, mewling about problematic hosts means little.

Meanwhile, authoritarians are eager to host large-scale gatherings and acquiesce to their prestige. Currently, for example, Saudi Arabia is the sole bidder for the 2034 FIFA World Cup.

Countries could try enforcing laws to limit the Saudi influence’s reach. National security is frequently used as a pretext to thwart foreign investments in crucial sectors, such as ports and 5G wireless networks.

Saudi plan is working

However, American regulators are unlikely to intervene because golf and video games do not pose a threat to national security. Even less likely is it to be politically influenced by the US Congress or the White House. Saudi Arabia is a crucial component of the United States ‘ strategy to defeat Iran in the Middle East, and arguing too much about human rights or sports investment is not worth the strategic expenditures.

The genius of Saudi Arabia’s enterprise is that it’s power projection by consent. Investors and fans want what bin Salman is selling, governments have limited recourse and critics are left to grasp at standard, out-dated arguments.

For Saudi Arabia, however, its sports charm offensive is about more than money. It’s about making an investment in the kingdom’s future prosperity and security and the Saudi dynasty’s longevity. So far, the plan is working.

At Carleton University, Aaron Ettinger is an associate professor of international relations.

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.