At their last meeting of the year, EU leaders were meeting in Brussels with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as Russian President Vladimir Putin conducted his properly managed monthly phone-in and press conference to answers questions from journalists and regular Russians. Unsurprisingly, the war in Ukraine loomed massive at both situations.
But the conflict in Ukraine is only one aspect of a complex, rapidly transforming political environment that neither Russia nor the EU, enable only Ukraine, are able to completely control. Donald Trump, who did re-enter the White House at the end of January 2025, is the main reason for this.
He now has a significant impact on the calculations made by Moscow and Brussels. However, his fervently-focused, if detail-free, plea for the conclusion of the Ukrainian war is viewed with suspicion on the other side of the Atlantic. This is true for both Moscow and Brussels.
On Monday, December 16, the German foreign officials reiterated their unwavering support for Kyiv. Previous German prime minister Kaja Kallas, who is now the EU’s top representative for international affairs and security policy, made the clear claim that there needs to be more military support from Europe. The code would be to make it possible for Ukraine to “hold on” and “turn the balance in their pursuit because Putin won’t stop until he stops,” according to the report.
In a further sign of the EU hardening, rather than softening, its position on Russia, the foreign officials adopted the bloc’s 15th sanctions package. This is one of the most important sanctions to time, which targets 54 people and 30 businesses and places an extra 32 businesses on the blacklist for evading existing sanctions.
On December 18, Zelensky met with NATO secretary standard Mark Rutte, another dialogue skeptical. Like Kallas, he wants to “focus on the business at hand” to ensure that Ukraine has everything Putin needs to keep from winning. Rutte’s words echoe those of António Costa, the new leader of the European Council, who also remarked that the Union must” stand with Ukraine for as long as needed and do whatever it takes” for the Russian invasion to be defeated and international laws to rule.
In the meantime, Putin, during his yearly phone-in, was whole of his usual rhetoric about Russia winning in what he continues to call a” specific military function” in Ukraine. The main goal of this function is to convince regular Russians that things are generally on track to accomplishing Russia’s war goals. Ironically, this is the third time in a row that Putin has praised Russia’s superiority and inevitable victory, which is obviously lost on both the president and his audience.
A committee of the Russian defense ministry meeting on December 16 more reinforced the information that the Kremlin is determined to achieve a military victory. These Putin outlined continued funding into the region’s armed forces, now totalling 6.3 % of GDP.
While he made the point that the Kremlin” may improve this consumption endlessly,” he was also unwavering when he reiterated that” the position, the Soviet people are giving everything they can to the military forces to fulfill the duties we have set.” These things, in Putin’s see, include the battle of” the neo-Nazi government in Kiev, which seized power again in 2014″ and” to push the army out from our territory”.
Officials in Moscow and Brussels seem strangely congruent in their determination to keep fighting, despite whatever kind of agreement Trump does consider, at least in their public statements.
Mounting force
Putin’s justification for doing so is that he firmly believes that the government is in place. His troops only made daily benefits of around 30 square kilometers of Ukrainian place in November. The impact of European authorization to hit targets deep inside Russia has so far been scant. Russia’s latest air battle against Ukraine’s critical national system, however, has caused extraordinary damage.
For the Union, the reasoning is unique. In the event of a peace, let alone a full peace agreement, EU leaders are hesitant to accept Trump as their replacement and are yet to come to terms with reputable safety guarantees for Ukraine. A Trump-brokered package, so, carries too many challenges. The idea of Putin regrouping and rearming after a brief break in the fighting would be the top preoccupation of Western leaders, which would then pose an even greater threat to Western security.
It is hoped that Ukraine’s continued defense of itself against Russian aggression will help the EU and other NATO members avoid the kind of philosophical conflict Ukraine has been having since Russia’s full-scale war in February 2022.
All of this leaves Ukraine vulnerable to both military force from Russia and political force from the incoming Trump administration to reach a package, which includes the loss of roughly 20 % of Russian country that Russia has illegally annexed since 2014. Ukraine’s European allies will also be under political pressure to continue fighting in a conflict that Europe is trying to avoid.
With Trump 2.0 and 2025 in hand, Zelensky has few viable allies and no other viable options. The best thing Ukraine can hope for is passing the time. Trump will need Zelenensky to apologise. Before a ceasefire can be reached, he will need to be open to the idea of negotiations with Russia.
If Europe, in the meantime, gets serious about its own defense, this might finally lead the EU and Kyiv’s European NATO allies to stand on their own feet and provide the continent, including Ukraine, with credible deterrence against Russia.
So far, they have talked the talk. They will need to demonstrate that they can walk the walk in 2025.
The University of Birmingham’s Stefan Wolff is an assistant professor of international security.
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