The weather battles between India and Pakistan on April 2025 were more than just an atmosphere battle; they also provided a workshop in system-of-systems airpower, demonstrating that in contemporary warfare, the network, not the aircraft, should be at the center, and Southeast Asia’s mixed-fleet air forces may be paying close attention.
The South China Morning Post (SCMP ) reported that Pakistan coordinated the detection and engagement of Indian aircraft using ground-based radars ( A ), fighter aircraft ( B), and airborne warning systems ( C), guided by Saab 2000 Erieye airborne early warning & control ( AEW&, C ) planes.
This real-time data sharing between sensors, missile launchers, and fight managers, according to SCMP, is a significant departure from conventional air combat, where each jet handled engagement and detection individually.
In an Aviacionline article, Gaston Dubois points out that Pakistan’s private Link-17 made it possible for combat platforms from various origins to connect to one unified and clear tactical network.
Dubois claims that this network-centric layout makes it possible to create a real-time operating guide, supports dynamic goal allocation, and gives opponents who have disjointed information streams or limited system compatibility an advantage in making decisions.
He points out that Pakistan has only 40 aircraft while India has over 70. But, Pakistan has completely benefited from informational supremacy and shared situational awareness as a result of a combined system of receptors and data connections.
According to Fabian Hoffman in an post for The Spectator, Pakistan had to do a fairly sophisticated kill chain, which included the detection, tracking, and engagement of targets. This was achieved with obvious success.
Hoffman’s study demonstrates that Pakistan’s advantage in atmosphere combat was more due to the coherence and speed of its decision-making network than really excellent hardware or numbers.
Wang Xiangsui and Charriot Zhai claim in an essay for The China Academy that Pakistan’s benefit comes from the simplicity of its fighter jet fleet, which only has six forms and has sourced all of its fighter acquisitions from China since 2000.
In contrast, they point out that India has fourteen different fighter forms from five different countries, which significantly raises the difficulty of integrating data links. Although the Indian Air Force ( IAF ) does not have a lag in individual fighter designs, their Western and Russian missile and avionics systems are incompatible.
Wang and Zhai also mention that the Russian and French fighters in India’s arsenal often struggled to communicate with one another and don’t fire their missiles. This lack of interoperability highlights the drawbacks of having a wide range of platforms, which was once viewed favorably but presently undermines the effectiveness of interconnected combat.
These tactical takeaways from the current India-Pakistan atmosphere skirmishes reinforce the notion of operating airpower as an ecology rather than relying on specific platforms.
An integrated air defense system ( IADS ) is described in a June 2019 article for The Mitchell Forum by Peter Mattes as being organized to carry out surveillance, battle management, and weapons control. It is made up of interdependent but distinct elements like radars, command systems, communications networks, weapon platforms, and personnel.
These elements operate in a fused, horizontal system, according to Mattes, which is enabled by contemporary data and communication technology, more than acting independently. He points out that fighter jets are not standalone assets but function as part of this system’s defensive counter-air capabilities, in addition to surface-to-air missiles ( SAM ) and electronic warfare systems.
He adds that their part is integrated into various components to assure layers, adaptability, and smooth air defense across realms.
South Asian air forces have not yet deployed in high-intensity system-of-systems environments, but their procurement and planning decisions suggest that they may be prone to the fragmented architectures that hampered India’s airpower effectiveness during the Kashmir conflict.
Vietnam may be facing a significant challenge in replacing its Soviet-era Su-22 jets, according to Defense and Security Monitor ( DSM) in February 2025, as the Ukraine War has cast doubt on Russia’s dependability as a supplier and the performance of its aircraft has much to be desired.
Although Vietnam and the US have reached an agreement to purchase 24 F-16 fighters, the Vietnamese People’s Air Force (VPAF ), which is built around Soviet and Russian aircraft, will need new training, maintenance, and logistics structures. These changes might lead to serious connectivity issues.
In a SCMP post from April 2025, Maria Siow mentions that Vietnam’s decision to purchase US F-16s was motivated by a wish to utilize business negotiations with the US rather than a corporate shift away from Russia.
Siow claims that Russia had provided 80 % of Vietnam’s weapons before 2022, and that even though Vietnam is working to expand its vendors, the Taiwanese government still has faith in Russia more than the US. She points out that it’s unclear whether Vietnam may get brand-new F-16s or used ones because both have questionable fight potential when used against China’s secrecy fighters.
She adds that the deal is weighed heavily by the jet ‘ higher price, the possibility of a hostile Foreign response, and the attractiveness of less well-known options like C-130 cargo planes. Additionally, according to Siow, Vietnam hasn’t had any trouble acquiring Russian give parts, which makes it even more unlikely that it will ever buy F-16s.
In a selling for USD 8.1 billion, Indonesia perhaps have reconsidered its buy of 42 jets of that type due to India’s reduction of Rafale fighters. The order may increase the number of F-16, Su-27, and Su-30 fighter jets in its fighter fleet, which is a jumbled up system.
Dave Laksono, who defended the Indian government’s decision to purchase Rafale jets, pointed out in an SCMP article that even the most skilled fighter jets can get shot down or encounter complex issues, while also acknowledging that Pakistan’s claims that an American Rafale jet was broken offer legitimate and creative grounds for evaluation.
Further, Chappy Hakim makes mention of an integrated command-and-control structure in a Jakarta Post article that requires a complete network of reconnaissance radars, early warning sensors, tracking systems, and a command-and-control system. Without this supporting architecture, adding a new fighter type may result in lessening returns.
In Malaysia, Defense News reported in September 2024 that the nation is struggling to keep its 18 Su-30 MKM jets in flight and that Western sanctions have hampered its ability to buy parts from Russia.
Olli Suorsa claims in a December 2024 Fulcrum article that the nation intends to buy ex-Kuwaiti F/A-18 jets as a stopgap measure, but these aircraft are older than Malaysia’s F/A-18s currently in use. He adds that having two F/A-18s of different generations could cause spare parts to be incompatible and make maintenance tasks more challenging.
Southeast Asian nations ‘ failure to create cohesive air combat networks could turn their fighter fleets into expensive liabilities in an era where airpower is defined by systems integration.