Kiev believes that its new long-range weapons, a combination of drone and missile systems, will significantly improve its ability to repel Russian military attacks.
Russian promotional material suggested that the “rocket drone”, called Palianytsia, may have a range of 700km, and may bring about 250 Soviet military targets within selection, opening a new step of the atmosphere war.
Since its supporters also impose restrictions on the use of long-range arms in occupied Ukrainian territory rather than in Russia itself, Ukraine believes that using this new drone technology is necessary to combat new Russian advances. As the fresh rocket aircraft is not supplied by Ukraine’s friends, it would not have to agree with these regulations.
Throughout the entire conflict, aircraft systems has gained a significant following. And the Kremlin’s skill to use drones to devastating impact has been made clear in recent days, which has highlighted Ukraine’s needed for a new strategy.
On August 26, Russia launched 109 Iranian-built Shahed robots alongside 127 weapons aimed at incapacitating Ukraine’s energy grid. At least 15 of Ukraine’s locations experienced power cuts and water scarcity, which were caused by the attacks.
At least five people were killed and 30 injured. Russia launched yet another drone attack that targeted sensitive infrastructure and human targets the following day.
Both Russia and Ukraine are using one-way attack ( OWA ) drones. A one-way strike drone ( also known as a bomber aircraft ) flies to its destination and activates on or above it, destroying the aircraft in the process, unlike most armed robots, which drop one or more weapons and return to their deployer for further use. The long-range designs used by both countries typically resemble a small airplane with a wing under 10 meters.
On August 22, Ukrainian OWA robots launched a big fire and extra blasts from munitions stored at a Russian airfield in Volgograd. Ukraine has been using long-range drones to targeted Russian airbases, business websites, and fuel system for decades.
Russian regulators have also been frantically trying to stop helicopter attacks by installing more weather defenses around Vladimir Putin’s personal residence and installing nets around refineries in an effort to get an inbound drone.
Why are OWA robots so critical?
Military forces have used drones for a long time, but OWA robots pose a distinct and growing danger. OWA drones can hit targets hundreds of kilometers away with comparative accuracy, as I recently explained in my new study.
They are simpler and less expensive to make in mass, but they typically have smaller missiles and are slower than conventional missiles. This implies that nations ( and armed groups ) that would have previously struggled to build and maintain a ship of missiles now have access to a weapon with extraordinary variety and efficiency.
In the summer of 2022, both Ukraine and Russia began using OWA robots. Russia’s first big drone strike was in October 2022, but Ukraine had used them before.
In June 2022, an impromptu OWA aircraft, perhaps made from a changed business aircraft bought online, struck a Soviet oil refinery in Rostov, causing significant damage.
Creating advantage
Until late 2023, Russia’s use of drones was significantly larger than Ukraine’s. The advantage of Russia was that they could import their Shahed drones from Iran and then export them under license to their own factories.
Russia launched thousands of drones into Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure in 2023, including at energy substations and grain silos. The drones, along with Russia’s missiles, led Kiev to , ask for , air defense assistance from its allies and adopt , innovative ways, such as acoustic sensors, to shoot them down , without running short of ammunition. Ukrainian businesses were also working on their own OWA drones to repel opposition.
To avoid restrictions on how weapons supplied by its allies are used on Russian territory, Ukraine must rely on drones it has built on its own or purchased from private contractors. They are often aimed at Russia’s defense and oil sectors.
Ukraine launched an ambitious drone campaign at the end of 2023 that targeted oil facilities ( a significant source of revenue for Russia ), airfields ( home to weapons and weapons used against Ukraine ), and even factories where Russia manufactures its drones.
OWA drones are becoming more commonplace and easy to make, as are missiles. When defending ships from Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and preventing Iran’s drone and missile attack on Israel in April, the UK has had to deal with OWA drones twice in 2024.
OWA drones launched by militant groups have also attacked facilities that have US personnel spread throughout the Middle East. Even the most advanced military forces will face challenges comparable to those in Russia and Ukraine, such as shooting down large numbers of drones without running out of air defense missiles.
The Royal Navy used Sea Ceptor missiles to intercept Houthi drones in March, which are significantly more expensive than the drone they intercepted and rely on Sea Ceptor missiles to intercept other threats like Houthi missiles.
For armed forces worldwide, the advancement of OWA drones, and other drone technology, will increase the costs of air defense. They will need to invest in more kinds of , counter-drone systems , while maintaining the air defenses they already have to defeat traditional threats such as hostile aircraft.
When intercepting a missile, defense systems that operate against drones ( such as lasers ) might not be effective. Layered air defenses will be required to prevent any threat from reaching its intended audience.
For instance, the UK is currently reevaluating its air and missile defenses as a result of how Russia and Ukraine use drones and other standoff weapons.
Drones, and drone technology, have changed the rules of warfare globally, as well as in Ukraine, and will continue to do so. Armed forces are already frantically trying to keep up with them all over the world.
Marcel Plichta is pursuing a PhD at the University of St Andrews ‘ School of International Relations.
This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.