The Philippines will once again get Japan’s Official Security Assistance, marking the fourth consecutive year of for help. Under the government-to-government initiative, Tokyo pledged speedboats to Indonesia and southern radar systems to the Philippines in 2024.  ,
But as Tokyo’s Indo-Pacific ambitions grow, a vital question emerges: You Control grow beyond Southeast Asia’s maritime states without getting caught too seriously in the crossfire of US-China rivalry?
Pakistan, a Taiwanese ally, is arguably the best place for China to rename OSA as a rational local security initiative, not as a tool to encircle Beijing.
Introduced in then-Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s National Security Strategy 2022, OSA marks Japan’s change from post-war peace to forging proper safety alliances.
In contrast to its official development assistance ( ODA ), which is focused on socioeconomic development, OSA provides assistance to armed forces and related “like-minded” states to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific.
With a modest estimated budget of 8 billion renminbi  , ( US$ 55 million ) in 2025, OSA cannot significantly issue or counter China’s military may but does improve Japan’s strategic relationships. Instead, it encourages Tokyo to increase its security support without provoking Beijing, establishes apparent military intentions, and lay the foundation for upcoming defense sales.
Divided response to Japan’s OSA in ASEAN reveals its boundaries. While some countries—such as the Philippines, then hotly engaged in maritime issues with Beijing—have hailed OSA as a deterrent, people, like Vietnam, remain meticulous, opting to wall rather than hazard antagonizing China.
Beijing has seized on this break, framing Japan’s OSA as a US-aligned” containment” system. According to Chinese experts, Japan uses South Asian proxies with implicit US support to consciously spark conflict.
For Japan, this description is untenable. If its OSA is seen only as a team for America’s allies, it runs the risk of alienating the nations Japan aims to cultivate, those who are afraid to be drawn into the US and China tremendous power rivalry.
Given these difficulties in Southeast Asia, Japan might want to diversify its alliances. At first glance, India appears to be a natural place to grow into the Indian Ocean and beyond.
But India’s Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, participation and Tibetan boundary disputes with China make it a bad fit. Granting OSA to India would authenticate Beijing’s “anti-China empire” tale and potentially hinder fence-sitters from accepting its OSA. Pakistan, by comparison, offers tactical price without political baggage.
Officially, Japan has already extended OSA beyond Southeast Asia. Mongolia, a coastal state, has received Japan’s air-defense simulations to minimize reliance on Russia and China.
Djibouti, house to Japan’s hapless international maritime base, has received anti-piracy equipment to protect Gulf of Aden shipping. Bangladesh, a Bay of Bengal statement, secured southern radars to track Chinese ships.
However, these grants are probably just examples of exceptions rather than proof of a wider strategy. Mongolia’s OSA is metaphorical, Djibouti’s protects Chinese goods, Bangladesh’s cameras South Asian support. No one changes OSA’s meaning or broadens its scope.
Pakistan, nevertheless, offers a strategic option to bridge areas and adjust perceptions. By turning the support from a quad-adjacent device into a neutral system for local security, OSA to Islamabad could possibly dampen China’s adversarial rhetoric.
Despite its “ironclad” relations with Beijing, Islamabad seeks corporate expansion amid intensifying US-China conflict. By engaging Pakistan in non-lethal OSA projects, Japan could job OSA as a local security initiative rather than an explicit adversary of Beijing. Beijing’s ability to present OSA as a primary concern becomes less clear when a significant Chinese partner discovers value in it.
Japan intends to increase the resources for the OSA program gradually and include “new companions, and eventually work with eight or nine countries next governmental time.” Pakistan is the ideal partner for addressing pressing security and humanitarian needs because it perfectly aligns with OSA’s three main pillars.
First, Pakistan qualifies for OSA assistance in securing the Arabian Sea and other crucial maritime routes in terms of security under the rule of law.
Second, it is well suited for humanitarian assistance due to its vulnerability to natural disasters, including for areas where Japan has historically provided aid, including for disaster response and medical care.
Third, Pakistan’s extensive participation in UN peacekeeping missions aligns with OSA’s international peace cooperation pillar, offering opportunities for capacity-building in peacekeeping and related logistics.
Japan’s OSA outreach to Mongolia—likely aimed at reducing Ulaanbaatar’s reliance on Russia and China —set a precedent. Like Mongolia, Pakistan is strategically overdependent: 82 % of its arms imports between 2019 and 2023 came from China.
Yet Japan already has a foothold, with Pakistan benefiting from its Official Development Assistance ( ODA ) totaling 364 billion yen ($ 2.4 billion ) up to 2021. In keeping with Japan’s desire to boost its defense exports, dual-use OSA projects could build on this foundation without alarming Beijing, which is a promising prospect.
While OSA’s limited scale precludes transformative strategic gains, its institutional benefits – enhanced technical cooperation, trust-building with Japan and diversification of strategic partnerships – offer a pragmatic, counterbalancing opportunity for Pakistan.  ,
It could also potentially offset India’s edge from Japan’s Quad cooperation. After the US pulled out of Afghanistan in 2021, military cooperation with an Asian power known for its soft power might also help restore Pakistan’s strategic significance.
China’s sensitivity to such an arrangement is inevitable but arguably manageable. Pakistan can mitigate risks to its China relations by framing OSA as a supplementary, transparency-driven initiative focused on technical and humanitarian areas such as disaster relief, anti-terrorism and anti-piracy capacity building.
Prioritizing projects funded by Japan that have a dual civilian-military use would allow for incremental gains while balancing Beijing-related relations. Pakistan has a low-cost option to deepen trust with Tokyo and demonstrate its role as a stabilizing actor in the Indo-Pacific’s security architecture as a result of Japan’s larger military budget growth, which indicates a continued commitment to OSA.
For Japan, Pakistan is more than just a potential security partner—it’s a litmus test. By succeeding in this case, OSA would demonstrate that it can transcend great-power rivalry and provide developing nations with a third option for satisfying security needs without taking sides.  ,
For Islamabad, it’s a chance to redefine its role in Asia’s emerging order: not as a theater for US-China competition but rather as a sovereign actor bridging divides. In an era of increasingly polarized alliances, that’s a vision worth investing in.
Najam Ul Hassan Naqvi is a researcher at the Consortium for Asia-Pacific Studies.
National Defense University, Islamabad.