Professional spy that targets double- use technology presents a serious challenge to governments – as the , G7 recognized , at its latest leaders ‘ meeting in Hiroshima next May.
Protecting technology that, by description, is used in both personal and military software requires a complex regulation model. Sensitive data that needs to be protected is frequently the result of the creation and ownership of private companies, which may not have the same level of awareness and safety against espionage as the state.
This issue of dual-use engineering regulation is particularly acute in Japan, which does not have a central organization established to combat industrial espionage and has a hostile public opinion of such institutions.  ,
Japan needs to strengthen its brains arsenal in order to combat such threats, with both conventional and non-traditional business spying on the rise. The current organization that seems most appropriate for the role, the Public Security Intelligence Agency ( PSI), and its capabilities need to be strengthened.
Why PSIA?
Other Japanese government organizations have previously dealt with industrial counterespionage, including the National Police Agency ( NPA ) and the NSS Economic Unit.
In order to avoid creating a policeman position, the NPA needs to be separated from law enforcement and intelligence gathering, even though it has the resources and personnel necessary for the job.
If we consider the NSS and its economic device, their primary responsibility is to coordinate government security, and they are not always expected to carry out specific operations and policies.
NSS employs federal authorities on loan from a number of other organizations. That leaves a small number of in-house agents with the NSS to work for a long time, which reduces its effectiveness as a police force and creates a potential barrier to acquiring knowledge on the activity of counter-industrial espionage.
The Public Security Intelligence Agency has characteristics that allow it to function as the organization’s primary working force for business counterespionage.
The PSIA was established in 1952 and is responsible for protecting Japan’s public safety, with its ,
Its initial focus on battling left-wing protesters gradually shifted to terrorism in the 1990s. And now it recognizes that it is an organization that also gathers data about financial stability. This change seems to fit with Japan’s current pattern of safety risks.
However, the PSIA continues to strive to expand its scope in the field of counter-industrial espionage, but its authority is insufficient because the foundation law has n’t been updated to reflect the function it aims to play.
Since the 1999 organization-related Act on the Control of Organizations was introduced, its scope of authority has not changed. While building de facto ability is essential, shoring up the PSIA’s constitutional authority is also crucial.
A proper constitutional mandate would allow the PSIA to conduct a standardized self-evaluation of its operations in accordance with the “plan, do, examine, work” formula. Making such a mechanism organized is necessary because intelligence procedures are by nature largely unaccessible to outdoor regulation.
Moreover, the PSIA operates with the mission of the , Revolutionary Activities Prevention Act, which does not properly fit the nature of business counterespionage.
The work, which was passed in 1952, imposes the necessary controls on any business that engages in terrorist usurpation as an organizational activity. The law imposes penalties for violent provocative behavior.  ,
The organization can just monitor and restrict corporate goals, which is one of the PSIA’s statutory limitations. People are better at concealing their connections because business spy is not always conducted at an corporate level. A separate financial security-related law should be provided to the PSIA with a mandate that includes these individual-level activities, particularly in a separate one.
Finally, information revealing inside the state needs to be systemized. The crucial data collected by the PSIA  needs to be regularly shared with the policy-making part.
For instance, the Ministry of Finance and another important departments can use the PSIA’s counter-espionage knowledge when evaluating foreign direct investment cases. FDI is alleged to be one of the main pathways for delicate technology leakage.
The PSIA and different ministries, such as MoF, are currently essentially nonexistent in terms of comprehensive information discussing. The propriety of information sharing will be unsteady if a sharing system is no written into law or if sharing is based solely on customs and practices. So, institutionalizing such joint intelligence- sharing cooperation is essential.
The PSIA’s strengthening will have a number of advantages for Asian financial security goals. First of all, with a more focused authority for the PSIA, cooperation and trust-building with like-minded nations in the counter-industrial espionage field may be made easier.
It has long been pointed out that , Japan is lacking in its counterespionage features, creating hurdles for worldwide information sharing and shared R&, D with another state. With the strengthening of the PSIA, Japan’s position and reputation will improve, giving it more opportunities for intelligence-sharing.
In response to a survey report from KPMG and Thomson Reuters, 7.2 % of respondents said they had established specialized groups dedicated to financial stability, and nearly half of businesses have not taken steps to prepare themselves for economic spy.  ,
According to the survey, about 56 % of companies listed information assessment and risk evaluation as one of their problems in terms of financial security. This suggests that the majority of Chinese businesses require some form of assistance in order to function in accordance with the changing laws.
Luckily, the PSIA has local branches across Japan. Although these regional offices have long been used as cybersecurity data gathering centers, they may also serve as a platform for close communication and guidance for the business side, although it may take time to develop a genuine partnership between the two parties because of the PSIA’s reputation as a counterterrorism agency.
Challenges back
The tips for policy change are likely to face some challenges. The most significant question will probably be whether or not the Chinese are interested in discussing for increased intelligence capacity.
In contrast to the populations of many American industrialized nations, the Asian population has a substantially lower tolerance for the government’s improvement of people security. That’s largely attributable to the state’s use of the Special Higher Police and military officers to thwart freedom of speech both before and during the Second World War.  ,
Unprecedented public opposition arose during the 2013 discussion on the Act protecting Especially Designated Secrets. Very little time was spent debating the specific types and character of the knowledge that was the subject of shelter under the Act because the Chinese public and the opposition group were focused on issues relating to the people’s right to know.
In a case like this, there has already been economic security breach studies that have resulted in false charges ( such as the one involving DeRight Precision Machinery Co, Ltd, also known as Ohkawara Kakohki Company ).  ,
The police’s management of this case may have inspired the authorities to strengthen coordination with law enforcement and reinforce the capabilities of its intelligence services, which would help to stop similar incidents from occurring in the future.
Rei Koga is a PhD candidate at King’s College London (KCL)’s Department of European and International Studies. Her research focuses on the Indo-Pacific region’s response to Chinese financial statesmanship and diplomacy. She previously held positions with the Japanese Cabinet Secretariat.
The Young Leader system at the Pacific Forum published this article first. It is republished these with authority.