Assuming Shigeru Ishiba’s ascendance to the top of the leadership leaves a lasting impression on Japan, issues abound about how much he will stay in line with and alter Fumio Kishida’s plans and models.
While Ishiba is widely expected to uphold several of Kishida’s initiatives, including on international relations and financial strategy, he may also implement large departures in private policy amid the nation’s some evolving and profound challenges.
Kishiba’s finally unhappy administration was characterised by careful yet regular policy-making with an emphasis on monetary stimulus measures that attempted to balance growth and inflation.
His administration sought to modernize Japan by using digital transformation while looking for ways to address demographic issues caused by a rapidly aging population and workforce decline. Social welfare reforms, particularly on pensions, were thus integral to Kishida’s agenda.
On foreign policy, Kishida prioritized enhancing Japan’s alliances, particularly with the United States, while amplifying Japan’s role in multilateral frameworks such as the Quad. In an effort to strike a balance between economic interests and security concerns, Kishida took a very measured diplomatic stand toward China and Russia.
His initiatives to restore relations with South Korea and strengthen ties with ASEAN nations, including Indonesia, were notable diplomatic accomplishments.
In addition, during Kishida’s tenure, discussions about the establishment of a NATO liaison office in Japan and its increasing alignment with NATO were a sign of Japan’s growing integration with Western security systems in response to regional threats.
Ishiba’s approach to domestic policy is expected to integrate continuity with innovation. Economically, he will likely sustain Kishida’s fiscal stimulus policies, especially if the global economy remains sluggish amid slowing growth in China and the US.
However, there is already rumor that Ishida may adopt a more conservative outlook on finances by implementing austerity measures and tax reforms to lower the country’s high debt. A change of this nature would significantly alter Kishida’s strategy and have significant effects on Japan’s economic stability.
Ishiba will also be under pressure to address more directly the problems posed by Japan’s graying population. While Kishida’s pension reforms provided a foundation, Ishiba may need to implement more comprehensive policies to address labor shortages, possibly by encouraging more immigration or investing more in artificial intelligence and automation.
On foreign policy, Ishiba’s approach to Japan-South Korea relations will be quickly and closely scrutinized. Significant progress was made by Kishida in resolving these frequently tense issues, particularly through cooperation on regional security issues.
Ishiba is likely to continue along this line, although he may also attempt to address unresolved historical disputes with a fresh perspective, which might lessen tensions and open the door to a stronger bilateral partnership.
On Japan-Indonesia relations, Ishida is expected to build on Kishida’s initiatives aimed at strengthening economic and maritime security cooperation. Given Indonesia’s prominence in Southeast Asia, Ishida could seek to expand this budding partnership, particularly in sectors such as the digital economy and infrastructure development.
This strategy would help Japan increase its economic impact while reducing China’s Belt and Road Initiative’s rapid-growing trade ties and its potential economic benefits.
To be sure, Japan-China relations will present Ishida with perhaps his most multifaceted and crucial challenge. The administration of Kitshida’s government struck a delicate balance between maintaining economic ties, which were frequently complicated and stifled by the US-led tech war and China’s efforts to impose sanctions, and addressing security concerns head-on, particularly those posed by the two parties ‘ territorial disputes in the East China Sea.
Ishiba, a former defense minister, may thus adopt an even more assertive approach to security issues, which could lead to further accelerating Japan’s already robust remilitarization while pursuing even greater security cooperation with other regional powers. At the same time, he will need to maintain economic ties with China, Japan’s top trade partner, to maintain economic stability at a delicate juncture for the global economy.
Ishiba’s approach to Japan-Russia relations, meanwhile, is expected to reflect Kishida’s cautious stance, particularly in the context of ongoing global tensions involving Russia, including in Ukraine. Energy cooperation between the two parties will be at the forefront of the conversation, which Ishida might downgrade in favor of more stable and secure sources in the name of economic and supply chain security.
The potential for a more open relationship with North Korea will be one of Ishiba’s most promising prospects. The Japanese government continued to impose strict sanctions and put new pressure on North Korea over its nuclear program and the ongoing thorny issue of Japanese abductees.
Ishiba may seek diplomatic resumption, especially if Pyongyang offers fresh indications of a willingness to engage in dialogue, even though he is unlikely to abandon these hard-line positions. This would be a significant change that would have significant effects on Japan’s role in East Asia and regional security.
Japan-United States relations will, of course, remain the cornerstone of Tokyo’s foreign policy. In response to shared concerns about China’s expanding influence and rising aggression in nearby waters, under Kishida, the alliance was significantly strengthened through increased military cooperation.
In spite of who wins the US election in November, Ishiba is anticipated to maintain and possibly deepen the relationship, in particular in the vein of America’s evolving Indo-Pacific strategy to counterbalance China’s rise and power.
A NATO liaison office could be established in Japan to show its commitment to international security standards and help the country become more in tune with Western defense initiatives. In a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape with a view to strengthening Japan’s security posture, the government of Ishiba could use this relationship to leverage this relationship.
On the global stage, Ishida’s participation in the Quad will likely remain robust as the grouping shifts toward more economic and wider-reaching security initiatives, perpetuating Kishida’s multilateral efforts to counter China’s influence in the region.
Ishiba will likely uphold Japan’s commitment to multilateral dialogue while taking steps to improve global governance in an increasingly multipolar world in the Trilateral Commission, which includes Japan, the United States, and Europe.
Overall, Ishiba’s leadership demonstrates a delicate balance of change and continuity. Although many of Kishida’s policies are expected to be upheld, particularly those involving international relations, his approach to domestic issues and some international relationships may pave the way for Japan.
Ishiba’s ability to strike a balance between continuity and change, addressing Japan’s immediate problems, and positioning China in a more difficult and complex world.
Former Indonesian Foreign Ministry diplomat Simon Hutagalung The City University of New York gave him his master’s degree in comparative politics and political science. The views expressed in this article are his own.