Japan and the US have recently taken a number of actions to increase deterrence-building in relation to the Taiwan Strait.
For instance, in 2021, Tokyo and Washington reportedly came up with a shared plan that calls for the US Marine Corps to establish an attack base along the Nansei island chain in order to prepare for an armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
Additionally, it was announced that Washington would repurpose a Marine Corps regiment in Okinawa and equip it with anti-ship missiles that could can & nbsp, target @ nfspp, and PLA Navy ships during an armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait following the conclusion of US-Japan Security Consultative Committee( 2 2 ) discussions in 2023.
However, the Republic of Korea( ROK) has long been hesitant to follow the same path. The election of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and lately expressed hostility toward China within South Korea may result in a shift in the situation.
Seoul’s move to take a more proactive stance on Taiwanese problems has been significant. For instance, Taiwan was first mentioned in a mutual declaration andnbsp between the ROK and the US in May 2021.
Seoul opposes any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait through force, according to ROK Foreign Minister Park Jin, who stated in a CNN & nbsp interview in February 2023, and said that any such change would” direct impact” on South Korea. This represented a striking change from earlier posture.
It would be foolish not to turn such a determination, no matter how small, into small concessions made to Seoul that finally support Taiwan’s protection. This article will list and go over three of these actions that need to be taken.
USFK to support Taiwan
To determine whether Seoul will permit US Forces Korea ( USFK ) troops to support US operations during a military contingency in the Taiwan Strait, trilateral discussions between the three nations should first be organized.
Seoul would have the room it needs to give USFK the” corporate flexibility” to work outside of the Korean Peninsula thanks to Japan’s commitment to allow the US to use its bases in-country to defend Taiwan, which Chinese foreign policy elites now and expected.
Additionally, discussions can be held to develop strategies for ROK and Chinese forces to support the back area and intelligence-gathering in the event of a military emergency along the Taiwan Strait.
In these discussions, Washington must convince Seoul that the USFK can prevent the DPRK from taking any military action during a fight in the Taiwan Strait. For instance, Washington may enter into a nuclear sharing and partnership in the NATO style with Seoul.
In the event of a fight in Taiwan, Seoul must also be ready to engage in more burden-sharing regarding punishment efforts in comparison to Pyongyang. With the ROK’s now huge war and advantages over the DPRK, this shouldn’t present a major obstacle.
assistance with the beach protect
Next, through shared coast guard procedures, the three nations should work to improve their cooperation with Taiwan.
Japan has demonstrated initiative in this area. For instance, a memorandum of understanding allowing the conduct of combined search and rescue operations was signed by Taiwanese and Chinese officials in 2017.
Similar to Taiwan, the US established a Coast Guard Working Group in 2021 in an effort to strengthen its relations with the two countries. A report on national guard assistance with Taiwan is also required by the 2022 US National Defense Authorization Act, and it should be expanded to include beach watch training as well.
Given this law, Seoul and Taiwan should start combined beach guard training exercises. Together, the four countries should hold coaching activities, especially in the waters and nbsp, off Pacific Island nations with which Taiwan has diplomatic ties.
Cooperation can concentrate on problems like drug trafficking, & nbsp, marine debris, and illegal, unreported fishing given Seoul’s potential concerns about upsetting Beijing.
Alliance Chip4
Third, the three countries should continue efforts to bring the Alliance Chip4 to fruition. The proposed alliance will enable the three countries to build, together with Taiwan, a more robust and comprehensive semiconductor supply chain that reduces Beijing’s leverage on the international stage.
When it comes to electronics, each of the four countries has a distinct comparative advantage. Lee Chang, the ROK Minister of Trade, Industry, and Energy, stated that Taiwan is powerful in the factory business and that South Korea holds its advantages in memory chip manufacturing. Japan is rich in minerals and aspects, while the US has the tools and technology.
Despite initial concerns about the program, Chip4 has shown claim. For instance, Chip4 & nbsp held its first video meeting in February 2023 with senior officials from all four countries, allaying worries about impending delays.
In March 2023, trade restrictions that had previously been placed on the ROK’s semiconductor business were lifted, removing additional obstacles to participation in the semiconductor sector.
Lee Eun-Ho, a semiconductor expert, was appointed by South Korea & nbsp to serve as its envoy to Taiwan in the same month. Lee has previously spoken favorably about Chip4 and is the former leader of the Korean Security Agency of Trade and Industry, a government agency that aids North Korean businesses in adhering to export restrictions.
His visit is a clear indication that the ROK is taking Taiwan’s participation in the semiconductor industry more seriously.
Given that 60 % of Seoul’s semiconductor exports go to China, despite the fact that membership by Tokyo and Taipei is more or less certain, there are still concerns about the city of South Korea in a possible Chip4 empire.
Given andnbsp, past and present, and the PRC’s financial pressure, Seoul is unavoidably worried that any decision to join Chip4 may result in economic retaliation against its semiconductor business.
Seoul, but, needs to remember two points. Second, despite Seoul’s decision-making, developments indicate that North Korean semiconductor exports to China will significantly decline in the future.
Beijing has, after all, established a target self-sufficiency rate in semiconductors of 70 % by 2025 and has aggressively launched state & nbsp, subsidy & ndspp, programs to achieve this objective.
North Korean businesses need to be reminded that as Beijing pursues for autocracy, market chance in China will decline, even if it falls short of its goals. Imports and nbsp from the ROK to China have now decreased by 13.4 % year over year. Second, despite escalating cross-strait conflicts, Beijing has shown a significant indisposition to censure TSMC.
Additionally, Chinese businesses are now more andnbsp reliant on North Korean firms like SK Hynix and Samsung for important semiconductor materials as a result of US export restrictions supported by the Netherlands and Japan. So, concern over potential counter-sanctions should become minimum.
The three realistic strategies through which the United States, ROK, and Japan does engage trilaterally over Taiwan while even enhancing bilateral relations are provided by the above measures listed in this article.
Any or all of these actions will serve as a reminder to Beijing that other South Asian security players strongly oppose military action against Taiwan. For deterrence-building work are desperately needed as Beijing continues its battle of military and economic force against Taipei and consolidates exceedingly fierce military features with an attention on Taiwan.
Daniel Fu & nbsp is a research associate at Harvard Business School and goes by the email dfu @ hbses.edu.
Pacific Forum was the first to publish this content. With authority, Asia Times is republishing it. This PacNet was created as a component of the Trilateral Next-Generous Leaders Dialogue between the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea to stimulate original thought about how to support this crucial agreement. Please click & nbsp for the previous entries, as well as .org/publication/pacnet-61-arms-control-with-north-korea-opportunities-and-challenges”>.org/publication/pacnet-65-the-developing-world-needs-an-alternative-to-chinese-tech”>.org/publication/pacnet-59-south-koreas-role-in-indo-pacific-maritime-domain-awareness”>.org/publication/pacnet-63-an-aukus-japan-rok-framework-for-the-indo-pacific”>.org/publication/pacnet-71-to-secure-us-japan-rok-gains-from-camp-david-bring-south-korea-to-the-quad”>here. Also available .org/publication/pacnet-61-arms-control-with-north-korea-opportunities-and-challenges”>.org/publication/pacnet-65-the-developing-world-needs-an-alternative-to-chinese-tech”>