Trump is not yet in office, and some people are beginning to understand that they didn’t receive the results they hoped. During his campaign,  , Trump promised unhappy consumers , that his policies may “rapidly travel costs down” and “bring your food expenses means down”.
Understandably, Trump has now , equivocated on that assurance, declaring that “it’s hard to bring things down when they’re up”. Conservatives hoped that Trump would upend the transgender movement and advocate for a traditional view of identity, but he now claims he doesn’t “want to get into the bath problem” and that he wants” to have all individuals treated pretty.”
Some technologists anticipated that Trump would be a friend of engineering and a foe of inadequate unions, but now Trump denies automation and supports the longshoremen’s union:
And so on. This doesn’t come as a surprise to everyone, of program— we’ve had nearly a decade to observe Trump , make promises and split them.
Everyone is aware that Trump adheres to his own preferences, feelings, and personal objectives, and that what constitutes his philosophy is merely a set of instincts and hazy ideas that he independently compiled after watching too many CNN on television in the 1990s. If you projected your hopes and dreams onto Trump when you pulled the lever, also, I guess that’s on you.
All in all, I’m not , too , worried about the status of the United States right then. Our business is strong, even if Trump re-accelerates prices by running huge deficits and toying with the Fed, it probably didn’t get severe.
Our world is slowly settling back after a decade of upheaval. Climate change is a risk, but it ‘s , typically being caused by different countries, so even if Trump cancels clean electricity subsidies it’ll had only a marginal effect on the planet.
A lot of long-term persistent problems, like injustice, are definitely worth addressing but not as instantly essential as we made them out to be in the 2010s. Trump may put Ukraine under the bus, but doing so would be a terribly wrong and repugnant thing to do. It also won’t pose a direct threat to the US.
And yet there’s one big exception, which is the threat posed to the US by the People’s Republic of China. China has the capacity to defeat the US in any extended conventional war, thanks to its domination of global manufacturing, soon, it may have the capacity to , defeat the US and all of its allies combined. What China will then only be able to do to the US in accordance with its current policy.
And I think it’s clear that , what China’s current leaders want , is to reduce the US to a second-rate power so that there’s no chance it will threaten their hegemony or their freedom of action in the future. This is what some claim the US did to Russia following the Cold War. And communist China is not , nearly , as nice a country as the US was in the 1990s.
The economic and political consequences for the American people would be, to put it mildly, pretty negative.
The only way I can think of preventing this happening is to close the manufacturing gap between the US-led alliance and China, rather than simply praying that China somehow collapses or that the Chinese are some sort of uniquely passive and mild people who won’t actually do anything as their leaders say they will.
Biden , made some strides toward this , during his term in office, reviving US manufacturing somewhat with his industrial policies, and implementing stringent and wide-ranging export controls on the Chinese chip industry.
The big question is whether Trump will continue the effort to ( partially ) catch up to China in manufacturing, or whether he will scrap it. Given that Trump frequently talks about how his tariffs on China are going to restore American manufacturing, this may seem like a stupid question. But you shouldn’t believe this story, for several reasons.
The first is that Trump’s tariff threats, like his promise to bring down grocery prices, may be mostly bluster. During his campaign, he promised 60 % tariffs on China, now, he has apparently , reduced the number to 10 %. That is a pretty small amount, and exchange rate appreciation will , easily cancel it out.
The second is that Trump’s tariffs on US allies will significantly hinder China’s effort to become a manufacturing partner. Currently, Trump is threatening only 10 % tariffs on China, but , 25 % tariffs on Mexico and Canada. This is likely just bluster and theater ( in which case we should inquire as to how an economic strategy that heavily relies on bluster and theater will help the US catch up to China in terms of manufacturing ).
But if it’s for real, it will hurt US manufacturing, by making imported components more expensive. Remember that while US tariffs on Mexico, Canada, and other allies directly affect the Chinese manufacturing juggernaut, creating a large common market outside of China is one of the most important strategies.
Trump’s tariffs, in my opinion, could give him the most political and rhetorical cover to basically abandon his fight against China’s influence. Tariffs, along with aggressive rhetoric, give Trump the appearance and reputation of a China hawk.
Without suffering much of a political blow, he could effectively gut America’s nascent resistance to China thanks to his stellar reputation. In the 2020s, we might discover that only Trump could sell us out to China, much like Nixon did in the 1970s.
Why do you think Trump did that in his first term when he was largely very hawkish toward China? Several reasons.
First of all, he is already discussing a number of ways to accommodate Chinese power. Trump initially requested a TikTok divestment, but he later reversed his opposition to the bipartisan TikTok divestment bill earlier this year.
The Information has reported , that TikTok altered its algorithm to favor Trump and the GOP. Trump may have been helped by billionaire Jeff Yass ‘ financial contributions to TikTok, which he also owns.
The bipartisan CHIPS Act, the most significant and ( so far ) successful single policy that America has implemented to shore up its industrial base in more than 50 years, was denounced by Trump during his campaign.
In other words, Trump’s main reason to believe he might sell American interests to the CCP is that he is already openly discussing doing so.
Additionally, it’s possible that some of Trump’s advisors favor a complacent view of Chinese power. Although Trump has appointed some hawks like Marco Rubio to his administration, his most important advisor and confidant — at least, for now— is Elon Musk.  , A recent story in the Financial Times , detailed Musk’s deep business connections with China — connections that he would be loath to lose in a conflict:
The richest man in the world has close ties to powerful Chinese Communist Party leaders, and is reportedly urging Beijing to make important decisions regarding Tesla, his$ 1 billion electric vehicle business. The carmaker relies heavily on its largest factory in Shanghai, which is the largest in its global network, to sell to the nation’s 1.4 billion people and export its China-made vehicles to other parts of the world. Musk’s Chinese suppliers, especially in batteries, are also crucial to the company’s global manufacturing operations, including in the US…
According to Yuqiu Wang of Freedom House,” Musk is not only vulnerable to Beijing’s pressure, but he also appears to genuinely enjoy close relationships with China’s authoritarian leaders,” he says. The CCP has plenty of opportunities to influence Trump’s China policy thanks to this dynamic.
Vivek Ramaswamy , and , Tulsi Gabbard , have also both called for the US to accommodate Chinese power in Asia, with Tulsi even going so far as to , denounce Japan’s rearmament , in the face of Chinese aggression. So although it doesn’t seem , certain , that Trump will roll over for the Chinese Communist Party, it certainly seems like a real possibility.
So how will we know? With Trump, there’s always a lot of bluster and theater. On top of that, it’s hard to tell whether Trump really believes that tariffs will be effective in restoring American manufacturing, or if they’re just a smoke screen. Meanwhile, Congress will probably , fight hard to keep the CHIPS Act , and the TikTok divestment bill.
However, Trump has the power to sabotage America’s efforts to compete with Chinese influence. He could cancel , the export controls , that the Biden administration placed on the Chinese semiconductor industry. Trump could simply do it whenever he wanted, without requiring executive action to remove export controls.
And because the policy is not really in the limelight, there probably wouldn’t be a popular backlash to its cancellation. So export controls are pretty much a pure test of Trump’s China policy — if he keeps them, it’s because he , wants , to stand up to China, and if he cancels them, it means he doesn’t.
And make no mistake — China , really, really , wants those export controls gone. Despite early , wailing and gnashing of teeth , over Huawei’s creation of a 7nm chip, the US export controls have almost certainly been very effective in slowing down China’s chip industry. Just a few examples of evidence point to the effectiveness of the controls:
- SMIC, the Chinese foundry company that developed the 7nm chip, was rumored to be rapidly advancing to 5nm. But the company has reportedly , delayed its 5nm release until at least 2026. This has  , left SMIC’s customer Huawei in the lurch, relying on technology that’s fast becoming obsolete.
- Even SMIC’s 7nm process, hailed as a catastrophic failure for export controls, is actually , not achieving good yields, and is reportedly having reliability issues. This is probably , hurting Huawei’s production , of leading-edge phones.
- In the last five years,  , over 22, 000 Chinese semiconductor companies have reportedly shut down. This is almost certainly due to some of it being exported.
- Huawei’s own chip production is , probably suffering as well, with , very low yields. The low yields are probably a result of having to rely on older, outdated equipment, due to export controls.
- Meanwhile,  , Chinese companies are pessimistic , about their ability to keep up with leading-edge chipmakers without access to the latest chipmaking tools from the Netherlands, the US, and Japan. This is expected to have  , deep ramifications for the AI race , between the US and China.
In other words, export controls are doing what they’re designed to do. They’re not killing China’s chip industry, but they’re slowing it down in important ways, and letting the U. S. retain its technological edge.
What’s more, the Biden administration constantly strengthened the controls, plugging loopholes even as China fought to come up with new workarounds. In fact, the outgoing administration  , released one more very strong update , to the export controls on December 2, denying China many of the best cutting-edge AI chips.
If the US wants to maintain any sort of military-technological advantage over China, export controls are effective and absolutely necessary. Chips are  , the foundation of , all , modern weaponry, from missiles to drones to satellites to advanced fighter jets.
And AI itself, which relies on advanced chips for inference and training, is quickly emerging as a vital tool of conflict. AI will become even more important to the military balance when autonomous drone swarms strike the front line.
Even with all the world’s industrial and tariff laws, the US is unlikely to be able to compete with China. America needs to maintain a technological edge to counteract its productive weakness, which should be balanced out by its quality deficiencies. Those semiconductors are the edge. If Trump cancels the export controls, it will mean he’s destroying America’s best chance to keep its weapons ahead of China’s weapons.
Now, Trump , might , not do this. After all, Trump was the one to start the practice of imposing export controls on China during his first term ( which targeted a select few Chinese businesses ). But recall that Trump dropped the export controls against China’s ZTE, reportedly as , a personal favor to Xi Jinping. Congress , scrambled to keep the controls in place, but they failed.
Trump’s second term could see a repeat of that episode. Trump might cancel America’s semiconductor export controls, possibly as some kind of deal for China dropping its own far less formidable export controls on , drone batteries , and , various metals , — or maybe just for no reason at all. Trump might not even need any justifications for his actions.
In any case, Trump’s decision to revoke export controls will send the strongest message that his administration wants to stop trying to compete with Chinese influence. Don’t let tariff theater fool you; this is the real test.
This , article was first published on Noah Smith’s Noahpinion , Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become a Noahopinion , subscriber , here.