JAKARTA: Despite having the fourth-largest population in the world, boasts the largest Arab politics on the planet, is at the center of a crucial region in terms of geopolitical issues, and consistently punches below its weight on the international stage.
The non-aligned movement’s leader Sukarno and its leader Suharto, who played a key role in the Cold War, have kept a low profile since democratization in 1998.
As political leaders have focused on promoting a post-authoritarian social order while promoting economic growth,” a thousand friends and negative enemies” has become a national anthem.
New President- elect Prabowo Subianto, but, properly herald a more effective approach to Indonesia’s international matters.
For the past century, Indonesian foreign policy has run on a somewhat successful driver. When he took office in 2014, president Joko Widodo, aka Jokowi, declared to his supporters that he would never afterwards waste his time in this manner and that he would merely change his mind after being prodded.
Indonesia’s international affairs were in the hands of Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, a career diplomat who adhered to Indonesia’s traditional place of non-alignment between great powers while strengthening regional relationships, with the exception of a deluge of national politics around the G20 hosted in Bali in 2022.
Prabowo, officials say, can be expected to get a far greater interest in foreign policy. Unlike Jokowi, Prabowo, 72, has spent much of his living overseas and is comfortable doing business in English.
Insiders claim that he is eager to leave a lasting reputation, an impulse that frequently prompts leaders to appear to successes abroad, despite the decades of hard work he has pursued the presidency. His rumored poor health and his age probably give off a sense of urgency.
What will this then imply for both the area and the rest of the world? Prabowo, the nation’s present defense minister and a previous special forces common, is known to have a firm preoccupation with Indonesia’s sovereignty, a short- fuse temper and a penchant for away- the- cuff comments.
At the same time, officials argue he is finally a realist. He wo n’t likely get too far away from Indonesia’s customary policy of careful non-alignment and good ties with all, which Prabowo has already rhetorically committed, along with fiery asides about the need for greater national strength, thanks to geopolitical realities and a talented foreign ministry bureaucracy.
Some credit the original president Abdurrahman Wahid, also known as Gus Dur, whose cautious career diplomats kept his frequently innovative foreign policy inclinations under control.
On the main political problem of rising US- China conflicts, Indonesia, like most ASEAN powers, has much interest in being drawn into a duel.
China is Indonesia’s second-largest investor, and it actively participates in important infrastructure tasks and the corporate metal industry. There are powerful opportunities to keep relationships on an even keel despite tensions over China’s nine-dash series, which overlaps with some of Indonesia’s regional waters.
America’s economic relationship, on the other hand, is commonly viewed as unsatisfactory but the US is also valued as a security companion, weapons supply and large counterweight to China. Prabowo, who has long emphasized the value of military power and is looking to international partners to support an ambitious military modernization program, holds this to be especially significant.
So far, China has arguably played a defter hand in wooing Prabowo. That was apparent when Prabowo was invited for an official visit to Beijing before he was formally proclaimed president, which was a strange step.
The US, meanwhile, has reportedly left Prabowo feeling somewhat slighted. The Americans notably waited until his victory was formally approved over a month later as ambassadors gathered to congratulate him on his victory on February 14.
The ex-soldier’s alleged interest in Prabowo’s ability to enter the US while serving as defense secretary was also reportedly piqued by the complication that allegedly prevented him from entering the country even after a visa ban related to allegations of human rights abuses dating back to the 1990s was lifted.
Still, there’s little sign these sore feelings will greatly affect Prabowo’s foreign policy. Despite his own feelings for Indonesia and the US, Prabowo consistently strengthened them, including by increasing joint military exercises.
Indeed, there’s a certain expectation in Jakarta that Prabowo’s preoccupation with security might motivate him to put more distance from China than Jokowi, who visited the country eight times in 10 years as president.
Prabowo is expected to take a stronger stand against Chinese intrusions into Indonesian territorial waters, though few people see him going as far as the Philippines, which has dramatically changed its attitude and behavior toward China under Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s US-aligned rule.
Indonesian stalwarts on foreign policy seem to welcome this as a necessary correction from Jokowi’s conceited lack of understanding of the situation.
Prabowo’s ostensible desire to contribute more to the world might inspire him to raise Indonesia’s voice on current crises. In 2023, at the Shangri- La Dialogue defense talk shop in Singapore, he shocked many, not least the Indonesian foreign ministry, by using his speech to propose a peace plan for Ukraine.
He once more reiterated his peace proposal at the conference this year, giving his support for Indonesia’s participation in a fictitious UN peacekeeping force in Gaza, though this time the foreign ministry appears to have been informed in advance.
Myanmar, where the coup-installed junta’s position appears more vulnerable on the battlefield, might conceivably also draw his attention as the risk of regional blowback rises.
Given that the conflicts are unresolvable and that Indonesia has no known influence over developments in Gaza or Ukraine, how much he could accomplish in any of these foreign policy areas is still a mystery.
Myanmar, which is technically still a member of ASEAN, may offer opportunities for Indonesia to serve as a mediator between the military and rebel groups. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Indonesia successfully facilitated the mediation of peace in Cambodia.
Any successful intervention in Myanmar or other countries would require close cooperation with his foreign minister and the diplomatic bureaucracy. Crucially, Prabowo is expected to replace Retno as the nation’s top diplomat.
The minister has typically been a technocrat who has risen through the bureaucratic ranks and whose personality aligns with the president’s since the Reformasi era. However, it’s already rumored that Prabowo might use a former prime minister or other ally.
Roesan Roeslani, businessman and former ambassador to the US who played a key role in Prabowo’s presidential campaign, Fadli Zon, a member of Prabowo’s Gerindra party, Dino Pati Djalal, former deputy foreign minister and key foreign policy advisor under president Susilo Bambang Yudhyono, and Meutya Hafid, a Golkar party member and chair of the parliamentary foreign policy committee, have all been suggested as possibilities.
While all would be unconventional choices, most would likely be serviceable, though there may be doubts about their mastery of the bureaucracy.
The only person who stands out is Fadli Zon, a combative politician known for his ties to Islamist organizations, his admiration for Russian President Vladimir Putin, and his blatant prejudice against Chinese Indonesians. whose appointment to the top position would alarm everyone, both domestically and abroad.
Who Prabowo eventually settles on, technocrat or otherwise, will perhaps be the best indication of the priorities of a man who, despite being a veteran of Indonesia’s politics, policymaking and military affairs, retains a streak of unpredictability and penchant for springing surprises.
Joseph Rachman , is a Jakarta- based freelance journalist covering , Indonesian , and ASEAN news. Follow him on X at @rachman_joseph