With Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle ( MIRV ), India’s most recent Agni- 5 test cements its position in the elite group of world powers, a significant step forward in improving nuclear deterrence in relation to China and Pakistan.
Many media outlets reported this month that India had safely completed the initial flight test of its Agni- 5 MIRV weapon. This step propels India into the elite class of nuclear power with MIRV technologies, including the US, UK, France, China, Russia and Pakistan.  ,
The test was conducted on Abdul Kalam Island in the Bay of Bengal, off India’s north beach. Although India did not specify how many MIRVs were involved in the Agni- 5 check, it is believed to have carried between two and ten missiles.
The start of the Agni line, which is named after the Sanskrit word for “fire,” was hailed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi as a happy moment for the country. Home Minister Amit Shah and defence secretary Rajnath Singh praised the study’s commitment to Modi’s eyesight of a self-sufficient India.
The good energy, canister- launched Agni- 5 has a range of over 5, 000 kilometers, allowing it to pin regions deeply within the territories of possible adversaries like China and Pakistan.
Given the ongoing borders tensions with China and India’s geopolitical rivalry and tensions with Pakistan, which underscore the rocket’s role in national surveillance and deterrence, the capability is especially important.
By enhancing the resilience of its nuclear forces, complicating adversaries ‘ missile defence calculations, and highlighting India’s no-first-use nuclear plan with a credible second- hit capability, the integration of MIRV technology into India’s missile arsenal will affect the region’s proper balance.
India needs to move its MIRV missile program quickly because of Pakistan’s pursuit of MIRV technology and China’s evolving missile defenses.
Rajesh Basrur and Jaganath Sankaran mention in a May 2016 Stimson Center report that India’s MIRV program has been influenced by both perceived external threats from China and internal imperatives.
Basrur and Sankaran note that India’s MIRV program aims to ensure its security against China’s improving military capabilities, including China’s own MIRV and ballistic missile defense ( BMD) advancements.
In a region already rife with nuclear rivalries, skeptics question the escalation risks and the implications for crisis stability, claim claim those who support MIRVs ‘ ability to penetrate Chinese BMD systems.
MIRV missiles are “use it or lose it,” because putting numerous nuclear warheads on one missile makes it more vulnerable to a first strike that destroys a lot of a country’s ability to launch a second strike.
Basrur and Sankaran add that India’s MIRV capabilities are complicated by its long-standing nuclear policy, which is characterized by restraint and a formally no-first-use stance.
In addition, they discuss the relationship between civilian oversight of India’s nuclear weapons program and counterarguments to a minimalist nuclear deterrence posture.
They do, however, warn that technological advancement frequently outweighs strategic doctrinal clarity, which could prevent developments like MIRVs that do not fully conform to India’s minimalist nuclear doctrine.
India still faces strategic challenges in enhancing its nuclear disarmament strategy against China. Those constraints include the two sides ‘ economic interdependence, India’s desire to be a leader in the so- called” Global South” and China’s relative political and economic advantages.
India’s close economic ties with China, participation in multilateral initiatives led by China, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO ), and participation in China-led military exercises may restrain India’s flexibility and nuclear posturing, according to Asia Times in December 2022.
In October 2022, Asia Times reported that China is confident that its authoritarian system of government is capable of outperforming India’s democracy and that its technological prowess will continue to be a decade ahead of India.
Asia Times reported that Pakistan launched its second test of the Ababeel MRBM in October of that year at the Sakhi Sarwar range in Punjab province in November 2023. Like the Agni- 5, the Ababeel MRBM is also designed to carry MIRVs.
Pakistan’s ability to penetrate India’s new missile defense system was reportedly enhanced by the test launch, which was conducted to confirm a number of design and technical parameters and evaluate the performance of various subsystems.
India’s Agni- 5 may still have to overcome reliability concerns before it is fielded. Regarding India’s nuclear weapons ‘ effectiveness and its capacity to produce enough fissile material for a MIRV nuclear arsenal, it may be questioned due to its MIRV capability.
In a 2014 article in the peer-reviewed Asian Survey Journal, Frank O’Donnell and Harsh Pant point out that India’s MIRV-capable Agni-5 and Agni-6 will spark demand for more sophisticated and smaller warheads. According to O’Donnell and Pant, Indian scientists ‘ claims of hyperbolic capability may have undermined India’s commitment to developing missiles and a more extensive nuclear arsenal.
While the recent Agni- 5 test may have at least partially dispelled those doubts, Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda note in a July 2022 Bulletin of Atomic Scientists article that while the Agni- 5 has been tested eight times before, additional testing may be required before the missile reaches operational capability.
In her book Striking Asymmetries: Nuclear Transitions in South Asia, Ashley Tellis points out that India’s nuclear weapons’ small yields are the most important constraint on its arsenal. According to Tellis, adding more low-yield warheads to India’s stock would not help the country’s shortage.
India’s slow fissile material production, despite having an extensive nuclear infrastructure, owes to the fact that its nuclear capabilities are focused more on power generation than nuclear weapons production.
Tellis asserts that India has the ability to increase the production of weapons-grade plutonium in its civilian nuclear power plants and has done so in the past. In the event of a global fissile material cutoff treaty, she claims that India will keep producing a surge of materials.