Europe can’t be defended against Russian attack: report – Asia Times

A shocking but accurate record on European and European defense has been released by the German Kiel Institute. According to the report, the state of Germany, Europe, and the United States is nevertheless terrible.

Bottom line: Despite all the talk of a NATO combat, the alliance, including the United States, is not prepared for any conflict with Russia. Additionally, it makes the suggestion that the cost of security products is causing profit for defense companies but not for the sake of security as a whole.

The Kiel Institute, founded in 1914, is regarded as Germany’s leading significant think tank. In September, the Institute&nbsp, produced a study &nbsp, called” Fit for war in decades: Europe’s and Germany’s slow rearmament vis-a-vis Russia”.

The review makes a significant point about how ready Germany and other European nations are when Russia attacks them. Additionally, it tells a terrible story about how expensive and unsatisfactory European protection manufacturing has become. &nbsp, &nbsp,

A fantastic example is Germany’s Caracal weather abuse car. A Caracal is a kind of crazy rabbit found in Africa, Pakistan, the Middle East and parts of India. The German car, an unarmored gussied-up car based on a Mercedes G group vehicle, was put up by Rheinmetall, Mercedes-Benz AG and ACS Armored Car Systems GmbH.

A European Caracal Air Assault Vehicle.

The Caracal lacks weapons on its wide-open sides. Over 3, 000 of these cars have been provided to Ukraine at a cost of&nbsp, 1.9 billion dollars, which works out to 620, 000 dollars per product. &nbsp,

For less than$ 35, 000 per copy, you could pin an antitank weapons or equipment gun on a four-wheel drive industrial jeep. And since Ukraine has no evacuation ability, an air abuse aircraft dropped onto the field is a non-starter. ( The euro now trades at$ 1.08 to the US dollar. )

30mm weapons for the German Puma troops fighting car is an equally abhorrent case. The Puma costs a remarkable$ 5.3 million each, while its 30mm weapons charges around &nbsp, 1, 000 dollars per chance! &nbsp,

Puma you fire up to 600 rounds per minute. That compares to a US 30mm High Explosive Dual Purpose round ( more specialized than a run-of-the-mill bullet ) at$ 100. European 30mm ammunition costs ten times more than American 30mm weapons.

Additionally, soldiers are getting defensive defense headsets from the German army. Tactically available commercially available tactical headsets retail for$ 299. If additional features like noise cancellation are added, the price may go up to$ 400, but not more. But European devices cost a whopping&nbsp, 2, 700 dollars each.

Bottom line: People and businesses are making a lot of money by providing Western armies or sending goods to Ukraine. Some people believe it to be openly corruption because institutions are involved in these transactions. Mind that the Kiel Institute just goes as far as to claim these payments are uber-expensive, no more. &nbsp,

A European Puma Tank.

The fact that Russia’s defense industry is growing rapidly and that North Korea is then adding more supplies with artillery shells and missiles is a lot, according to the Kiel record. &nbsp,

North Korea, it seems, has been grinding out weapons also in excess of anything it can use, and until now, it did not trade them. Of course, the Kim Jong Un tyranny is sustained by the Russian agreement with North Korea by providing funds or the equivalent and funding the projects.

All of this helps present, in part, that Germany’s opportunities in security are corrupted ( I think that is the right word ) by excessively expensive equipment. &nbsp,

Also if Germany really meets the NATO target of 2.1 % of GDP for defence spending, what the European military ends up receiving is incredibly expensive. Not to mention that a lot of it ends up in Ukraine and is only gradually, if at all, replaced on the domestic before.

Even with sufficient saving, what money is spent on boggles the mind. Very much, for instance, is going into heat defense, something that is important for Germany’s potential defense needs.

Nevertheless, NATO-supplied air defenses have done a poor to horrible work in Ukraine, a forerunner of a dangerous upcoming in Europe unless the problem is corrected. An interesting note ( website 25 ) in the statement, set in ultra-small form, discusses Ukraine’s ability to shoot down Russian missiles and uavs:

Sample interception rates for commonly used Russian missiles in 2024: 50 % for the older Kalibr subsonic cruise missiles, 22 % for modern subsonic cruise missiles ( e. g. Kh-69 ), 4 % for modern ballistic missiles ( e. g. Iskander-M), 0.6 % for S-300/400 supersonic long-range SAM, and 0.55 % for the Kh-22 supersonic anti-ship missile.

There is little information about the infiltration levels of hypersonic weapons: Ukraine claims a 25 % intrusion price for the Kinzhal and Zircon, but Ukrainian options also claim that to interceptions of this nature require the fire of all 32 launchers in a Patriot battery made of US-style to have any chance to shoot down a single hypersonic missile. By contrast, European Nationalist batteries have 16 rockets, and Germany has 72 launchers in full.

Take notice that Patriot’s interceptor missiles are in extremely limited stock. Manufacturing these weapons takes a long time, and setting up these weapons has proved difficult. Bolloxing manufacturing lines is also caused by a lack of crucial parts. &nbsp,

Boeing provides crucial components for the missile’s target ( when it works ) while US defense contractor Lockheed Martin is the main manufacturer. Boeing wo n’t solve that problem, at the earliest, until 2027. In addition, Boeing is currently facing a significant business strike and a crisis internally that is still far from resolved.

But there are great questions about air mechanisms. The US has given Ukraine the Patriot and other methods. The Russians put a lot of effort into destroying them, but even when they succeed, their catch level is below par. Europe has supplied IRIS-T, NSAMS and other methods that, so far as can be determined, are almost similar to the Patriot. &nbsp,

On the whole, Jewish methods are greater, but they are not deployed in Ukraine. What is regarded as the major US method for air defence, AEGIS ( in the form of AEGIS Ashore ), is not in Ukraine. The devices are in use in Romania and Poland.

Europe largely has none of its own air defense deployed in Europe. The US is not much more prosperous. Some systems, particularly the Ground-Based Mid-Course Interceptor based in Alaska, are a combined case.

The Pentagon is then searching for better-performing fighter weapons to replace its current ones. The 40 or so weapons in stock merely function about half the time despite some tests that were optimized to ensure success.

The potential is also concerning as fast weapons arrive on the field, seen in Ukraine in the form of Russia’s Kinzhal and Zircon. Hypersonic assault weapons are hardly ever a possibility for systems like the Patriot, Iris-T, or any other NATO air defense systems.

The Kh-47M2 Kinzhal weapon as seen at the 2018 Moscow&nbsp, Victory Day Parades.

The image is n’t particularly beautiful when it comes to drones, which are being shot off by Ukrainians and Russians in droves. They are difficult to kill, and present war tanks and troops fighting vehicles can be destroyed by systems like the Russian Lancet helicopter. &nbsp,

No one has yet devised a successful strategy to stop swarms of drones, not yet Israel, and stop some of the smaller attacks that pass by.

Above all, the Kiel record puts a new and important view on Europe’s security position and, by extension, the US, which is pledged by treaty to help protect Europe.

It is time to step back and assess whether a credible defense of Europe is possible in the wake of NATO’s continued expansion and growing angst in Europe and Russia. Right now, judging by the Kiel report, the answer is no.

At Asia Times, Stephen Bryen is the senior correspondent. He also served as the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s staff director and its deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. &nbsp,

This&nbsp, article was originally published on his&nbsp, Weapons and Strategy&nbsp, Substack, and is republished with permission.