Volodymyr Zelensky, the president of Ukraine, arrived in the US on September 22 for a year of events, including a meeting with Vice President Kamala Harris and US President Joe Biden. Zellensky has stated that he will present his “plan for success” in the Ukraine war.  ,  ,
Will Washington give in to Zelensky’s desire to apply Western-provided missiles for strikes inside Russia is a distinct but crucial question. The US government has so far only vested its control over Ukraine’s ability to fire missiles from the Army Tactical Missile System ( ATACMS ), which can travel up to 190 miles, at Russian military installations.  ,
The US also has the power to stop Ukraine from firing Storm Shadow boat weapons, made by a UK-French partnership, into Russia because they contain US-made parts. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer has  , reportedly , lobbied Biden to soften the limits.
Biden , said , on September 22 that he had never yet made a decision on the topic. He is hesitant to try to provoke Russian President Vladimir Putin into a direct issue with the US or its supporters in Europe.  ,
On September 12, Putin repeatedly stoked this concern,  , saying , on Russian Television that if Western countries let Ukraine apply their missiles to attack targets within Russia, “it would mean that NATO countries… are at war with Russia”, which he said do” change the very nature of the conflict”, a hint at using his nuclear weapons.  ,
This is a statement that some non-Russian commentators agree with. For example, an op-ed , published , on September 14 in , Asia Times , ( and originally , here ) by Stephen Bryen, a former senior US Defense Department official,  , echos and amplifies Putin.  ,
Bryen contends that NATO is “declaring war” on Russia, which would equate to” World War II I” and that the US government “wants to launch missiles into Russia” because the Obama administration “knows that their Ukraine policy is a disaster.”
A more in-depth and balanced analysis is required. In liberal democratic nations, authoritarian leaders like Putin have unrepeated access to the free press. They use it to both threaten consequences and, over time, to weaken the capacity to resist, particularly among those supporting Ukraine under NATO and other democracies.  ,
Putin has a reason to believe that the democratic partners who support Ukraine will eventually give in to his willpower and force him to agree to terms with a deal. He also has less to worry about at home thanks to draconian measures to punish criticism of Russian policy or military performance.  ,
In fact, Russia’s Ukraine policy has clearly been a disaster, while US policy has been largely successful. With the addition of Sweden and Finland, NATO now has a much longer land border with Russia and is now larger than before Putin’s aggression.  , It is more unified and is spending much more on defense.  ,
Russia has made a sizable contribution to the conflict, not just in the form of ships or human remains at the bottom of the Black Sea. It has lost access to technologies and markets, especially in Europe.  , Foreign purchases of Russian arms have tanked.  ,
Even the wealthy elites close to Putin had their yachts and other foreign assets taken, but even the average Russian has had limited travel opportunities outside Russia and higher-priced goods at home in comparison to before. Many of the most educated individuals have left the country. Putin is wanted in connection with international law violations.
If Putin had any real understanding of what he was getting into, he would have undoubtedly not have launched the invasion in February 2022. A much smaller country has humiliated Russia, fighting it to almost a standstill, so it is in Putin’s interest to attribute his failure to a powerful alliance of alleged US “proxies” and “puppets” arrayed against Russia. He knows that’s a half-truth at best.
It’s difficult to imagine that President Biden, who is renowned for being cautious, will abruptly change his mind and start a third world war. If he grants Ukraine greater freedom to use weapons, it will undoubtedly have requirements that limit the use of force against crucial military targets. This is also in Ukraine’s interests since using a single ATACMS missile costs US$ 850, 000, while a Storm Shadow costs US$ 1 million.
Washington and its allies ‘ goals are to assist Ukraine in defending itself and avoiding a direct conflict with Russia, which is why there are so many complaints about Biden’s “excessive caution” being used as the focus.  ,
However, the strategy has changed significantly since Korea in 1950 or Kuwait in 1991, when the US led the charge and its allies and its own forces engaged the enemy who had broken international law. Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity is the foundation of the UN Charter’s anti-aggression principles.  ,
Even China takes the official position that any settlement involving Ukraine should begin with this. China, however, should walk the walk in light of its own history as the victim of Japanese aggression.  , In 1933, the UN’s predecessor, the League of Nations, tried to invoke the theory of collective security and voted to condemn Japan. Tokyo’s response was to withdraw from the League and continue the aggression.
In the current situation, the UN General Assembly voted 141 to 5 to demand that Russia withdraw its troops from Ukraine. There were also 35 abstentions, including some very important Asian countries that did n’t want to take sides. The Russians simply ignored the vote, much like the Japanese in 1933. Moreover, they rattled the nuclear threat against anyone who might directly interfere.
Has Russia shown any sign of wanting a third world war? Puntin’s initial aggression was obviously wrong-headed, and this was made worse by his further investigation through Ukrainian territory’s formal annexations.  ,
Putin, however, makes a conscious effort to steer clear of any kinetic contact with NATO forces and has resisted doing so repeatedly as he has been warned that using nuclear weapons could lead to Russian use.  , Examples include the US agreeing to Ukraine’s request for F-16s and defensive Patriot missiles.  ,
Missile strikes in areas of Russia close to Ukraine would not have such a significant impact on the conflict as to give credence to Putin’s nuclear threat. The US already , routinely provides , Ukraine with military intelligence, including satellite data for targeting Russian forces or military infrastructure.  ,
The Ukrainians have been using drones to attack targets inside Russia, often farther away than the ATACMS’s 190-mile range. And, most notably, Ukrainian forces recently occupied a small enclave in Russia, an incursion that galvanized a surprisingly weak Russian reaction.
Putin has buffed before about using nuclear weapons, but that does not indicate that he has no red lines. If he wants to protect his leadership over Russia, it is reasonable to assume that he might use tactical nukes.  ,
But toppling him is neither a Ukrainian nor a NATO objective, and extending the limit of missile strikes to 190 miles from Ukrainian-held territory presents no new danger to Putin’s political position.
Instead, such missile attacks would force Russians to relocate significant military staging areas away from Ukraine. That is a step toward a negotiated settlement, but it is not a justification for a nuclear war.
Better assisting Ukraine will bring us closer to a just peace than accosting Putin’s bluffs. But this is not enough. A serious international diplomatic initiative based on close cooperation with Ukraine is also required.  ,
As the actual belligerents, neither Kiev nor Moscow is in a position to convene such an initiative. A coalition of third parties, including but not limited to NATO, is needed. The purpose would be a settlement based on Ukraine’s pre-2014 territorial integrity, which Russia solemnly agreed to in 1994.  ,  ,
That rule would not prevent the various assurances regarding Russian access to ports and the treatment of ethnic Russians in Ukraine, for whom the Ukrainian Constitution already provides protection, from being taken into account. A peace agreement in which both Ukraine and Russia can declare that their goals have been accomplished should be possible.
This will require a lot of time, and Western powers may need to do even more in the way of physical engagement to create a conducive negotiating environment. However, democracies need to show that they are serious about achieving a peaceful settlement based on the established standards of the international system given the country’s propensity for long wars.
And that they are willing to take on both diplomatic and military leadership in this regard.
Charles Morrison is senior fellow and president emeritus, East-West Center, Denny Roy is senior fellow, East-West Center.