Frequent Risks
The possible formation of splinter groups by another top leaders and members who might not agree with the dissolution poses the initial threat.
The majority of JI people are likely to pursue the dissolution call. As a result of a revamped selection process and domestic surveillance system, JI individuals recruited over the past century have been mostly disciplined in accordance with the news.
Nevertheless, there are radical groups in JI that may believe. However, there has been precedence of like factions operating autonomously.
Imaruddin made use of the immediate power vacuum created by Para Wijayanto’s imprisonment in 2019 to launch attacks, an action JI has forbidden since 2011. His faction made plans to attack Chinese-Indonesian owned stores in Banten, West Java and East Java, amassed over 260 million rupiah ( US$ 16, 060 ), and procured two firearms before being arrested.
The second risk is a plot to invade well-known religious organizations and mobilise public support for the establishment of an Islamic express in Indonesia.
In the past ten years, JI’s preferred strategy has changed from using violence to using dakwah ( preaching ). Some JI researchers claimed that “if establishing an Islamist position were the purpose, above-ground organizations like the Islamic Defenders Front had made more progress than JI.”
Finally, JI recognised that it does not need to prospect dakwah efforts. It has been releasing JI seniors from the organization’s structure so they can get on community leadership positions. Ahmad Zain-An-Najah, the most well-known case of this, was a member of the influential Indonesian Ulema Council when he was detained for JI connections in 2021.
Even after the organization stops operating, JI was continue its efforts to support JI radical ideology.