The important part place would play in a Taiwan Strait conflict is highlighted by China’s strong moves to counter Starlink’s martial applications with cutting-edge satellite disruption methods.
This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP ) reported that Chinese scientists have developed a method to target SpaceX’s Starlink satellite constellation. According to SCMP, the technique is used to simulate a space mission that could use 99 Chinese satellites to view nearly 1,400 Starlink satellites in less than 12 hours.
The study, led by Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics director Wu Yunhua, features Starlink’s martial applications as seen in the Ukraine conflict.
According to the Chinese team’s computer model, China could effectively monitor and control the functional status of Starlink satellites, which are equipped with lasers, microwaves, and other types of reconnaissance and tracking equipment. The SCMP report cites a fresh linear AI engine that was used to mimic the whale hunting strategy.
Wu’s team claims to have created an unheard technology that makes it possible for computers at the surface command center to create a detailed and trustworthy action strategy in less than two hours.
Additionally, it states that the Harbin Institute of Technology, which is also a member of the job, has received significant funding from the Foreign government and military.
China is officially developing anti-satellite systems to counteract the Starlink network’s perceived military threat, which has shown geopolitical utility in Ukraine by enabling real-time battle coordination.
Foreign researchers advocate” soft and hard remove methods” to destroy Starlink’s distributed star, which provides resilient connection through over 2, 300 satellites.
Targeting individual Starlink satellites is deemed inefficient, instead, China has explored disruptive technologies, including the Relativistic Klystron Amplifier ( RKA ), a high-power microwave weapon capable of disabling sensitive satellite electronics. But, deploying for techniques faces challenges, including dish heat and power demands.
China is also developing advanced directed-energy arms like solid-state laser mounted on spacecraft and is exploring the potential of X-ray beams, which are concepts from the US Strategic Defense Initiative ( SDI) to destroy some satellites simultaneously. This strategy aims to remedy the standard anti-satellite arms’ cost-exchange imbalance.
The logic for these programs stems from Starlink’s confirmed defense advantages, such as boosting US drones ‘ and cunning fighters’ data speeds by 100-fold, and its important role in Ukraine’s field successes, including the sinking of the Russian cruiser Moskva.
China’s rely on such technology reflects a broader strategy to mitigate Starlink’s features and maintain space superiority, especially in scenarios like a Taiwan issue.
Noting Starlink’s effectiveness in the Ukraine war, Juliana Suess mentions in a January 2023 article for the Royal United Service Institute ( RUSI) that Taiwan, inspired by Ukraine, is developing its Low-Earth orbit ( LEO ) satellite communications system.
According to Suess, the project was announced by the Taiwanese Space Agency in December 2022 and aims to give Taiwan a sovereign capability for independent communications in the event of a Chinese invasion.
She points out that the system is designed to protect Taiwan’s undersea cables, which currently serve as the backbone of its external communications, from potential attacks.
In a July 2024 report for the Stanford Cyber Policy Center, Charles Mok and Kenny Huang highlight the vulnerability of Taiwan’s undersea cables, which the island relies on for its internet connectivity.
Mok and Huang point out that Taiwan has 15 submarine cables that connect it to international digital networks and carry over 99 percent of the world’s data. The risk of unintentional or deliberate cable damage is increased, however, because its location in an earthquake-prone region and its proximity to geopolitical tensions.
They note recent incidents of severed cables near Taiwan, which are believed to be involving Chinese ships, have raised concerns about potential digital blockades. They point out that fixing undersea cables takes time, and that having a few global repair fleets adds to this.
In line with the vulnerabilities of Taiwan’s undersea cable infrastructure, The War Zone reported this month that Taiwanese authorities have accused a Chinese-owned vessel, the Shunxin-39, of severing an undersea communications cable near Keelung Harbor.
According to The War Zone, this incident is the most recent in a line of similar events affecting Taiwan’s underwater infrastructure. The Shunxin-39, which is registered in Cameroon but controlled by a Hong Kong company led by a Chinese national, was discovered to be operating under multiple identities, raising questions of deliberate sabotage.
According to the report, Taiwan’s coast guard attempted to intercept the vessel for investigation, but rough weather prevented boarding. The ship then mentions that it continued its journey to South Korea, where Taiwanese authorities requested assistance with the investigation.
According to The War Zone, the damaged cable from the Trans-Pacific Express network is essential for connecting East Asia to the US West Coast. The report says that although communication was rerouted with minimal disruption, the incident highlights the vulnerability of Taiwan’s undersea infrastructure.
Although satellites are immune from these flaws, Mok and Huang contend that undersea cables cannot be replaced due to their high cost and limited data storage.
Furthermore, Marc Julienne mentions in a November 2024 report for the French Institute of International Relations ( IFRI ) that while ambitious, Taiwan’s LEO satellite program faces several key challenges.
First, Julienne makes a note of the fact that the use of foreign partners for satellite launches highlights the lack of local launch capabilities, a significant impediment to achieving full space power status. Although autonomous launch vehicles are in the works, he claims that development is still slow, with test flights only scheduled for 2028.
Second, he claims that efforts to create a domestically controlled LEO broadband satellite constellation are hampered by the limited experience in space-based communications among Taiwan’s traditional space actors and the lack of satellite communication expertise within its industrial base.
Julienne says these challenges are compounded by Taiwan’s geographic and geopolitical vulnerabilities, such as reliance on submarine cables for internet connectivity, which are prone to natural disasters and potential sabotage by adversaries.
He makes the point that Taiwan’s efforts to improve” communication resilience” through satellite constellations are important but require significant financial and human capital investments. However, he says Taiwan’s burgeoning space sector struggles to attract and retain talent, with many engineers favoring higher-paying opportunities in semiconductors or working overseas.
Finally, Julienne says navigating the geopolitical sensitivities of space development, particularly in maintaining civilian oversight and avoiding provocative military applications, adds complexity to Taiwan’s ambitions.