Asia (Page 40)

China ’s fresh non-nuclear hydrogen bomb is designed to destroy sustained power to terrify Taiwan’s soldiers and split their resistance in urban war.

This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP ) reported that Chinese scientists successfully detonated a non-nuclear hydrogen bomb in a controlled field test, citing a peer-reviewed study published last month in the Chinese-language Journal of Projectiles, Rockets, Missiles and Guidance.

Developed by the China State Shipbuilding Corporation’s 705 Research Institute, the system uses mg hydride—a solid-state gas storage material previously engineered for off-grid power applications—as its principal part.

During stimulation, reverberations break the stuff into micron-scale contaminants, releasing hydrogen fuel. This fuel ignites into sustained fire and reaches temperature exceeding 1,000 degree Celsius.

Unlike regular TNT blasts, which produce a simple, really high-pressure wave, China ’s novel weapon creates a lower top blast pressure but sustains its fireball for over two hours, causing extended infrared damage and enabling directed energy results.

Researchers emphasized the weapon’s military applications, ranging from common heat forecast to precision-target death, facilitated by its stable network response mechanism.

The production of magnesium hydrogen, longer restricted to facilities, saw a breakthrough with the beginning of a high-capacity grow in Shaanxi state earlier this year, capable of producing 150 lots annually. However, certain details about the exam site or operational tactics remain unclear.

The faculties of China ’s magnesium hydroxide weapon appear operationally similar to those of a thermobaric tool. These weapons disperse a huge cloud of energy that ignites upon contact with air, producing a high-temperature fire and a deadly wave that can reach bunkers and buildings. These arms are especially effective in urban war.

Russia’s use of its TOS-1 thermobaric rocket launcher in Ukraine offers a glimpse into how China may use its new bomb in Taiwan, using enormous blasts to eliminate infantry in buildings, starve occupants of oxygen and inflict damaging internal injuries.

In a June 2024 article for The National Interest ( TNI), Peter Suciu mentions that Russia’s urban warfare tactics using the TOS-1 appeared to emphasize that the best way to take out infantry in buildings is to prevent them from getting out, and that those who get out are too severely injured to continue fighting.

China may face a similar situation in Taiwan should an invasion of the latter bog down into an urban war of attrition. In the 2022 book Crossing the Strait, Sale Lilly mentions that China ’s urban warfare tactics are guided by the principle of “killing rats in a porcelain shop, ” emphasizing the brutality of such operations while exercising caution to prevent the destruction of cities.

Further, Lilly points out that besides the height of Taipei’s skyscrapers, the city ’s underground infrastructure, including parking garages, shopping centers and subway stations, dramatically expands the area available for urban warfare.

Such infrastructure may play a vital role in Taiwan’s attritional defense. E Sean Rooney and other writers mention in an October 2024 Proceedings article that if Taiwan were forced to defend itself without the US, its urban environment would provide an ideal defensive environment, as massed fires against urban targets would create more rubble and defensive positions, requiring China to hold both aboveground and underground layers in a laborious advance.

Rooney and others also say that China using mass fires against urban areas could generate an international backlash and turn international popular opinion against it.

While thermobaric weapons could be effective in such an environment, they could also cause massive collateral damage. However, as China claims its new bomb has a controllable chain reaction and a weaker blast force than TNT, it hints at the weapon’s power being scalable to address such concerns.

Alternatively, China may also take a page from the US “shock-and-awe ” tactics in Afghanistan, using its new bomb as a psychological weapon.

Michael Schmitt and Peter Barker mention in an April 2017 Just Security article that the US Massive Ordnance Air Blast ( MOAB) weapon, originally designed to be used against large troop formations or hardened aboveground bunkers, was thought to have a potent effect on Islamic State ( IS ) morale due to its reported 1. 6-kilometer blast and the fact its detonation creates a mushroom cloud similar to a nuclear weapon.

Schmitt and Barker note that the MOAB was effective against IS cave and tunnel networks, with the pressure wave killing or injuring the occupants and collapsing the system.

They say that the MOAB could cause an adversary to abandon certain operations, such as underground warfare, forcing them to expose themselves. Additionally, they mention that such a potent weapon sends a powerful message to adversaries, signaling resolve and other strategic messaging.

In the case of China and Taiwan, Afghanistan’s cave and tunnel networks may not be too dissimilar from Taiwan’s underground defenses. A MOAB-type weapon — leveraging sustained blast and thermal effects — could be particularly effective against small frontline strongholds like Kinmen and Matsu.

Taipei’s urban setting and dense civilian presence contrast markedly with isolated cave networks, which pose minimal collateral damage risks. Since China would most likely want to minimize collateral damage, avoid massive urban battles and contain international backlash if it attempts to invade Taiwan, it may use its new bomb as a psychological weapon in conjunction with a blockade.

Using such a weapon against Kinmen and Matsu could rapidly degrade defender capabilities, particularly in confined underground spaces where sustained thermal effects and pressure waves would be most devastating.

Still, the extent and speed of defensive collapse would depend heavily on factors such as weapon yield, defensive preparations and the effectiveness of air defense neutralization efforts.

The purported sheer power of China ’s new bomb, alongside the potential for rapid neutralization of Kinmen and Matsu’s defenders, would be a prelude to landing operations to eliminate surviving resistance and seize the islands.

However, a shock-and-awe island seizure of Kinmen and Matsu and a blockade of Taiwan may be a low-risk, low-reward strategy. Capturing Kinmen and Matsu is not the same as seizing Taiwan. While the loss of Kinmen and Matsu and resulting shortages could impose severe psychological and logistical pressure, Taiwan’s leadership has demonstrated resilience in past crises.

Strong international support, including US military intervention, could bolster Taiwan’s resolve, making outright capitulation unlikely even after heavy initial setbacks.

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Ending Russia’s conflict in Ukraine was one of Donald Trump’s plan promises, and one that he reportedly boasted could be achieved in 24 hours. But three weeks after taking office, the Trump administration has just managed to negotiate a partial ceasefire that has done nothing to stop the fighting.

On April 13, for instance, Russia fired nuclear missiles into the town of Sumy in north-eastern Ukraine, killing at least 35 residents gathered to celebrate Palm Sunday and injuring over 100 more.

Military assaults have continued despite several meetings between top Russian and US officers, and telephone conversations where Trump and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, have spoken immediately.

But, why are Trump’s efforts to end the conflict struggling to get off the starting blocks? The most important reason is that Russia is blocking development. Moscow has created hurdles, deployed delaying techniques and has frequently muddied the waters.

Trump’s significant effort is his request for a 30-day public ceasefire to prepare the way for broader peace agreements. While Ukraine’s leader, Volodymyr Zelensky, agreed to this quickly when it was proposed in March, Putin did no. He rather offered a shop plan: a partial peace banning assaults on energy system.

Russia relies heavily on the trade of power, particularly oil, to finance the war. But Ukraine has been carefully targeting Russia’s oil industries and storage services, primarily using domestically produced robots. Ukraine is estimated to have destroyed 10 % of Russia’s processing capacity since the beginning of 2025.

By narrowing the context of the peace, Putin was able to protect Russia’s power generation while continuing to attack Ukraine. Moscow needs the battle to continue to achieve its explicitly stated purpose of controlling all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, the four areas of Ukraine it claimed to conquer in 2022.

Another Russian technique has been to get every opportunity to present a list of requirements for Ukrainian agreements. These include Kyiv giving up its claims to Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia, abandoning its purpose of joining NATO, and reducing its military forces considerably. Russia also wants Ukraine to agree to a shift of social authority.

This technique is critical for two reasons. Second, Russia’s requirements make it clear that Moscow envisages the conflict as the first step in a longer-term schedule to practice control over all of Ukraine, not only the conquered lands. And second, constantly stating Russia’s needs gets them into the open discussion.

When journalists – or, specifically, US officials – repeat them, as Trump’s special minister Steve Witkoff did late, they gain an air of legitimacy. This creates the desire that a peace deal will cooperate with Moscow ’s plan.

Russia is even good at deflecting attention apart from ending the war. Maybe Putin does this with praise and by appealing to Trump’s sense of self-importance.

In an interview about his March journey to Moscow, Witkoff glided over his failing to secure a commitment from the Russians to agree to a public peace and rather conveyed a touching tale demonstrating Putin’s respect for Trump.

Putin apparently told Witkoff that he went to church and prayed for Trump’s recovery after he narrowly escaped an assassination attempt during the election campaign. Putin also sent Witkoff back to the US with a portrait of Trump, painted by an artist who is known for producing flattering portraits of Putin himself.

Another effective tactic of deflection involves money. Russian officials dangle the prospect of lucrative deals involving trade and investment in front of Trump administration officials. This was evidently the focus of much of the first meeting between US and Russian officials in Saudi Arabia in February, although it was convened to discuss plans for peace.

It is also probably the reason for Kirill Dmitriev’s visit to Washington at the beginning of April. Dmitriev, a figure close to Putin and head of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, confirmed to journalists that his discussions encompassed possible deals with the US involving rare earth metals, exploiting resources in the Arctic, and resuming direct flights between the US and Russia.

Trump’s role

While Russia places obstacles in the path of peace, Trump and his officials do nothing to remove them. This allows Moscow to continue waging war without constraints.

Despite Trump’s occasional tough talk about running out of patience with Moscow, as well as his threats of secondary tariffs on countries that buy oil from Russia, no measures that would put pressure on Russia have been implemented.

Trump has instead made excuses for Moscow. He described the attack on Sumy as a “mistake”, and has expressed admiration for Putin for dragging his feet to get a better deal with Washington.

This contrasts sharply with Trump’s dealings with Ukraine. Zelensky was publicly humiliated during his meeting with Trump and US Vice President J D Vance, in the Oval Office in February. Trump has even accused Zelensky of starting the war, which was launched by a mass invasion of Russian forces.

Trump and his team have shown far less interest in Ukraine’s security needs than in striking a lucrative deal to extract the country ’s natural resources. The prospect of the Trump administration negotiating a peace agreement that the Ukrainians would accept seems remote.

So, where does this leave the peace process? When the partial ceasefire arrangement comes to an end later in April, Washington will have to decide whether to resume its efforts to secure a general ceasefire or chart a new course.

Based on his track record so far, Trump might just blame the Ukrainians for refusing to surrender to Russia’s terms, abandon attempts to reach a negotiated settlement to the war, and go straight to reestablishing normal relations with Russia.

Jennifer Mathers, Senior Lecturer in International Politics, Aberystwyth University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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