Asia (Page 3,216)

So he’s back. Again. Turkey’s longest-serving leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, now has another five years to lead his country. The question is, lead it to where?

Historians will one day grapple with what “Erdoganism” is – and what it has meant for Turkey – but, living through it, it is clear Erdogan has the politician’s gift for pivoting positions.

The days of “zero problems with neighbors” or the aspiration, post-Arab Spring, to support the revolutionary fervor has vanished. One of these days, Erdogan may even take a trip to Damascus.

What, then, might the next half-decade hold for Turkey? Might he – as hoped by many of those European politicians Erdogan has irritated – lead the country back to some sort of orthodoxy, a political and economic “rational path”?

Start with economics, which is where the term orthodox is used – or rather, as it applies to Erdogan’s economic views, “unorthodox.”

Erdogan has long been a supporter of the view that lowering interest rates leads to a lowering of inflation – the exact opposite of what is usually called orthodox economics. (It’s the reason economies like the US and the UK, struggling with inflation increasing prices, have repeatedly raised, rather than lowered, interest rates.)

Immediately after the election, Turkey watchers were pleased to see Mehmet Simsek, a former finance minister until 2015, when Erdogan started his unorthodox economic experiments, return as finance minister.

Simsek said in his first comments last week that Turkey would return to “rational ground.” So far, so pleasing for the outside world. True, Erdogan also said in his first speech after being sworn in that “inflation will fall” – but that was just far enough away from his claim, pre-election, that he would keep cutting interest rates to give investors hope. There was that pivot again.

Refugee crisis

What, then, of Turkey’s foreign policy? One thing that won’t change is the Syrian refugee crisis, which, with Erdogan still in charge, will splutter along at roughly the same tempo, perhaps speeded up slightly if he can get Damascus to play along.

What won’t happen, as his opponent Kemal Kilicdaroglu had pledged during the campaign, is the mass deportation of millions of Syrians. That, at least to European leaders fearful of another wave of migration, counts as “rational.”

Nor will there be any attempt to claim – or reclaim, depending on one’s historical perspective – a leadership role in the wider Middle East. Revolutionary fervor has left the capitals of the Middle East, replaced by a yearning for quiet economic cooperation and an end to the region’s wars. Erdogan, already keen to court Riyadh, will be back in the capitals of the Arab Gulf region before the end of the year.

When it comes to relations with the West, things get trickier, and much depends on what an “orthodox” foreign-policy approach means.

Sweden’s bid to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a good example. When Finland and Sweden first requested to join the alliance just over a year ago, almost all members accepted. Turkey was the rare holdout, using it as an opportunity to negotiate with Stockholm over what Ankara considers a lenient stance on Kurdish militant groups.

The same happened with the Ukraine conflict, of which the Swedish accession was a consequence. Again, NATO expected that Turkey would follow the West’s lead and line up against Russia. Instead, Turkey took a more independent approach, refraining from imposing sanctions on Russia while supplying its powerful military drones to Ukraine.

In some ways that approach paid off, since Turkey negotiated a grain deal with Russia that allowed Ukraine to export wheat, corn and barley, providing Kiev with a lifeline during the war. But that diplomatic victory doesn’t compare with standing by its NATO allies.

Independent foreign policy

That independence, or at least the search for it, is the nearest thing to Erdoganism in foreign policy.

That’s what the talk about a resurgence of Ottoman tendencies has often obscured. Modern Turkey, as it gears up for its second century post-independence, is not an imperial country in search of an empire. But nor is it merely another European or Asian country.

Under Erdogan, Turkey aspires to be an independent country, able to remain a pivotal part of NATO but keep relations with Russia; able to seek European Union membership while expanding its influence in the Middle East.

If an “orthodox” foreign policy simply means following what is decided in the major capitals of Europe and the US, then Turkey will certainly not follow it.

That independence, of course, cuts two ways. What Erdogan calls freedom to act, others call unpredictability. Where he seeks ad hoc deals, others seek stable alliances.

That, as the country and its neighbors prepare for five more years of Erdogan as president, is the only constant. Turkey, seen from abroad, may on occasion take the rational path – but the only orthodoxy in Ankara is independence.

This article was provided by Syndication Bureau, which holds copyright.

Faisal Al Yafai is currently writing a book on the Middle East and is a frequent commentator on international TV news networks. He has worked for news outlets such as The Guardian and the BBC, and reported on the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa. Follow him on Twitter @FaisalAlYafai.

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