The North’s domestic product experienced a significant drop of 12 per cent in 2022 compared to 2016, the agency told lawmakers during a briefing, according to lawmaker Yoo. The number of North Koreans said to have died due to hunger between January to July was more than double the recentContinue Reading
PUBLISHED : 18 Aug 2023 at 14:00
Pheu Thai Party’s prime ministerial candidate Srettha Thavisin says he wants to tackle poverty and inequality, as he fends off corruption allegations ahead of a confirmation vote next week.
Parliament will meet on Tuesday to vote on whether to approve the wealthy property mogul as prime minister and end three months of rumbling political deadlock since the May 14 general election.
The 61-year-old’s Pheu Thai Party heads a multi-party coalition formed after the reformist Move Forward Party (MFP) — which won the most seats — saw its leader denied the PM spot by conservative, pro-military forces.
“I would like to reiterate that my enemy is poverty and inequality. My goal is to make every Thai person’s life better,” Mr Srettha said in a video message on Facebook on Friday.
Mr Srettha, the former head of Thai property giant Sansiri, rejected allegations of improper dealings made in recent weeks by Chuvit Kamolvisit, a colourful former massage parlour tycoon turned anti-graft whistleblower.
“We are transparent in our work. I come here today to show my innocence to the general public that my activities were done according to the law,” he said.
“I would like to refute all claims that Chuvit has made against me.”
Mr Chuvit this week asked police to investigate two land purchases by Sansiri, which is listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET).
House Speaker Wan Muhamad Noor Matha confirmed the vote for prime minister would be on Tuesday, starting no later than 3pm.
To become premier, Mr Srettha needs a majority across both the lower house of 500 elected MPs, and the 250-member Senate which was handpicked by the kingdom’s last junta.
Opposition from the Senate to the MFP’s plans to amend Section 112, also known as the lese majeste law, and tackle business monopolies sank its leader Pita Limjaroenrat’s ambitions.
And so despite winning most seats, the MFP will go into opposition while two parties from the outgoing army-backed government will have a share in power.
On Thursday it was confirmed the new coalition would include the United Thai Nation Party (UTN) of outgoing Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha — a former army chief who deposed an elected Pheu Thai government to seize power in 2014.
And the coalition also includes Bhumjaithai — another party from the outgoing government — leading some to question how different the new administration will be from the old one.
Former massage parlour tycoon-turned-whistle-blower Chuvit Kamolvisit reveals his latest allegation against Pheu Thai’s prime ministerial candidate Srettha Thavisin at the Davis Hotel, which he owns, in Bangkok, on Tuesday. (Photo: Somchai Poomlard)
SINGAPORE: Properties linked to 10 foreign nationals arrested in a S$1 billion (US$736 million) money laundering probe included seven detached bungalows in Sentosa Cove, 79 condominium units and 19 commercial spaces. In an update on Friday (Aug 18), the police said that 105 properties have now been issued with prohibition of disposal orders inContinue Reading
PUBLISHED : 18 Aug 2023 at 13:26
Move Forward Party (MFP) list-MP Rangsiman Rome stands firm that he will urge parliament to reconsider its decision to reject the renomination of MFP leader Pita Limjaroenrat as prime minister.
Mr Rangsiman said on Friday that he will proceed with his motion for a new parliamentary review of the resolution passed on July 19.
The 31-year-old MP said he would present the proposal during a meeting of the Senate whip and representatives of political parties, convened by Parliament President Wan Muhamad Noor Matha, on Friday. The objective is to establish a timeline for debating the motion in the upcoming parliamentary session scheduled for Aug 22.
The MFP member said it was not necessary for the debate to be lengthy as it would provide parliament an opportunity to reflect upon potential errors made.
“Regarding the vote on this motion, we hope we’ll win, but the final decision does not rest with us,” said Mr Rangsiman. “Frankly speaking, compromising our principles in this matter would establish a precedent with far-reaching implications.”
“Using the parliamentary mechanism for nominations carries implications beyond the prime ministerial post, as it also extends to other roles. We must take extra caution when employing this issue (parliament’s resolution to reject Mr Pita’s renomination) as a precedent.”
During a joint session of the House and Senate on July 13th, the MFP leader failed to secure the majority required for the prime ministerial post. On July 19th, parliament voted against allowing Mr Pita to be renominated.
On Wednesday, the Constitutional Court dismissed the Ombudsman’s petition related to the rejected renomination of Mr Pita. The court based its decision on the grounds that the three petitioners, Pornchai Theppanya and Boonsong Chalaythorn, who both voted for the MFP in the May 14 general election, and Move Forward MP Panyarut Nuntapusitanon, were not directly affected by the parliamentary decision.
Upon learning of the ruling, Mr Pita said he would not file a fresh petition with the court because he believed the issue should be settled by parliament rather than the court.
When asked whether Move Forward is ready to be the opposition again, Mr Rangsiman said the party would assume the role of opposition once a government is formed. He reaffirms his party’s position of not supporting the Pheu Thai Party’s nominee for prime minister.
On Tuesday, the election-winning MFP announced that it would not back Pheu Thai candidate Srettha Thavisin for prime minister as the formation of the government now is not reflective of the people’s voice.
Despite its divergence from Move Forward, second-placed Pheu Thai has been actively seeking its former ally’s backing for real estate tycoon Srettha to become the next prime minister.
Since announcing his bid for the presidency on Jul 19, Mr Ng has reiterated his lack of political affiliations and his experience in managing the country’s reserves through his 45 years in public service.
Mr Ng started his career as an investment analyst in the Ministry of Finance in 1970, before moving to the Monetary Authority of Singapore when it was formed in 1971.
In 1986, he joined GIC and headed the equities and bond department. He held other posts, including managing director of public markets, before being appointed as group chief investment officer in 2007 – a position he held until his retirement in 2013.
The Elections Department, in its statement issued on Friday morning, said the Presidential Elections Committee “is satisfied that Mr Ng is a man of integrity, good character and reputation” based on information available.
The committee noted that Mr Ng was GIC’s group chief investment officer for more than three years.
It was also “satisfied” that given the nature of Mr Ng’s position and performance in GIC, Mr Ng has the experience and ability comparable to a person who was chief executive or held the most senior executive post at a Fifth Schedule entity. Such entities include key statutory boards and government-owned companies such as the Central Provident Fund Board, Temasek and GIC.
The committee added that it was satisfied that Mr Ng has the experience and ability to “effectively carry out the functions and duties of the office of President”.
The next step for those who have qualified is to be nominated as candidates. To do so, they must deliver their nomination papers, along with the certificate of eligibility, community certificate and political donation certificate, on Nomination Day on Aug 22.
Nomination proceedings will take place at the People’s Association auditorium at King George’s Avenue between 11am and 12pm.
If more than one candidate is nominated, Singaporeans will go to the polls on Sep 1, which will be declared a public holiday.
Questions had swirled over whether Russian President Vladimir Putin – sought by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for his role in the Ukraine war – would attend this year’s BRICS conference in South Africa, which is a signatory of the ICC. But a spokesman for Ramaphosa last month said PutinContinue Reading
There have been reports that Ukrainian units have crossed the Dnipro River and established bridgeheads on the eastern side – which could be an important moment in Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive push in the south. How many troops made the crossing and how secure their bridgehead really is remains unclear.
Ukraine’s counteroffensive push has thus far failed to gain the same momentum as their counterattacks last autumn, despite previously high expectations. Kiev is under considerable international pressure to show results – and soon – to maintain enthusiasm from the Western allies on whom it is depending for much of its weaponry.
That the counteroffensive has been more of a grind than last year’s lightning-fast push in September and October is down to several factors. The destruction of the Kakhovka Dam in June delayed the progress of Ukrainian forces towards the Dnipro by several weeks because of floodwater and has also widened the river.
Bridges across the Dnipro were also washed away, meaning an amphibious crossing has become the only option – and a much more difficult one.
Instead, Ukrainian progress can be characterized as slow but steady. There are daily reports that Ukrainian units operating in various sectors of the front lines are gradually recapturing villages occupied by Russian forces in the early days of the war.
But the rapid push south to the Sea of Azov to effectively cut Russia’s army in half and isolate Crimea has not materialized. It is not unreasonable to expect that the war will last for years.
Crossing the Dnipro River and establishing a secure bridgehead on the eastern bank would be a breakthrough.
Throughout the history of conflicts in Ukraine going back millennia, the river has been a key strategic barrier. But it has huge importance for many areas of life in Ukraine: transport, energy – even food (the river was estimated before the war to supply 80% of the country’s fish).
But right now its strategic importance is at the fore. Running north to south through the whole of the Russian occupiers realized its strategic importance early on in the war, they understood they could divide and conquer Ukraine, and establish a natural defense against attacks by controlling the river.
During the counteroffensive in autumn 2022 Ukraine recaptured a considerable amount of territory in the east and south, and drove Russia from the west bank of the lower Dnipro. But Russia still dominates the east bank. Which is why reports of Ukrainian crossings are so important.
But these reports must be greeted with caution. Ukraine has held positions on the east bank before, allowing it to conduct raids into the Russian-occupied parts of Kherson region with the hope of establishing a presence there. But each of these has been beaten back.
But there is hope on the Ukrainian side that the latest raid could succeed where the others have failed. In its regular updates on the situation in Ukraine, the UK’s Ministry of Defense noted on August 14 that: “Ukrainian forces have worked to raid or set up small bridgeheads at new locations on the Russian-held east bank.”
This, in addition to the bridgehead it has held near the ruined Antonivsky bridge, close to the city of Kherson, since June, could allow it to push further south through Russian-held territory.
There are several scenarios as to how the campaign might proceed. Russia is reported to be moving men and equipment south to reinforce and defend the east-bank Dnipro area and the key city of Kherson.
Heavy fighting also continues in the Bakhmut region, a year-long battle that has consumed many thousands of lives over the past 12 months.
There are daily reports of offensive and counteroffensive operations on both sides in the region, which Russia sees as key to capturing and controlling the Donetsk region, which it claimed last September after “referendums”, condemned in the West as a sham.
Ukrainian forces are also reported to be involved in heavy fighting on at least three sectors of the front, and advancing in the Luhansk region, north-east of Donetsk and in the western Zaporizhia region, further south.
All of which means that Russia’s planners are faced with a balancing act as to whether to maintain troops concentrations in these sectors of the frontline or move more units south to reinforce the east bank of the Dnipro.
A successful assault resulting in a substantial Ukrainian breakthrough on the east of the Dnipro in the Kherson region would give Ukrainian troops a much easier and clearer path to Crimea.
Meanwhile, reports that Ukraine has recaptured the strategically important town of Urozhaine in the western Zaporizhia region has opened the possibility of a push south towards the Sea of Azov, which Kiev has declared to be one of its key objectives in this counteroffensive.
But as the New York Times cautioned recently, “the fact that progress in Kiev’s long-anticipated counteroffensive is now measured by the recapture of small villages reinforces how difficult the fighting has become.”
As US military analyst Frederick Kagan wrote in Time magazine recently: “Much as we might hope that the road to the Sea of Azov will simply open for Ukrainian forces the odds are high that fighting will remain hard, casualties high and frustration will be a constant companion. All of which is normal in war.”
So while there are daily reports of positive developments in Ukraine’s slow but steady counteroffensive, much will continue to depend on the steadfastness of support from Kiev’s Western allies.
There are signs of war weariness in some countries that were formerly solid supporters of Ukraine, including – for example – Slovakia, where a pro-Kremlin candidate is leading in the polls ahead of next month’s election, campaigning on withdrawing support for Ukraine both militarily and in terms of maintaining sanctions.
Kiev must pray that this does not become a pattern that would fracture NATO support for its war effort.
Veronika Poniscjakova is Senior Teaching Fellow, University of Portsmouth
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
The Japanese stock market has experienced an impressive upswing. Since January 2023, the Nikkei 225 index has risen by around 30% – by far outperforming US and European stocks.
The boom is driven by foreign investors, with Berkshire Hathaway CEO Warren Buffet’s Japan visit seen as a “stamp of approval” for investing in Japan.
The boom is surprising because since early 2023 the corporate sector has had no positive news concerning innovations that would boost the international competitiveness of Japanese products.
As the Bank of Japan (BoJ) has hardly lifted interest rates, financing conditions have remained benign, allowing corporations to postpone restructuring.
Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s new capitalism has not come with comprehensive structural reforms. The Japanese education system continues to fail to produce innovative human capital and the fast-aging society is becoming an increasing constraint on labor supply.
From this perspective, Japan’s growth perspectives remain gloomy. The boom seems more financial than real, supported by historically low real interest rates in Japan.
Foreigners drove the June 2023 Japanese stock market surge. In the United States and the euro area, the sharp inflation increase since mid-2021 has prompted central banks to lift interest rates high. This has clouded growth perspectives.
As financing costs for corporations have substantially increased and the value of bonds in the balance sheets of banks has declined, financial instability has emerged. With strong wage claims perpetuating inflation, a recession in the United States and Europe may be inevitable to tame inflation.
This seems to have tempted foreign investors to reshuffle funds to Japan, where the pressure on the BoJ to increase interest rates is lower and inflation has been less pronounced, standing at 3.3% in June 2023.
Central Bank Governor Kazuo Ueda remains committed to the yield curve targeting. The average credit interest rate was at 0.7% in June 2023 and the 10-year government yield has remained below 0.5%.
With US and European interest rates rising high relative to Japan, the Japanese yen has depreciated by 36.3% against the dollar since January 2021. This has made Japanese stocks cheap in terms of US dollars.
Despite the slight easing of the yield curve control in July 2023, in the medium-term the scope to increase interest rates for the BoJ remains limited. With government debt amounting to 1.44 quadrillion yen (US$9.6 trillion), raising interest rates would fiscally paralyze the Japanese government.
The BoJ’s large asset purchases have created large deposits for the commercial banks at the BoJ (549 trillion yen as of March 2023). Lifting the interest rates on commercial banks’ deposits by only one percentage point would generate painful interest rate expenses for BoJ of about 5.5 trillion yen.
This implies that Japanese corporations can continue to expect public support via benign financing conditions. With the BoJ continuing to buy government bonds — the equivalent of roughly 70 trillion yen in the first half of 2023 — the Japanese government can also remain supportive of aggregate business activity. There is also a larger scope for subsidies, which were announced for semiconductor and battery production.
Domestically, the yen’s depreciation boosted the revenues of large export-oriented Japanese enterprises. At the same time, depreciation made the acquisition of foreign assets more expensive and repurchases of Japanese stocks more attractive.
In 2022, stock repurchases by Japanese corporations reached a historical peak of 9.2 trillion yen. For 2023, SMBC Nikko Securities has already recorded a volume of 4.6 trillion yen as of mid-May.
While the Nikkei 225 is slowly reapproaching its peak before the bubble economy bursts, the new stock market miracle seems driven by state intervention — as previously in the case of Abenomics.
On top of direct and indirect subsidies, the BoJ has in the past bought large amounts of exchange-traded funds (ETFs). As of June 2023, it held about 57 trillion yen (37 trillion yen in book value) in ETFs. This equated to 81% of all Japanese ETFs.
Whereas the Japanese government and the BoJ keep zombifying Japanese corporations, interest rate increases in the United States and Europe will exert pressure on US and European corporations to increase efficiency and push forward innovation. This suggests that the long-term fundamental growth prospects of stock markets are in favor of the United States.
Japan and its corporations will only be able to recuperate their past strength if the BoJ follows the interest rate policy of the US Federal Reserve. Doing so will prompt the corporations to increase efficiency and urge the government to implement decisive structural reforms.
Taiki Murai is Research Assistant at the Institute for Economic Policy, Leipzig University.
Gunther Schnabl is Professor of Economic Policy and International Economics at Leipzig University.
Given the warm welcome Bashar al-Assad received at the Arab League just three months ago, one might have expected rather warmer words from Syria’s president about the state of Arab relations in a rare interview last week.
But no: “Maybe it’s the way we think,” he said, “but we don’t come up with practical solutions … we prefer to give speeches, press releases and meetings.”
It was unrealistic, he said, to expect that there would be economic results from the return to the Arab fold in mere months.
If that was his view of the members of the Arab League, it’s unsurprising that his view of the man whose troops occupy parts of his country would be much worse.
“Erdogan’s goal is to fabricate an excuse for a Turkish invasion in Syria,” he said, pouring cold water on the suggestion that he and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan might meet.
Along the pathway of a return to some semblance of normal diplomatic relations – to say nothing of “normalcy” within Syria, which is still many years away – the next logical step after rejoining the Arab League would be for Syria to resume relations with Turkey.
Yet that step is much harder than the previous one. As much as Turkey may want a rapprochement, Syria is in no rush, as demonstrated by Assad’s dismissive words.
Yet while the wait-and-see game worked so well in pushing the Arab League to normalize, an extensive period without repairing the Syria-Turkey relationship will end up damaging Damascus – and perhaps even permanently altering the geography of Syria.
For now, time is firmly on Assad’s side. Prior to the Turkish election in May, Erdogan was keen on some progress, because it could then be presented to the Turkish electorate as potential steps toward resolving the crisis of Syrian migrants, millions of whom are refugees in Turkish cities and towns.
Yet for Assad, Erdogan, despite his desire to improve ties, is actually the lesser of the possible interlocutors. Erdogan’s main opposition, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), ran on a firmly anti-Syrian platform, pledging to normalize relations with Damascus quickly and send Syrians home.
When even the ostensibly more liberal Turkish opposition is openly campaigning to send Syrians home, there is little necessity for Assad to negotiate. He can simply wait for a change of politician in Ankara, or for the pressure to build on Erdogan, and his negotiating hand grows stronger. The pressure of millions of Syrians on Turkish soil is his strongest card.
Erdogan knows this, which is why he has been more vocal in wanting to meet with Assad than the other way around. Yet his red line is the same one that Assad raised in the interview, and which Erdogan reiterated last month: no withdrawal of Turkish troops.
For now, the major issue is that Ankara does not yet have an endgame that Assad can accept. Erdogan’s big idea of resettling Syrian refugees along the Syrian side of the border, protected by Turkish troops, had the twin benefits of easing the pressure on Turkish cities caused by millions of migrants, as well as pushing Syrian Kurdish militants away from the border.
But it had one major flaw: It was dependent on the Assad regime’s tacit acceptance. And while the Syrian government saw no benefit in attacking those enclaves for many years, when it comes to diplomatic recognition, accepting these enclaves is proving a sticking point.
Partly, of course, that has to do with a refusal to accept foreign troops – but partly it is also about accepting a precedent of allowing Turkish troops, which will then make it harder to get rid of the American troops still protecting the Kurdish areas.
Turkey is now locked into that outcome, or something very similar to it.
However, it is precisely for that reason the Assad regime should find an accommodation with Ankara now. Because the Turkish occupation, as hard as it is to dislodge now, will only become harder over time.
The Syrian refugee crisis is a major political issue in Turkey, to the extent that it was a major topic in the presidential election. With Erdogan in power for perhaps five more years, it is unthinkable that he would allow the issue to fester for so long that it becomes a wedge issue again.
That means that a solution might be found in the next few years, one that Ankara might seek to impose on Damascus. And with relations with Russia changing so much over the Ukraine war, it’s possible circumstances may mean that Moscow, Assad’s main international supporter, goes along with it.
This may be hypothetical for the moment, but the main leverage the Assad regime has over Turkey are Syrian bodies and time.
Damascus can always halt the return of refugees, or make life so hard they don’t wish to return, leaving Ankara with the problem. If, however, Turkey finds a solution to the refugee issue, that would flip the time leverage: Then every year that passes would entrench the Turkish solution.
With the Arab League, Assad merely had to wait, and circumstances would eventually create the conditions for a rapprochement. But with Turkey, those conditions already exist.
A delay of a year or two might be possible, but the longer Damascus waits, the more likely it will be that Ankara imposes a solution. And then the Turkish occupation will prove much harder for Damascus to end.
This article was provided by Syndication Bureau, which holds copyright.
Faisal Al Yafai is currently writing a book on the Middle East and is a frequent commentator on international TV news networks. He has worked for news outlets such as The Guardian and the BBC, and reported on the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa. Follow him on Twitter @FaisalAlYafai.
SINGAPORE: Former Senior Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam, former GIC chief investment officer Ng Kok Song and former NTUC Income chief executive Tan Kin Lian have qualified as candidates for Singapore’s Presidential Election, the Elections Department (ELD) announced on Friday (Aug 18). Businessman George Goh was however unsuccessful in his application for a Certificate ofContinue Reading