Solving the green energy riddle

In 1987, the Nobel laureate economist Robert Solow famously observed, “You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics.” The phenomenon that became known as the Solow paradox referred to the slowdown in productivity growth during the 1970s and ’80s despite the rapid development in technology during the same period.

A similar paradox might describe the green energy transition. Amid an explosion in wind turbines and solar panels, the global share of coal, the dirtiest fossil fuel, has barely moved since the early 1980s, as growth in China and India has offset reductions in Europe and the United States. Meanwhile, the proportion of hydroelectricity has been flat over that period, while nuclear rose but recently fell because of Germany’s phase-out.

Dig deeper into the details, however, and there are signs that the renewables riddle can be solved. Oil has lost significant ground while gas, the cleanest fossil fuel, has gained. So-called “modern” renewables – solar, wind, and geothermal – have also picked up dramatically, going from 1% of all global energy production in 2007 to 7% in 2021. And last year, wind and solar produced 12% of global electricity. 

While fossil fuels remain 82% of the world’s energy mix, there is progress in bringing this down. What we need now is to accelerate the transition.

The money

How this will be accomplished is a matter of science, policy and, above all, money.

BP’s most conservative transition scenario, based on current technology, estimates that solar and wind output will rise from 2,100 terawatt-hours in 2019 to 6,890TWh in 2030. By contrast, the scenarios for reaching net-zero carbon by 2050 from both BP and the International Energy Agency (IEA) have the 2030 figure at just over 12,000TWh.

That’s the difference between scaling up renewables by a factor of three versus a factor of six. Put another way, the conservative scenario adds more than the entire electricity generation of the US, while net-zero scenarios gain by the equivalent output of China plus India.

In the right locations, solar and wind are the cheapest sources of new electricity. This has been achieved by some moderate improvements in technology, but mostly by scaling up manufacturing and experience, and by reducing capital costs, as investors have grown comfortable with these low-risk projects.

Solar power in the best locations in the Middle East, North Africa or South America cost about 12 US cents per kilowatt-hour in 2012, but bids by 2021 came in at just over 1 cent.

Costs for offshore wind have also dropped dramatically in recent years, and subsidy-free wind farms have been awarded in Europe, with companies such as Denmark’s former oil and gas company Ørsted and Norway’s state petroleum firm Equinor in the lead. Wind is even progressing in the US and East Asia, with costs around 7.5 cents per kilowatt-hour predicted to fall to 5.3 cents by 2035.

By comparison, at current prices, generation from gas costs some 3 to 4 cents per kilowatt-hour in the US and Middle East, and 13 cents in Europe and East Asia. The inclusion of a carbon price at Europe’s current level of around $100 per ton would add an additional 3.5 cents to these figures, making wind and especially solar clearly superior. Nuclear is low-carbon but more costly.

Challenges: trade and materials

With such attractive characteristics, what’s holding back a more rapid renewable revolution?

There are broadly eight sets of challenges, applying on different timescales and in different places. These are trade, materials, land, the grid, intermittency, end-use, policy, and society. 

Supply-chain bottlenecks and rising interest rates have temporarily interrupted the trend of cost reductions, but these will likely resume. Yet grit in the wheels of the global trade engine will remain, at least in the short-term.

Europe, the US and China are engaged in a subsidy race to spur domestic manufacturing and control key future energy technologies.

Tariffs, “buy-local” provisions, onshoring inducements, and concerns over human rights and the environment, however worthy, complicate the China-dominated renewable industry, which has been so successful at driving down costs.  

China makes as much as 95% of key solar module components, about 75% of lithium-ion battery parts, and more than half of wind turbine nacelles (the cabins that connect the blades to the tower and house the generator and gears).

The United States’ massive Inflation Reduction Act throws down the gauntlet to Beijing, but also to Brussels. Smaller markets, such as India and the UK, have their own aspirations but risk being caught between the giants. A trans-Atlantic green trade war would raise costs all around, while subsidies risk locking in uncompetitive industries.

China and, to a lesser extent, Russia and a few African and Latin American countries also dominate the supply chain for basic raw materials used in renewable energy, batteries, hydrogen electrolyzers, and electric vehicles – notably rare-earth minerals, lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper, platinum-group metals, graphite, and polysilicon.

China doesn’t monopolize the mining of rare earths as it once did, but it remains the leader in their processing, and similarly for copper, lithium and polysilicon. It has extensive international investments, too.

While there’s no shortage of most of these minerals in the ground, there are constraints on how fast extraction and processing can be increased.

Resource nationalism in Latin America and Indonesia favors domestic ownership and processing. Political insecurity and troubling labor conditions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the main source of cobalt, and strikes and electricity shortages in platinum-mining South Africa, are further problems.

As the US, the European Union, the UK and their allies seek to increase critical mineral mining and processing, environmental opposition makes it difficult to approve additional extraction. Mining for copper and gold in Minnesota and Alaska, and lithium in Serbia, has been torpedoed in recent years.

Recycling is only of limited help, given that most renewable systems today are new and must scale up multiple times, requiring a large input of primary materials.

Some of these limitations can be designed around – novel electrolyzers avoid precious metals, wind-turbine and electric-vehicle motors can do without rare earths, copper can be substituted with aluminum, and new batteries need less nickel or cobalt. But these choices all involve some friction, higher costs, or performance trade-offs.

Challenges: land, grid, intermittency, and end-use

One requirement that can’t be designed away is land. An oil or gas field, or a coal or nuclear power plant, has a relatively small footprint for the energy it generates. Wind, solar, or growing crops for biomass require much larger areas.

For the EU, India, Japan and South Korea, a predominantly solar-based system could eat up 5% of total land area by 2050. In Germany, only about 9% of the country is technically feasible and available for wind power.

Offshore wind, particularly in constricted marine locations such as the North Sea, the northeastern US, or Singapore, competes with naval grounds, sensitive marine ecosystems, historic and tourist locations, views, fishing grounds, shipping lanes, and so on.

Even acceptable sites may face lengthy permit delays and legal battles, as in the Cape Wind project off Cape Cod, Massachusetts, which applied for a permit in 2001, was initially approved in 2005, but finally abandoned in 2017 after opposition from well-heeled and prominent residents and local property owners, such as former US senator Ted Kennedy, Governor Mitt Romney, and current US climate envoy John Kerry.

Land barriers are not insuperable, but they aren’t negligible either. 

A related issue is that of grid connections. Wind, solar, and hydroelectric dams are often built in remote locations and need long-distance transmission lines to take their electricity to consumers.

In the US, 2,000 gigawatts are estimated to be waiting for a grid connection. Renewable developers in the UK have about 176GW in the queue – more than twice the existing capacity from all sources – with some being told they may have to wait until 2036.

Building transmission lines to take power from windy northern Germany to the industrialized south has also been held up.

The grid is particularly important because of another characteristic of wind and solar power: intermittency. Anti-renewable advocates are fond of reminding us that “wind doesn’t always blow, and the sun doesn’t always shine,” as if energy specialists didn’t notice. For now, the quantities of wind and solar power are relatively small in most places, and can be balanced by “dispatchable” gas, coal, biomass, or nuclear power.

Solar output regularly exceeds total midday demand in areas such as California and South Australia, only to fade out in the evening when demand goes up. Batteries are being deployed on a growing scale, but current batteries are poorly suited to seasonal storage – for instance, saving large quantities of surplus power from summer for a cold, dark, windless northern European winter.

In the net-zero scenarios of the IEA or BP, wind and solar would make up 38% of electricity generation by 2030 and 68% by 2050. Such a system would require all options to function daily and year-around.

It would also need geographic diversity of resources connected by long-distance cables, such as the Xlinks project, which will bring 3.6GW of solar and wind from Morocco to the UK via a subsea interconnection.

Other low-carbon resources include gas or coal with carbon capture and storage; nuclear fission; hydroelectric dams; and geothermal. Then there are the less developed or more futuristic options, such as tidal, wave, current, and ocean thermal generation; nuclear fusion; or space-based solar power.

Medium-term storage can use new battery types, such as iron-based flow batteries, or thermal storage (making ice to store cold energy, or heating salts or other materials, as concentrated solar power plants do).

Long-term storage can rely on hydrogen or its derivatives such as ammonia, methanol, or synthetic methane. Hydrogen also helps with bringing renewable electricity into other end-uses: the provision of high-temperature heat for industry, “e-fuels” for long-distance transport, and chemical feedstocks. 

The solutions: policy and society

Perhaps the two most intractable challenges remain in policy and society. Today’s renewable transition is unevenly distributed. The Netherlands, a small and not very sunny country, generates more non-hydro renewable power than the whole of sub-Saharan Africa. But this must change dramatically by mid-century, when most population and economic growth occurs outside Europe.

BP’s net-zero scenario sees Asia-Pacific as having almost half the world’s renewables by then, while Africa, the Middle East and South America collectively move to twice Europe’s level.

To get there, government policies will need to move away from over-rewarding pet projects in favor of cost-effective renewables. The investor community must also stop penalizing proposals in developing economies.

On the social side, vested interests, legacy industries, railways, political parties, and labor unions often oppose renewables, particularly in the case of coal-dependent regions.

South Africa’s Just Energy Transition Partnership, backed by the EU, the UK and the US, was intended to help the country move away from coal. But its Energy Minister Gwede Mantashe, a former miner and self-proclaimed “coal fundamentalist,” is also a key supporter of President Cyril Ramaphosa, and not so keen on the plan.

Renewable energy has the wind in its sails. Technology, economics, security concerns, and climate policy strongly support its progress. But the realities of delivering such an enormous transformation are too often underestimated or glossed over.

This is not an argument against renewables, but it demands a strong response to identify and remove barriers as quickly as possible. With careful planning and leadership, the clean energy riddle can be solved, and the renewables revolution can spread beyond California and Copenhagen to Kolkata, Congo and Cape Town. 

Follow Robin Mills on Twitter @robinenergy.

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False alarm behind Biden’s tech war emergency

US President Joe Biden has officially determined that the rapid advance of China’s semiconductor, microelectronic, quantum computing and artificial intelligence technologies constitutes “an unusual and extraordinary threat” to US national security.

Declaring a “national emergency,” the president has ordered new procedures to restrict US outbound investments that could exacerbate the supposed threat.

But while the wording of the White House statement is severe, the policy measures it outlines are neither new nor particularly extreme in the context of the administration’s escalating tech war on China.

Although US venture capitalists seem to be the primary target of the forthcoming restrictions, the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) quickly released a statement on the matter:

“The semiconductor industry recognizes the need to protect national security, and we believe ensuring a strong and globally competitive US semiconductor industry is a vital part of achieving that goal.

We are assessing today’s proposal and welcome the opportunity to provide feedback as part of the public comment period. We hope the final rules allow US chip firms to compete on a level-playing field and access key global markets, including China, to promote the long-term strength of the US semiconductor industry and our ability to out-innovate global competitors.”

On August 9, the White House issued an “Executive Order on Addressing United States Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern.”

The executive order states that “countries of concern are engaged in comprehensive, long-term strategies that direct, facilitate, or otherwise support advancements in sensitive technologies and products that are critical to such countries’ military, intelligence, surveillance, or cyber-enabled capabilities.”

China’s semiconductor industry is among those targeted by the executive order’s new investment curbs. Image: Twitter

It goes on to say that these advancements “will accelerate the development of advanced computational capabilities that will enable new applications that pose significant national security risks, such as the development of more sophisticated weapons systems, breaking of cryptographic codes, and other applications that could provide these countries with military advantages.”

The “countries of concern,” which are listed in an annex, are the People’s Republic of China, the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong and the Special Administrative Region of Macau.

These “countries of concern are exploiting or have the ability to exploit certain United States outbound investments, including certain intangible benefits that often accompany United States investments and that help companies succeed, such as enhanced standing and prominence, managerial assistance, investment and talent networks, market access, and enhanced access to additional financing.”

President Biden has therefore ordered the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the heads of other relevant government agencies, to issue regulations that identify transactions fitting this description, require notification of such transactions, and prohibit transactions determined to “pose a particularly acute national security threat because of their potential to significantly advance the military, intelligence, surveillance, or cyber-enabled capabilities of countries of concern.”

According to the US Congress-funded Voice of America (VOA), the Biden administration “has been working on

the executive order at least since August 2022… Last October, the White House stated it was moving ahead with the program, mentioning ‘screening of outbound investment’ as an approach to address national security threats under its National Security Strategy.”

Biden has declared a national emergency, but this is a longer-term policy concern dating back to president Donald Trump. It may be regarded as a ratcheting up of diplomatic and economic pressure on China or a way of countering rising Republican allegations that Biden is weak on China.

In June, Sequoia Capital, the venerable Silicon Valley venture capital firm, announced plans to deal with the potential risk to its business by spinning off its operations in China, a process that should be completed by the end of March 2024. In fact, all US investors received advanced warning of the soon-to-be-imposed restrictions.

The measures appear to be a double-edged sword. In May, Patrick McHenry, chairman of the US House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services, sent Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen a letter saying:

“US venture capital firms typically acquire control, substantive decision-making rights, board seats, or material nonpublic technical information when they invest. As your colleagues in the Office of Investment Security know, these represent potential national security risks to the target country – in this case, China. It is inexplicable that the administration hopes to rescue China from these risks before Beijing can.”

The semiconductor industry’s concerns were put much more directly by Intel CEO Pat Gelsinger at the Aspen Security Forum in July.

“Right now, China represents 25% to 30% of semiconductor exports. Right, if I have 25% to 30% less market, I need to build less factories, right? You know, we believe you want to maximize our exports to the world. We want to maximize selling fish, not fishing rods, right, across the world, including China,” Gelsinger said.

Intel CEO Patrick Gelsinger isn’t a big fan of Biden’s tech war restrictions. Image: Twitter

“You can’t walk away from 25% to 30% and the fastest growing market in the world and expect that you remain funding the R&D and the manufacturing cycle… this is strategic to our future, we have to keep funding the R&D, right, the manufacturing, etc.

“We agree on the priority of national security, but, as (National Security Advisor) Jake Sullivan said, high walls, small garden. Today, we have over 1,000 companies on the entities list, many of which have nothing to do with national security… and nothing to do with security concerns in China.”

What Sullivan actually said was “…we are protecting our foundational technologies with a small yard and high fence.” But the yard is getting bigger, new fences are being built and US business and government clearly do not see eye to eye.

Some compromise may be reached during the period for public comment, but at this point it appears that the advance of Chinese technology will henceforth take place with less US participation and, therefore, less US understanding of what is happening in China.

Follow this writer on Twitter: @ScottFo83517667

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China’s high-tech Field of Dreams

TIANJIN – Watching the giant cranes glide across the longshore of this ancient port, a visitor has to pinch himself to remember that this is not a gigantic toy, but one of the world’s ten largest facilities, moving more than 20 million containers a year from ships to trucks without a single human in sight.

Built in just 19 months in 2020-2021, the automated Tianjin port isn’t just a means to send Chinese exports to the world. A high-definition video on an enormous curved screen in the visitor center reminds the visitor that the most important export item is the port itself. Tianjin was built to be cloned worldwide.

Call it the Sino-forming of world trade: Supply-chain bottlenecks due to port congestion, endemic in the Global South, can be alleviated by this artificial intelligence-driven system that dispatches cranes communicating on a 5G network, and empties a large container ship in just 45 minutes. At the biggest US port at Long Beach, California, unloading the same ship takes between 24 and 48 hours.

Crane operators that used to scrunch up in a booth at the top of their equipment now control the blue behemoths with joysticks from a remote tower, with each worker monitoring several machines. An AI algorithm works out the fastest route from ship to land transport.

The AI-driven port at Tianjin. Photo: Asia Times

This is China’s “Field of Dreams.” Build it, and they will come is the essence of China’s long-term strategy. The “it” in this case includes the world’s largest 5G network, the world’s newest and most efficient infrastructure and a national commitment to apply AI to the so-called Internet of Things, including manufacturing, transportation, logistics, medicine, urban management, and finance.

“They” are China’s private entrepreneurs, who are slow to get past a series of speed bumps: the draconian 2022 Covid lockdowns, the government’s crackdown on Alibaba and other Big Tech companies, and the freeze-up in China’s property market, which is locking up a great deal of private capital.

The Fourth Industrial Revolution is underway in China, although its applications are limited to a few big installations. Some of the productivity gains are remarkable. Near Shenzhen, this writer visited an automated factory where Huawei manufactures thousands of 5G base stations a day, adding to the 2.3 million that China already has installed out of 3 million worldwide.

It has several assembly lines that each require 15 workers, compared to nearly 80 workers three years ago. Most of them are there to check that the automated assembly and testing equipment is doing its job properly; only one stage of assembly required human hands.

Detailed data isn’t available, but China’s auto industry—the world’s biggest buyer of industrial robots—has achieved remarkable gains in efficiency, allowing BYD and SAIC to offer electric vehicles at a price of around US$10,000. That’s less than China’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP), and comparable to the $800 price at which Henry Ford sold his first Model T in 1908, cheap enough so that any modestly prosperous family could afford a car.

China exported more than a million vehicles in the first three months of 2023, overtaking Japan as the world’s largest auto exporter, and its offerings at the low end of the EV price spectrum will help raise its market share in Europe as well as the Global South.

China’s authorities know that the Fourth Industrial Revolution will stall unless private entrepreneurs embrace the new technologies. The National Development and Reform Commission issued a July 24 directive calling on authorities at all levels to “mobilize the enthusiasm of private investment.”

Government bodies, the directive said, should “boost private investment confidence,” “focus on key areas and support private capital participation in major projects,” and “give full play to the important role of private investment.”

The NRDC will “select a group of enterprises with large market share and strong development potential,” “in line with the requirements of major national strategies and industrial policies” and “conducive to promoting high-tech enterprises.”

But the animal spirits of private entrepreneurs are not fired up by directives from bureaucrats, who aren’t qualified to pick winners among private firms. Beijing’s belated acknowledgment that China’s economic future depends on private risk-taking isn’t enough.

Chinese firms have to believe that the government won’t repeat its 2020-2021 crackdown on Alibaba and other Big Tech companies. And Chinese households, who have about 10% of their assets in stocks and 70% in real estate, have to invest in technology instead of houses. None of that will change overnight.

In July, Huawei’s Cloud division CEO, Zhang Pingan, unveiled Pangu, an AI system for a wide range of business applications. In contrast to ChatGPT and other so-called Large Language Models, the Huawei executive told the 6th World Artificial Intelligence Conference in Shanghai, “The Pangu model does not compose poetry, nor does it have time to compose poetry, because its job is to go deep into all walks of life, and help AI add value to all walks of life.”

Huawei’s Zhang Pingan says Pangu will impact all walks of life. Image: Twitter

The platform is powered by Huawei’s own Kunpeng chipset and Ascend AI processor. It’s a do-it-yourself system for training AI models on proprietary data. Huawei Cloud offers its customers “large-scale industry development kits. Through secondary training on customer-owned data, customers can have their own exclusive industry large models,” the company said.

Although “Nvidia’s V100 and A100 GPUs remain the most popular GPUs for training Chinese large-scale models,” a recent study notes, “Huawei used its own Ascend 910 processors” to train the Pangu model.

Second, China appears able to produce proprietary AI chips like Ascend, which requires 7-nanometer processors. US sanctions were supposed to prevent China from making 7nm chips for years, but Chinese chip fabricators appear to have worked around US restrictions—at a cost.

It’s hard to tell through the fog of tech war whether and to what extent US tech sanctions are holding back China’s rollout of business AI applications. Announcing Alibaba’s better-than-expected second-quarter results on August 10, the company’s Cloud division CEO mentioned that a short-term shortage of GPUs was a constraint on growth.

How rapidly Chinese businesses will adopt AI systems such as Pangu and its competitors is hard to predict. Pangu’s first commercial application to coal mining debuted in late July in a Huawei joint venture with Shandong Energy Group. Late in 2022, China’s largest appliance maker Midea opened China’s “first fully connected 5G smart factory,” according to a Huawei video.

China’s private entrepreneurs face some significant hurdles. It’s hard to quantify them, but a couple of simple parameters are helpful. The price-earnings multiple of China’s CSI 300 stock index is about 13, compared to 21 for America’s S&P 500. Equity is much cheaper in China, which means that entrepreneurs pay a lot more for capital than their American counterparts.

The riskiness of the Chinese equity index, moreover, is nearly double that of the S&P 500. The implied volatility of options on MCHI, the broad Chinese stock market ETF that tracks the MSCI China Index, is now roughly 30%, compared to just 16% for the VIX index of implied volatility for the S&P 500.

As recently as 2021, the implied volatility of the US and China indices was roughly equal. China employed AI-based systems to track and predict Covid outbreaks in 2020 and 2021, and China’s economy was the first to bounce back from the Covid recession. The more contagious strains of the virus defeated China’s systems in 2022, and the government responded with prolonged lockdowns (see “China’s avoidable Covid crisis,” Asia Times, May 13, 2022).

Another depressant is the continued upheaval in the property market, which in reality is a political standoff between the central government and local authorities who took on between RMB35 trillion and RMB70 trillion of so-called hidden debt.

The central government won’t bail out the cities without assuming control of their finances. On paper, municipalities own enterprises with RMB205 trillion in assets, and on the whole are solvent, but the political tug-of-war will keep the property market in crisis mode for some time.

If we believe analysts’ estimates for capital investment in China, private business remains cautious. Shown in the chart below are the Bloomberg consensus estimates for CapEx in several major sub-sectors of China’s CSI 300 Index. The only big increases in expected spending are in energy and utilities, both dominated by state-owned enterprises. Industrial and information technology company CapEx plans remain subdued.

Graphic: Asia Times

The future of business AI, though, doesn’t depend entirely on large-capitalization companies. AI is a force multiplier for small and medium businesses, a Huawei executive told me during a tour of the company’s exhibition halls in Shenzhen.

Smaller shops can achieve very high efficiency in flexible manufacturing by applying AI to automated factories. Ultimately, industrial AI may incubate a new generation of manufacturing entrepreneurs, just as the internet upended retailing.

Huawei is a protean enterprise that is transforming itself from a telecom equipment maker into a global business facilitator. 5G2C (5G for consumers) is a mature business with limited growth prospects, and the company envisions a future based on 5G2B (5G for business), with a full suite of AI-based solutions.

Whether China’s entrepreneurs will come to the “Field of Dreams” built on high-speed broadband and AI remains an open question, but it’s still early days. As Alibaba and Huawei executives emphasize, the new Cloud-based AI systems just came online.

The political will and profit opportunities are visible, and China may yet surprise the world as much as it did during the 1990s and 2000s.

Follow David P Goldman on Twitter at @davidpgoldman

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Quick fix to sea row ‘urgent’

Cambodia deal will ‘help in energy crisis’

The issue of the overlapping area claimed by both Thailand and Cambodia should be resolved as soon as possible to help combat Thailand’s growing energy crisis, according to Kurujit Nakorntap, executive director of the Petroleum Institute of Thailand (Ptit).

Mr Kurijit, who also formerly served as secretary of the Energy Ministry, made the remark during a speech at a forum titled “The Overlapping Claim Area (OCA) between Thailand and Cambodia” that was co-hosted by Chulalongkorn University’s Law Faculty and the Treaties and Legal Affairs Department of the Foreign Affairs Ministry on Thursday.

He said it is necessary to resolve the conflict as it would help save Thailand from an impending energy crisis as this contested area could become a new petroleum site in the upper part of the Gulf of Thailand. It is located near the Bongkot and Erawan gas blocks.

He said the country’s natural gas reserves have decreased, and new sources have not been found since 2005. In addition, the amount of natural gas imported from Myanmar is also decreasing.

Additionally, international oil companies (IOCs) have started to withdraw their investments from Thailand, he said. Therefore, resolving the dispute over the OCA could serve as a huge boon because that area is enriched with natural gas, Mr Kurujit said.

“As it is a no-man’s-land, we can’t determine the value and amount of the gases underneath the sea floor, but technically, the area of the Joint Development Area [JDA] below the latitude of 11 degrees north is located in the Pattani basin and is enriched with natural resources. Even if we do not know how much [gas] is there, it is a valuable investment, and there is a high probability we will make some good discoveries,” he said.

To resolve the dispute, he suggested bilateral negotiations on stating clear boundaries and an agreement on principle for a lower JDA, as well as talks over taxation, customs, jurisdiction, environmental management, and the allocation of rights/interests among existing concessionaires from both countries. He also suggested a new organisation be set up to oversee this, a joint authority funded, and legislation implemented to effectively administer petroleum exploration and production in the JDA.

“When it comes to negotiations, we’re not saying ‘we want it all’, but rather we need to compromise while considering all related factors such as politics, the economy and the history of our two countries,” Mr Kurujit added.

Furthermore, he suggested all stakeholders should learn from previous successes, such as the Thai-Malaysian agreement to conclude a cooperation project in their JDA by signing an MoU in 1979 that saw both countries agree to equally split the benefits of certain operations within their overlapping seas. They also agreed to set up the Thailand-Malaysia Joint Authority to work together.

Mr Kurujit also cited the deal between Thailand and Vietnam on the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Thailand in 1997, which has enabled Thailand to take natural gas from the Arthit gas and condensate field.

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Free hepatitis screenings

Free hepatitis screenings
Health officials provide free health services to people. The Ministry of Public Health is stepping up nationwide screening for hepatitis B and C viral infections, both major contributors to incidences of liver cancer nationally. (Photo: Ministry of Public Health Facebook)

The Ministry of Public Health is stepping up nationwide screening for hepatitis B and C viral infections, both major contributors to incidences of liver cancer nationally, with a target of stamping both out completely in Thailand by 2030.

There are estimated to be around 2.2 million people already infected with hepatitis B and 300,000 to 800,000 with hepatitis C in Thailand, said Dr Opas Karnkawinpong, permanent secretary for public health.

He added that as well as liver cancer, infectees are also associated with other severe conditions, including cirrhosis (severe scarring) of the liver.

The earlier these infections are detected, the better the outcome of treatment, he said, adding that many lives could be saved if hepatitis infections are detected in their very early stages.

In addition to screening, treatment is also available free of charge at healthcare facilities in almost all communities nationwide, said Dr Opas.

Those born before 1992 are entitled to one free screening in their lifetime, while those who are in one of five at-risk groups — those living with HIV/Aids, intravenous drug users, men who have sex with men, healthcare workers and inmates — are eligible for a free test every year, he said.

Officially launched on Friday, the free hepatitis B and C screenings began on April 1, he said.

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Reconciliation by accident

Reconciliation by accident
Pita Limjaroenrat, leader of the election-winning Move Forward Party and its prime minister candidate, greets supporters during a rally at CentralWorld in Bangkok on July 9. (Photo: Wichan Charoenkiatpakul)

Reconciliation by accident

The Move Forward Party (MFP) must have realised by now that emerging on top at a general election does not guarantee holding the reins of power.

The party has also witnessed its closest ally, the Pheu Thai Party, turn against it under the cloak of a “neo-conservative” foe.

The MFP, according to analysts, pulled off one of the most surprising results in politics when it took the country by storm in the May 14 polls and won 151 House seats out of 500 up for grabs.

Sooner after the unofficial results were released by the Election Commission (EC), party leader Pita Limjaroenrat bestowed upon himself the title of presumptive prime minister, much to the delight of supporters and, at the same time to the chagrin of some MFP admirers who thought it was premature to do so.

The MFP had rushed to consolidate eight parties in the so-called “pro-democracy” bloc who had stuck with it during their years in opposition against the Prayut Chan-o-cha administration.

The MFP took an unprecedented step to draft a memorandum of understanding outlining policies the eight parties would pursue in a coalition government. The MFP hoped the document, despite not being legally binding, would tie the parties together in spirit.

A source said the MFP-led alliance’s prospects did not look bright from the outset. Two almost equally large parties do not typically find the incentive to do business with each other as coalition partners since one, thinking it wields sizeable bargaining power, would tend not to yield to the other over the execution of policies.

With 151 MPs, the MFP has 10 more than the Pheu Thai Party.

Pita: Premature PM announcement

However, Pheu Thai was in a far better position to form a government, given its longstanding connections with other parties, even those in the opposing camp, such as Bhumjaithai and Palang Pracharath.

The source agreed the Pheu Thai-MFP relationship was tenuous, and it would have been sooner rather than later that they split. Their separation was also destined to be a less-than-amicable affair.

As the Pheu Thai Party edges closer to leading the next government, war with the MFP looms large on the horizon.

The source said the MFP deserves credit for having succeeded in under four months since the May 14 election, what the Prayut administration had failed to do in nine years of running the country.

The MFP’s election triumph has forced traditionalist parties such as the once-powerful Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP) and its breakaway, the United Thai Nation (UTN) Party, to not only swallow defeat but also search for allies still formidable enough to fight off what they consider is an MFP threat to their political and ideological conservatism.

That is where Pheu Thai comes in, according to the source.

Since the frictions, both visible and behind closed doors, between the MFP and Pheu Thai have intensified, signs have emerged of longstanding colour-coded conflict between the red and yellow shirts easing.

The red shirts are loyal supporters of Pheu Thai while the yellow shirts align themselves with parties that uphold traditional values and are staunch defenders of the crown.

For years, the two sides had been embroiled in a bitter conflict which came to a head in May 2014 when the yellow shirts led by the People’s Democratic Reform Committee held protracted mass protests and demanded the ouster of the Pheu Thai-led government, accusing it of gross corruption chiefly over its flagship rice-pledging scheme.

Pheu Thai was eventually toppled in a coup engineered by the National Council for Peace and Order headed by Gen Prayut, who subsequently became prime minister and installed his close ally, Gen Prawit Wongsuwon, as deputy prime minister in charge of national security.

Gen Prayut became a patriarchic figure and a prime ministerial candidate of the UTN, whereas Gen Prawit has served as the PPRP leader.

But the two parties’ recent election defeat — where they hugely underperformed with the PPRP garnering 41 MPs and the UTN 36 — has left the conservative establishment with no one among them to defend its cause and stand up to the MFP.

The two parties have no choice but to turn to Pheu Thai and lend their full support for it to become the next ruling party. Pheu Thai has also struck a chord with the PPRP and the UTN by keeping clear of amending Section 112 of the Criminal Code or the lese majeste law, something the MFP has vehemently refused to do.

The source said that Pheu Thai, if it heads the new government, will need all the support it can muster to counter and even emasculate the MFP, which looks increasingly likely to end up an opposition party. By gaining support from traditionalist parties, Pheu Thai may find itself inching ever closer towards becoming the guardian of conservative values.

So who do you put your faith in?

With the Move Forward Party (MFP) now dumped and no “uncle” parties included yet in a political alliance being formed by Pheu Thai, the next prime ministerial vote will see if the MFP and senators are true to their word, according to observers.

Srettha: Pheu Thai’s likely PM nominee

After tearing up an agreement it signed with the MFP and six small parties to give itself a chance of forming a coalition government and return to power, Pheu Thai has forged a new alliance with Bhumjaithai, the third-largest party, following the general election in May.

Pheu Thai and Bhumjaithai, with a combined 212 House seats, have lured six small parties — Prachachat, Chartpattanakla, Seri Ruam Thai, Plung Sungkom Mai, Thongthee Thai and Pheu Thai Ruam Palang — into a new coalition bid with 28 seats.

The alliance is growing further with the inclusion of the Chartthaipattana Party.

However, it is still short of a majority in the 500-seat House of Representatives by a dozen seats.

Pheu Thai has a few choices — turn to its arch-rival, the Democrat Party, the United Thai Nation (UTN) Party or the Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP), according to observers.

The UTN and the PPRP are referred to as “uncle” parties because of their association with Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, the former UTN chief strategist, and Gen Prawit Wongsuwon, the PPRP leader.

Because Pheu Thai made a campaign promise not to work with parties that are a legacy of the coup-makers that toppled the government it led back in 2014, the Democrat Party is deemed a safer choice, according to observers.

Several Democrat MPs have reportedly agreed to support Pheu Thai’s prime ministerial candidate. Democrat support will be enough for Pheu Thai to eliminate the need to approach the UTN or PPRP to join the coalition.

“We don’t really have a choice but to join hands with the Democrat Party. The party is rocked with internal strife, but its ‘true’ leader has given us a list of 21 MPs who will vote for our party’s [prime ministerial] candidate,” said a highly-placed Pheu Thai source.

Pheu Thai is poised to nominate property tycoon Srettha Thavisin in the next prime ministerial selection round in parliament, which is yet to be scheduled.

In the lead-up to the crucial vote, the Pheu Thai-led alliance may lure more small parties into its bloc and bring the total number of House seats over the majority threshold to 269. If this is the case, its coalition will be made up of all parties except the MFP, UTN, PPRP and four Democrats who do not see eye to eye with the rest of the MPs in their party.

According to the Pheu Thai source, the party has taken this path, hoping that the MFP and the military-appointed Senate will keep their promise in the prime minister vote.

The Senate has reportedly agreed to back the Pheu Thai candidate if the MFP, which faces strong resistance due to its policy to amend the lese majeste law, is dropped from the coalition, while the MFP has promised to support the party as long as no “uncle” parties are in the equation.

“We’re trying to meet the Senate’s conditions so that they will vote for us now that the MFP is out of the coalition line-up.

“We hope that they will honour their word,” said the source.

According to the source, Pheu Thai will avoid, at all costs, inviting the UTN or the PRRP to join its coalition.

“It would be our last option. We’ll opt for it if it’s totally necessary,” said the source.

However, because of outrage from many pro-democracy supporters, including some of its own voters who feel betrayed by the party’s decision to desert the MFP, observers say Pheu Thai has very little to celebrate even if it succeeds in forming a coalition.

According to observers, the UTN, which has 36 seats largely due to Gen Prayut’s popularity, is politically doomed if it does not become part of the incoming government now that Gen Prayut has announced he has stepped away from the party and is leaving politics.

As for the PPRP, the party may endure because its MPs are veteran politicians with solid support bases in their respective constituencies, while Gen Prawit is expected to fade away if he is not awarded a cabinet post in the new government.

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Chartthaipattana pro-charter rewrite but says some parts are ‘sacred’

Chartthaipattana pro-charter rewrite but says some parts are 'sacred'
Pheu Thai Party leader Cholnan Srikaew, left, waves his hand as Chartthaipattana (CTP) leader Varawut Silpa-archaan, centre, and CTP director Nikorn Chamnong, rigt, arrive at parliament on Thursday. Pheu Thai welcomed the CTP into its coalition to form a government. (Photo: Chanat Katanyu)

The Chartthaipattana Party (CTP) voiced support for setting up a charter-drafting assembly to write a new constitution but insisted Chapters 1 and 2 must be left untouched.

CTP director Nikorn Chamnong said on Friday that he agreed with the policy of Pheu Thai Party, the core party forming a new government, to amend the current charter and said the best approach would be to create a new one with the involvement of the public.

However, he said Chapters 1 and 2 must not be revised, and a planned referendum on the charter rewrite must not leave room for any interpretation that these two chapters can be amended.

Chapter 1 contains sections defining Thailand as a single, indivisible kingdom with a democratic regime and the King as the head of state. Chapter 2 contains sections pertaining to the royal prerogatives.

Mr Nikorn’s comments came as Pheu Thai posted on Friday on its social media that a charter rewrite was top of its agenda.

The party said it would ask the cabinet at its first meeting to pass a resolution on holding a national referendum on the issue. This would be drafted by the people via a charter-drafting assembly, according to the party.

The Internet Law Reform Dialogue (iLaw) has urged the new government to disclose the questions that would be posed at the planned referendum. Ratchapol Jaemjirachaikul, an iLaw representative, said the group had concerns about these.

He said some of the questions posed during the referendum in 2016 confused people.

ILaw manager Yingcheep Atchanond asked if the charter rewrite could be pursued if Pheu Thai was planning to invite the Palang Pracharath Party and United Thai Nation Party (UTN) to join the coalition.

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A weekend in Ho Chi Minh City: What to see, where to eat, what to do in Vietnam’s largest city

The museum is filled with photographs depicting the brutalities that the French and later the Americans committed in their losing campaigns against the Vietnamese. In addition to photos of rows of bodies in open pits, burning villages and instruments of torture, the harrowing displays are heavy on graphic shots of Vietnamese deformed by US chemicals like Agent Orange, with hardly any mention of the atrocities the North and South committed against each other.

11.30am: Relax in comfort

The Thao Dien area, across the river from the Binh Thanh District, is home to forests of condo and commercial high rises. Popular with expats and affluent Vietnamese, the area has all the accoutrements of the city’s upturn, from chic boutiques to gourmet eateries.

For brunch, visit Laang, a stylish, vegetarian-friendly Vietnamese restaurant that may be a welcomed alternative to the multitude of uncomfortably warm, open-air eateries. You can’t go wrong with a platter of wraps and rolls, including succulent grilled chicken and veggies wrapped in fresh leaves (239,000 dong), sweet and savoury grilled eggplant stuffed with shiitake mushrooms (109,000 dong) and the refreshing pomelo, lime and butterfly pea juice (79,000 dong).

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