Asia (Page 2,478)

In what may be the first of its kind, Chinese scientists have unveiled a new Stirling engine-powered high-power microwave (HPM) weapon, marking a significant leap in directed-energy warfare technology with possible applications in future urban warfare scenarios.

This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that Chinese scientists have claimed to develop an HPM weapon driven by four compact and efficient Stirling closed-cycle heat engines.

SCMP notes that Stirling engines in China’s new HPM design efficiently convert thermal energy into mechanical energy, working together as a reverse heat pump.

The report mentions that the superconducting coil generates a magnetic field with a strength of up to four teslas harnessed to drive HPM waves powerful enough to suppress drones, military aircraft and even satellites.

China claims that it is the world’s first openly reported HPM weapon based on Stirling engine technology.

SCMP states that the intensity of its continuous, steady-state magnetic field reaches 68,000 times that of the Earth’s magnetic field, or close to half the magnetic field strength of the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) in Europe.

It says that the weapon system, which can easily fit into a truck, boasts a significant reduction in energy consumption for generating a strong magnetic field compared with existing technologies. According to preliminary tests, China claims it consumes only one-fifth of the energy required by current methods and can operate continuously for four hours.

The development of low-energy, compact, superconducting magnet systems is essential for large-scale production and use of microwave weapons. The report claims that the Chinese scientists involved in the project achieved the breakthrough partly due to sanctions initiated by former US president Donald Trump.

Since the US government issued an export ban on rare-earth barium copper oxide (ReBCO) and other cutting-edge superconducting materials to China in 2018, Chinese suppliers including Shanghai Superconductor Technology have faced a surge in local demand.

Asia Times noted last month that while directed-energy weapons (DEW) such as lasers and HPMs are touted as the future of counter-drone and anti-satellite weapons, HPMs are known to suffer from low efficiency, high losses in the air and limited range at atmospheric levels.

Those disadvantages have restricted the development of ground-based systems while size and power consumption hinder their use on space-based platforms.

However, recent advances in miniaturization and beam control can offset some of those disadvantages, potentially turning HPMs into practical battlefield weapons.

In March 2023, Chinese scientists from the College of Advanced Interdisciplinary Studies at the National University of Defense Technology invented a compact power source that can significantly decrease the size of HPM weapons, SCMP reported.

The report says that the device can generate electricity up to 10 gigawatts at ten pulses per second, making HPMs powerful enough to fry sensitive electronics in planes, drones and satellites.

SCMP describes the device as an electron accelerator that speeds up electrons in an unusual design sporting two spiral tubes similar to DNA. It says that the spiral tubes were submerged in glycerin, a low-cost liquid that provides excellent insulation, requires no maintenance on the battlefield and eliminates short circuits once air bubbles are removed.

As with the Stirling engine-based design, SCMP mentions that the electron accelerator is small enough to fit on a bookshelf and can be mounted on rooftops or trucks for surprise HPM attacks against overhead targets.

Compact HPM weapons may be strategically deployed on future battlefields characterized by the intensive use of drones, as seen in Ukraine and Israel.

In a May 2023 article for Military + Aerospace Electronics, Jim Romeo mentions that HPMs can destroy computers, electronics and sensors without harming human life, a capability well-suited for urban warfare scenarios that require low collateral damage.

Romeo notes that HPM weapons can neutralize enemy capabilities and combatants nonlethally, offering advantages such as deep magazine capacity, simplified logistics, negligible cost per shot, instantaneous engagement and extreme accuracy.

Along those lines, China may need such capabilities should it decide to invade Taiwan. In a January 2024 article for the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR), David Sacks mentions that if the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) were to enter Taipei, it would face costly urban warfare, having to fight street-by-street in a city of seven million inhabitants.

Furthermore, Sale Lily, in an October 2022 RAND report, describes the PLA’s approach toward urban warfare as “killing rats in a porcelain shop,” indicating the need to avoid collateral damage in trying to wrest Taiwan from urban defenders.

Woon Wei Jong, in an October 2023 Think China article, says that Taiwan’s military is preparing for urban warfare and enhancing its asymmetric warfare capabilities, including acquiring  “mobile, small, portable, and AI-enabled” weapons, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and counter-UAV systems.

Jong mentions that the Taiwanese military will use geography, terrain features, urban environments, buildings and critical infrastructure protection measures within tactical defensive areas for layered counter-offensive capabilities and defense-in-depth.

As such, HPM weapons may play an essential role in a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan in terms of tackling resistance and avoiding collateral damage that could harden Taiwanese resolve to repel invading forces.

However, HPMs may not be the game-changers some are touting them to be.

Timothy Heath and other writers stress that in a 2023 RAND report, strong political leadership, a largely unified and cohesive public, and strong public support for a compelling national cause or ideology is the most durable foundation for a resolute defense.

The Rand report writers state that Taiwan’s ability to resist China in the first 90 days between an invasion and US intervention will hinge on the strength of its political leadership and social cohesion above other variables, such as military effectiveness, durability and firepower.

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There is much talk about “de-radicalization” in Gaza, de-militarization and not allowing Hamas, the Palestinian Authority (PA) or UNRWA to be in charge. 

The PA has forgone elections since January 25, 2006, and lost elections in Gaza. UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, in its present shape perpetuates and aggravates the conflict rather than being an institution to mitigate it.  

All three objectives – de-radicalization, de-militarization and preventing dictatorial regimes from gaining power – have been pursued around the world, at times successfully, at times not. The failures offer better lessons than the successes.  

Germany and Japan went through successful de-radicalization after World War II. However, this experience cannot be replicated and bring about transitions from dictatorial and deistic mindsets toward decentralized, meritocratic ones. Yes, Germany abandoned Nazism. However, that ideology did not have centuries-old roots, as the combination of centralization and an Islamic conception of society have had in the Middle East.  

Japan abandoned both a warmongering political leadership and the concept of emperor’s divinity, when in an Imperial Rescript on January 1, 1946, Emperor Hirohito declared that he was not a living god.

These acknowledgments were not so drastic as they appear at first sight, since the 1889 Constitution of the Empire had already separated state and religion and distinguished Shintō from other religions. The latter’s rituals became just part of Japan’s program of national ethics.  

These cases of “de-radicalization” in a relatively short time are thus not applicable to either Gaza, the West Bank, or the more populous Muslim states in the Middle East, expectations of “Arab Springs” having been hallucinations, really. Moreover, Germany and Japan were demilitarized, and the US stayed put in them during the years of transition. 

Societies in the Middle East, based on deistic/dictatorial conceptions, never had the institutions to disperse power – financial power in particular. 

Such conceptions, assumed to last forever, are not discarded quickly in favor of voter-made laws and institutions, though occasionally mutated from theocracies to pan-Arab, nationalistic principles – the kind of transitions that Europe had gone through centuries before, and which have been typical of societies whose populations and mobility were growing rapidly.

The transitions brought about new dictatorships, masked occasionally by democratic jargon, and accompanied by corruption and violence, as seen now in the Middle East, Asia, Africa or Latin America – and centuries before in Europe too.

And, as noted, the German and Japanese de-radicalization and de-militarization happened while the Allies stayed in these countries after winning in World War II, and reshaped the countries’ institutions. However, these days, if a coalition of countries were to remain in Gaza, replacing Hamas and UNRWA, that would be labeled “occupation,” “colonialism,” “imperialism” – and as of now this option does not appear to be in the cards.  

How much military would be needed to stay in place to disarm various Islamist cells and put in place a decent administration, paving the path toward a civil society – whose essence is dispersion of powers?

Recent events in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans offer guidance of both what not to do and a range of goals that a coalition’s administration/military staff would have to commit to.

The Iraq experience

In Iraq, the US was set on dissolving the Baath military and administration, assuming this would prevent Saddam Hussein’s followers from restoring dictatorship and also prevent conflicts among the country’s Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds.

A memo signed by then-US secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld titled “Principles for Iraq – Policy Guidelines” stated that the coalition would “actively oppose Saddam Hussein’s old enforcers – the Baath Party, Fedayeen Saddam, the Special Republican Guard, etc – and make it clear that the coalition will eliminate the remnants of Saddam’s regime.”

But the consequence was that 400,000 previous military personnel became unemployed – together with 750,000 Baathists in the administration, from policemen to museum curators and ordinary civil servants – all now, with their families, facing uncertain prospects.  

The discarded officers and soldiers abandoned their bases – with weapons. The police force was drastically reduced, and security of property was much diminished. It took long years to replace the political administration.  

This could have been mitigated by recognizing that the mere fact of being Baathists did not imply eternal loyalty to Saddam, but – as was the case of many Communist Party members in Russia – to make a living. There are few Solzhenitsyns in this word, and the old Latin adage applies: “Primum vivere, deinde philosophari” – meaning “first live, philosophize later.” 

As to the country’s military: According to the US Marine Corps’s Robert Weiler, it took two years to form just 40,000 Iraqi “soldiers assumed loyal enough to be enough to replace the departing coalition forces.” As events showed, this was not enough.

During the prewar planning, the US military estimated that 386,000 troops would be needed for a while to replace the discarded Iraqi military and also fulfill security tasks such as protecting border, military and other infrastructure, and maintaining law and order. Only 150,000 were deployed. 

Applications for Gaza

What do these events and numbers imply about a potential administrative solution for Gaza?

A RAND study concluded that after wars where the army and administration are decimated, in order to sustain law and order, a country would need one soldier for every 50 citizens (the numbers used for Kosovo). For Iraq’s roughly 25 million people this would have meant 500,000 troops. 

For Gaza’s 2 million, this would mean 40,000 troops to be able to de-militarize, de-radicalize the place, sustain law and order, and also supervise the creation of institutions that eventually could assure that future transitions of political powers would happen without resorting to violence.  

After all, this feature defines a civil society and what democracies are assumed to be about, not just voting, which can easily create mobs. As to a proposed “ceasefire” – it would be signed and enforced by which entity? 

The above experiences imply that without long-term commitment and the required dedicated personnel and resources, Gaza would face problems Iraq and Afghanistan have been facing after premature departure of coalition forces, and without leaving behind enough competent administrative personnel. In particular, the successful de-radicalizations of Germany and Japan are inapplicable for the Middle East. 

A serious obstacle to such long-term commitment in both the US and Western Europe, more serious than the fads dominating political discussions, is the fragile state of government finances. Although the US House of Representatives approved a stopgap bill to fund the federal government a few weeks ago, that ends in early March – an in-depth discussion about re-allocating funds has hardly started.

Since it is unlikely that either the US or Europe would commit adequate funding for significant military and reliable administrative personnel to watch over Gaza, and with Muslim and Arab countries unwilling or unable to commit supervising de-militarization and de-radicalization, it appears that the solution would be for a coalition to prevent re-armament by watching imports.

That would entail closing the land borders hermetically – Israel emulating on the northern and eastern borders what Egypt has done on Gaza’s southern border. Then letting the Gazan population manage without any trade relations with, or going through, Israel.   

The area’s situation would not differ from Israel’s in 1948, when the country’s only opening for trade was toward the Mediterranean and firmly closed on the north, east and south (Eilat came later) – as it would be for Gaza.

The vast tunnel network shows that the local population has the technical capacity to build a decent infrastructure, manufacturing, water supplies – above the ground. 

Israel managed to prosper with some 800,000 people, surrounded by neighbors who promised daily to kill them. Gaza’s population of some 2 million would not have to worry about that, and even a tiny fraction of them would not be at risk – if they focused on building better lives for themselves, rather than amassing infrastructure to attack Israel, and destabilize Sinai and Egypt. So they could eventually prosper too. 

Perhaps it is time for Gaza’s population not to count on the kindness of strangers, or even their cousins.

This article draws on Reuven Brenner’s book The Force of Finance (2001) and his articles “Unsettled Civilizations: How the US Can Handle Iraq,” (2004), “How to Relink 7 billion People” (2017), and “Demography Is Not Destiny” (2024).    

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