Two weeks into US President Donald Trump’s subsequent word, the liberal global order is on life support.
Alliances and international organizations are now seen by the United States as obligations. Europe and NATO are framed as bad company, “ripping off” the US. On his so-called” Liberation Day”, Trump even imposed 20 % tariffs on all European Union goods.
The Trump presidency has been far less important of the US ‘ relationships in the Indo-Pacific place. On a visit to Tokyo this year, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth described Japan as America’s “indispensable partner” in deterring Taiwanese anger.
But, Japan and South Korea fared even worse than the Union with Trump’s fresh tariffs. Trump slapped Japan with 24 % tariffs and South Korea 25 %. ( Both countries enjoy a trade surplus with the US. )
But, how are the US ‘ two key supporters in the Indo-Pacific dealing with the capricious US head? Did they follow Europe’s result in reassessing their personal safety relationships with the US?
Japan: a good mountain but concerns remain
America’s post-war protection plan in Asia contrasts from Europe. While NATO was built on the premise of shared military among its users, the US adopted a “hub-and-spokes” type in Asia, relying on diplomatic relationships to contain the spread of communism.
Japan and South Korea have huge sheltered under the US nuclear umbrella and held big US military bases. Both are also very sensitive to changes in the US ‘ Indo-Pacific policies.
Japan, in particular, has a long history of cautious empire control with the US, epitomised by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s courting of Trump.
During Trump’s first term in office, Abe’s plan targets aligned strongly with the US: transforming Japan’s security position to make it a serious military and diplomatic energy. Japan increased defense spending, lifted hands trade restrictions and increased ties with India and Australia.
Prime Minister Fumio Kishida continued to raise Japan’s safety profile from 2021-24, once increasing military investing and taking a hard line on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. He emphasised” Europe today may become Asia tomorrow”.
His son, Shigeru Ishiba, had a successful conference with Trump in February, soon after his opening. The mutual declaration reaffirmed US protection promises to Japan, including over the Senkaku Islands, which are claimed by China.
Japan even agreed to buy American liquefied natural gas, and eventually committed to working with South Korea to build a US$ 44 billion plan to import LNG from Alaska.
Nevertheless, these positive advancements do not think the marriage is on solid ground.
In early March, Trump complained the US-Japan security agreement signed in 1960 was “one-sided” and a top administration official again called for Japan to increase its defence spending to 3 % of gross domestic product ( GDP ) – a huge increase for a country facing serious demographic and fiscal pressures.
Reports even emerged the US was considering cancelling a new shared headquarters in Japan aimed at deeper connectivity between US and Japanese forces.
South Korea: exceptionally susceptible on trade
South Korea faces comparable pressure. Ties between the two countries were strained during Trump’s first word over his require South Korea increase the amount it pays to network US troops by nearly 400 %. A 2021 deal restored some security but left Seoul seriously worried about the future of the empire.
South Korea’s operating leader, Choi Sang-mok, has expressed a desire to improve relations with the US, though Trump has apparently been great to his improvements.
With a$ 66 billion trade surplus with the US, South Korea is considered the country most vulnerable to trade risk with the Trump administration, according to a Swiss research group.
Trump’s prior recommendations that both South Korea and Japan develop nuclear weapons or compensate for US atomic security has also rattled some emotions. As trust in the US empire diminishes, both places are engaging in an urgent public debate about the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons.
Conflicts moving forwards
Potential for conflict is on the ocean. For instance, Tokyo and Washington are set to renegotiate the deal that dictates how much Japan pays to host US soldiers next month.
Both friends pay large sums to host US foundations. South Korea will pay$ 1.14 billion in 2026, and Japan pays$ 1.72 billion annually.
A trade conflict may also enable a reevaluation of the expenses of US efforts to detach from China, possibly leading to closer economic ties between Japan, South Korea and China. The three countries have agreed to accelerate talks on a trilateral free trade agreement, which had been on hold since 2019.
Another challenge is semiconductors. Japan’s new semiconductor revitalisation strategy is prioritising domestic investment, raising questions about whether Trump will tolerate “friendshoring” if Japan diverts investments from the US.
In 2024, Japan outspent the US in semiconductor subsidies ( as a share of GDP ), while Taiwan’s TSMC, the world’s largest contract chipmaker, expanded its production capacity in Japan.
Seoul remains an important partner to Washington on semiconductors. Samsung and SK Hynix are both boosting their investments on new semiconductor plants in the US. However, there is now uncertainty over the subsidies promised to both companies to invest in America under the CHIPS Act.
Ultimately, the strength of these alliances depends on whether the Trump administration views them as long-term bulwarks against China’s rise in the region or merely vassals that can be extorted for financial gain.
If the US is serious about countering China, its regional alliances are key. This would give Japan and South Korea some degree of leverage – or, in Trump terms, they’ll hold valuable cards. Whether they get to play them, however, depends on what Trump’s China policy turns out to be.
Sebastian Maslow is associate professor of international relations, University of Tokyo and PaulO’Shea is senior lecturer, Centre for East and South-East Asian Studies, Lund University
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.