The moon is about to rise, doo- dou’doo.
The moon is approaching, and I say
It’s fine.
– The Beatles
China demonstrated its capabilities in 2023 by achieving one of the most exciting industrial-technological feats in years. The jaw-dropping performance, which has been in the works for a while, portends many years of even more remarkable performances and an economy that is about to undergo complete change.
Of course, the majority of Western media and analysts missed it in their magnificent obscurity and began 2024 by busy reducing China’s reported 5.2 % GDP growth using some “feelzy” amazing approach. These are the same individuals who were shocked in 2023! …by China’s increasing auto imports.
What precisely did China would in 2023, then? It increased the potential of thermal manufacturing and generation by more than 200GW. China also made major advancements in nuclear and wind power, but come ignore those since they will eventually lead to round mistakes.
based on a thorough investigation by Lauri Myllyvirta of CarbonBrief. In 2023, clean energy industries accounted for 40 % of China’s GDP growth. While the world was enthralled by China’s electric vehicle ( EV ) revolution, the consumer-facing segment is only one of the “new three” —solar, batteries, and EVs—that will revolutionize the Chinese economy over the next few decades.  ,
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President Xi Jinping declared in September 2020 that China’s CO2 emissions will reach a top before 2030 and that the nation had become carbon neutral by 2060. With a projected 2030 generation capacity of 1, 200 GW, wind and solar may be significant. The maximum for fuel use is anticipated in 2025, and it will gradually phase out over time. The following are:  , , SVP, NBP,
Over six times ahead of schedule, China did reach 1, 200 GW of wind/solar generating power at some point this season. Participants in the COP28 Conference of the United Nations agreed to triple the output of alternative energy by 2030, mostly as a result of China’s expanding solar supply chain.
Estimates for China’s renewable energy capacity in 2030 range widely, from 2, 400 GW ( tripling that of year-end 2023 ) to 3, 300 from Goldman Sachs to 5, 000 by prolific X ( Twitter ) analysts Glenn Luk and TP Huang. What matters is where China hills, not the exact number on the hyperbolic part of the s-curve in 2030.
Renewable energy sources can produce 75 % of the energy produced by fuel in 2023, assuming Goldman Sachs ‘ 3, 300 Facebook forecast and a efficiency factor of 15 %. It is 114 % at 5, 000GW. Given fast developing safe-keeping technology and new industries that you capitalize on changed energy economics, the greatest plateau of suitable solar power is anticipated to be higher—possibly much, much higher.
Prices for solar photovoltaic ( PV ) modules decreased by almost 50 % year over year in 2023, according to the International Energy Agency ( IEA ). Since 2021, the capacity to manufacture PV has tripled, with China accounting for almost all of this growth.
By the end of 2024, the global manufacturing capacity for PV modules will rise by another 40 % to 1, 100 GW, with China continuing to hold a supply chain share between 80 and 95 % ( depending on the manufacturing segment ).
China’s clean electricity plan has abruptly accelerated, demonstrating its proper adaptability. Nothing was certain how energy technologies and economy would fare when the 2030 solar target was set in 2020. China had wagers placed on wind, solar, nuclear, storage, and electric vehicles ( EVs ).
All of the chips and other components were moved into the solar and industrial/technology stack required to milk it for maximum benefit, including batteries, ultra-high voltage ( UHV ) transmission, and EVs, once it became clear that the cost of PV panels could be buried.
For opportunistic power generation ( i .e. when the sun is shining ), solar is now less expensive than coal. For baseload power, renewable and storage—the capacity to conserve energy in substance chargers for cloudy days—are about to surpass coal in price.
While new calcium ion systems promises to be even more affordable, lithium batteries are already available. A national network that changes for local weather and seasonal variations in power demand must now be scaled and built out.
The narrative begins farther up. China is a fighter in MMA who has been quietly honing innovative techniques since the mid-2000s. Combat supporters believed that the new fashion was prepared for the 2017 hexagon, which would put an end to the building of new coal-fired power plants.
It turned out too soon. The fighter switched back to the old style ( mass coal buildout ) but still suffered humiliating defeats ( rolling brownouts in 2021 ). By 2019 it was clear the new style was n’t winning matches ( PV prices were still too high, limited wind scalability ).  ,
However, the training persisted, and improvements were made ( rapidly lowering PV and battery prices ), and now it is truly prepared for display. Everyone is mesmerized by the novel, fancy takedowns (electric cars ), but what they see is only a small portion of the larger Brazilian ground game of jujitsu.  ,
A PV and storage-based energy generation system will produce sporadic but predictable bursts of “free energy” that new industries can digest at full working capacity with appropriate redundancies. By 2030, 5, 000 GW of solar capacity should be able to remove all baseload coal, barring storage. Any more solar power would be sauce. In addition,  ,
Magical things like large distillation, indoor grain production, and” costless” environmentally friendly metal smelting take place here. Given the speed of the buildout, we may begin to see some of this revolutionary stuff happening within five years.
Primary energy consumption ( oil, coal, gas, nuclear, renewables, biomass, etc. ) quadrupled after China entered the rapid urbanization and infrastructure buildout phase of its development at the turn of the century. China consumes 75 % more major power than the US. But, it is 60 % less per person.
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As China’s economy becomes more service and consumption-oriented, it is anticipated that its main energy consumption does plain like the US. Although estimates vary, the majority of analysts predict that China’s primary energy consumption will plateau at OECD per capita levels around 2030, significantly below the US ( with its propensity for monster trucks and gas-guzzling SUVs ).
That might not be the situation. How small can energy prices drop with renewable economics being driven by China-sized scaling? Will massive electric vehicles ( EVs ) gain the same level of popularity in China as heavy-duty pickup trucks do in the US? What novel energy applications, if any, may novel economics justify? Desalination? extremely affordable manure jet energy based on hydrogen How great does China’s output of renewable energy reach? The following are:  , , SNP, BSP, NBP, ABNBSP, TBS, and NBSPS,
The speed of power innovation and the expansion of grid infrastructure will determine the answers to the aforementioned questions. The cost of installing PV modules has decreased to the point where it is now the constraint in some economy. If comparable changes in storage and transfer can be attained, next China’s economy—if not the entire world—will change.
Net income is the most crucial line on the money speech in bourgeois finance. The series to increase is that. Theoretically, increased societal welfare will be achieved through the combined efforts of individuals motivated to increase online income.
Cost of goods sold ( COGS ) is the most crucial line on the income statement in communist accounting. Maximizing COGS, in theory, stops capital from hoarding resources by either overspending clients or paying employees. Maximizing COGS in the USSR actually discouraged development and, over time, slowed efficiency.
China is attempting to get both methods. It might even be successful. China encouraged investment in the EV, power, and PV sectors two decades ago by providing ample grants and tax advantages to all takers ( at least all private ones ).
As a result, there were hordes of market participants who fiercely competed with one another, innovating desperately, and driving down prices ( as well as online revenue ). Underpinned by China’s enormous market, little profitable industries never only aggressively scaled up but were also compelled to innovate by the fierce competition.  ,
Of course, this has n’t always been successful, and the model changes occasionally. Despite years of government aid, China is also several generations behind in the semiconductor industry. Professional aircraft is such a complicated project that numerous market participants cannot be encouraged. With only one small local rival (ZTE), Huawei rose to the top of the market for telecommunications equipment.
Nevertheless, China has managed to run the snail and rabbit approach in change in the EV, battery, and PV spaces, where no legacy player had an established lead. Scale up so quickly and deep that catching away is difficult. The tortoise method is the only choice in sectors with established leaders, such as semiconductors, industrial aircraft, and biotech, where China got its start.
What does disappointment look like if success is the complete transformation of China’s market, with distillation plants irrigating inside solar-powered fruit farms and Chinese families cruising around in US$ 15, 000 Hummer-sized EVs?
Grid-level storage may never be commercially viable due to battery technology. The Xinjiang deserts are not terraformed into solar farms, and scaled UHV tranny could prove to be an impossible engineering challenge.
Even then, with coal power plants serving as a backup, renewable energy may still be able to completely eliminate coal-fired electricity era in China, which would be extremely advantageous for the country’s air quality and climate objectives.
We would like to go back to our regularly scheduled programming for China’s clean-adjusted GDP growth in 2023, which was 1.5 % with investments, government spending, household consumption, and net exports all contributing 2 % and 0.5 %, respectively.
Everything here is based on the “feelz.” Bloomberg articles, appalling stock market performance, and displeased fuel lords and real estate developers who relocated to Singapore are all well known.
We may also switch the channel and find out that China is so politically unbalanced that it has no option but to spend needlessly and can create GDP growth whatever it wants by dialing debts up and down.
The second-highest growth in household consumption since the financial crisis ( deep bow to Uzbekistan ) could not possibly have been achieved by one massive Ponzi scheme.
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China’s returns from “uneconomic” investment in infrastructure and urbanization ( housing, high-speed rail, roads, and bridges ) are exactly what you are looking at in the above chart. Investment in EVs, batteries, and solar infrastructure has been and probably wo n’t be any different.
In China, it is a fool’s errand to look for results in company financial statements or even entire industries. Everything is in the effects. in the quantity of cities that is then stake a claim to first-tier status. in the second-tier cities, which are now cooler than first, in their own crazy approach. in the roughly 70 % of university graduates who will graduate this time.
And if everything goes according to plan, Greta Thunberg and Al Gore will be driven through Shanghai’s roads in enormous electric vehicles with designs the size of living rooms.