The countries of the AUKUS announced their “optimal road” in 2023, which described the steps and timelines for Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, as illustrated by the slide above.
Wall 2 of AUKUS includes a number of advanced features that the three countries intend to develop up, while Pillar 1 of AUKUS is known as Pillar 1.
Lately, Pillar 2 has been covered in media coverage, and there is rumor that Canada and Japan might both sign on to the security agreement. Although this may have some significance, there is no mention of any other countries being included in Pillar 1, which is the subject of this article.
Some have disputed the idea that this is the best course of action, arguing that if the Royal Australian Navy (RAN ) buys the Virginia class from the United States, they should stay with a submarine made by the US.
This is logical, but it is ineffective because of a number of factors that involved parties to the discussion have considered for some months. This article aims to provide more details about the rationale behind choosing the best path and outlines some of the obstacles that will need to be overcome along the way.
The initial project envisions the establishment of the Submarine Rotation Force West ( SRF-West ), the first vessel to transport both UK and US SSN submarines ( nuclear-powered general-purpose attack subs ) to western Australian ports, with RAN personnel being embedded in these boats. The goal is to familiarize and expand the Australian workforce’s knowledge of operating, maintaining, and sustaining nuclear-powered submarines.
This is a major undertaking both from the perspective of the real-world operator and to develop the strong expertise required to fill the numerous national policy and supervisory positions in the future.
The RAN intends to purchase three of their own Virginia-class SSNs made in the US as part of the next phase of the plan. The second two are likely to be used submarines with the possibility of the second being delivered directly from the US production line. Despite this, there is some skepticism as to whether this is feasible given that the US has trouble producing enough submarines for itself.
Obviously, the strategy is the result of extensive work between the three countries and is far more than just an ambition, but make no mistake, the work required to deliver it is – and will be – significant.
The last part of the plan, in the first 2040s, is the consolidation of SSN AUKUS by the RAN. SSN AUKUS may be “based on the UK’s next-generation design, which incorporates cutting-edge US underwater technologies, and is based on the best of both the UK and the United States. SSN-AUKUS may serve as Australia’s and the UK’s upcoming strike underwater.
They should be impressive models.
But what?
One may begin there – the cliché of “every trip starts with a single action” completely applies. There is a very long way to go, but RAN personnel are now completing education in the UK and the US.
All well-experienced American employees at all levels can benefit them, and there will only be so much that they may “buy in” from US and UK staff. This will not be a simple task.
Although it might be argued that the route should be followed once operations have been initiated with a US-designed, built SSN, this approach would not be practical or even efficient.
The fundamentals of submarine battle have not changed, nor do the personnel ‘ innate ability and proper culture, but all three countries have a history of operating and training together.
Operating a gas propulsion system is much less difficult than some would have us to feel; in reality, it is all about nuclear.
Nuclear is a challenge, but it’s one of understanding, experience, and great logic, not just one of pushing buttons and watching dials. It involves a thorough understanding of risk, complete training, guidance, and the development and appreciation of thorough procedures and the operating rules.
The most effective way to develop these skills, which are essential to this program, is not to follow one instructor, but rather to gain as much knowledge as possible from many sources so that impartial expertise can be developed. Only in such a way may a third country absolutely operate as a peer and still maintain its political and functional independence.
Australia is surprised to learn that the UK and the US share similar design and engineering ideas, but the journey these three countries have taken will be longer, laborious, and not cheap. The award at the end of the street is undoubtedly regarded as being of enormous value.
The greatest challenge, however, is not one of training, growing expertise or even cadres of operators, it is the development and sustaining of industrial capacity ( and infrastructure ), performance, time and cost to build and maintain these magnificent machines.
Intellectual property ( IP ) issues will need to be addressed by the defense industry from the three countries at the earliest opportunity to put them aside and enable the program. They will need to be bold and incredibly collaborative.
It is very comforting to know that efforts are being made to break down barriers and establish a common business foundation across AUKUS nations, such as ITAR regulations and the introduction of new government regulations.
No one should undervalue the decision-making, investment, and responsibility required in order to truly collaborate across government and industry. This will need to be combined with innovative ways of doing so.
Conclusion
Australia and the United Kingdom have a sizable investment in Pillar 1 of AUKUS, which has received substantial aid from the United States.
Detractors who claim it will never happen are due to the timelines, but we would caution against doing so because this assumes there are n’t the necessary changes in industrial capacity and business performance.
This article has described the program’s delivery over the next few years and why it is regarded as the “optimal pathway.”
The greatest problem for this enormous effort is the creation of the necessary business capacity that must have already begun.
The time to expand, develop, and spend is now because the reward is enormous. This will need true collaboration between the three countries and among all industry partners. Additionally, it will require the prerequisite innovative ways of working to make decisions at the speed of relevance.
Former Royal Marines Brigadier Rory Copinger-Symes spent his final four years at US Indo-Pacific Command in even while serving as one. He presently has a variety of functions, including journalist for AUKUS Forum News, a Senior Advisor for Bondi Partners and Senior Advisor to SecureCloud , among other things.
Piers Moore is Technical Director at RB Safety , Consultants and a former Royal Navy , Commander , who was responsible for setting the capability , needs for the Astute Class ships substitution, which has become SSN AUKUS.
With PacNet’s agreement, this article has been republished. Read the original below.