The latest developments in the South China Sea territorial dispute point to ASEAN’s long-running failure to deal with a major regional problem, highlighting the regional organization’s inherent weakness.
As the confrontations between Chinese and Philippine vessels near the Second Thomas Shoal within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) have grown sharper, the South China Sea has perhaps surpassed Taiwan as the most volatile flashpoint in eastern Asia.
On March 5, the Chinese Coast Guard again employed ramming and a water cannon to attempt to stop a much smaller Philippine vessel from resupplying the soldiers manning a ship intentionally grounded on the reef that serves as a Philippine guard post.
This time, the Chinese water cannon broke the window on the bridge of the Philippine supply boat, reportedly injuring four crewmen.
Based on its expansive “nine-dash line” claim to ownership over most of the South China Sea, Beijing claims that the Second Thomas Shoal is Chinese territory, demands that the Philippines tow away the grounded ship and refuses to allow repairs to the vessel, which is 80-years-old and falling apart.
Both Beijing and Manila are treating the showdown as a test of commitment to defending national territory under threat of theft by a foreign government. Manila’s ally, the United States, is obligated to protect Philippine ships and aircraft that come under “armed attack” under a mutual defense treaty.
Typical of its preference for gray-zone tactics, China keeps its actions just below the threshold of what would trigger a US military response. But China is now employing kinetic force that can cause bodily harm, seemingly very close to an “armed attack” even if not with firearms.
Furthermore, Philippine armed forces Western Command chief Vice Admiral Alberto Carlos says he is running out of vessels to run the re-supply missions because the Chinese water cannon attacks inflict damage that forces the supply boats to withdraw for repairs.
If this situation continues, China will succeed in driving Philippine personnel off a feature they currently occupy, changing the South China Sea’s status quo in Beijing’s favor.
Washington will unavoidably consider an intervention such as US Navy or Coast Guard vessels escorting Philippine supply ships, or perhaps even standing guard while the Philippines builds a permanent outpost to replace the decaying ship. This could bring US and PRC ships into confrontation with each other, with the potential for further escalation.
In contrast, the Taiwan Strait has calmed slightly as an arena of potential US-China military conflict since the latter part of last year.
Taiwan continues to endure hostile Chinese signaling and, more recently, opportunistic Chinese encroachment into the waters around Taipei-controlled Kinmen island. But Beijing’s reaction to the election of Democratic Progressive Party candidate Lai Ching-te as Taiwan’s incoming president was moderate.
Beijing’s Taiwan policy will be mostly on auto-pilot through late May as the Chinese government waits to hear what Lai says in his inauguration speech.
ASEAN could help prevent a conflict over the Second Thomas Shoal by unitedly condemning China’s aggressive attempts to enforce its excessive territorial claims. This would be a reasonable position to take.
Twelve years ago, ASEAN and the Chinese government agreed to a Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea, which obligates rival claimants to “resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force,” and prohibits “activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability.”
China’s actions are clearly non-compliant.
Then, in 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague declared China’s expansive nine-dash line claim invalid, giving China no lawful basis for asserting sovereignty over areas within the Philippines’ EEZ. Beijing would be much less likely to bully the Philippines if all the other ASEAN members objected.
Sadly, that is not happening. The same week the Chinese Coast Guard was pummeling a Philippine supply boat with a water cannon, Australia hosted a summit of ASEAN leaders. On March 6, the entire group released a statement, called the Melbourne Declaration, that makes only a vague reference to the tensions around the Second Thomas Shoal.
“We continue to closely follow developments in the South China Sea,” it says. “We encourage all countries to avoid any unilateral actions that endanger peace, security and stability in the region.”
Contrary to the wishes of the Philippine delegation, the statement does not mention the 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The statement displays boldness of conviction on other issues. It criticizes North Korea for its missile test launches and nuclear tests. It “deplores in the strongest terms the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine.”
And it calls for a cease-fire, increased access for humanitarian aid deliveries and a release of hostages in Gaza. But it gives the Chinese government a pass.
While attending the summit in Australia, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim summed up the attitude of some of the ASEAN member states. “China seems to be the leading investor into Malaysia,” he said. “We do not have a problem with China.”
But Malaysia does have a problem with China. Beijing claims territory within Malaysia’s EEZ, Chinese fishing boats trespass there and patrols by Chinese ships and aircraft frequently annoy the Malaysian government.
This is a structural problem. ASEAN members agree to operate by consensus, meaning in practice every ASEAN member has veto power over every ASEAN action and statement.
Observers have criticized ASEAN for its weakness in addressing not only the South China Sea territorial disputes but also the Myanmar civil war, the Rohingya crisis and the problem of transnational air pollution caused by brush fires. Elites in Southeast Asia are themselves critical of ASEAN; most see it as ineffective, slow and unable to act unitedly.
The relationships that individual ASEAN members have with China vary greatly. At one end of the spectrum is Cambodia, which is nearly a Chinese colony.
At the other end is the Philippines, which in April 2023 opened four new sites for US rotational military access under the two sides’ Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). The Chinese government responded by saying the Philippines is “being used by the US” in “an act that escalates tensions in the region and endangers regional peace and stability.”
This diversity of orientation toward China makes ASEAN almost incapable of taking a firm position in opposition to China on any strategic issue, even though Southeast Asians are sensitive and averse to Chinese domination.
Cambodia regularly blocks proposed ASEAN actions related to the South China Sea that displease Beijing. A senior retired Singaporean official publicly suggested that because Cambodia and Laos are satellites of China, ASEAN might need to expel them to save itself.
Both Beijing and Washington, for what it’s worth, voice support for “ASEAN centrality.” ASEAN is clearly useful to China as an obstacle to organized resistance against Beijing’s agenda. ASEAN’s usefulness to the US is less apparent.
Given the economic importance of China to Anwar’s Malaysia and to various other Southeast Asian governments, it is understandable that they generally wish to avoid antagonizing China.
In this case, however, they risk following that strategy so assiduously that they fumble the larger objective of preventing great power conflict from flaring up within their subregion in the South China Sea.
Denny Roy is a senior fellow at the East-West Center, Honolulu.