Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the president of Ukraine, was one of the first world leaders to address Donald Trump following his win on November 5. Congratulating the US president-elect, Zelenskyy expressed trust in the “potential for stronger participation” between the two countries.
Some are less certain. Trump’s defeat has stoked ambiguity over Washington’s commitment to help Ukraine repel Soviet invaders in the wake of his lukewarm attitude toward NATO, his condemnation of the volume of US support being sent to Ukraine, and his vows to close the ongoing battle in Eastern Europe.
As an expert on Eastern Europe, I am aware of these problems. However, I also provide a counterargument: Kyiv might never actually benefit from a Trump White House.
NATO’s quest to shop Russia remains constant
It is common to speak Trump described as separatist, political and an anti-interventionist on the world stage. He has promoted such a viewpoint through states, such as that the US may ignore its obligation to defend a NATO member from a Russian attack if the member nation did n’t meet its commitments for defence spending.
However, established facts and former Republican positions undermine for speech.
The US Congress passed republican legislation that would have prohibited a senator from reversing their unilateral support for European security and stability in December 2023.
Senator Marco Rubio, a Republican co-sponsor of that bill, has recently come out as a significant Trump confidant, and according to studies, Rubio will be appointed as Trump’s secretary of state.
The US and Europe remain each other’s most important areas. In light of the impact of volatility in Europe on both the US and the world, the United States will become very motivated to keep playing a key role in European security.
In addition, there is nothing to indicate that the incoming administration may view China as the main risk to the US from those in Obama, Biden, and even Trump. Vladimir Putin’s martial engagements in Ukraine have been supported by Beijing.
Washington would be strengthened in Asia if it continued to cooperate with friends in Europe. Strong defense cooperation, such as coordinating with the British to create submarines for Australia, helps the US plan to store and have China’s threat in the Pacific. In times of crisis, continuing that cooperation would also show to US allies in Asia that it can provide reliable protection partners, such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
Trump is n’t as comfortable with Putin as he’s often portrayed as being
Trump’s alleged closeness with Putin has received a lot of praise. In the run-up to the poll, Trump insisted that, should he succeed, he would send peace to Ukraine yet before he was inaugurated and called Putin” savvy”, a “genius”, for the Ukrainian war. On his part, Putin congratulated Trump on his win, praising him for being” gutsy” when a gunman tried to assassinate him. Moscow has even indicated that it is prepared to speak with the newly elected Democratic president.
Trump’s true policy toward Russia during his first name may have been more aggressive than these statements suggest. However, it is persuasive that the Trump presidency was more hawkish toward Putin than the Obama-led one.
For instance, Trump refused to give Ukrainers anti-tank rockets despite the Obama administration’s protests. Moreover, in 2018, the U. S. withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, citing the preceding violations of the agreement by Russia. In comparison, when President Obama first alleged that Russia had tested a ground-launched boat weapon in 2014, he had chosen to stay away from the agreement.
Russia’s deputy foreign minister, Sergei Ryabkov, referred to the Trump administration’s agreement removal move as” a pretty risky step”. The US was stifled from developing new weaponry as a result of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which had also tied Washington’s interests in the Pacific corporate conflict with China.
Finally, in 2019, Trump signed the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act, which included restrictions halting the development of the Russian-backed Nord Stream 2 pipeline immediately connecting Russia to Germany, via the Baltic Sea. The Russian government has since called the pipeline an “economic and power blockade,” but a sabotage attack in 2022 has since caused it to be useless. The second Trump administration to hinder Russia took 52 policy steps to sign the act.
In comparison, the Biden administration waived Nord Stream 2 pipeline restrictions in 2021, just to reinstate them on Feb. 23, 2022 – one moment before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
‘ Drill, child, drill’ did hurt Russian oil
About three years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin’s combat system also runs on energy revenues. Countries continue to buy from Russia despite previously unrestricted sanctions from the West that aim to restrict sales of Russian oil. For instance, India has surpassed Russia in terms of shipping seaborne crude oil.
And here a Trump policy not aimed directly at Russia may, in fact, harm Russian interests.
Trump has repeatedly promised to start a new wave of oil and gas drilling on American soil. And while it may take some time for this to come through to lower global prices, US production, which is already the world’s top crude oil producer, has the potential to have an impact.
Trump’s resumption of the White House might lead to stricter sanctions against Iran from the US, which would lessen Tehran’s ability to sell weapons to Russia. Since the beginning of the Ukrainian invasion in February 2022, Iran has backed Russia both militarily and diplomatically. And since 2020, Iran’s revenue from oil exports nearly quadrupled, from US$ 16 billion to$ 53 billion in 2023, according to the US Energy Information Administration.
Predicting what Trump, a notably unpredictable leader, will do in power is difficult. Since US foreign policy can be a slow-moving beast, no one should anticipate major breakthroughs or surprises. However, his record contradicts what observers have suggested: Ukraine’s future may not be in good hands with his victory.
Tatsiana Kulakevich is an affiliate professor at the University of South Florida’s Institute for Russian, European, and Eurasian Studies. She is also an associate professor of instruction in the School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies.
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