In the face of numerous challenges in the US and the allied security manufacturing base for quite munitions, National defense contractor Anduril Industries plans to replenish thoroughly depleted US weapon stockpiles with its fresh low-cost Barracuda cruise missile.
This month, Anduril unveiled the Barracuda family of Autonomous Air Vehicles ( AAVs ), including the Barracuda-100, Barracuda-250 and Barracuda-500 – all of which are designed for affordable, hyper-scale production.
Anduril mentions that these air-breathing, software-defined inconsequential AAVs offer increasing size, variety and cargo capacity and are compatible with different loads and work mechanisms.
The company says the Barracuda-M configuration provides a cost-effective, adaptable cruise missile capability, addressing the US and its allies ‘ pressing need for more producible and upgradeable precision-guided munitions ( PGM ).
The Barracuda home of AAVs functions advanced automatic behaviors, given and air-breathing engines, enabling higher speeds, agility and extended ranges. Anduril says the Barracuda is designed for fast, low-cost council and requires fewer equipment and parts, making it 30 % cheaper than competition.
It makes use of components from the supply chain to support supply chain resilience, and notes that its compact design makes quick adjustments to changing threats and new technologies. Additionally, the Barracuda home supports a variety of vision sets and can be used on a variety of platforms, including surface-to-aircraft and fifth-generation fighters.
With Barracuda, Anduril says it aims to restore the US army with these intelligent, adaptable and mass-producible weapons, combining modern technology with cutting-edge equipment to improve air dominance and strike capabilities.
At a time when the US defense industry base struggles to meet demand, Anduril’s Barracuda AAVs could provide flexible, affordable, and versatile PGMs to address some of America’s production and supply chain issues.
Seth Jones notes that the US faces a number of significant challenges in producing PGMs in a report from January 2023 for the Center for Strategic and International Studies ( CSIS ).
Jones says lead times are a significant bottleneck, with certain missiles, such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile ( JASSM) and Tomahawk Block V, taking up to two years to produce.
He mentions that due to workforce and supply chain constraints, the US defense industry base struggles to maintain surge capacity.
Jones points out that despite businesses needing stable contracts and more consistent demand signals to invest in production, inconsistent orders from the US Department of Defense ( DOD ) only make the issue worse.
He adds that the US defense industry is further hampered by single-source dependencies for crucial components like rocket motors and missile energy. He mentions that the global supply chain, particularly reliance on China for rare-earth metals, also poses vulnerabilities.
Jones says that regulatory hurdles, such as outdated Foreign Military Sales ( FMS ) and International Traffic in Arms Regulations ( ITAR ), retard arms sales to critical allies, impacting the defense industry’s ability to ramp up production efficiently.
Further, in a February 2023 CSIS report, Jones says that the DOD’s munitions stockpiles would likely be insufficient in a major regional conflict, including a war with China over Taiwan.
According to Jones, simulations revealed that the US would run out of crucial long-range PGMs in a few weeks, which poses a significant challenge in continuing a protracted conflict with China.
He makes the point that China has outpaced the US by five to six times in terms of buying expensive weapons, making this shortfall even more so.
Jones points out that the defense industry base has long faced problems, including inconsistent demand signals and supply chain vulnerabilities, which prevent it from being able to replenish stockpiles quickly.
He claims that with China’s expanding military might and the rising threat of conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the need to deal with these issues has grown. The author makes it clear that deterrence depends on a strong industrial base that is capable of producing enough munitions and weapons systems.
In a report for the Center for a New American Security ( CNAS ) in June 2023, Stacie Pettyjohn and Hannah Dennis claim that the main problem with the US defense industrial base is a combination of a lack of manufacturing capacity and fragile supply chains.
These issues, according to Pettyjohn and Dennis, are made worse by the industry’s reliance on complex and frequently unstable supply chains for crucial components, such as rocket motors and microelectronics. They add that the US defense sector, which cut production during the post-Cold War era, is now battling to increase production quickly.
To address these problems, they mention that the DOD has identified the need for stability and capacity expansion, which they argue can be achieved through multi-year procurement ( MYP ) and large-lot procurement ( LLP ) programs.
Pettyjohn and Dennis claim that these initiatives are intended to boost production capacity, provide consistent demand signals to the US defense sector, and increase the ability to increase output when necessary.
In addition to boosting US domestic production inefficiencies, Anduril’s Barracuda will need to leverage the capabilities of key allies like Japan and South Korea.
Wilson Beaver and Jim Fein suggest that the US should look into the possibility of working with partner countries to increase America’s munitions production capacity in a report from February 2024 for The Heritage Foundation, a conservative US think tank.
In some allied nations, including South Korea and Japan, Beaver and Fein mention that there is significant manufacturing capacity and robust defense industries. They recommend that the US make the most of this capability and look into ways that allies ‘ foreign companies can increase the production of US-made defense equipment like munitions.
They point out that the supply of munitions is so inadequate that the production of munitions by partners and allies, including Germany, the UK, Japan and South Korea, would not negatively affect US manufacturing.
However, a US Congressional Research Service ( CRS ) report from June 2021 mentions the difficulties of coordinating the industrial bases of different countries to meet US military standards, which frequently causes synchronization of production and increases the risk of operational delays.
The CRS report makes it clear that the complexity of working with foreign supply chains can increase potential delays. It mentions that US PGMs frequently contain ingredients from foreign countries, which pose risks to supply chain integrity and allow for quick replenishment of stockpiles.
In a March 2023 War on the Rocks article, Vasabjit Banerjee and Benjamin Tkach discuss significant challenges that the US’s co-production of weapons with allies poses, which they claim are primarily caused by supply chain bottlenecks and export regulations.
Banerjee and Tkach point out that international collaboration is hampered by export laws meant to safeguard US intellectual property and maintain technological advantages. According to them, these regulations frequently lead to bureaucratic strains that can stymie co-production licensing agreements.