China has spent the majority of the past two decades spluttering up friends both domestically and abroad. At the end of March, two rounds of ministerial meetings with local foes Japan and South Korea took place in Tokyo and Seoul.
And earlier in April, the red carpet was draped around the Spanish president, Pedro Sanchez, for his next trip to Beijing in less than seven times. This occurred just before the Taiwanese president, Xi Jinping, made his first overseas vacation of the year in 2025, conducting a charm offensive against Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia.
Donald Trump, who has returned to the White House has undoubtedly skewed the restrictions between friend and foe, is at the heart of these political maneuvers.
China, Japan, and South Korea have all previously used caution when interacting with one another. This is the result of royal anger, conflicted territorial issues, and conflicting safety positions with the US.
However, the volatility of the Trump administration, which has most recently been demonstrated by the implementation of severe business taxes, appears to be bringing the three nations closer up.
Their respective governments agreed to increase the Secretary-General and DSL Secretaries ‘ terms of office from two to three at the ministerial meeting in Tokyo in March. In an effort to encourage cooperation between the three countries, this also largely unknown foreign organization was established in 2011.
The decision represents a growing increasing mutual confidence between these countries, despite what appears to be a minor administrative adjustment. Wang Yi, the country’s foreign minister, has made it clear that the extension represents a complete support for the organization’s function. China has then requested that Japan respond to US taxes in a planned manner.
China sought to strengthen corporate ties and argue its leadership as a result of this renewed interest in local assistance.
China put together a sophisticated political plan for Xi’s visit to Vietnam. It sought to reaffirm” comrades and brothers” ‘ ideological ties and counteract Hanoi’s new deepening relationships with Washington.
To Lam, the general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, stated after speaking with Xi that his nation has always viewed developing relations with China as” a proper decision and top goal.”
Malaysia, on the other hand, is one of the first countries to support Xi’s name Belt and Road Initiative. It became a “partner state” in the BRICS team of emerging markets in 2025 and is now the chairman of the ASEAN team of South Asian states. In order to coordinate China’s relationships with the alliance, Malaysia now has a key role.
Anwar Ibrahim, the Malay prime minister, made the connection between the two nations apparent during Xi’s visit. In response to US risks, he claimed that Malaysia” stands with China.” One of China’s major trading lovers is Malaysia.
Cambodia is even regarded as one of Beijing’s most steadfast allies in Southeast Asia. In honor of China’s contribution to Cambodia’s advancement, it perhaps gave the name” Xi Jinping Avenue” as a name for a road in the funds, Phnom Penh, in May 2024.
For Xi’s most recent attend, the government made all the stops. Norodom Sihamoni, the king of Cambodia, individually welcomed Xi at the airport in a never-before-seen split from protocol. Additionally, the two nations increased their ties to an “all-weather” agreement, which suggests that their relationship is adaptable to physical changes.
Relations with Europe
Sanchez’s April attend to Beijing, on the other hand, marked a crucial turning point for bilateral relations between China and the EU. Following the US tariff increase, Xi demanded that the EU and China” simultaneously resist unilateral bullying.” This seems to have had a positive impact in Madrid.
The Spanish committee emphasized that Washington’s tariff increases were “neither good nor only” and had hurt the EU economy. Additionally, it stated that Europe may” strengthen unity and cooperation to protect its own pursuits.”
Some leaders have expressed an interest in stabilizing relations with Beijing, and this message appears to be reaching out to wider European lines. For instance, Union von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, has had” creative” conversations with Taiwanese Premier Li Qiang to discuss potential business problems brought on by US taxes.
However, the EU is faced with an apparent choice: whether to engage China as a substitute financial partner or rebel against a possible rise in redirected Foreign exports that would threaten European industries and worsen already-existing political tensions.
Spain, for its part, makes its own proper decisions. Madrid’s desire to become the world’s leader in alternative energy is highlighted by Sanchez’s return to China, where Foreign investment is anticipated to be key.
This helps clarify why Sanchez remarked that” Europe needs to evaluate this choice when asked about the EU’s tax legislation on China during a media briefing in September 2024. Spain finally decided to withdraw from the EU’s decision to impose levies on China’s electric vehicle industry.
China’s message to the world is obvious. It supports free trade and has a steady partner. In the face of growing political uncertainty, whether China can inspire the world to trust its leadership is a question that remains open.
Ming Gao is a study professor at Lund University studying East Asia.
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