Over the past five decades, the political landscape has changed significantly. The US’s hasty departure from Afghanistan in 2021, followed by its deepening involvement in the Ukraine conflict, then understood as a grinding proxy fight between NATO and Russia, exposed the boundaries of US influence.  ,
Washington has struggled to stop the Houthis, Iran, and Syria crises in the Middle East while continuing to support Israel’s murder in Gaza. In East Asia, its pledges are becoming more strained by a more confrontational North Korea and a rising China. At home, prices, borders insecurities, and social fragmentation all contribute to the growing awareness that American supremacy is waning both domestically and globally.
No nation is most likely to be impacted by Japan’s equivalent drop. Japan has remained attached to Washington ever since the end of World War II, whether it be physically, socially, or physiologically. Its politics are greatly influenced by British interests, and its protection is largely outsourced. Its media group repeatedly repeats Washington’s utterances.
Washington stumbles, as has the post establishment in Japan, also, obviously incapable of imagining a world in which Washington is no longer the dominant force.
However, that post-Washington world is quickly developing and has already been established in many ways. Japan must begin a process of corporate decoupling from America if it wants to get ready for the fast developing multilateral world. This does not imply a quick and slack compensation of ties; rather, it means making a conscious and deliberate effort to establish autonomy in crucial areas of diplomacy, defense, and economics.
Second, Japan ought to think about engaging in discussions with those who are generally thought to be opposed to the so-called Washington-led progressive international order. These discussions would serve as logical steps in the direction of resolving a long-standing provincial issue as well as a declaration of Japan’s intention to expand its diplomatic options.
For instance, Japanese officials may silently communicate with North Korea. The resolution of the abductee problem, a humanitarian issue that has remained unsettled for decades, would be a key goal.
For far too much, pro-Washington groups within Japan’s traditional formation have relied on the US to guide the abduction conversations. The problem has frequently been enshrined in wider strategic objectives, such as reducing the North’s ballistic missile features or denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.  ,
But, North Korea has little interest to engage under the current circumstances. The issue is stalemated because North Korea is aware that Washington’s goal is disarmament, so it is important to return the abducted people.
Tokyo and Pyongyang will not meet unilaterally thanks to strong interests in Japan, effectively devaluing the abductee problem by putting it in subjection to Washington’s political prerogative. This treachery by the” traditional” political class in Japan only serves as proof that Japan will not follow an independent path through East Asia.
A strong, Japan-led effort could rekindle the conversation, not just about the abductee case but also about the topic of suppressing diplomatic relations in general, reminiscent of former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi’s approach. North Korea may react to such requests more warmly if Japan made an immediate contact with North Korea without acting as Washington’s styrofoam or message-bringer.
Second, in spite of the current geopolitical tensions, Japan if re-engage with Russia. A calm, logical politics with Moscow might be able to accomplish many goals, including acquiring energy resources, halting economic sanctions, and, most importantly, reopening the dialogue on the status of the Northern Territories.  ,
Recognizing some political challenges, such as Russia’s handle of Crimea and various regions in Ukraine, may seem improbable in terms of achieving a consensus in territorial issues, but they could be used as bargaining chips in discussions that prioritize Japan’s regional interest. Tokyo should never evade sanctions, but more carefully consider whether a gradual shift in Washington’s position was yield strategic advantages.
Third, Japan needs to reevaluate its long-term use of US military installations. A more intelligent security position may be a part of a broader protection plan, even though the alliance with the US remains fundamental to Japan’s security framework in the minds of defense planners in Tokyo.
The pro-Washington formation in Japan needs to learn the word “double containment.” Under the excuse of burden-sharing, Japan may begin by strengthening its administrative control and operational oversight of some bases.
A gradual and clear renegotiation of the foundational structure may lay the foundation for greater autonomy in defense affairs, without causing an unnecessary conflict.
Tokyo may even start a national dialogue on revisiting the Three Non-Nuclear Concepts in parallel. However, it is important to keep in mind that nuclear sharing is certainly a viable long-term purpose. As a pillar of Chinese autonomy, Japan may work toward nuclear weapons.
Third, reevaluating Japan’s financial relationship with the US, especially its position as one of the largest US Treasury Bondholder, is likewise necessary. A steady growth of Japan’s supply assets and a reduction in US debt exposure may provide a long-term hedge against future volatility, even though an abrupt sell-off may be difficult and self-damaging.
Japan is in very risky territory, and the bond markets are in turmoil. Given that Washington appears to have an insatiable appetite for more debt, this is even more concerning. Because of this, Tokyo is now facing a difficult task of reconfiguring the situation for creditor countries like Japan.
Fifth, any adjustment of strategic posture must be accompanied by a national evaluation. To expose the extent to which Japanese politicians, the Japanese media, and other people and institutions worked with Washington during the postwar era, Japan must establish a truth and reconciliation commission.
Washington is Japan’s protector, not its ally. Tokyo has remained a slavish camp follower of Washington’s murderous foreign adventures long after decolonization movements swept Asia, Africa, and Latin America. As a first step toward restoring Japan’s colonial dominance, the Japanese people deserve to know who sold their nation to Washington.
Japan’s strategic separation from Washington won’t just be a military, fiscal, or political exercise. It must also be a time for reflection, an opportunity to reshape Japanese society by telling the truth about the past and allowing the Japanese people to accept the gravity of the crimes their leaders have committed against them.
Jason M. Morgan is the co-author of The Comfort Women Hoax: A Fake Memoir, North Korean Spies, Hit Squads in the Academic Swamp, and is also a research fellow at the Moralogy Foundation in Kashiwa, as well as an associate professor at Reitaku University in Kashiwa, Japan, as well as an editorial writer for the Sankei Shimbun newspaper in Tokyo.