China is a king at twisting the tale.
Dai Bing, the Chinese ambassador to South Korea, claimed on his X accounts that South Korea should be appreciative of the 90-day extension of US levies on Korean exports on April 11. He stated:
The “mutual taxes” have been delayed by 90 days. Is that beneficial? Remember that this 90-day grace period would never have existed if it weren’t for China’s solid deterrence and significant counterattack! Remember that this is only a 90-day joy period.
이른바 ‘ 상호 관세’가 90일간 유예됐다고 합니다. 좋은 것이라고 할 수 있을까요? !
잊지 마십시오. 중국의 단호한 반격과 강력한 저지가 없었다면 이 90일 유예기간은 아예 존재하지도 않았을 것입니다!
그리고 잊지 마십시오. 이것은 단지 90일의 유예일 뿐입니다! https ://t.co/FDWu68vfpP— Dai Bing 戴兵 다이빙 ( @AmbDaiBing ) April 11, 2025My response wasn’t fury, even though many South Koreans expressed outrage. It was incredible. They’ve turned tale manipulation into an art form, I thought.
a command pump
However, it’s not all about talent. The US left the door open, in part, to China, who has been able to steal the tale.
The first blanket imposition of tariffs on nations all over the world, including the uninhabited, penguin-inhabited islands close to Australia, has undermined the US’s credibility, both economically and socially.
Washington has allowed Beijing to stand out as the only child in the room by acting without proper quality. China now asserts that it is absorbing the impact of US tariffs and that its retribution is the catalyst for the temporary restraint it has been receiving from companions like South Korea.
And then, countries like South Korea are trapped in a complicated middle earth. Because Washington’s steps have been difficult to defend, China’s tale has some validity.
Beijing can give a twisted kind of clarity as a result of this kind of corporate ambiguity. Beijing’s information instantly seems more reasonable even when allies are uncertain whether Washington is a friend or a rival. Understanding eventually gains strength.
Eisenhower’s teaching
Examine the approach of today to that of former US president Dwight D. Eisenhower during the Cold War. Eisenhower understood the risks of provoking autocratic adversaries to join their economic crisis and, possibly, into their hands. In his 1984 publication The Pacific Alliance, professor William S. Borden wrote about it.
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles remarked to his listeners at a crucial cabinet meeting on August 6, 1954, that Japan had chosen the defense development route” to getting control of their own businesses and their own components.” He claimed that if the US offered tariff reductions,” Japan had very quickly move bankrupt” if it were to remain on our side. He urged all organizations to back these agreements.
Eisenhower reaffirmed his position, saying that” this kind of business should not only be allowed but encouraged, especially as Japan is concerned with the surrounding Red locations in Asia.” He reaffirmed that” We can’t force them back past the point of no return.” If we do, they likely declare,” To Hell with you, we’ll come Communist.” That is the focus of this. We had either hang Japan for the free earth or engage in a war to keep it there. This issue is global. We must work on a large top. We must do a lot of knowledge.
Eisenhower reaffirmed his country’s domestic economic worries, saying,” Don’t let us allow Japan get to the point where they want to ask the Kremlin into their nation.” In the presence of such a danger, whatever else fades into meaningless.
The Eisenhower management understood that making financial sacrifices in the short run was a necessary step toward long-term American ideology and stability.
In contrast, the recent tariff strategy places a premium on short-term political magnification over strategic coherence. Worse, it runs the risk of undermining the very partnership that is required to combat China’s growing anger.
Supporters and adversaries may begin making plans for a world where American administration is conditional, momentary, and transactional if the US appears to be unreliable in its commitments.
The trust divide
What the alliances are currently learning is a risky lesson: that Washington might cure them similarly to its rivals without much notice or diversity.
The most important lessons for US partners from this price war is not about industry; rather, it’s about confidence.
America has demonstrate that its management is trustworthy if it wants to be successful. China is filling the void where the quality in the US may be. More companions are likely to look abroad for security unless Washington shifts its international monetary policy to long-term alliance-building, as Eisenhower once did.
The price of solitude
The universe is strongly monitoring. Friends are figuring out dangers. America’s greatest threat is not China’s advertising; it’s the solitude created when allies believe they have no one to depend on. China pushes its edition of the truth, too.
Washington requires more than just solid policy if it wants to maintain its position in the world order. It requires consistency, faith, and the courage to handle its friends like friends, not just when it’s simple but when it’s difficult.
Hanjin Lew, a political commentator with a focus on South Asian issues, is a previous foreign official for conservative South Asian events.