Indonesia is betting on Turkey’s Kaan fighter jet to modernize its aging air force—but can Jakarta’s ambition overcome its budget reality?
Breaking Defense reported this month that Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto is interested in joining Turkey’s Kaan fighter jet development program. The expression of interest came during a high-level meeting in Ankara with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
The Kaan program, spearheaded by Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI), focuses on creating a fifth-generation combat aircraft to address Turkey’s punitive removal from the US F-35 fighter program after it acquired Russia’s S-400 missile defense systems, which Washington considers sensitive.
At their joint press conference, Subianto emphasized Indonesia’s desire to partner with Turkey’s defense industry on the Kaan project as well as submarine development. The Kaan aircraft made its first flight in February 2024, successfully attaining an altitude of 8,000 feet and reaching speeds of 230 knots.
The program aims to deliver its first production model to the Turkish Air Force by 2028-2029, with future models having sixth-generation capabilities, such as manned-unmanned teaming with Turkish UAVs.
The potential collaboration aligns with Erdogan’s broader strategy to nationalize Turkey’s defense sector. Indonesia’s interest underscores its drive for military modernization and reflects the growing geopolitical significance of defense cooperation between the Indo-Pacific and Middle East regions. TAI declined to comment on the development.
Indonesia has faced significant struggles in modernizing its air force. In a March 2021 commentary for the Singapore-based S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Olli Suorsa mentions that Indonesia’s primary combat aircraft, the F-16, Hawk and Su-27/30 come in six variants from three manufacturers.
Suorsa says this force composition makes maintenance, repair and overhaul difficult and costly, with interoperability among various types practically non-existent. He also points out that Indonesia’s air force modernization has struggled with funding, lack of government commitment and an inefficient, highly personalized acquisition policy.
Indonesia’s attempts to modernize its air force have had mixed results. For instance, in December 2022, it dropped its plans to acquire Russian Su-35s due to US pressure and the threat of sanctions.
Also, the country has been struggling to pay its share in South Korea’s KF-21 Boramae next-generation fighter project. As of March 2025, Indonesia had only paid 25% of its pledged contribution, which is 20% of the project’s US$5.5 billion budget until 2026.
This situation led the South Korean government to take up 74.5% of Indonesia’s outstanding balance of $322.2 million, with Korean Aerospace Industries (KAI) shouldering the remaining 25.5%.
These capability gaps led Indonesia to consider stopgap solutions, such as buying used Qatari Mirage 2000 jets, which did not push through due to technical, practical and corruption concerns.
While Indonesia placed an order for 42 French Rafale jets in February 2022, with the first jets expected to arrive in 2026, the fighter’s lack of stealth and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) capability makes it vulnerable to an adversary with an advanced integrated air defense system (IADS), according to a January 2025 report by the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI).
The IFRI report mentions that French pilots flying Rafales found winning against F-35s in joint exercises challenging due to the former’s sensor limitations. It adds that while the Rafale is still relevant in the short and medium term, its capabilities are becoming increasingly inadequate for high-intensity combat operations within a coalition setting.
While Indonesia’s partnership with Turkey allows the former to future-proof its air force to some degree, the Kaan’s dependency on foreign assistance may cast doubts on its exportability.
In a May 2024 War on the Rocks article, Rebecca Lucas and Stuart Lee mention that building a fifth-generation fighter is difficult, as the US is the only other NATO member with indigenous fifth-generation aircraft programs, such as the F-22 and F-35.
Lucas and Lee say countries with independent fourth-generation fighter programs, such as France with its Rafale and Sweden with its Gripen, disguise their reliance on external suppliers for key systems.
They point out that for Kaan, Turkey used technical advice from UK defense firm BAE Systems and US-supplied General Electric F110 engines while an indigenous replacement is underway. According to them, that situation raises questions about whether Turkey can turn the Kaan from a one-off test aircraft into a repeatable, exportable and sustainable program in service.
They add that export restrictions from critical Kaan technical data suppliers and subsystems may limit Turkey’s future choices.
In an October 2020 article, Luerdi and Hizra Marisa explain the possible reasons why Indonesia views Turkey as an ideal high-end military modernization partner.
They note Turkey can help Indonesia to narrow existing defense weaknesses, such as a limited domestic technology base, insufficient strategic military hardware and dependence on major powers’ supplies. Luerdi and Marisa highlight Turkey’s leading position in military technology and arms sales as key to such a partnership.
In line with that, a March 2025 report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) says that in 2024, Turkey was the 11th largest arms exporter globally, with most of its sales going to the UAE, Pakistan and Qatar.
Molly Campbell mentions in a September 2024 article for the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) that military drone exports served as Turkey’s gateway into the global arms industry. Campbell mentions that since 2018, Turkey has made 65% of all sales, overtaking China as the world’s largest military drone supplier.
Jens Bastian mentions in a February 2024 report for Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) that Turkey’s armament projects, such as the Bayraktar TB-2, Altay main battle tank (MBT), Anka-3 stealth drone and Kaan fighter show its aim to become independent of international providers, systematically promote technological innovation with start-ups and universities and increase its capacity to export various weapons systems.
However, Turkey must keep costs down given the saturated fighter jet market. Can Kasapoglu mentions in a June 2024 Atlantic Council article that the Kaan faces competition from the US F-35, South Korea’s KF-21, France’s Rafale and Sweden’s Gripen.
Kasapoglu says that Turkey’s best sales pitch for the Kaan would be to position it as an alternative NATO-grade fighter for countries that cannot purchase the F-35.
Further, Monty Pounder mentions in a Channel News Asia (CNA) article this month that despite Subianto’s ambitious military wish list, Indonesia’s defense spending has hovered around only 1% of GDP for decades.
Pounder says the Indonesian state collects relatively little revenue and has one of the lowest revenue-to-GDP ratios in the Asia-Pacific region.
He also says that the impact of Indonesia’s planned acquisitions must be assessed against its military’s low baseline capabilities. Pounder says the Indonesian Air Force’s F-16s will approach 40 years of service as the Rafale jets arrive in 2026.
If such trends continue, even if Indonesia manages to acquire Turkey’s Kaan, it might not significantly affect its overall military capability.